



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-333D/cd
Ser 0007P33
25 MAR 1968

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From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Judge Advocate General

Subj: Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
on 8 June 1967 (U)

Encl: (1) RADM I. C. KIDD, USN ltr of 18 June 1967 with Endorsements
one through six, forwarding subject record of proceedings

1. The remarks and conclusions of the first endorsement as modified by the second endorsement have been noted. Those relating to command and control and to communication actions and procedures are considered to be within the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since LIBERTY was carrying out a JCS-directed mission. As noted in enclosure (1) to the third endorsement, these aspects of the LIBERTY incident have been examined by a JCS-appointed fact-finding team. As a related matter, the Chief of Naval Operations has directed that a comprehensive study be undertaken to inquire into all aspects of the operations of all ships of the same general category as U.S.S. LIBERTY for the purpose of improving command and control procedures. This study is currently going on.

2. With reference to the remaining recommendations of the second endorsement:

a. Recommendation 4.b: the shortage of radiomen second class and above is a well-recognized problem of long standing. The Chief of Naval Personnel has advised that at the end of FY 1968 the projected strength of RM2 and above will be approximately 85% of stated requirements. Every effort is being made to fill the shortage. In regard to training and upgrading of RM2 and above, the Communications Systems Technical Control School provides graduates of the Radioman Class B School with twelve weeks of instruction in the communications systems used in the technical control centers of the Naval and Defense Communications Systems, leading to designation as Communications System Technical Operator (RM-2318) or Communications System Technical Supervisor (RM-2319). This school has been four classes per year, 30 RM2 and above. It is planned to double the output of the school.

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
32/731 of 21 Jun 76 by authority of OPNAV Memo SEC 009/D
on 29 Jun 76 David R. Spaulding
JAG Security Manager

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b. Recommendation 4.c: the Commander, Naval Communications Command has stated in paragraph 4 of the sixth endorsement that he, together with the Director, Defense Communications Agency and other interested commands and agencies, is taking action in respect to operational communications deficiencies.

c. Recommendation 4.d: appropriate notification of Defense Attache officers is being implemented on a case-by-case basis.

d. Recommendation 4.e: the Chief of Naval Operations agrees that damage control procedures used by LIBERTY personnel should be documented for Navy-wide information and use. By copy of this endorsement, the Commander Navy Ships Systems Command is requested to take appropriate action. He is also requested to study and make recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to (1) improved visual identification measures as proposed in paragraph 14 of the first endorsement and (2) the provision of emergency reserve signalling devices referred to in paragraph 3.d of the second endorsement.

3. Retain the report for historical purposes.



J B COLWELL
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Fleet Operations and Readiness)

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5 JAN 1968

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SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on ltr of Rear Admiral Isaac C. KIDD, USN, 111645/1100 of 18 June 1967

From: Commander, Naval Communications Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967

Réf: (b) SECNAV Memo to SECDEF ser 006874 of 4 December 1967 NOTAL

1. Forwarded.
2. Concur in those findings of fact pertaining to communications less finding number 40. Subsequent investigation has indicated that FBIS messages did not contribute to message delays.
3. Reference is made to the Judge Advocate General third endorsement to the basic correspondence.

a. Do not concur in the estimated cost to effect repairs as indicated in paragraph 4. Reference (b) sets the cost of restoring LIBERTY, including its previous electronic configuration, at \$9.6 million.

b. Concur in that portion entitled, "Messages of 7 and 8 June Ordering Changes of LIBERTY Operations."

4. Commander, Naval Communications Command, together with Director, Defense Communications Agency, and other interested commands and agencies is taking action to improve doctrine, procedures, installations and equipment in order to reduce delays and permit rapid flow of important messages during crisis situations.

Robert H. Weeks
ROBERT H. WEEKS

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AGTR-5
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FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on Subject Record

From: Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Commander, Naval Communications Command

Subj: Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry to inquire into
the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY
(AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967

1. Forwarded.
2. Examination of the subject record of proceedings does not reveal any evidence of material design deficiencies that contributed adversely to the events leading up to the attack or during the control of damage that followed.
3. The cost to restore USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) to the configuration that existed prior to the attack is shown in Appendix E to the Third Endorsement.

F. C. Jones

F. C. Jones
Vice Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command

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CORRESPONDENCE)

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on subject record

From: Chief of Naval Personnel
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command
(2) Commander, Naval Communications Command

Subj: Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY
(AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967

1. Forwarded.
2. The subject record of proceedings disclosed that the USS LIBERTY, while engaged in peaceful operations in international waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, was subjected to an entirely unprovoked and unexpected armed attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats. The attack resulted in 34 deaths and 171 injuries to personnel on board LIBERTY, and an estimated cost in excess of five million dollars to effect repairs of damage to the ship and equipment.
3. The Judge Advocate General commented that "the Israeli Government has admitted that this was a tragic accident and has agreed to make amends." Also the Judge Advocate General opined that the 34 deaths were not due to the intent, fault or negligence of anyone in the U.S. Naval Service, and that all injuries of personnel embarked in LIBERTY which resulted from the armed attack were sustained in-line-of-duty and not due to misconduct.
4. No one was designated a party to this inquiry. No disciplinary action was recommended, and none is contemplated by the Chief of Naval Personnel.

GEO. E. FORD
GEO. E. FORD
By direction

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enclosure & basic correspondence) Ser: 00010

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on subject record

3 NOV 1967

From: Judge Advocate General
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Personnel
(2) Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command
(3) Commander, Naval Communications Command

Subj: Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY
(AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967

Encl: (1) Summary of Events

1. Forwarded for information, for such action and comment as may be deemed appropriate, and for return.
2. The letter of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet of 6 September 1967 is considered the Second Endorsement.
3. Enclosure (1) has been prepared and attached to the record to aid in the review. The communications aspect of enclosure (1) has been prepared with the assistance of representatives of the Commander, Naval Communications Command. Not included with enclosure (1) but available for review, if desired, in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, are copies of the Certificates of Death (NAVMED N) for each deceased and those copies of the treatment records of injured personnel furnished by the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
4. The Court of Inquiry was charged with the task of investigating the armed attack of Israeli air and sea forces upon USS LIBERTY in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967 which resulted in 34 deaths and 171 injuries to personnel embarked in USS LIBERTY. Of the number injured, 63 did not involve a loss of time from duty and as of 21 September 1967 all but 10 of the total injured have been returned to a full duty status. The cost to effect repairs of damage to the ship and equipment is estimated at \$5,612,160.00.
5. The record discloses beyond any doubt that USS LIBERTY was, at the time of the attack, engaged in peaceful operations in international waters and that the attack of Israeli aircraft and motor

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
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torpedo boats was entirely unprovoked and unexpected. It has been determined that the Israeli Government has admitted that this was a tragic accident and has agreed to make amends. The State Department is currently preparing to claim compensation from the Israeli Government for damages resulting from the attack both on behalf of the U. S. Government and private individuals concerned.

6. The Judge Advocate General is of the opinion that the 34 deaths resulting from this incident were not due to the intent, fault or negligence of anyone in the U. S. Naval Service and that all injuries of personnel embarked in USS LIBERTY which resulted from the armed attack were sustained in-line-of-duty and not due to misconduct.
7. To expedite review of the record, a copy of the testimony of the medical officer which is unclassified has been extracted and forwarded by separate correspondence to the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for information and such action and comment as may be deemed appropriate direct to the Chief of Naval Operations, with a copy to the Judge Advocate General, to constitute the BuMed action on the record.
8. The proceedings in this Court of Inquiry have been conducted in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Manual of the Judge Advocate General and are therefore legal.



WILFRED HEARN

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS

On 10 June 1967 Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, ordered a Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967. The Court consisted of Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN, President, and the additional members Captain Bernard J. Lauff, USN, and Captain Bert M. Atkinson, Jr., USN. Captain Ward Boston, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Allen Feingersch, USN, were designated to serve as counsel and assistant counsel for the Court respectively.

The Court was directed to inquire into all the pertinent facts and circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack; damage resulting therefrom; and deaths of and injuries to naval personnel. The Court was directed to submit its findings of fact.

Pursuant to the direction of the convening authority, the Court conducted its proceedings in closed session. The Court met for the first time at 2314, 10 June 1967. Before the Court closed on 16 June 1967 in order to deliberate and prepare its findings of fact it had taken the testimony of 19 witnesses and received as exhibits 49 separate offers.

Enclosure (1) to JAG End. JAG:131.1DBB:as
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It has been determined that a separate ad hoc factfinding team with Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA, as head, was appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the circumstances relating to the command and control and communications actions and procedures associated with the events during the period 1-8 June 1967 which culminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY, 8 June 1967. The factfinding team was directed to ascertain the adequacy of the command and control and communications arrangements involved in the operational control of USS LIBERTY and accomplishment of her mission, to include:

- a. The manner in which command and control of LIBERTY was being exercised.
- b. The normal system for exercising command and control versus that which was in effect at the time of the incident, if different.
- c. The specific orders issued to LIBERTY between 1-8 June and the orders to which LIBERTY responded during the same period.
- d. Circumstances attending any conflicting directives, inordinate delays in the receipt of messages or other proper orders, or their non-receipt.

This team was directed to report its findings together with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

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findings and recommendations of this JCS factfinding team are not included in this summary.

It has also been determined that a preliminary inquiry into this incident has also been conducted within the Israeli Government. The findings of this inquiry were forwarded by the U. S. Defense Attache Office, Tel Aviv, Israel on 14 August 1967 to the Chief of Naval Operations. The findings of the Israeli preliminary inquiry are not included in this summary. It is to be noted, however, that the report does reflect that USS LIBERTY was identified by Israeli Defense Forces as a U. S. Navy vessel earlier on the day of the attack and that the lack of knowledge of this identification on the part of the immediate commanders of the attacking Israeli air and sea forces led to the tragic incident.

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Attached to this summary as Appendices A through E are the following documents to insure completeness of the record:

1. CINCUSNAVEUR msg dtg 231620Z of June 67 to USCINCEUR (C) (Appendix A)
2. EXASST to CNO memo, OP-002:tr, OP-00 memo 000365-67 of 7 Jul 67 w/4 encls; subj: USS LIBERTY Court of Inquiry; addenda to (TS) (Appendix B)

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3. List of deceased personnel from USS LIBERTY with copies of Certificate of Death NAVMED N (Rev 4-58) for each deceased (U) (Appendix C)
4. List of all injured personnel from USS LIBERTY with diagnosis and prognosis and copies of treatment record (U) (Appendix D)
5. Copy of ltr of Commander NavShipSys Com, AGTR-5 Ser. 527-1450 of 1 Sept 67 concerning estimated cost of repairs to USS LIBERTY (U) (Appendix E)

LIBERTY OPERATIONS 24 May 1967 - 8 June 1967

LIBERTY, under the command of Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, 494464/1100, departed ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, at 0530 Z, 24 May 1967 pursuant to orders from Commander, Service Squadron Eight (COMSERVRON EIGHT msg dtg 0240020 Z, May 1967) which directed LIBERTY to proceed to ROTA Spain at best possible speed of advance (SOA). OPCON was to be shifted from CINCLANTFLT to USCINCEUR upon LIBERTY passing the sea buoy inbound to ROTA on 31 May 1967; upon assuming OPCON, USCINCEUR was requested to make preparations for the extended deployment of LIBERTY in the Eastern Mediterranean in accordance with a schedule to be passed ASAP (JCS msg dtg 291602Z, May 1967).

LIBERTY's operating schedule was set forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z, June 1967, which in pertinent part ordered LIBERTY to

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(1) depart ROTA Spain on 2 June, (2) during the period 2-8 June, proceed enroute via Gibraltar Strait to a position 32-00N, 33-00E via the northern African coastal route with 13 nautical miles as the closest point of approach (CPA) to the UAR, and (3) during the period 9-30 June, conduct operations south of 32-00N and between 33-00E and 34-00E. While conducting these operations, the CPA to the UAR and Israel were to be 12.5 and 6.5 nautical miles respectively.

LIBERTY message dtg 010712Z of June 1967 advised its ETA in ROTA as 010845Z and that it would chop to CINCUSNAVEUR at 010901Z without report. In CINCUSNAVEUR message dtg 020717Z, June 1967, LIBERTY was directed when RFS 2 June, to depart ROTA and proceed in accordance with the JCS directed operating schedule. LIBERTY advised CINCUSNAVEUR that departure from ROTA would be at 021230Z and that she would proceed at best speed in accordance with the operating schedule (LIBERTY msg dtg 011305Z June 67). By message dtg 022108Z June 1967, to CINCUSNAVEUR, LIBERTY announced its departure from ROTA at 021230Z and that its ETA on station was 080300Z. LIBERTY sitreps on 3 and 4 June reported the following: (1) LIBERTY message dtg 032028Z reported an 032400Z

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position of 37-10N1 004-03E7, PIM (Point of intended movement) coastal easterly of 15 knots, (2) LIBERTY message dtg 042050Z June 1967 reported an 042400Z position of 37-22N4 011-15E8, PIM 12-16 until 050130Z thence 106/15. These two messages were received at the U. S. Communications Station, Morocco but there was no evidence that the Communications Station refiled these messages into common user channels for onward delivery. LIBERTY message dtg 051934Z June 1967 reported an 052400Z position of 35-20N 19-11E, PIM of 106/115, and that LIBERTY had assumed condition readiness three-modified. Condition readiness three-modified meant that LIBERTY had her normal steaming watch on deck, plus one man standing by the forward gun mounts. LIBERTY carried two pedestal mounted .50 cal. Browning Machine Guns on her fore-castle and identical mounts on either side of the deck-house aft of the bridge. Under "modified condition three", bridge lookouts would man the two after guns until the crew manned general quarters. By its message dtg 062036Z, LIBERTY stated it would be reporting to the OPCON of COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z, and further advised that its armament consisted of four .50 caliber machine guns. COMSIXTHFLT directed LIBERTY to conduct operations as previously directed but

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advised LIBERTY that in view of the then present Arab/Israeli situation and the unpredictability of the UAR actions, to maintain a high state of vigilance against attack or threat of attack and to advise if the local situation dictated a change in the area of operations (COMSIXTHFLT msg dtg 062349Z June 1967). In its message dtg 070908Z LIBERTY reported on 070800Z position of 33-06N 28-54E PIM 109/16.5 until 072300Z, thence stationary within 30 nautical miles of 31-45N 33-30E. The final sitrep of LIBERTY reported an 080800Z position of 31-45N 33-30E PIM within 30 nautical miles of the above position. (LIBERTY msg dtg 080800Z). This reported operating area was within the operating areas set forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z -- the latest guidance received by LIBERTY prior to the attack.

The following three messages which modified LIBERTY's area of operation were not received by the ship prior to the attack: (1) JCS message dtg 072230Z, (2) JCS message dtg 080110Z, and (3) COM SIXTHFLT message dtg 080917Z. The facts relating to the non-delivery of these three messages as indicated in the Court of Inquiry are summarized hereafter.

LIBERTY OPERATIONS on 8 June 1967 (All Times are BRAVO)

The projected operations of LIBERTY on the morning and afternoon of 8 June were to proceed to a point 13 nautical miles from the UAR

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Coast at 31-27.2N 34-00E (Point Alfa), thence to 31-22.3N 33-42E (Point Bravo), thence to 31-31N 33-00E (Point Charlie) retracing this track until new orders were received. If fixes could not be obtained accurately as Point Charlie was approached, it was intended to head due north until the 100 fathom curve was crossed and the track moved to the north to more or less move back and forth on the general average of the 100 fathom curve. The normal steaming speed was to be five knots. Normal steaming colors were flown and there was no intention to steam at darken ship. At 0754 LIBERTY was steaming on a course of 130°T at a speed of 10 knots. At 0849, LIBERTY passed through Point ALFA and changed course to 253°T. At 0905, speed was decreased to 5 knots. Point Bravo was passed at 1132 and the ship's course was changed to 283°T.

OVERFLIGHTS OF LIBERTY ON 8 June 1967 PRIOR TO THE ATTACK

There were a number of overflights of LIBERTY by unidentified aircraft prior to the attack on 8 June 1967. The first overflight occurred at 0515 -- after sunrise. Although no markings or insignia were seen, this aircraft was noted to have a double fuselage -- looking somewhat "like an old P-38 or a small flying boxcar" (Record, p. 60).

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This plane circled about three or four times off the port beam and then took off in a true direction toward Tel Aviv. At 0850 a single jet crossed astern of the ship at a distance of approximately three to five miles. This aircraft circled the ship from starboard to port and returned to the mainland in the direction of the UAR. A "locating two" message was transmitted on this sighting -- LIBERTY message dtg 080742Z. At about 1030, a flight of two unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship three times at about 10,000 feet and at a distance of approximately two miles. At about 1056 an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about three to five miles. This plane circled the ship around the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed back toward the Sinai Peninsula. Overflights by aircraft similar in configuration to the American "flying boxcar" (C-119) occurred at about 1145, 1220 and 1245. During the 1145 and 1245 flights the ensign was specifically noted to be flying from the foremast, and, due to a slight breeze, was extended. It has been determined that the NORD 2501 of which the Israeli Government has 34, is a twin fuselage plane similar in appearance to the American "flying boxcar".

AIR ATTACK ON LIBERTY

At 1132, LIBERTY passed Point Bravo and changed course to 283° T. At 1348 the ship secured from general quarters drill.

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1351, while on a course of 283°T, three small surface contacts at a range of 32,200 yards and a bearing of 082°T were picked up on LIBERTY radar. This contact was reported to the bridge. The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and the Officer of the Deck were on the bridge at the time. At 1353 radar reported possible aircraft passing over the surface contacts. At 1358 a single aircraft was sighted approaching the ship from 135° relative at an altitude of approximately 7,000 and at a distance of approximately 5-6 miles from the ship. This aircraft was noticed to have similar if not identical characteristics to the jet aircraft which had orbited the ship at 1030. LIBERTY received no communications from this aircraft nor did it attempt to transmit any to the aircraft. The Commanding Officer directed the Officer of the Deck to call the forward gun mounts stating he believed the aircraft were going to attack. The Officer of the Deck tried unsuccessfully three times to raise the forward mounts. One aircraft passed down track of the ship, and at about 1403 there was a loud explosion -- portside amidship. Prior to the attack, at about 1400, the Commanding Officer personally sighted the minaret at El Arish at a bearing of 142° from the ship and range determined from radar of 25.5 miles. Prior to the air attack there was no fire directed from LIBERTY at any of the aircraft. Immediately following the

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explosion, the Commanding Officer ordered general quarters and signalled all ahead flank on the engine order telegraph. Between 1405 and 1410 LIBERTY was under repeated air attack with two or more aircraft making between 6-8 coordinated strafing, rocket and incendiary runs over the ship. The attacks were made in a criss-cross fashion over the ship with each attack coming at approximately 45-second to one-minute intervals. These attacks caused three major fires topside covering large areas of the ship with flames and smoke. Two 55 gallon gasoline drums on the portside 01 level and a motor whaleboat on the starboard side on the 02 level aft of the bridge were set ablaze. In addition, the public address system, the 21 MC and most sound-powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the first of the attack. While the air attack was in progress and despite a severe leg injury from shrapnel, the Commanding Officer obtained a camera from the safe on the bridge and commenced photographing the attacking aircraft and later the motor torpedo boats engaged in the strafing and torpedo attack.

SURFACE ATTACK ON LIBERTY

During the latter moments of the air attack three motor torpedo boats (MTB's) were noted to be approaching the ship from the northeast

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on a relative bearing of approximately 135° at a distance of about 15 miles. LIBERTY was on a course of 283° T at a speed in excess of five knots. The boats were in wedge formation, 150-200 yards apart, with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Their speed was estimated at 27-30 knots. Since they appeared to be coming in a torpedo launch attitude, the Commanding Officer directed mount 51 to take the boats under fire. He also noticed that the normal steaming ensign had been shot away during the air attack and ordered a second ensign to be hoisted from the yardarm. A holiday size ensign was hoisted on the port yardarm. It has been determined that the size of this flag was 7 x 13 feet. The Commanding Officer alerted the crew to standby for a torpedo attack from the starboard side. LIBERTY continued on a course of 283° T at maximum speed. At about 1428 when the boats were approximately 2,000 yards from LIBERTY, there appeared to be signalling from the center boat. It also appeared to the Commanding Officer that this boat was flying an Israeli flag. Because of the intermittent blocking of the view by smoke and flames, it was not possible to read the signals of the boat and no signals were transmitted from LIBERTY due to the fact that the starboard searchlight had been destroyed in the air attack. In view of the possibility

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that the attacking aircraft were Israeli and the attack was conducted in error, the Commanding Officer yelled to mount 51 to hold fire. However the order was apparently not received and at about 1431, mount 51 fired a short burst at the boats. As soon as mount 51 opened fire, mount 53 began firing at the center boat. Mount 53's fire was described as extremely effective and blanketing the area and the center torpedo boat. Simultaneous with the firing from mounts 51 and 53, the MTB's commenced strafing the starboard side of LIBERTY. The flames from the burning whaleboat made it impossible to approach mount 53 from the starboard wing. The Commanding Officer ordered Ensign Lucas around the portside of the bridge to get machine gun 53 to cease fire. Simultaneously the Commanding Officer passed the word to standby for a torpedo attack. Ensign Lucas returned and stated he saw no one at mount 53. At 1434 a torpedo passed 75 yards astern of LIBERTY. At 1435 a torpedo struck the starboard side of LIBERTY amidship. The torpedo hit caused no major fires but the blast caused a loss of electrical power throughout the ship, and a 9° starboard list. The explosion caused the ship to come dead in the water with all power and steering control lost. Engines and boilers were secured at 1436. The torpedo struck the research coordination center. These spaces flooded instantly. The condition of the remains recovered from this space indicated that death was instantaneous.

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ACTIVITIES OF MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AFTER ATTACK

Immediately after the ship was struck by a torpedo, the MTB's stopped dead in the water and milled around astern at a distance of approximately 5-800 feet from LIBERTY. One of the MTB's was seen to have a hull number of 206-17. One of the boats started signalling the ship. Code Lima India signifying that the ship was not under command was hoisted by LIBERTY. Using a hand-held Aldis lamp, LIBERTY signalled "U. S. Naval Ship". The MTB then sent in English "Do you need help?" followed by "Do you want us to standby?" The LIBERTY reply to both inquiries was in the negative. The MTB then came up to the portside and flashed "Good Luck" and returned astern to join the other two boats. At about 1505 the MTB's retired towards shore to a range of about five miles. At about 1507 a helicopter bearing the Star of David approached LIBERTY from the portside and hovered at a distance of about 500 yards. A second helicopter approached the ship at 1508. The markings on these helicopters were 04 and 08 or D4 and D8 respectively. Passes were made around and over the ship but they were not observed to pick up bodies, persons or debris. At 1536, the MTB's which had departed again headed towards the ship at high speed. The order to standby for torpedoes was again given. No attacks occurred and the MTB's departed. Between 1536 and 1710

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the MTB's returned to the ship several times. By 1713 they had retired out of sight over the horizon. At about 1615, two unidentified jet aircraft approached the ship from the starboard side and reconnoitered from a distance. At about 1845 an Israeli helicopter circled close to LIBERTY and attempted to signal. The craft appeared desirous of landing, but the Commanding Officer ruled out a landing as too hazardous. Repeated attempts to communicate with the helicopter were unsuccessful. At 1852 a message packet was dropped on the fore-castle. The message written on a calling card of the U. S. Naval Attache, Tel Aviv asked "Have you casualties?". LIBERTY attempted by several means to communicate that there were many casualties, but there was no indication that the message was understood. The helicopter departed shortly after sunset -- about 1905.

MESSAGES OF 7 AND 8 JUNE ORDERING CHANGES OF LIBERTY OPERATIONS

Means and time of transmission and handling of several messages are of importance in the sequence of events leading up to the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Included in the record of the Court of Inquiry are evidence and testimony to the effect that from 1 June and until and during the attack on LIBERTY, communications systems concerned were

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inundated with large numbers of messages many of which were of high precedence. The messages discussed below were competing with this flood of messages for the available capacity of message handling systems and talents of the personnel involved.

LIBERTY was, on 8 June 1967, copying the JRTT Broadcast originating from U. S. Naval Communications Station, Asmara and the XRI Broadcast originating from U. S. Naval Communications Station, Greece. The former broadcast was LIBERTY's primary means of receipt of general service messages and the latter its primary means of receipt of messages pertaining to its research mission. LIBERTY had been copying JRTT since 070001Z June and prior to that time had been copying the KRTT Broadcast, keyed from Morocco. Each of these broadcasts is crypto covered. Physical locations of the broadcast terminals and communications files in LIBERTY were in the research spaces, the area in which the torpedo hit. These files were not available to the Court since they were largely destroyed.

JCS priority precedence message 7337 072230Z June 1967, addressed to USCINCEUR for action and LIBERTY, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR and others for information, stated that LIBERTY's previously assigned operating area (JCS 6724 011545Z June 1967) was

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for guidance only and could be varied as local conditions dictated.

Closest points of approach to UAR and ISRAEL were increased to 20 and 15 miles respectively. The record does not indicate the time of receipt of this message by USCINCEUR. However, it was received by CINCUSNAVEUR at 08/1642Z and COMSIXTHFLT at 08/0724Z.

LIBERTY did not receive the message prior to the attack since the message was not received by Naval Communications Station, Asmara until 08/2125Z and broadcasted ten minutes later. It should be noted that JCS message 7347 which is discussed below cancelled this message and that 080110Z was received by the action addressee, USCINCEUR, prior to receipt of 072230Z.

JCS message 7347 080110Z June 1967 was a Top Secret, immediate precedence message addressed to USCINCEUR for action and CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, LIBERTY and others for information. The message requested that LIBERTY comply with operating areas previously imposed on SIXTHFLT units, i. e., not closer than 100 miles to Israel, Syria and Egypt and 25 miles to Cyprus. This message, when transmitted for LIBERTY by the Department of the Army Communications Center, (DACC), was misrouted to Naval Communications Station, Philippines where it was received at 08/0400Z. Naval Communications Station, Philippines personnel then rerouted the

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message to Naval Communications Station, Morocco at 08/0449Z, however, it was received by DACC at 080502Z and routed by DACC to National Security Agency. The message was not received by Naval Communications Stations, Asmara or Morocco for transmission to LIBERTY. Time of delivery to CINCUSNAVEUR was 08/0312Z. COMSIXTHFLT received the message via Naval Communications Station, Morocco at 08/0639Z. Time of delivery to USCINCEUR, the action addressee, is not shown in the record, however, this time has been established as 08/0211Z.

USCINCEUR immediate precedence message ECJC/JRC 09045 080625Z June 1967 was addressed to CINCUSNAVEUR for action and COMSIXTHFLT, LIBERTY and others for information. Reference (a) of this message was a telephone conversation between an officer of the originator's headquarters and CINCUSNAVEUR duty officer which occurred at 080425Z. This conversation is discussed below. Reference (b) was the JCS 100 mile message. The entire text was "This confirms reference A to take reference B FORAC." It has been determined that the time of receipt of this message by CINCUSNAVEUR was 08/0727Z. This message was transmitted on JRTT Fleet Broadcast at 08/1059Z.

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CINCUSNAVEUR immediate precedence message 080455Z June 1967 directed COMSIXTHFLT to take JCS 080110Z June 1967 for action. It has been determined that COMSIXTHFLT received this message 08/0518Z. In addition to sending the message discussed above, the CINCUSNAVEUR Contingency Watch Team, using a teletype conference circuit, passed JCS 080110Z June to COMSIXTHFLT along with a wire-note to take it for action. This occurred at about 08/0440Z.

COMSIXTHFLT immediate precedence message 080917Z June 1967, addressed to LIBERTY for action and sixteen information addressees, directed LIBERTY to proceed immediately to a new operating area and not to approach the coast of the UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 miles and Cyprus closer than 25 miles. This message was transmitted to Naval Communications Station, Morocco at 08/1058Z and entered into the Defense Communications System at 08/1100Z for delivery to Naval Communications Station, Asmara. (LIBERTY was copying the Asmara Fleet Broadcast). After relay by DCS Major Relay Station, Seville (San Pablo) the message was transmitted to DCS Major Relay Station, Asmara where it was erroneously relayed to Naval Communications Station, Greece at 08/1215Z or 08/1238Z (conflict of evidence) from which it was returned to DCS Major Relay Station, Asmara at 08/1503Z* and then sent to Naval Communications Station

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Asmara from which it was broadcast at 08/1525Z. The first air attack occurred at 08/1203Z.

In addition to, and concurrent with, the record communications discussed above there were a number of telephone conversations/directives between members of the commands concerned which are important in considering the sequence of events.

1. At 07/2350Z there was a VOCOM (secure telephone) from an officer in the Joint Reconnaissance Center, (JRC) Washington, to a member of the CINCUSNAVEUR Contingency Watch Team, in which it was requested that LIBERTY be withdrawn to an operating area not closer than 100 miles from Israel, UAR and Syria. The record further indicates concern by CINCUSNAVEUR personnel since; the call had bypassed USCINCEUR, was not confirmed by a message or date-time group of a message, and they "had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message".

2. At 08/0030Z the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer called and advised a USCINCEUR staff member of the JRC call and requested that the directive be confirmed and a date-time group be provided.

3. At 08/0325Z the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Duty Officer called and requested another USCINCEUR staff member to apprise him

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of action taken on the request made in the 08/0030 Z call. Shortly thereafter, the USCINCEUR representative returned the call and provided the date-time group (JCS 080110Z). A copy of JCS message 080110Z was delivered to the CINCUSNAVEUR duty officer coincident with this call. At this time the teletype conference noted above was initiated.

During the air attack, pursuant to an order received in the ship's radio control via the general announcing system, the CINCUSNAVEUR High Command voice net was utilized by LIBERTY to report the attack and the situation as it developed. These transmissions were received by USS SARATOGA and passed to higher authority via Naval Communications Station, Greece. This High Command circuit became the primary means of communication with LIBERTY since LIBERTY carried out destruction procedures of classified material including keying material.

DEATHS AND INJURIES

The air and surface attacks on USS LIBERTY resulted in the death of thirty-four persons and injuries to 171 persons. Copies of the death certificates (NAVMED N) of those killed are attached to this summarization as Appendix C. Appendix D to this summary contains

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a list of the injured with diagnosis, prognosis, expected disability and the actual or expected loss of time from duty for each injured person. Pertinent treatment records as obtained by the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery are also contained in Appendix D. It has been determined that as of 21 September 1967, all but ten of the total injured have been returned to a full duty status.

MATERIAL DAMAGE

The major material damage to LIBERTY resulted from the torpedo explosion. This explosion resulted in a hole centered at frame 60 and extending 24 feet downward from just below the second deck and longitudinally from frame 53 to frame 66 (39 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape, larger at the bottom. Outboard 15 feet of the first platform and the associated structure were badly damaged. There was lesser damage to the second platform deck. The second deck and frames were buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending inboard 15 feet. In addition there was major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below the second deck from frame 52 to frame 78 along the entire width of the ship. The two research compartments which extend the entire width of the ship suffered severe structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and facilities were reduced to twisted wreckage.

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Topside damage resulting from aircraft's strafing and rocket attacks and from MTB strafing -- the ship was hit by more than 821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary -- resulted in the pilot house and signal bridge, forward deck house, all gun tubs, many antennas, numerous bulkheads and decks being holed by explosive rockets. The whale boat was destroyed and many life rafts holed or burned. There were numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions. The gyro-compass, air conditioning plant and many minor items of equipment which were located in superstructure spaces were damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personal effects were damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during firefighting.

The total cost to effect repairs of damage to the ship and equipment has been estimated as \$5,612,160.00. Appendix E to this summary contains an itemization of the estimated cost of repairs.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
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JAG

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ROUTINE
RI 231620Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO USCINCEUR
CNO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COURT OF INQUIRY USS LIBERTY (U)
A. USS LIBERTY 032028Z JUN 67
B. USS LIBERTY 042050Z JUN 67

1. AS A RESULT OF FOLLOW-UP ACTION IT HAS BEEN
DETERMINED THAT REPA AND B WERE TRANSMITTED FROM
LIBERTY TO NAVSECGRUDIPT MOROCCO BEING RECEIVED AT
040359Z AND 050530Z RESPECTIVELY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
THAT EITHER MESSAGE WAS REFILED INTO COMMON USER CHANNELS.

3. THE TWO MESSAGES IN QUESTION ARE QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE
PI 032028Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO JCS

CNO
CONFIDENTIAL
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRUALNT
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCINCEUR
NFOC
NSAEUR
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRMED

61 0110 0111 0112 0113 0114 0115
611B 0110 0111 0112 0113 0114 0115
613B 0110 0111 0112 0113 0114 0115
615B 0110 0111 0112 0113 0114 0115

61...ACT
SN OPA 00109 33 06 92 94 94G 007 NDDC IP

App. A to Encl. (1) of JAG End JAG:131.1:
DBB:as, Ser: 00010 of

FILE NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
00084/1/PO	1		3	23/1952Z	231620Z JUN 67

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NAVAL MESSAGE

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CTFI 60
CTFI 64
NAVCCMMST MOROCCO
CONFIDENTIAL
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT

1: 032400Z9 POSIT 37-10N1 004-03E7. PIM COASTAL
EASTERLY 15 KTS.

2: TRSSCOM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AGAIN FAILED. LEAKS
BEYOND CAPACITY OF SHIP'S FORCE TO REPAIR UNTIL SPARE
PARTS RECEIVED NEXT PORT OF CALL. SITEREP NO. TWO
TRSSCOM CASREP SEPARATELY.

GP4
BT UNQUOTE
QUOTE
PI 042050Z JUNI 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO JCS
CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANFLT
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCINCEUR
NFOIO
NSAEUR
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRMED
CTFI 60
CTFI 64
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT

1: 042400Z0 POSIT 37-22N0 011-15E8 PIM 12-16
UNTIL 050130Z. THENCE 106/15.

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
035084/1/PD	2		3	23/1952Z	231620Z JUN 67

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NAVAL MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

GP4
BT
UNQUOTE

4. REQUEST A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE BE INCLUDED IN THE
OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY AS PART OF
EXHIBIT 48.
GP-4.

↑
done
HWA

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035084/1/P0	3		3	23/1952Z	231620Z JUN 57

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Ser 1027/00 00020/00
18 June 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on ltr of RADM Isaac C. KIDD, USN, 111645/1100
of 18 June 1967

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe
To: Judge Advocate General

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
on 8 June 1967 (u)

1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. On 8 June 1967, the USS LIBERTY suffered an unprovoked attack by Israeli air and naval forces in international waters off the coast of the United Arab Republic. The Court of Inquiry, convened by CINCUSNAVEUR to look into the circumstances and prepare findings related to this attack, has completed its deliberations which are forwarded herewith.
3. It is the opinion of the convening authority that USS LIBERTY was operating in international waters in conformance with the most recent guidance received by her provided by competent authority. It is important to note that there were in fact command decisions made by responsible authorities subsequent to receipt by LIBERTY of the guidance under which she was operating. These subsequent decisions and actions, which the ship did not receive for a combination of several reasons, could have resulted, had they been received in timely fashion, in the ship being as much as 100 miles away from the position in which she found herself at 1200Z on 8 June.
4. The circumstances, when viewed in retrospect through the record of proceedings, indicate that any one or combination of the several communications delays and/or non-receipts varied in the reasons therefor from personnel error to technical difficulty, including errors in judgment.
5. Had LIBERTY not been attacked, the probability is high that none of the aforementioned problem areas would have been identified as critical which is usually the case in circumstances of this sort. It is important to keep in mind that decisions subsequent to LIBERTY's initial operational

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tasking were based upon no known new evidence of potential danger to the ship; but were rather based upon factors other than operational in nature. It is the conviction of the convening authority, that, had new hard intelligence been available and been the basis for new decisions governing LIBERTY's movements, follow-on actions taken with specific regard to guaranteeing timely delivery of such critical guidance would have been handled differently. Such was not the case. Therefore, normal formal procedural practices were followed, and the new command decisions were relayed to the ship in routine fashion, i. e. by standard fleet broadcasts rather than by emergency direct communication capabilities which were available--such as the HICOM net.

6. It is the further conviction of the convening authority in regard to the foregoing, that prospective implementors, such as the ship itself, of action directed by higher authority, when the immediacy of action is critical, must be informed of the planned action concurrent with the transmission of action instructions by the higher authority involved. In this respect, we found LIBERTY's situation being discussed at the highest command levels where decisions were being made and instructions issued without taking concurrent precautions to inform the ship of the planned actions by the same most rapid means of communications available--in this case, telephonic and voice-radio systems. On the other hand, however, there was apparently absolutely no new intelligence and operational evidence at the time of the aforementioned discussions to dictate utilizing such special and high precedence communications capabilities.

7. In summary on this point, certain remedial measures for future situations are indicated, some of which are within the capabilities of this headquarters. These will be implemented by CINCUSNAVEUR and his subordinates, to include, for example, concurrent paralleling intentions known to CINCUSNAVEUR from higher authority direct to prospective action subordinates immediately upon receipt of the guidance in question. It must be borne in mind, however, that here again, the best professional judgments will dictate on a case by case basis the degree of urgency required. Such was the case in the LIBERTY incident and, nothing in the findings of fact disclosed justifiable rationale for taking emergency measures to get the information of planned OP area changes to the ship, other than the fact of the attack itself. The LIBERTY incident provides a classic example of the devastating effects complete surprise produces.

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8. Further to the foregoing, the convening authority has reviewed the proceedings most carefully to determine whether or not there was any indication received by the ship's embarked capabilities prior to the attack which would have dictated a need for emergency measures. Every piece of available evidence indicates that such was not the case.

9. On the matter of command and control, the convening authority, as Naval subordinate to USCINCEUR was exercising operational control of LIBERTY through his subordinate, Commander, Sixth Fleet. The fact that the precise operational guidance applicable to LIBERTY at the time of the attack had been received from still higher authority, in no way altered the full responsibility for the ship resting on CINCUSNAVEUR himself. There is no question but that CINCUSNAVEUR had the continuing responsibility for monitoring the position of the ship and insuring the ship's relative safety while in assigned areas. Further, there was no evidence available to CINCUSNAVEUR, up to the moment of the attack itself, to indicate the ship was in jeopardy to a degree beyond normal and continuing risks extant in any operational situation proximate to the shores of warring nations.

10. In summary, in this instance as in others throughout recent years, it was the judgment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, that the technical research efforts of USS LIBERTY were well worth the calculated risks involved; keeping in mind that proper precautionary measures had already been taken by CINCUSNAVEUR and by his subordinate, COMSIXTHFLT, on 6 June (two days before the attack), both of which directives all concerned assumed were known to USS LIBERTY. The record discloses, however, that while LIBERTY had received the CINCUSNAVEUR guidance to COMSIXTHFLT, LIBERTY had not received COMSIXTHFLT's message of 6 June wherein details for the implementation of this tempering and discretionary guidance had been provided, together with proper provisions for the protection of the ship in the event of an emergency.

11. On the technical and material side, the convening authority noted with great interest the remarkable efficiency of the coordinated Israeli air and surface attack. The efficacy of air-delivered rockets was particularly noteworthy with regard to their penetrating capabilities and devastating accuracy. Preliminary evidence of damage based upon limited available information at this time, indicates long lead time procurements will require

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approximately one year. Major overhaul requirements approximately two to four months. Aggregate dollar costs total some twelve to fourteen million dollars.

12. On the matter of personnel, heroism was the order of the day. The Commanding Officer is being recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor and the ship for the Presidential Unit Citation.

13. It is the conviction of the convening authority that the possibility is high that the ship would have been lost completely had there not been the highest order of damage control competence on board combined with the fact that the ship had secured from General Quarters for drill only minutes before the attack took place.

14. Visual identification procedures, and techniques require early attention. We, as well as the Israelis, were apparently deficient in our recognition competence compared to World War II levels of proficiency. Current United States ship profiles are not readily locatable except in such documents as Jane's "Fighting Ships". Where we have active ship configurations susceptible to confusion with other ships of other nations, we should explore immediately improved identification measures such as national colors on vertical and horizontal surfaces using high visual intensity paints, a safeguard not susceptible to being shot down in the opening stages of an action as was the case in the LIBERTY incident. Intense fires on the ship coupled with herculean efforts by the engineer department to increase speed both produced heavy black smoke which compounded the recognition problem facing the attacking forces.

15. The foregoing comments by the convening authority lead to an overall conclusion that the attack was in fact a mistake; that the element of complete surprise without inquiry eliminated any possibility for a timely government to government announcement of the ship's presence had we been asked; that communication shortfalls resulted in delays in delivery of operational traffic which, had they not occurred, might have resulted in the ship being at a safer distance off shore. The lessons learned in these instances are reminiscent in many respects of those learned after the attack on Pearl Harbor as they apply to the need for complete and free exchange of mission and operational information between responsible authorities and fleet units themselves. In the final analysis, it is this same fleet unit that must enjoy timely advice to be effective. No useful purpose is served by complete knowledge and awareness of decisions at high levels without appropriate concurrent actions stemming therefrom at the lowest echelons in the critical chain.

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16. Communications limitations continue with us. Improvements in equipment never seem quite able to fully offset load increases and the ever present personnel error. Where such combine with staffing delays and completely unexpected actions through mistake by another state, the results cannot be other than explosive in international potential.

17. The proceedings and findings of the Court of Inquiry are approved, based upon knowledge available as of 191425Z.

John S. McCain, Jr.
JOHN S. MCCAIN, Jr.

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ORIGINAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
United States Atlantic Fleet
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

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Ser 00073 /J141
6 September 1967

From: Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding
the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5) on 8 June 1967 (U)

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op-61B/jrb Ser: 000204P61 of 21 June 1967

1. (U) In accordance with the request contained in reference (a), enclosure (1) thereto has been reviewed.
2. (TS) A review of the proceedings reveals that the court was not required by the convening authority to submit opinions and recommendations and none were in fact submitted.
3. (TS) The Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet generally concurs in the comments of CINCUSNAVEUR except as stated in this paragraph. CINCLANTFLT is of the opinion that:

a. The senior officers in the operational chain of command who received the JCS directive to move the LIBERTY to 100 miles off the coast of Israel should have taken direct and positive action to inform the implementing agent, COMSIXTHFLT, without delay.

b. The U.S. Army Communications Center, Asmara should be required to furnish a detailed report of the reason for the failure to pass the JCS message 080110Z correctly to its proper destination, if this has not already been done.

c. There is a critical shortage of experienced communications personnel assigned to communications stations.

d. Lack of emergency reserve signaling devices on board LIBERTY for use after the signal lights were destroyed may have contributed to the MTB attack since the IDF claims that the MTBs attempted to contact the ship prior to their attack.

e. Inadequate physical identification by Israeli forces engaged in the attack may be correctly cited as the reason for the attack on LIBERTY.

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f. The investigation does not adequately portray the magnitude of the damage wrought by the IDF. (As an example, no mention is made of the use of napalm or anti-personnel type bombs.)

g. Defense Attache Officers should be furnished with current information relating to the presence of a ship with the configuration and mission of ships such as LIBERTY.]

4. (U) CINCLANTFLT recommends as follows:

a. Senior Watch Officers and action staff officers throughout the armed forces should be emphatically reminded of their responsibilities in handling directives of high priority and sensitivity.

b. The qualifications of radiomen, particularly in the grade of second class and higher, be reviewed with a view to establishing training programs and upgrading where necessary and further testing if such is indicated.


c. The Defense Communications Agency be requested to review communications procedures with a view to reducing the number of messages which are clogging the communications system, and thus permit the rapid flow of the truly important messages.

d. Implementation of opinion g. which is stated in paragraph 3 hereof.

e. Damage control procedures used by LIBERTY personnel be documented for future use Navy-wide as an example of outstanding performance of duty under the most adverse circumstances.

5. (U) CINCLANTFLT will initiate action to implement the items recommended in paragraph 4 which can be implemented within the resources and authority of the Commander in Chief.

6. (U) Subject to the foregoing, the proceedings, findings of fact, and recommendations of Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, are concurred in.


E. P. HOLMES

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~~FOR EYES ONLY~~

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-002:tr
Op-00 Memo 000365-67
7 July 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Subj: USS LIBERTY Court of Inquiry; addenda to

Encl: (1) USDOCOSOUTH 011020Z July 1967 (TS)
(2) USDOCOSOUTH 021734Z July 1967 (C)
(3) NAVCOMMUNIT NAPLES 061222Z July 1967 (S)
(4) Photographs (4) of USS LIBERTY in drydock
at Malta (U)

1. At the request of Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, Jr., President of the Court of Inquiry convened by Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe on the USS LIBERTY incident, enclosures (1) through (4) are forwarded herewith for insertion into the Record.

2. Records of this office indicate that your office holds copy number 1 of the Record of the Court of Inquiry.

Very respectfully,

J. H. King, Jr.

J. H. KING, JR.
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Assistant to the
Chief of Naval Operations

App. B

App. B to encl (1) of JAG End JAG:131.1:
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NAVAL MESSAGE

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~~NOFORN~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ROUTINE
R 011020Z JUL 67
FM USDJCSOUTH

TO CNO

INFO CINCUSNAVEUR

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

FOR CAPT KING OP-002, INFO LCDR FLINGERSCH, ASST COUNSEL LIBERTY
COURT OF INQUIRY
SUBJ: LIBERTY.

1. CINCUSNAVEUR 261649Z PASEP TO CNO FOR CAPT KING REFERS.
2. REFERENCE MSG TO BE INSERTED INTO LIBERTY RECORD TOGETHER WITH FOLLOWING AMPLIFYING INFO.
3. JCS FACTFINDING TEAM EVIDENCED MUCH INTEREST IN LIBERTY COMMO PRACTICES WHEREIN ROUTINE REPORTS AND REQUESTS FOR MISSED MSGS WERE OFTEN PACKAGED UP WITH HER MORE CRITICAL OUTGOING TRAFFIC AS A CABOOSE ON THE MAIN TRAIN. THIS PRACTICE COVERED IN DETAIL AS I RECALL, IN CINCUSNAVEUR COVERING ENDORSEMENT. JCS TEAMS FEELING SEEMED TO BE THAT SHIP WAS POSSIBLY A LITTLE SLIPSHOD IN FILING SUCH ROUTINE REPORTS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO RECORD OF SOME OF HER SITREPS AND POSITS EVER BEING RECEIVED.
4. MY CONVICTION FROM MOST CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH SURVIVING MEMBERS SHIPS COMPANY WAS THAT SHIP WAS METICULOUSLY THOROUGH IN THIS AND ALL OTHERS AREAS BUT COURT COULD NOT PROVE IT AT TIME REPORT SUBMITTED ON 18 JUNE. WE KEPT DIGGING HOWEVER AND REFERENCED MSG PROVES WE WERE CORRECT.
5. THIS APPEARS TO BE LAST RECOVERABLE PIECE OF FACTUAL EVIDENCE ON THIS ASPECT OF COMMUNICATION ISSUE WHICH FURTHER INTENSIFIES THE SPOTLIGHT OF INDICTMENT ON SHORE BASED COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES.
GP-4

FILE (1)
CAPT KING (002) ...ACT (2)
VIA 94313F *

Encl (1) to CNO Memo Op-002
000365-67 of 7/7/67 00000A

COPY NO. 1 OF 5 COPIES
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CONTROLLING NO.	PAGE OF PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE-TIME GROUP
000986/37NF	1	01/1124Z	011020Z JUL 67

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ROUTINE
R 021734Z JUL 67
FM USDOCOSOUTH

TO CNO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L NOFORN

FOR CAPT KING OP-002
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:
R 261649Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO RUFRF/COMFAIRMED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN
COMFAIRMED NOT ADDEE. PLEASE PASS TO RADM KIDD IN
U.S. NATIONAL CHANNELS
PERSONAL WIRENOTE FOR RADM KIDD
LIBERTY INCIDENT (U)

1. OFFICIAL FOLLOWUP ACTION REVEALS THE TWO LIBERTY
SITREP/POSIT MESSAGES SENT ON 3 AND 4 JUNE DROPPED
THROUGH THE CRACKS AT THE SECURITY GROUP IN MOROCCO.
INVESTIGATION BY MOROCCO PERSONNEL REVEALS THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THAT SECGRU REFILED THE MESSAGES INTO COMMON
USER CHANNELS FOR ONWARD DELIVERY AS THEY SHOULD HAVE
DONE. MISHANDLING IS ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATOR ERROR.

2. AS YOU DIRECTED, THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PASSED ON
TO CNO AND USCINCEUR FOR OFFICIAL INSERTION INTO THE
RECORD. THE CONTENT OF THESE MESSAGES IS QUOTED FYI:

A. USS LIBERTY 032028Z

QUOTE
CONFIDENTIAL
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SETREP/POSIT

1. 032400Z9 POSIT 37-10N1 004-03E7, PIM COSTAL EASTERLY
15 KTS.

CAPT KING(002) ...ACT
VIA 9481SF *

00000A

Encl (2) to CNO Memo Op-002
000365-67 of 7/7/67

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C02537/3/CG	1	02/1907Z	021734Z JUL 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NAVAL MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

2. TRSSCOM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AGAIN FAILED. LEAKS BEYOND CAPACITY OF SHIP'S FORCE TO REPAIR UNTIL SPARE PARTS RECEIVED NEXT PORT OF CALL. SITREP NO. TWO TRSSCOM CASREP SEPARATELY.

UNQUOTE.

B. USS LIBERTY 042050Z

QUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

JCS PASS TO JRC

CINCLANT PASS TO JRC

SITREP/POSIT

NOFORN

1. 04.2400Z O POSIT 37-22N4 011-15E8.

PIM: 12-16 UNTIL 050130Z. THENCE 106/15.

UNQUOTE.

3. THERE IS ONE FINAL ACTION CONCERNING PHOTOGRAPHS OF CERTAIN LOGS WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN CONTAINED IN THE ONE ROLL OF RUINED FILM. LIBERTY HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO FURNISH THE APPROPRIATE NEGATIVES OR POLAROID PICTURES. UPON RECEIPT THEY WILL BE REPRODUCED AND COPIES SENT TO CNO AND USCINCEUR COMPLETING THEIR RECORDS.

4. THE MASTER FILE HAS BEEN COMPILED AND IS STORED IN THE TOP SECRET VAULT AT THIS HDQTRS.

5. PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE IS ANY FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. VERY RESPECTFULLY, YOUR JUNIOR LEGAL ADVISOR, LCDR FEINGERSCH.
GP-4.

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
002537/3/CG	2		2	02/19/67	021734Z JUL 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NAVAL MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE
O 061222Z JULY 67
FM NAVCOMMUNIT NAPLES

TO CNO

INFO CINCUSNAVEUR
USS LIBERTY

NOFORN

FOR

~~SECRET~~ U.S. EYES ONLY

FOR CAPT KING, OP002; INFO ADM MCCAIN, CDR MCGONAGLE FROM
RADM KIDD
LIBERTY

1. REQ ADD FOLLOWING AMPLIFICATION AS APPROPRIATE ADDENDUM TO LIBERTY INQUIRY PURSUANT YOUR REQ FOR AMPLIFYING FACTS.
2. FOLLOWING ATTESTED TO BY CO LIBERTY CDR MCGONAGLE; CTC THOMPSON; AND SIGNALMAN DAVID THROUGH CDR MCGONAGLE.
3. VISUAL SIGNALLING NOTED BY C.O. AND SIGNALMAN DAVIS (SUBSEQUENTLY WOUNDED AND HOSPITALIZED) DURING PT RUN-IN WAS NOT REPEAT NOT DISTINGUISHABLE THROUGH SMOKE/FLAME.
4. ALLEGED AA FROM PT'S WAS NOT REPEAT NOT READ BY LIBERTY PRIOR TORPEDO HIT.
5. CTC THOMPSON RECALLS REACHING POSITION ON LIBERTY BRIDGE SOMETIME AFTER TORPEDO HIT. THOMPSON NOW ESTIMATES TIME ARRIVAL ON BRIDGE SOME NINE TO TEN MINUTES AFTER TORPEDO HIT.
6. C.O. DID NOT REPEAT NOT ORDER AA SENT TO PT'S SINCE HE KNEW WHO THEY WERE, HAVING SIGHTED STAR OF DAVID INSIGNIA.
7. THOMPSON SAYS FIRST IDENTIFIABLE VISUAL TRANSMISSION FROM PT'S READ BY ANYONE ON LIBERTY WAS "DO YOU NEED HELP" FOLLOWED BY "DO YOU WANT US TO STAND BY" WHEN BOATS HAD PULLED CLEAR OF SMOKE OBSTRUCTED BEARING AFTER REPEAT AFTER TORPEDO HIT.
8. THOMPSON STATES AFTER ALDIS LAMP UNLIMBERED, WHICH WAS

002(1) VIA 9481SF ...ACT
FILE(1) AND NO OTHERS

00000A

Encl (3) to CNO Memo Op-002
000365-67 of 7/7/67

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008659/1/TS	1	07/0335Z	061222Z JUL

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NAVAL MESSAGE

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

NAVY DEPARTMENT

AFTER HE GOT TO BRIDGE WHICH WAS AFTER TORPEDO ATTACKS, THE ONLY THING SENT BY LIGHT TO PT'S WAS "NO THANK YOU" IN REPLY TO OFFER OF HELP.

9. SUMMARY:

- (A) FIRST DISTINGUISHABLE PT VISUAL TRANSMISSION WAS OFFER OF HELP AFTER TORPEDO HIT: ALTHOUGH FLASHING LIGHT FROM CENTER PT WAS OBSERVED INTERMITTENTLY PRIOR THERETO.
- (B) NO AA ORDERED OR ACTUALLY SENT FROM LIBERTY TO BEST OF ANYONE'S RECOLLECTION AT THIS TIME.
- (C) WITH STBD SIGNAL LITE CAPABILITY WIPED OUT IN AIR ATTACK, ALDIS LAMP NOT BROUGHT INTO USE UNTIL AFTER TORPEDO HIT.

10. PRECISE TIME SEQUENCING CONTINUES MOST DIFFICULT AS APPARENT FROM ABOVE; HOWEVER, C.O. AND THOMPSON ARE UNSHAKEABLE IN CONVICTION IMPOSSIBLE READ PT'S LIGHT PRIOR ATTACK AND ON FACT THAT LIBERTY ALDIS LAMP NOT UNLIMBERED UNTIL AFTER TORPEDO HIT. I AM CONVINCED THESE MEN KNOW WHAT THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT.

3P-4

NOTED

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
003669/1/TS	2		2	07/0335Z	06122EZ JUL

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
DECEASED PERSONNEL FROM USS LIBERTY

ALLENBAUGH, William B.	CT3	684 49 96
ARMSTRONG, Philip M., Jr.	LCDR	569825/1100
BLANCHARD, Gary Ray	SN	771 77 22
BROWN, Francis	QM3	778 76 70
CAMPBELL, Ronnie J.	CT2	856 13 23
CONVERSE, Jerry L.	CT2	794 79 44
EISENBERG, Robert B.	CT2	776 09 35
GRAVES, Curtis A.	CT1	519 58 24
GOSS, Jerry L.	CT1	511 31 28
HAYDEN, Lawrence P.	CTSN	307 53 70
HERSEY, Warren E.	CT1	903 67 11
HIGGINS, Alan	CT3	788 62 97
HOAR, Carl Lewis	SN	774 46 48
KEENE, Richard W., Jr.	CT3	778 82 75
LENAU, James Lee	CTSN	997 56 58
LINN, Raymond Eugene	CTC	571 13 74
LUPTON, James M.	CT1	511 31 28
MARGGRAF, Duane Rowe	CT3	773 96 50
MARLBOROUGH, David W.	CTSA	316 04 80
MENDIS, Anthony P.	CT2	777 62 87
NYGREN, Carl C.	CT3	788 37 16
PIERCE, James C.	LT	649805/6462
RAPER, J. L.	SGT, USMC	1994072
REHMEYER, Edward E. III	CPL, USMC	2120919
SKOLAK, David	FN	B50 17 83
SMITH, John Caleb, Jr.	CT1	237 77 94
SMITS, Melvin D.	CTC	493 95 96
SPICHER, John Clarence	PC2	473 41 77
THOMPSON, Alexander N. Jr.	GMG3	770 47 21
THORNTON, Thomas B.	CT3	997 97 91
TIEDTKE, Philippe C.	CT3	914 32 84
TOTH, Stephen S.	LT	669613/1100
WALTON, Frederick J.	CT1	236 31 86

BLUE, Allen M.

Civilian

ENCLOSURE (1)



**DECLASSIFIED
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18 June 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~ - Downgraded to UNCLAS upon removal of enclosure (1)


From: Rear Admiral Isaac C. KIDD, USN, 111645/1100
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
on 8 June 1967

Ref: (a) CINCUSNAVEUR ltr FF1-3 Ser 1550/13 of 10 June 1967

Encl: (1) Subject record of proceedings

1. As directed by reference (a), a Court of Inquiry was convened on 10 June 1967. The original record and two complete copies thereof are forwarded herewith as enclosure (1).


ISAAC C. KIDD

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals :
Not automatically declassified.

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 9 COPIES

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TOP SECRET**

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE
FPO NEW YORK ~~09521~~ 09510

FF1-3
5830
Ser 1550/13
10 JUNE 1967

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
To: Rear Admiral Isaac C. KIDD, Jr., USN, 111645/1100

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding
the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967

Ref: (a) JAG Manual

1. In accordance with section 0402 of reference (a), a Court of Inquiry is hereby appointed to inquire into the circumstances surrounding an armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) which occurred at approximately 1230Z, 8 June 1967, while steaming in the vicinity of 31°23' North Latitude, 33°25' East Longitude. The Court will convene at Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, London, England, at 2000 on 10 June 1967, or as soon thereafter as practicable.
2. The Court shall consist of you as president, and Captain Bernard J. LAUFF, USN, 097651/1100, and Captain Bert M. ATKINSON, Jr., USN, 447058/1100, as members. Captain Ward BOSTON, Jr., USN, 419063/1620, a lawyer qualified in the sense of article 27(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is hereby designated counsel for the Court, and Lieutenant Commander Allen FEINGERSCH, USN, 612119/1100, is hereby designated assistant counsel for the Court.
3. The Court is directed to inquire into all the pertinent facts and circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack; damage resulting therefrom; and deaths of and injuries to naval personnel. After deliberation, the Court shall submit its findings of fact.
4. The duty of the Court to designate individuals as parties to the inquiry during the proceedings, when appropriate, is set forth in section 0302 of reference (a).
5. The Court is directed to take the testimony of witnesses under oath and to submit a verbatim record of the proceedings. Military witnesses will be warned of their rights in accordance with article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prior to the taking of their testimony.


Ex. A

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FF1-3
5830

6. The Court will conduct its proceedings in closed session.
7. Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, will furnish the necessary reporters and other clerical assistance to the Court for the purpose of recording the proceedings and preparing the record of this Court of Inquiry.


JOHN S. MCCAIN, Jr

Copy to:

CNO

CINCLANTFLT


COMSIXTHFLT

CAPT Bernard J. LAUFF, USN

CAPT Bert M. ATKINSON, Jr., USN

CAPT Ward BOSTON, USN

LCDR Allen FEINGERSCH, USN







20 MARCH 03

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IS NOT WITH
THE RECORD

IF LOCATED IT
WILL BE ADDED
AT A LATER TIME

al

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App. D

(2) 1311

USS LIBERTY INJURED PERSONNEL

RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
CT1	349 53 80	Fracture 5th Metatarsal Right foot	54 days	none
CT2	774 03 93	Sprain, left ankle	10 days	none
CT3	771 76 77	Contusions & Abrasions, mult. Shrapnel wounds, multiple	5 days	none
FA	B51 81 55	Laceration 5th digit, lt hand	none	none
FN	699 53 81	Contusions and abrasions multiple	3 days	none
CT1	486 30 12	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	1 week	none
CTSN	B40 15 47	Laceration, right hand	none	none
CTSN	139 55 74	Shrapnel wounds	5 days	none
CTSN	998 13 79	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	1 week	none
Lieutenant	625125/1610	Flash burns, face & arms, multiple lacerations & contusions	1 day	none
CT1	521 38 68	Puncture wounds, rt & lt hands	none	none
FN	B10 22 23	Contusions and abrasions, right leg	none	none
Civilian		Shrap wnds, multi, soft tissue, back burns, 1st & 2nd degree, lt forearm	5 days	none
CT2	774 27 59	Burn, first degree right knee	none	none
CS3	796 37 68	lacerations, multiple, both hands	1 week	none
NM3	998 19 47	Burn, first degree, left forearm	none	none
FN	795 91 61	Shrapnel wound, rt. hand	none	none
FN	779 52 59	Laceration, third digit, left hand	none	none


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


NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
	CT2	796 85 28	Contusions & abrasions left thigh	3 days	none
	CT3	913 41 23	Shrapnel wounds 1st & 2nd degree burns, hands, bilateral mult abras, contu,	5 days	none
	MNC	454 62 63	Lacerations, multiple burns, 1st & 2nd degree	1 week	none
	BT3	796 69 65	Multiple shrapnel wounds with keloid formation	1 day	none
	YN3	794 23 49	Flash burns, first degree, facial	9 days	none
	BT3	696 29 20	Lacerations, fifth digit right hand	none	none
	CT3	918 25 70	Contusions and abrasions right forearm	none	none
	FN	290 54 86	Shrapnel wound, left thigh	39 days	none
	CT1	444 13 12	Contusions, left leg	none	none
	CS3	B10 42 33	Cervical sprain	34 days	none
	CT1	535 14 85	Contusions and abrasions multiple	1 week	none
	CT3	794 84 55	Shrapnel wounds multiple	53 days	none
	SN	796 40 74	Abrasion and contusion left knee	none	none
	CT2	686 66 82	Abrasions & contusions, rt. forearm, & lac. 1st digit, rt hand	1 week	none
	CT2	353 80 14	Shrapnel wound, lt ankle & abrasions, multi, both forearms	14 days	none
	SN	771 04 56	Gunshot and shrapnel wounds multiple, left leg & back	62 days	Permanent Partial
	FN	674 38 09	Gunshot and shrapnel wounds multiple, ocular rupture	none	none
	SN	997 59 71	Contusion and abrasion right leg	none	none
	MMFN	998 07 12			

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NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
	CTSN	B20 04 91	Burn, 1st degree, rt foot & contusion, rt knee	none	none
	CTSN	B60 44 52	Lumbo-sacral strain	10 days	Temporary
	SN2	683 33 65	Gunshot and shrapnel wounds, multiple	47 days	none
	CT2	699 64 72	Contusions, multiple both arms	none	none
	CT2	599 79 51	Puncture wound, rt thigh & contusion of buttocks	7 days	none
	SH3	546 83 16	Abrasion, left calf	none	none
	HM2	599 67 51	Lacerations and burns, 1st degree, lt forearm	none	none
	CTSN	794 04 69	Contusions and abrasions, multiple	1 day	none
	SN	851 36 48	Contusion, left knee	none	none
	CT1	992 69 34	Contusions, right thigh	none	none
	CT2	914 81 10	Puncture wound, multiple left calf & thigh	7 days	none
	Lieutenant	653848/1615	Comminuted fracture, left femur Shrapnel wounds, multiple	7 months	none
	SN	917 66 74	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	1 day	none
	CT3	771 37 90	Lacerations, left hand & thigh	5 days	none
	RD3	794 71 33	Abrasions & contusions, right arm	none	none
	Lieutenant	574328/6302	Multiple lacerations, abrasions	none	none
	CTSN	B80 56 19	Abrasions & contusions, multiple	none	none
	YN3	697 82 42	Contusion, sacro-iliac	5 days	none
	CT3	118 73 49	Contusion, right thigh	none	none

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RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
GMG3	696 84 98	Shrapnel & gunshot wounds, multiple, rt pneumothorax	34 days	temporary
SN	918 44 65	Abrasions & contusions, multiple	none	none
CT2	685 56 42	Shrapnel wound, rt hand	none	none
SH2	609 22 48	Gunshot & shrapnel wounds, multiple	8 months	none
CT3	692 96 29	Shrapnel wounds, multiple, superficial	5 days	none
FN	R10 43 15	Abrasions & contusions, both arms	none	none
SN	639 15 99	Shrapnel & gunshot wounds, multiple	56 days	none
CTZ	794 91 41	Shrapnel wound back of neck, slight concussion	14 days	none
CT3	997 32 29	Shrapnel wound left lower leg and sprain left ankle	14 days	none
CTSN	918 51 32	Shrapnel wounds, lower extremities, both, & rt ilio-inguinal region	47 days	none
FA	B50 76 36	Sprain, rt ankle, & contusions both knees	14 days	none
BT3	773 86 89	Contusions, multiple, both legs	none	none
Lieutenant	710107/2105	Lacerations, multiple	7 days	none
CTSN	918 81 30	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	5 days	none
SA	998 70 04	Contusion, Scalp	none	none
FN	354 32 98	Sprain, left ankle	10 days	none
CT3	538 49 74	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	42 days	none
SN	779 57 61	Puncture wound, fifth digit right hand	none	none
CT1	539 00 34	Contusions and abrasions, multiple, both legs	5 days	none

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NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
SN	779 56 36	Shrapnel & gunshot wounds multiple	55 days	Permanent Partial	
CTC	518 69 45	lacerations, right hand, & contusions, back	5 days	none	
CT2	777 52 31	Puncture wounds, multiple	none	none	
ENFN	914 73 89	Fracture, simple, proximal tip, left tibia	20 days	Temporary	
SNSN	771 54 02	Laceration, right thumb rt forearm & scalp	5 days	none	
CTSN	914 59 44	Contusions & abrasions, multiple, shrapnel wounds, mult.	9 days	none	
FM3	773 35 21	Perforated bowel, hemothorax compound fracture, left patella	90 days	none	
SN	917 49 31	Shrapnel wound upper back	4 days	none	
CT1	594 81 55	Compound fracture, left lower leg, pneumothorax, rt lung, shrap wd scalp	7 months	none	
LCDR	584572/1610	Bilateral tympanic membrane perforations, traumatic, tattooing, face	89 days	none	
CT2	776 10 30	Fractured right incisor	none	Permanent Partial	
SSGT, USMC	1859856	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	5 days	none	
CT2	692 84 63	Lacerations, 4th & 5th digits, right hand	none	none	
FN	769 18 83	Contusions, multiple, Both knees	none	none	
Ensign	710515/1105	Multiple shrapnel injuries facial nerve palsy	14 days	Permanent Partial	
FN	916 29 05	Contusions, multiple both legs	5 days	none	
TN	776 98 09	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	27 days	none	
CT2	695 14 21	Contusions, multiple, face left ankle, right hand	5 days	none	
SN	998 21 92	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	28 days	none	

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NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
Bl	CTC	345 19 52	Contusions & abrasions multiple	5 days	none
	CTSN	B11 44 21	Lacerations, left hand and left knee	none	none
	SN	919 61 90	Laceration, third digit, left hand	none	none
	CT3	795 25 54	Contusions, multiple, both legs	5 days	none
	CT2	774 71 98	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	14 days	none
	CDR	494467/1100	Mult shrapnel & concussion Synovitis rt knee, hemorrhage, lac. sup. saph-vein, shock lacerations, multiple	21 days	none
	CTSN	B61 44 71	both hands	7 days	none
	SMSN	B71 04 56	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	5 days	none
	CT2	771 42 03	Contusions & abrasions, multiple shrapnel wounds, multiple	5 days	none
	FN	354 88 36	Burn, 1st degree, left elbow, laceration, left hand	none	none
	CT3	B40 65 88	Pematomas, both legs	none	none
	SF1	430 77 24	Contusions & abrasions both hands	5 days	none
	BT3	776 08 93	Contusion, left hand	none	none
	Lieutenant	671765/1616	Contusion, right kidney	3 months	none
	BT2	549 85 64	Contusion, right hand	none	none
	CT2	904 28 51	Contusions & abrasions multiple	5 days	none
	CTSN	B60 58 17	Contusions & abrasions both legs	5 days	none

NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
	SN	793 34 78	Contusions & abrasions multiple	7 days	none
	LT(jg)	692274/1105	Laceration, right hand hematoma, right flank	2 days	none
	CTSN	138 54 18	Burn 2nd degree, right hand	none	none
	CS3	904 30 77	Laceration, left hand	none	none
	SN	796 66 15	Skull fracture (multiple gunshot & shrapnel wounds)	28 days	none
	CT2	772 94 77	Laceration, left wrist	none	none
	CTSN	797 04 78	Laceration, left leg	none	none
	SK3	776 62 83	Contusion, left leg	none	none
	GMGSN	794 09 20	Contusions & abrasions, multiple, shrapnel wounds	7 days	none
	CT1	535 73 10	Shrapnel wound, right thigh, contusions, right arm	3 days	none
	Q13	353 95 47	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	9 days	none
	CT2	778 80 00	Laceration, right parietal scalp	none	none
	SKSN	917 37 39	Hematoma, left knee	none	none
	SN	137 51 83 796 43 22	Contusions & abrasions multiple	5 days	none
	BT3	119 90 38	Laceration, left knee	none	none
	IC1	517 81 45	Shrapnel wound, rt forearm	9 days	none
	SN	B12 40 15	Contusion, scalp	none	none
	SN	913 50 66	Gunshot & shrapnel wounds multiple, shrapnel frag, skull	5 months	temporary

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	NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
CT1			458 48 03	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	7 days	none
SN			B40 67 53	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	20 days	none
CTSN			778 80 10	Puncture wound, left wrist	9 days	none
EN3			694 00 58	Contusions & abrasions multiple	7 days	none
EN			B60 64 72	Contusion, right knee	none	none
CT2			542 55 84	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	7 days	none
IN3			353 96 33	Laceration, upper back	none	none
CT3			695 94 86	Contusions & abrasions multiple - shrapnel wounds	7 days	none
CTSN			904 39 56	Shrapnel wound, left ant. thigh	9 days	none
FN			917 52 08	Contusions, multiple both arms	none	none
CT3			777 58 53	Laceration dorsum, right hand Shrapnel wounds, multiple	35 days	temporary
SN			912 94 00 916 90 00	Gunshot and shrapnel wounds, multiple	30 days	none
DC3 646N			777 19 71	Contusions & abrasions multiple	7 days	none
CTSN			915 31 02	Traumatic arthritis, left knee	7 days	none
SH3			918 04 37	Lacerations multiple. both hands	14 days	none
CT2			776 28 26	Laceration, right shoulder	none	none
SN			698 89 13	Shrapnel wounds, multiple	63 days	none
BT3			B70 41 42	Multiple contusions both arms	7 days	none

B6

63
63

NAME	RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
	CT3	775 06 25	Lumbo sacral strain	5 days	none
	CT2	795 24 58	Multiple abrasions & contusions, both legs	7 days	none
Tom	Ensign	6869116/3105	Multiple shrapnel wounds legs, left hand	8 days	Temporary
	CT3	789 48 42	Multiple abrasions & contusions, lumbo sacral strain	2 days	none
	CTC	471 37 37	Shrapnel wounds, left forearm and flank	none	none
	MR3	688 22 63	Lumbo sacral & servical back strain	10 days	Temporary
	ET3	770 11 63	Fracture left radius, comminuted Shrapnel wounds, multiple	7 months	none
	FN	354 51 55	Contusions, chest and left arm	5 days	none
	STP3	773 22 68	Laceration, right hand	none	none
	SK2	370 92 58	Lumbo sacral strain	5 days	none
	HN1	298 39 72	Laceration, right hand	none	none
	CTSN	B50 34 20	Laceration, left hand	none	none
	CTSN	916 67 27	Laceration, right hand	none	none
	SN	775 67 19	Lacerations, multiple right hand	none	none
	BN3	775 76 78	Gunshot & shrapnel wounds, multiple	10 months	Permanent Partial
	CTSN	F40 69 13	Lacerations, both hands	14 days	none
	LT(jg)	699039/1105	Contusions & abrasions, multiple	7 days	none
	SN	999 88 63	Fragment wnd, abdomen Shrapnel wounds, multiple	5 months	none
	CS2	428 92 84	Contusions & abrasions, right flank	none	none

B6


64
64

RANK/RATE	SERVICE NO.	DIAGNOSIS	ESTIMATED LOST TIME	ESTIMATED DISABILITY
CT2	694 46 31	Contusions & abrasions multiple	7 days	none
SN	529 34 49	Compound fracture, 1st left metacarpal, shrap & gunshot wads	10 months	none
CTSN	796 87 55	Abrasion, left hand	none	none
CTSN	B40 63 62	Contusions & abrasions multiple, right leg	none	none
CT3	917 0836	Laceration left thumb	None	None


* Patient Still Hospitalized



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360



IN REPLY REFER TO
AGTR-5
Ser 527-1450
SEP 1967



From: Commander Naval Ship Systems Command
To : Judge Advocate General

Subj: Claims Pertaining to USS LIBERTY-(AGTR-5)

Ref : (a) CNM ltr MAT 09C:ETK of 21 August 1967 w/encl.

- Encl:
- (1) COMSERVLANT memo of 29 August 1967
 - (2) COMNAVSHIPYD NORVA ltr AGTR-5/4710 Ser 0196 of 29 August 1967
 - (3) Copy of fixed price Contract No. N62678-67-C-0018
 - (4) NAVSEC (Code 06R) memo Ser 06R-452 of 28 August 1967
 - (5) CO, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) ltr AGTR-5/4010 Ser 433 of 30 August 1967
 - (6) Sworn Statement of Mr. Paul T. Saari, NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ, Code 527

1. Reference (a) requested this Command to furnish the Judge Advocate General with cost estimates for the repair of damages inflicted upon USS LIBERTY by Israeli Air and Naval units on 8 June 1967.

2. The estimated cost of restoring USS LIBERTY and its equipment to the same condition prior to the attack on 8 June 1967 is \$5,424,202. The following is a breakdown of this estimate:

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| a. Actual Cost of Repairs Completed at Malta - enclosure (1). | 162,608 |
| b. Actual Cost of Norfolk Navy Shipyard Personnel Travel to Malta - enclosure (2). | 7,000 |
| c. Actual Cost of Oil Removal from Bulkheads and Overhead - enclosure (3). | 9,750 |
| d. Estimated Cost of Electronic Systems Restoration - enclosure (4). | 3,901,187 |
| e. Estimated Cost of Hull, Mechanical and Electrical Damage - enclosure (2). | 1,261,459 |
| f. Estimated Replacement Cost of Equipage, Allowance Items, Consumables, etc. - enclosure (5). | 141,656 |
| g. Estimated Cost of Labor Expended by LIBERTY Personnel in Excess of Normal Duties at a Rate of \$5.00 per hour. | 128,500 |

7 SEP 1967

App. E to Encl. (1) of JAG End JAG:131.1:DBB:as
Ser: 00010 of


66
66

AGTR-5
Ser 527-1450

3. It is noted that the actual cost of restoring and repairing the LIBERTY and its equipment will probably be increased by an undetermined amount because of the following conditions:

- a. The Norfolk Navy Shipyard estimates (enclosure 2) are based on current labor and overhead rates which are continuing to escalate.
- b. The replacement costs (enclosure 4) of the electronic equipment destroyed by the attack are based on 1964 prices plus escalation. However, these models are no longer available and new equipment to provide the same capability is considerably more expensive.
- c. The cost to eliminate the rubbing of the shaft, indicated in enclosure (2), cannot be determined until tests and inspections are made.
- d. The Shipyard estimates (enclosure 2) for the repair of the ship's electrical system include the correction of only known damage at this time. The remaining tests to be conducted will probably uncover further damage.

4. This Command recommends that consideration be given to providing for a second payment to cover the above probable increases when the exact cost figures are known.



Copy to:
CHNAVMAT W/ENCL.
CNO (OP-04) W/ENCL.
CNO (OP-03) W/ENCL.
CNO (OP-94) W/ENCL.

E. A. GRANTHAM
Deputy Commander for
Fleet Maintenance & Logistics

Commander Service Force
U. S. Atlantic Fleet
Norfolk, Va. 23511

29 August 1967

MEMORADNUM FOR COMMANDER, NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND

Subj: USS LIBERTY (AGTR5) battle damage repairs; cost of


Encl: (1) Copy of Malta Drydocks invoice ser 3235 of July 1967

1. Enclosure (1) is a breakdown of the repairs accomplished by Malta Drydocks during the period 14 June 1967 to 14 July 1967 in order to make USS LIBERTY (AGTR5) seaworthy for transit to CONUS. Certain items in enclosure (1) are not associated with battle damage repairs as outlined below:

Invoice price	\$163,564.50
Less non-battle damage repairs exceptions	
Item 128	\$140.00
Item 505	532.00
Item 510	42.00
Item 512	32.00
Item 810	24.00
Item 811	10.00
Item 812	176.00
	<u>\$956.00</u>

Total cost of temporary battle damage repairs: \$162,608.50.

2. It is certified that the costs outlined in enclosure (1) are those actually paid and that the estimates for the "exception" items are reasonable and just.



C.B. SWAYNE
Ass't Chief of Staff
(Maintenance)

Enclosure (1) to NAVSHIPS
Ser 527-1450

68
68

ENCLOSURE (1)

CATEGORY	ESTIMATED VALUE
Storeroom Items - Repair Parts, etc.	\$37,560.00
Clothing, Bedding, etc.	
Protective Clothing	5,050.00
Bedding	2,542.00
Crews clothing	2,000.00
	<u>\$9,592.00</u>
Office Machinery, Supplies	
Typewriters, Adding Machines	
Safe, supplies, etc.	\$13,662.00
	<u>\$13,662.00</u>
Cleaning Gear	
Vacuum Cleaner	\$80.00
Swabs, brooms, etc.	76.00
	<u>\$156.00</u>
Damage Control and Lifesaving Gear	
Life Preservers	\$1,417.00
Rafts	\$27,360.00
Motor Whale Boat	10,000.00
Hoses	560.00
Phones and PA System	1,433.00
Repair party apparatus	1,180.00
Fire Extinguishers, etc.	1,575.00
OBA Cannisters	89.00
Lights	260.00
Shoring, wedges, etc.	500.00
Misc.	235.00
	<u>\$44,609.00</u>
Medical Equipment and Supplies	\$940.00
Navigational Gear:	
Binoculars	\$1650.00
Compasses, bearing circles, etc.	\$2053.00
Signal Flags	607.00
Signal Lights	300.00
	<u>\$4610.00</u>
Weapons:	
.50 Cal. Machine Guns	\$16,000.00
Small Arms	233.00
	<u>\$16,233.00</u>
Fuel and Oil	\$3,115.00
Misc.	
Lines	\$6,140.00
Vehicle	1,300.00
Special Services Equipment	2,051.00
Still Picture Proj.	365.00
Multimeter	118.00
Point	780.00
Mess Utensils	75.00
Carpenter Shop Equipment	350.00
	<u>\$11,179.00</u>

ENCLOSURE (1)

ENCLOSURE (1)

Grand total of Ship's allowance material lost
and/or damaged beyond repair as a result of
Israeli attack on LIBERTY 8 June 1967

\$141,656.00*

*Above total estimates do not include portable electronics test equipment
which will be included in the listing of electronics equipment destroyed
to be submitted separately.

Manhours expended in debris removal, fire and security watches, and resto-
ration of habitability of ship in excess of that normally required to main-
tain health and cleanliness standards:

25,000 man/hrs.

Inventorying, packing, and shipping
of personal effects:
Restowage of Storerooms:

500 man/hrs
200 man/hrs
700 total man/hrs

Total man hours expended:

25,700 man/hrs

The undersigned solemnly swears that to the best of his knowledge and belief the individuals who prepared the detailed estimates enclosed herewith are recognized and regularly employed as experts in the field of naval repair, construction, and planning.

Paul T. Saari

PAUL T. SAARI
Naval Architect
Naval Ship Systems Command
Code 527

Subscribed and sworn to before me this thirty first day of August, 1967.

Ira W. Blair

IRA W. BLAIR
Commander U.S. Navy
Director of Auxiliary Ships Maintenance

My commission expires at the pleasure
of the President of the United States

Enclosure (6) to NAVSHIPS
Ser 527- 1450

71
71

CABLES TO:
DRYDOCKS MALTA
BENTLEY'S SECOND PHRASE CODE
TELEPHONE:
MALTA CENTRAL 22451
22491
TELEX ML 211

NSY
NSY
16006/67

Serial No. 1033

July 1967

TO CAPTAIN, OWNERS AND ALL CONCERNED IN:-

G.S.S. 10000

Dr. to
MALTA DRYDOCKS
(BAILEY (MALTA) LIMITED)

Registered Office:

THE DOCKS, MALTA G.C.

MANAGING AGENTS:

SWAN, HUNTER & WIGHAM RICHARDSON LTD.

Repairs Commenced 14. 6. 67
Repairs Completed 14. 7. 67

REMARKS

Vessel docked, undocked and including
1st day dues.

1157 30

Vessel docked 14. 6. 67
Vessel undocked 14. 7. 67

G.S.S. 6,000

Thirty (30) subsequent day drydock
dues.

The following work was carried out
as directed:-

100 100 100

1002 -

101

Manufactured and supplied navy type 110
bags and tarpaulin. (100 110 bags and 60' x 30'
tarpaulin).

2979 -

102

To weld approx. 100 in No. steel couplers
average size 12" x 12" x 3/16"

1000 -

103

To remove approx. 100 feet guard coil wire.

451

104

Remove approx. 10 in No. side couplers
average size 16" diam. x 3/4"

1001

47

1000

30

ENCLOSURE (2)

72
72

U.S.S. LEXINGTON

B/P

1943

50

103 104 105

104

Repair approx. 12 in No. 8/T doors and chalk test on completion.

1282

105

Renew approx. 6 in No. 8/T doors complete with frames.

5995

106

Renew approx. 12 in No. mesh wire gratings.

257

107

To clean, wirebrush, apply one (1) coat under coat approx. 500 sq. yds damaged paint work (superstructure). Final coat to be applied to entire topsides including decks and mast (paint M.D.D. supply).

9875

108

To crop 4 in No. miscellaneous storages damaged beyond repairs.

82

109

Manufacture 6 in No. galv. or H/3 boxes without lid, but with 2 handles 18" x 18" x 30" high.
4 in No. 1/2" holes to be drilled in bottom.

271

110

Remove all traces of oil from shipside and clean internally in way of damage, removing all crissings, also hose down No. 2 Deck.

4267

Supply Services of T.C.V. Bardsey. To remove Oil/Water from following Tanks. Clean internally and gas free.

- 5 - 52 - 2 - F
- 5 - 52 - 0 - F
- 5 - 52 - 1 - F
- 5 - 57 - 2 - F
- 5 - 50 - 1 - Q
- 5 - 57 - 0 - F
- 5 - 57 - 1 - F

16377

111

To manufacture and fit 1 in No. inflatable liferaft storage complete with quick-release gear, approx. size 15' x 5'.

243

112

Supply the following to the Engineer officer:-

- 5 doz. pairs overalls.
- 3 doz. pairs gloves.
- 3 doz. pairs sea boots.

2659

C/P

59432

50

ENCLOSURE (2)

73

13

U.S.S. LIBERTY

B/7

50402

50

120. JMS ED.

113

Supply the Services of Min No. covered lorries (with drivers) at U.S.N. disposal as required.

114

Replace lifeboat stbd side aft., holes in 10 in plates. Fibre glass patching to be carried out in situ and lifeboat water tested on completion.

115

To supply 1 in 11. 50 gall. drum of diesel oil and 1 drum 50 galls high octane gasoline and 4 in No. jerrycans filled with 2 gallons of gasoline each.

116

Main derrick part aft. purchase wire to be resecured.

117

HYDROGRAPHING DAMAGE SURV. SINE 50 - 73 STATIONS

(a) Take four (4) shots at different angle and supply 10 in No. of each, large sizes prints.

(b) Take shots as instructed during various stages of repair and supply 4 in No. of each, large sizes prints.

(c) Supply 2 in No. colour films (20 exposures).

DECK REPAIRS

(1) 1st Deck:-

Deck part removed bet. 57 - 62	22' x 13' x 3/8"
2 in No. deck beams removed.	9' x 4" x 1/2"
x 10' angle each.	
Insert fitted on deck	24" x 24" x 3/8"
Insert fitted on deck	36" x 36" x 3/8"
Lower part of 5 in No. divisional blind turned for access to deck plating.	2' x 25'
Deep girder part removed (stbd)	10' x 3/4" x 24"
Deep girder part removed (face plate)	10' x 1 1/2" x 19"

2nd Deck:-

No. 52 Transverse blind. part removed.	36' x 87' x 3/8"
No. 52 Transverse blind. insert fitted.	24" x 24" x 3/8"
11 in No. angle stiffeners on blind removed	40 x 6" x 1/2" x 10'
5 in No. brackets on stiffeners to deck removed.	15" x 12" x 3/8"
Deck part removed bet. 52 - 63	36' x 22' x 3/8"

ENCLOSURE (2)

C/7

6109

50

U.S.S. LIBERTY

8 in No. deck beams removed.	9" x 4" x 1/2" x 19' angle each.
Deep girder part removed (stbd)	16' x 25" x 3/8"
Deep Girder part removed face plate	14' x 19" x 1/2"
Deep beam on No. 53 frame removed.	20' x 25" x 3/4"
Face plate	16' x 19" x 1/2"
8 in No. webs on beam and Girder	23" x 18" x 1/2"
3 in No. girders removed bet 52 - 53	9" x 4" x 1/2" x 18' angle each.
Deck faired bet. 52-53 (Centre line)	20' x 10' area.
Insert fitted on deck bet 53-54	6' x 13" x 3/8"
Insert fitted on deck bet 55 - 57	18" x 18" x 3/8"
No. 60 Transverse bulkhead removed	62' x 19" x 1/4"
18 in No. T bars on same removed	5" x 6" x 1/4" x 10' each.
Centre line pillar removed 11 bar	16" x 8' x 1/2 in No.
	12" x 8' x 3/4"
	1 in No.
2 in No. longi. bulkhead burned off	10' x 20' each.
No. 60 transverse bulkhead.	10' x 19'

(b) LOWER DECK

Longi. bulkhead on stbd side removed bet 52 - 60	24' x 5" x 14' x 1/4"
Centre line bulkhead removed bet 52 - 60	24'5" x 14' x 1/4"
Longi. bulkhead part side part removed bet 52 - 60	24'3" x 8' x 1/4"
No. 60 transverse bulkhead part removed.	56' x 14' x 1/4"
6 in No. T bars on Centre line bulkhead.	3 1/2" x 8 1/2" x 14' (each)
7 in No. T bars on longi bulkhead stbd	5 1/2" x 6 1/2" x 14' (")
12 in No. T bars on No. 60 bulkhead	5 1/2" x 8 1/2" x 14' (")
3 in No. channel bars on 52 bulkhead	7" x 3 1/2" x 12" x 3 1/2" x 14'
1 in No. angle on No. 52 bulkhead	3" x 4" x 9" x 14'
Insert fitted on No. 64 bulkhead	42" x 25" x 3/8"
2 in No. T bars on 60 bulkhead part removed.	6" x 10" x 3/8" x 4' (each).
3 in No. brackets on 64 bulkhead to deck	20" x 11" x 3/8" x 5" flg. (each)
Tank top part removed 1st strake (stbd)	14' x 30" x 1/2"
Tanktop part removed 2nd & 3rd strakes) stbd)	11' x 23" x 3/8"
Margin plate bet. 53 - 64 removed	30' x 35" x 1/2"
Insert fitted on tank topbet 53 - 59	44" x 24" x 1/2"
59 - 60	13' x 33" x 1/2"
60 - 61	87" x 36" x 1/2"
No. 53 floor part removed	60" x 48" x 1/2"
No. 57 - 59 - 60 & 61 floors removed faired refitted.	60" x 48" x 1/2" each

ENCLOSURE (2)

U.S.S. LIBERTY

(c) STAFFORD SIDE

J strake removed bet 53 - 68 7'6" x 41" x 3/4"
 H 53 - 68 6'5" x 53" x 3/4"
 G 53 - 68 7'6" x 51" x 3/4"
 F 53 - 68 5'9" x 51" x 3/4"
 E 53 - 68 6'9" x 51" x 3/4"

Nos. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and
 64 frames removed from tank top to 1st deck.

1/2" x 9" x 4" x 27"
 angle each (shaped)

No. 65 & 66 frames removed bet 1st and 2nd decks

1/2" x 9" x 4" x 10"

No. 58 web frame removed

36" x 27" x 1/2"

Face plate

12" x 27" x 3/4"

3 in No. webs on 58 frame

11" x 35" x 1/2" (each)

2 in No. diamond plates fitted on

No. 58 web

frame to deep beam on 1st and 2nd decks 36" x 36" x 3/4"

2 in No. doubler fitted on No. 58 frame

to deep beam on 1st and 2nd decks. 11" x 33" x 3/4"

10 in No. brackets on margin plate

to frames 53 - 63

1/2" x 6" x 3" x 4" fl. each.

10 in No. brackets on frames Nos.

53 - 63 to 2nd deck removed. 1/2" x 15" x 12" each

15 in No. brackets on frames

Nos. 53 - 66 to 1st deck removed. 1/2" x 15" x 12" each

75775

120 Jan 20.

119

To remove approx. 20 tons of miscellaneous
 lockers, fitting elect. cable, pipes etc.
 (removals in connection with item 118)

359

120

To carry out daily check of ships form
 whilst vessel is in dock.

1026

121

To supply 100 fathoms of 1 1/2" rope as per
 pattern supplied.

270

122

Laundry arrangements.

733

123

New structure - 1 coat red lead to be
 applied as indicated and oiled.

375

124

New shell plating (damage repairs)
 all external welding to be X rayed).

516

125

To investigate oil leaks between 82 - 83
 stationscbl.

Survey report forwarded.

74

C/F

140518

50

ENCLOSURE (2)

76
 76

Job No

B/F 149518 50

126

Four (4) mast wires to be renewed.

127

Consequence on Item 116 (Damage repairs)
Now shall plating to be painted externally i.e. 4 coats
anti-corrosive paints (alternate colour) and 1
coat antifouling.

1579

128

... 1/2 in circ. water inlet gaskets, 2 in No.
securing lugs and bolts to be fitted.

149

129

To fit a welded doubler 15" x 6" x 1/4"
(in connection with Job No. 125)

150

500

Renew approx 80ft miscellaneous upper deck
piping.

25

501

In way of funnel damage, fit approx 24 in No.
welded doublers, average size 12" x 12" x 1/16"

502

Supply on land the following to the
Engineer Officers:

650

2 in No. salvage pumps

4 in No. air extractor fans.

503

To remove from deck bottom approx 20 tons
of miscellaneous scrap.

150

504

OK Rejected during actual
To shop overhaul and test on completion
1 in No. steam fire/flushing manifold pump.

2576

505

To cut keyways in 1 1/2" diam shaft.

532

The following work to be carried out in
connection with damage repairs (Item 116)
as indicated by Mr. Hardison.

20

506

Diesel oil supply and return for diesel
generator.

507

Salt water discharge from diesel generator.

600

508

Air escape and sounding tubes to fuel tanks.

550

509

55 lbs Steam supply and drains.

85

510

Feed pump shaft coupling to be machined as
instructed.

1226

42

C/F 149765 50

ENCLOSURE (2)

77
77

M.D.D.
Job. No.

B/Y

148765

50

511

Forecastle Deck
Exhaust pipe to aux. Generator to be
relogged.

512

To manufacture 1 in No. gear wheel as per
pattern

513

(60) C.O.2 bottles to be externally
cleaned or oil and recharged

803

Overhaul ^{two} 20 in No. gyro repeaters.

804

Overhaul and fix emergency steering bimble.

805

Gyro compass to have cartongiles removed.

806

To shop overhaul and test on completion
1 in No. emergency fire pump motor.

807

Salt water circ. pump motor to be shop
overhauled.

The following work to be carried out
in connection with damage repairs (Item 112) as
indicated by Mr. Harrison.

808

Cable glands in W/T structure to be made
good.

809

Electric lighting to be installed.

810

To manufacture 2 in No. coils as per pattern
(for U.S.S. Chikashio)

811

To rewind 1 in No. solenoid coil as per
pattern (for U.S.S. Chikashio).

812

Vent fan motor to be shop overhauled.

SERVICES PROVIDED

Hire of tug provided for docking, undocking
and departure of vessel.

Services of firewatchmen provided on board
vessel for duration of repairs.

Service of qualified chemist provided
certifying vessel free from gas. Tests carried
out and certificates issued during repairs.

Cables laid, connected up to vessel, and
shore electric power supplied during repairs.
Cables disconnected and removed on completion.
48621 EMI @ \$0.05 per unit.

C/Y

157060

50

ENCLOSURE 2

78
78

U.S.S. LIBERTY

Temporary electric lighting installed and service maintained during repairs. Cables disconnected and removed on completion.

840

Shore telephone installed on board for ships use. Service maintained during repairs, disconnected and removed prior to vessels departure.

84

Hoses laid, connected up to vessel and firemain water supplied. Service maintained during repairs, disconnected and removed on completion.

420

Hoses rigged and coupled up. Circulating cooling water supplied to refrigeration machinery. Hoses uncoupled and removed on completion.

420

One thousand six hundred (1600) tons of fresh water supplied to vessel.

960

Shore steam supplied to vessel for duration of repairs.

3760

Garbage removed and disposed of daily.

420

\$

16250 50

N.B. THIS ACCOUNT IS EXPRESSED IN AID IS PAYABLE IN DOLLARS

ENCLOSURE (2)



EC

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA 23709

In reply refer to
AGTR5/4710(214)
Ser: 0196

29 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard
To: Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command

Subj: Cost Estimate to restore, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) to original configuration

Ref: (a) Your 241520Z Aug 67

Encl: (1) Certification of estimator's ability
(2) Certification by Estimators

1. As requested by reference (a), estimates have been prepared for repair of all battle damages inflicted on the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) by aircraft and naval units.

2. A breakdown of the estimates is furnished in enclosure (2). Totals for specific areas are:

a. Structural	\$238,887
b. Electrical	\$525,731
c. Piping	\$93,620
d. Sheet metal	\$235,838
e. Machinery	\$50,108
f. Temporary Services and dry docking	\$117,275
g. Total	\$1,261,459

3. Above dollar figures are computed on the basis of current Norfolk Naval Shipyard labor and overhead rate of approximately \$60 per man day. Above machinery estimate includes only inspection and alignment check of shafting, reduction gears and turbines. Problems have been reported with rubbing of shaft after attack, but scope of repairs are unknown until above inspection is completed.

4. Estimates do not include costs of electronic equipment, antenna or allowance items, such as life boats, mattresses, blankets, pillows, etc. Also not included is cost of repairs made at Malta which are considered permanent repairs.

5. In addition to above estimates, five Norfolk Naval Shipyard personnel inspected the LIBERTY in Malta at a cost of \$7,000 which has been paid by the Type Commander.

J. A. Sisson

J. A. SISSON
By Direction Enclosure (2) to NAYSHIPS
Ser 527-1450

80
80

1E-
NAVAL MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

JAG

RUC ONE
R 201620Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO USCINCEUR
CNO

CIO: N
UNCLASSIFIED

COURT OF INQUIRY USS LIBERTY (U)
A. USS LIBERTY 032028Z JUN 67
B. USS LIBERTY 002050Z JUN 67

1. AS A RESULT OF FOLLOW-UP ACTION, IT WAS
DETERMINED THAT REPLY A AND B WERE
LIBERTY TO NAVSECGRU DPT WROCCO, MSG
040359Z AND 050530Z RESPECTIVELY. THERE IS NO
THAT EITHER MESSAGE WAS REPLIED INTO COMNAV 11

3. THE TWO MESSAGES IN QUESTION ARE QUOTED
QUOTE:

P 032028Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO JCS
CNO

CONFIDENTIAL
CONCLANT
CONCLANTFLT
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRUALNT
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCIN
NFC
NSAECR
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRMED

61
611
613
615

61 ...ACT
SN OPA 00 09 33 06 92 94 940 00 NDBC 1P

App. A to Encl. (1) of JAG End JAG:131.1:
DBB:as, Ser: 00010 of

NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF REPLY	DATE
164/1/PD	1	1	3	23/19512	11/1/67

81
81

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE

CTT 60
CTT 64
NAVCOMMET MOROCCO
CONFIDENTIAL
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
BTREP/POSIT

1. 032400Z9 POSIT 37-10N1 004-08E1 1000 01 01 01
EASTERLY 15 KTS.

2. TRSSCOM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AGAIN OVERHEATED.
BEYOND CAPACITY OF SHIP'S FORCE TO REPAIR.
PARTS RECEIVED NEXT PORT OF CALL. REPAIRS
TRSSCOM CASREP SEPARATELY.

GP4
BT UNQUOTE
QUOTE
P 043050Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO JCS

CNC
CINCLANT
CINCLANFLT
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
CONSERVLANT
CONSERVCON EIGHT
USCINCEUR
NFOC3
NSAECR
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRMED
CTT 60
CTT 64
NAVCOMMET MOROCCO
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
BTREP/POSIT

1. 042400Z0 POSIT 37-10N1 004-08E1 1000 01 01 01
UNTT 050130Z1 1000 01 01 01

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT
035084/1/P0	2		3	0400Z

UNCLASSIFIED

82

p2

32

32

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

4. REQUEST A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE BE INCLUDED IN THE
OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY AS EXHIBIT 48.

GP-4

done
WJ

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	FILE NO.	FILE
C35084/17P0	3		3		

SECTION

33

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83

33

CERTIFICATION OF ESTIMATORS' ABILITY

I certify that the below listed planers and estimators are qualified through experience to prepare estimates to accomplish work in their area of technical specialty:

Robert V. Watkins
Kenneth E. Dice
Bonnie L. Hardison
Jack S. Grimes
Frank Harrington
Joseph M. Piland

Structural
Electrical
Piping
Sheetmetal
Machinery
Temporary Services

Jonathan A. Sisson
Jonathan A. Sisson
Planning and Estimating
Superintendent

Enclosure (1)

STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES

1. Structural repairs main deck and above including holes and dents in shell plating above water line.

Labor: 2788 mandays Matl: \$13,545 Total: \$179,487

2. Structural repairs below main deck in torpedo damage area.

Labor: 918 mandays Matl: \$4,760 Total: \$59,400

I certify that the above estimates have been prepared to the best of my ability and constitute reasonably accurate estimates to perform the stated tasks.

Robert V. Watkins

Robert V. Watkins

Enclosure (2) page 1

85
p5

ELECTRICAL ESTIMATES

1. Replace cabling and equipment main deck and above with exception of cost of antennas and AN/SPS-10 equipment.

Labor: 1308 mandays Matl: \$21,480 Total: \$100,568

2. Install cable and electronics equipment in crypto 1 and 2 and research room number 1 not including hook up of electrical equipment in research room number 1.

Labor: 4380 mandays Matl: \$43,815 Total: \$301,170

3. Install power, lighting and I.C. equipment in crypto 1 and 2 and research room number 1.

Labor: 1,711 mandays Matl: \$20,733 Total: \$123,993

I certify that the above estimates have been prepared to the best of my ability and constitute reasonably accurate estimates to perform the stated tasks.

Kenneth E. Dice
Kenneth E. Dice

Enclosure (2) page 2

86

86

PIPING ESTIMATE

1. Piping repairs main deck and above as a result of aircraft damage.
Labor: 487 mandays Matl: \$3,710 Total: \$34,012
2. Piping repairs below main deck as a result of torpedo damages.
Labor: 400 mandays Matl: \$5,335 Total: \$29,735
3. Repairs to air conditioning compressor topside.
Labor: 179 mandays Matl: \$3,275 Total: \$14,194
4. Repairs to smoke stacks as a result of aircraft damage.
Labor: 239 mandays Matl: \$1,100 Total: \$15,679

I certify that the above estimates have been prepared to the best of my ability and constitutes reasonably accurate estimates to perform the stated tasks.

Bonnie L. Hardison
Bonnie L. Hardison

Enclosure (2) page 3

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SHEFT METAL REPAIRS

1. Repairs to ventilation below main deck:
Labor 667 mandays Matl: \$8253 Total: \$49,098
2. Repairs to work benches, stowage bins and safe lockers below main deck:
Labor: 1426 mandays Matl: 13,353 Total: \$99,363
3. Repairs to furniture main deck and above:
Labor: 65 mandays Matl: \$1307 Total: \$5207
4. Repairs to bulkheads, metal joiner doors, secure doors, insulation land deck covering below main deck.
Labor: 695 mandays Matl: \$11,962 Total: \$54,037
5. Repairs to bulkheads, rugs, metal joiner doors, insulation, lockers and stowages; main deck and above.
Labor: 234 mandays Matl: \$5,480 Total: \$19,520
6. Repair ventilation main deck and above.
Labor: 134 mandays Matl: \$573 Total: \$8613

I certify that the above estimates have been prepared to the best of my ability and constitutes reasonably accurate estimates to perform stated tasks.

Jack S. Grimes
Jack S. Grimes

Enclosure (2) page 4

88
88

MACHINERY REPAIRS

1. Removal and alignment of shafting (does not include access to remove shaft)

Labor: 438 mandays Matl: \$1050 Total: \$27,120

2. Inspect and repair propeller, outboard shaft bearing and rope guard.

Labor: 193 mandays Matl: \$570 Total: \$12,088

3. Take tape readings and reassemble main reduction gear, L.P. and H.P. sides (No repairs included in estimate).

Labor: 149 mandays Matl: \$125 Total: \$8,979

4. Check alignment H.P. and L.P. turbine couplings (no repairs included in estimate).

Labor: 30 mandays Matl: \$75 Total: \$1,921

I certify that the above estimates have been prepared to the best of my ability and constitutes reasonably accurate estimates to perform the stated tasks.

Frank Harrington, Jr.
Frank Harrington

Enclosure (2) page 5

89

89

SERVICES

1. Temporary services (water, steam, electricity, telephone, fire alarm, etc)

Labor: 739 mandays	Matl: \$25	Total: \$51,755
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2. Removal of debris and crane operators

Labor: 900 mandays	Matl: -	Total: \$54,000
--------------------	---------	-----------------

3. Dry Docking

Labor: 187 mandays	Matl: \$300	Total: \$11,520
--------------------	-------------	-----------------

I certify that the above estimates have been prepared to the best of my ability and constitutes reasonably accurate estimates to perform the stated tasks.

Joseph M. Piland
Joseph M. Piland

Enclosure (2) page 6

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90

JCB ORDER (Master Contract for Repair and Alteration of Vessels)		PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1
JOB ORDER ISSUED UNDER CONTRACT NO. N62678-67-C-0018		REQUISITION NO./PURCHASE AUTHORITY ComServLant msg. 152043Z August 1967	
THIS JOB ORDER IS ISSUED PURSUANT TO 10 U.S.C. 2301 ET SEQ. ☐ BY ADVERTISING UNDER INVITATION NO. N62678-68-R-32 ☒ BY NEGOTIATION UNDER 10 U.S.C. 2304(a) (2)		VESSELS (Name or number) USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	
OFFICE TO MAKE PAYMENT (If other than that designated by contract)		PER DIEM RATE OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. \$400.00 not to exceed 10% of Job Order price	
ISSUED BY Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN Fifth Naval District P. O. Box 215 Portsmouth, Virginia 23705		PLACE OF PERFORMANCE ☐ CONTRACTOR'S PLANT ☒ AS SPECIFIED BELOW OR IN SPECIFICATIONS OR SCHEDULE U. S. Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek Virginia	
TO: (Contractor and Address) Norfolk Shipbuilding, & Drydock Corp. P. O. Box 2100 Norfolk, Virginia 23501		AMOUNT \$ 9,750.00	
		COMMENCEMENT DATE 21 August 1967	
		COMPLETION DATE 5 September 1967	
		APPLICABLE SPECIFICATIONS AND/OR SCHEDULE Attached	

ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

Appropriation & Subhd. **1781804.2460**
Object Class **--**
Bu. Cont. & Sub. Allot. **94143**
Auth. Acctg. Activity **181**
Transaction Type **2D**

Property Acctg. Activity **--**
Cost Code **None 98015**
Code **02-532P**

An order hereby placed with you under and pursuant to the provisions of the above numbered contract between you and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA to effect the repair, completion, alteration of, or additions to the above named (or numbered) vessel as described in the above numbered specifications and/or schedule. You shall perform the following items at the price or prices specified therefor:

Item 1

DO-A-3 has been assigned this Job Order.

Clause 45 applies to this Job Order.

CONFORMED COPY

If this job order is issued on a negotiated basis, the Contractor shall execute the following acceptance:

Accepted this 19 day of August 29 1967

Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.

By [Signature]

Vice President

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By

W. F. TALMAGE

TYPED NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER

DD FORM 731-1

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

Enclosure (3) to NAVSHIPS
Ser 527-1450

91
91

1441

Norfolk Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corp.
P. O. Box 2100, Norfolk, Virginia

8.

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5) 18 AUG 1967

SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING, USN
FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT
P. O. BOX 215
Portsmouth, Virginia

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Pertaining to Specifications for
Repair and Alterations

The general provisions contained herein are applicable to, and form a part of the various items contained in specifications for work under a Master Contract for Repair and Alteration of Vessels (DD-ASPR Form No. 731).

1. Delays. In the event the contractor encounters difficulty in meeting performance requirements, or when he anticipates difficulty in complying with the contract schedule dates, he shall immediately notify the Contracting Officer via the Naval Inspector, in writing, giving pertinent details; provided, however, that this data shall be informational only in character and that this provision shall not be construed as a waiver by the government of any delivery schedule or date for any rights or remedies provided by law or under this contract.
2. Plans and Test Specifications.
 - a. Labor, materials and equipment indicated on plans or test specifications as being provided by "shops", "codes", "manufacturer", or "government", or listed as existing, which are required to complete work in these specifications are to be furnished by the contractor unless specifically listed as government-furnished in the specifications items. (Disregard all sources of supply referred to on the plans).
 - b. One non-reproducible (blueprint) copy of each plan referenced in the specifications will be furnished each contractor tendered an IFB and one reproducible copy of each plan will be furnished the successful bidder.
 - c. One non-reproducible copy of each test specification referenced in the specifications will be furnished each contractor tendered an IFB and three copies will be furnished the successful bidder.
3. Work Performance.
 - a. The contractor shall diligently perform the required work in accordance with an orderly schedule that will enable him to progressively complete the various phases of the work in a timely fashion. This work schedule shall be developed around certain milestone dates that are established in the specifications, including, but not limited to: drydocking, submission of various reports, post repair trials, and completion date.

b. Inspection and reports must be thorough and complete and made by experienced and fully qualified personnel, to assure an informed decision on necessary repairs. Sufficient time and manpower shall be scheduled by the contractor to make inspections properly and complete reports early in the contract period or in accordance with the dates required in the specifications.

4. Tests.

a. Whenever a test is required by the specifications, it shall be witnessed by the Naval Inspector and by a ship's inspector.

b. All work which requires acceptance tests shall be progressed in sufficient time to allow the contractor to complete such tests and correct deficiencies prior to the final job order completion date or at such earlier dates as may be directed in the specification.

c. Newly installed or reinstalled electronics or ordnance equipment shall not be energized except with the prior approval of a representative of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding.

d. In every case where it is necessary to operate ship's equipment for purpose of contractor's test or work, permission shall be obtained from the appropriate department head or the duty officer of the vessel via the Naval Inspector before proceeding with such operation.

e. Any work or tests requiring the inspection and approval of the Naval Inspector are to be performed during normal working hours, unless prior approval of the Naval Inspector is obtained. Normal hours are 8:00 A.M., to 4:30 P.M., Monday through Friday except on Federal Legal holidays. Work or tests performed by the contractor during other than normal working hours will be subject to inspection and approval by the Naval Inspector upon his return to duty on the next working day.

5. Fire Prevention and Safety:

The contractor shall abide by the requirements of "Safety and Health Regulations for Ship Repairing" as required by Clause 29 of the MSR Contract. The following precautions supplement those required by the "Regulations":

a. Whenever it is necessary to bring a quantity of any inflammable liquid in excess of five (5) gallons aboard ship via portable containers, the Naval Inspector shall be informed. The following precautions apply:

(1) The container is to be adequately protected during handling and while it is aboard ship.

(2) Provisions for confining any accidental spillage from such temporary storage tank to a small area are to be made by either fitting a pan underneath or a coaming around the tank with sufficient capacity to hold the entire contents of the tank.

(3) A fire hazard zone shall be designated and plainly marked around the container.

(4) Appropriate firefighting equipment and material shall be at hand in the vicinity of the fire hazard zone.

(5) It shall be removed as soon as it has served the purpose for which it was brought aboard.

b. Where a significant quantity of wood is required for work inside a ship, as much of the wood as practicable shall be treated to make it fire retardant.

c. The contractor shall assure that a supply of adapters and spanner wrenches for mating shipboard firefighting equipment (hoses and nozzles) with facility and/or municipal fire equipment is readily available on each pier.

d. Prior to the commencement of any "hot" work, the contractor will assure that adequate fire watch is stationed at the scene of the operation and in adjacent areas where a fire hazard might exist. When fire hazard is increased due to a large number of persons working in a limited area, or by location of hot work or other physical factors, the fire watches and equipment must be increased accordingly. If the ship's fire main is inactivated due to repairs specified, sufficient temporary fire stations shall be installed with hose and fittings to reach any point aboard with not more than one-hundred (100) feet of hose.

e. Before any welding, burning or other "hot" work is undertaken, the contractor shall obtain a certificate from a certified chemist showing that all spaces, compartments, tanks, voids, etc., including pipe lines, in, adjacent to, or upon which such work is to be performed, are gas free and safe for work. Subsequent tests shall be performed as necessary. Signs shall be posted as required by Sub-part B of the "regulations".

f. The contractor shall provide suitable precaution cards and post them in conspicuous places, on or near any equipment or material which offers a hazard to the security of the ship or the safety of personnel. Such warning signs shall be posted whenever precautions are necessary for the safe handling, stowage and security of dangerous materials, such as ammunitions, explosives or inflammables. Warning signs shall be posted whenever conditions of a hazardous nature are known to exist. Conditions which would prohibit smoking or welding, the presence of toxic or explosive vapors, acids or caustics, high voltage lines, breathing air supply lines, and radioactive materials are examples of conditions which would require the posting of warning signs. The contractor is also to assure that the protection afforded by such warning displays is further augmented by the familiarization of personnel with and the enforcement of, safety precautions.

6. Precautions against flooding:

a. Whenever the list of a ship or boat while waterborne or the failure of docking or hauling facilities could result in flooding through unattended hull openings open for repair or examinations, the contractor shall, at the end of each work shift not immediately followed by a shift engaged in work on these openings, secure all intact seachest and overboard discharge valves or fit temporary closures to these and to all other hull openings upon which work is being undertaken.

b. When the area of shell plating removal makes temporary closure impracticable, the contractor shall secure each vulnerable compartment in order to minimize potential damage. To the extent permitted by scope and urgency of work, underwater hull operations shall be scheduled to maintain positive vessel stability and maximum hull watertight integrity in event of flooding.

7. Piping.

All piping disconnected in performance of work shall be suitably blanked to prevent entrance of foreign objects.

8. Classified Work.

Clause 34 of the MSR Contract sets forth the military security requirements for classified work under the contract. The contractor shall have a Facility Security Clearance consistent with the degree of access required in order to undertake any classified work involved in attached specifications.

es

AGTR-5

I N D E X

Item No.

Title

1. OIL AND DEBRIS; REMOVAL FROM COMPARTMENTS

97

91

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

<u>Item Name</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
CU-1099/FRR	4	800	3,200
CV-157/URR	3	5,000	15,000
CV-591A/URR	6	400	2,400
CV-1089A/TLR-28	1	2,000	2,000
CV-1744/UG	1	17,500	17,500
DEM-21-4	1	1,000	1,000
HFM-6-PT-330-8	2	2,700	5,400
KY-463/FGC	10	200	2,000
LS-474/U	13	100	1,300
MX-27-M-ED	1	2,000	2,000
MX-2962/USM	1	600	600
NV-2	3	900	2,700
PP-1767/UG	2	400	800
R-390A/URR	50	2,500	125,000
R-1039/TLR-28	1	2,300	2,300
R-1274A/URR	2	800	1,600
R-1279A/URR	2	2,700	5,400
RO-98A	6	5,000	30,000
RO-1048-4	2	1,500	3,000
SB-15A	1	2,300	2,300
SB-315B/U	1	100	100
SB-1203A/UG	6	400	2,400
SB-1210/UG	6	400	2,400
TD-529/FRR	1	1,500	1,500
TD-687/URR	2	1,000	2,000

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

AGTR5/00
4010
Ser: 433

30 AUG 1967

From: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To: Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command

Subj: Ship's allowance material lost and/or damaged beyond repair as a
result of Israeli attack on LIBERTY 8 JUN 67

Encl: (1) Category listing and estimated value of material lost

1. It is hereby certified that to the best of my knowledge and belief the list of categories contained in enclosure (1) and their estimated replacement value are correct and correctly reflect the ship's allowance material which was lost, damaged, or disposed of as hazardous to the health, safety, and comfort of the crew or safety of the ship as a result of the Israeli attack of LIBERTY 8 JUN 67 and must be replaced prior to the ship being fit for unrestricted service.

W. L. McGonagle
W. L. MCGONAGLE

Copy to:
Commander Service Squadron EIGHT
COMSERVLANT

Enclosure (5) to NAVSHIPS
Ser 527- 1450

99
99

TOP SECRET

LIBERTY INCIDENT

8 June 1967


DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV MEMO Ser 009D-32/T31
on 21 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

COURT OF INQUIRY 7816-67

RADM Isaac C. KIDD Jr., USN



GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 yrs
(Not automatically declassified)

President

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

JAG TOP SECRET CONTROL
NO. CNA

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
NO TS-856
100 100

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

OF A

COURT OF INQUIRY

convened at London, England

by order of

Commander in Chief

U. S. Naval Forces Europe

To inquire into the circumstances

surrounding an armed attack on

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) which occurred

at approximately 1230Z, 8 June 1967

while steaming in the vicinity of

31°23'N Latitude 33°25'E Longitude

Ordered on 10 June 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

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* ALL WITNESSES CALLED BY THE COURT

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TOP SECRET

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-FIRST DAY-

Let the record show that a Court of Inquiry is in session, convened by Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe at London, England. The hour is 2314, the date is 10 June 1967.

Present:

Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, U. S. Navy;

Captain Bernard J. Lauff, U. S. Navy; and

Captain Bert M. Atkinson, Jr., U. S. Navy, members.

Captain Ward Boston, Jr., U. S. Navy, counsel for the court

I will now read the appointing order, original prefixed, marked exhibit A. Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, serial 1550/13 of 10 June 1967, from Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe to Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, U. S. Navy, 111645/1100; Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967; Reference (a) JAG Manual. In accordance with section 0402 of reference (a), a Court of Inquiry is hereby appointed to inquire into the circumstances surrounding an armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) which occurred at approximately 1230Z, 8 June 1967, while steaming in the vicinity of 31°23' North Latitude, 33°25' East Longitude. The Court will convene at Headquarters, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, London, England, at 2000 on 10 June 1967, or as soon thereafter as practicable. The Court shall consist of you as president, and Captain Bernard J. LAUFF, USN, 097651/1100, and Captain Bert M. ATKINSON, Jr., USN, 447058/1100, as members. Captain Ward BOSTON, Jr., USN, 419063/1620, a lawyer qualified in the sense of article 27(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is hereby designated counsel for the Court, and Lieutenant Commander Allen FEINGERSCH, USN, 612119/1100, is hereby designated assistant counsel for the Court. The Court is directed to inquire into all the pertinent facts and circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack; damage resulting therefrom; and deaths of and injuries to naval personnel. After deliberation, the Court shall submit its findings of fact. The duty of the Court to designate

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individuals as parties to the inquiry during the proceedings, when appropriate, is set forth in section 0302 of reference (a). The Court is directed to take the testimony of witnesses under oath and to submit a verbatim record of the proceedings. Military witnesses will be warned of their rights in accordance with article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prior to the taking of their testimony. The Court will conduct its proceedings in closed session. Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, will furnish the necessary reporters and other clerical assistance to the Court for the purpose of recording the proceedings and preparing the record of this Court of Inquiry. Signed John S. McCain, Jr.

All matters preliminary to the inquiry have been determined and the Court will sit in closed session. Counsel for the Court will now administer the oath to the members and the recorder and the President will administer the oath to the counsel for the court.

The appointed reporter, YNC Joeray Spencer, U. S. Navy, the members of the court and counsel for the court were sworn.

Captain Leonard Raish, U. S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. State your name, grade, organization and present duty station.

A. I am Captain Leonard Robert Raish, I am the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe.

Q. Captain, this Court of Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances attendant with the armed attack on USS LIBERTY. On 8 June 1967, will you please state your whereabouts?

A. I was on duty in CINCUSNAVEUR Headquarters.

Q. Will you please state to the Court what, if any, knowledge, you have concerning the deployment of USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Mediterranean on 8 June 1967.

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A. Yes, as Assistant Chief of Staff, I have the privilege of participating in the daily operations and intelligence briefings held in the Headquarters. An essential part of these briefings are the movements of ships in the NAVEUR command area. The LIBERTY passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, entered the Mediterranean, and took a generally easterly course, culminating in the position at which she was hit.

Q. What identification is relevant to the AGTR-5?

A. This ship is a commissioned ship of the United States Navy, designated USS LIBERTY. She is a technical research ship commanded by a line officer.

Q. Do you have in your custody as Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, any official records from the files of CINCUSNAVEUR concerning the deployment of USS LIBERTY in the Mediterranean?

A. Affirmative, I do. I have with me tonight messages pertaining to communications problems and events prior to and following the time that she was hit.

At this time, Counsel for the Court will request the reporter to mark, as exhibits for the record, these messages which are offered into evidence of the proceedings of this Court of Inquiry. These messages will be marked Exhibits 1,2,3,4,5.

There being no objection, the exhibits were received in evidence.

I now request Captain Raish to read these messages.

Captain Raish: Exhibit 1 is a Joint Chiefs of Staff Secret message 011545Z JUN 67 from JCS to USCINCEUR, info CNO, CINCLANTFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 64, USS LIBERTY, DIRNSA, NSAEUR, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, subject USS LIBERTY SKED, reference DIRNSA G/104/311906Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM). 1. When RFS request sail LIBERTY in accordance with the following schedule; A. 2 June depart Rota, B. 2-8 June ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS PERMITS. THEN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E, CAP MOROCCO MALTA 8 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMS EFBDIT 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM, C. 9-30 June CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E.

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WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISREAL 6.5 NM. 2. REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINCLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS, DAILY ~~SITREP~~ AND INCIDENT REPORTS. 3. ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF. 4. PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY SKED FOLLOW. Exhibit 2 is a Joint Chiefs of Staff message , Confidential 072230Z JUN 67, from JCS to USCINCEUR, info CNO, CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 67, USS LIBERTY, HQNASAEUR, NASAEUR OFF GERMANY, DIRNSA, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, subject USS LIBERTY, reference JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67. 1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE. 2. CHANGE CPA UAR TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM. Exhibit 3 is a Joint Chiefs of Staff Top Secret message 080110Z JUN 67, from JCS to USCINCEUR, info CNO, CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 64, USS LIBERTY, HQNSAVEUR, NSAEUR OFF GERMANY, DIRNSA, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, subject USS LIBERTY, references A. JCS 7337/072230Z JUN 67, B. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (NOTAL), 1. CANCEL REF A. 2. REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP AREAS DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM to CYPRUS. Exhibit 4 is a COMSIXTHFLT Secret message 080917Z JUN 67, from COMSIXTHFLT to USS LIBERTY, subject USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS, references A. JCS 011545Z JUN 67, B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67, C. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67. 1. PARA 1 REF C is MODIFIED BY REF B. PROCEED IMMED TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-40N/32-30E UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY FIVE MILES. 2. NO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY. 3. ACKNOWLEDGE. Exhibit 5 is a COMSIXTHFLT Secret message 101205Z JUN 67, from COMSIXTHFLT to CINCUSNAVEUR, references A. CINCUSNAVEUR 101036Z JUN 67, B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67, 1. REF A TAKEN FOR ACTION. 2. ACCORDING TO CO, USS LIBERTY, REF B AND ALL ASSOCIATED MESSAGES TO PASS CONTENT OF REF F WERE NOT RECEIVED ON BOARD LIBERTY PRIOR TO ATTACK.

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Q. From the information in the exhibits, was USS LIBERTY at the time of the attack, at the position that she was ordered to proceed to?

A. Yes, however, she did not receive two key messages which in effect cancelled the orders under which she was operating.

Q. Which are the two key messages you are referring to?

A. JCS 080110Z and COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z.

Q. Will you please explain to the Court, in a narrative manner, the substance of these messages and the applicability of the messages to USS LIBERTY?

A. LIBERTY was operating pursuant to a JCS message, 011545Z June 67, which directed her to proceed to position 32° North, 33° East. These orders were later modified by JCS 072230Z, which specified that the operating area specified in JCS 011545Z was for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate. This message also indicated "change the CPA to UAR to 20 NM and Israel 15 NM. The next message, JCS 080110Z, a Top Secret message directed USCINCEUR to change the operating area of LIBERTY such that she remained at least 100 miles off the coast of Syria, Israel, and UAR, and at least 25 miles off the coast of Cyprus. This message was also info to several addressees including CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, and USS LIBERTY. Action on this message was directed to COMSIXTHFLT.

Q. Is there any information available that LIBERTY received the JCS message 080110Z?

A. The LIBERTY did not receive that message.

Q. On what basis do you form that opinion?

A. I form that opinion on the information received from COMSIXTHFLT, who had queried the Captain of the LIBERTY, COMSIXTHFLT 101205Z.

Q. In other words, it is clear and certain that USS LIBERTY did not receive the message directing it to stay outside of 100 miles of the coast?

A. Yes. Additionally, COMSIXTHFLT, by his 080917Z repeated the substance

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of the JCS 080110Z when he directed the LIBERTY to comply with the later message.

Q. What response is indicated from the LIBERTY?

A. The LIBERTY did not receive that message either.

Q. As a communications specialist, will you please advise the Court of your opinion predicated on the exhibits in evidence, why these two messages were not received by LIBERTY?

A. Yes. The analysis reveals that the JCS message, 080110Z, was erroneously routed by the communications center serving the JCS to NAVCOMMSTAPHIL for delivery to USS LIBERTY. At 080449 NAVCOMMSTAPHIL took the correct action and re-routed JCS 080110Z to NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO for delivery to LIBERTY. Up to the current time this message has not arrived at NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO, and we are still attempting to trace the reason for non-delivery to NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO. COMSIXTHFLT's 080917Z which directed LIBERTY to comply with JCS 080110Z and essentially repeated its text as well, was sent from the LITTLE ROCK at 081058. The elapsed time in getting this message off the ship was about one hour and 45 minutes. NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO routed COMSIXTHFLT's message to Asmara via San Pablo Spain Defense Communication System - USAF major relay. At 081200, COMSIXTHFLT's message was received by the U. S. Army Communications Center at Asmara for further relay to NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA for placing on the broadcast to USS LIBERTY. At 081215Z the U. S. Army Communications Center Asmara relayed the COMSIXTHFLT message erroneously to NAVCOMMSTA GREECE for relay to LIBERTY. At 081506, and there is some question about the preciseness of this time, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE returned the COMSIXTHFLT message back to the U. S. Army Communications Center Asmara. At 081510 U. S. Army Communications Center Asmara then relayed the COMSIXTHFLT message correctly to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara and it was placed on the broadcast at 081525. Clearly, LIBERTY had not received this message as she was hit at least three hours before.

Q. In recapitulation, the official records from CINCUSNAVEUR, which you have read into these proceedings, indicate that at the time USS LIBERTY

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was under attack, she had not received either of these two messages, COMSIXTHFLT 080817Z and JCS 080110Z?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Do any members of the Court have questions of the witness?

Captain LAUFF:

Q. Can you give an opinion, based on your experience, as to why these failures to deliver occur in our system?

A. Yes, in my opinion these errors in routing turned out to be human errors on the part of the persons doing the routing in the Communications Center serving the JCS and in the Army Communications Center at Asmara. I would like to further point out that at the time these mis-routes occurred we were several days in a critical situation in the Mid East with a tremendous volume of high precedence traffic being handled and that the undoubtedly young kids who were doing this work were up against traffic volume and probably lack of experience. Communication systems like weapons systems these days are sophisticated but still perform as well as the people who operate them.

Q. Under the conditions such as you have just described, what do you estimate a normal delay time of the precedence of the JCS message 080110Z or the COMSIXTHFLT message 080917Z - what would be the delay time to the ship on average?

A. It would be unrealistic to give you an average because there are so many contingencies. The DCA has established standards which we use for guidance, however, meeting these standards is difficult to achieve particularly under the circumstances that we have been involved over the past week.

Q. Had the errors connected with the routing of the messages in question not occurred, would the messages have been received by LIBERTY in a timely fashion?

A. The answer to that is yes.

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Rear Admiral KIDD:

Do you gentlemen have any more questions?

No sir.

Captain, I have two or three questions I would like to ask.

Q. Are all of the terminals in the system related to delivery of the messages in question, to the best of your knowledge, now on-line crypto-equipped?

A. Affirmative.

Q. Has the introduction of the on-line system, in your experience, introduced a situation where we are perhaps becoming increasingly confident and dependent upon automation in general terms, beyond that which existed before the on-line systems were made a part of the communications network?

A. Yes sir. We are both confident and dependent, and in my opinion this is all to the good due to the increased capability of the system and increased speed of handling messages.

Q. Has the incidence rate of identifiable problems typified by these two messages increased, decreased, or remained about the same since the introduction of on-line crypto?

A. I have no way of comparing that sir, this is like saying were there more automobile accidents in the 1947 model automobiles compared to the 1967 automobiles.

Q. I think captain, you have really answered the question indirectly in the affirmative, that there is an increased incidence rate because with the increased capability, has not the volume increased also?

A. It wasn't my intention to give you that impression, sir. Yes, there has been a quantum increase in volume, ergo, the chances for errors would be greater, I grant you that. But on a percentage basis, I doubt it. On the old system, you were dependent on human beings all along the line. Under the new system, of course, you are still dependent on human beings, but in fewer places.

Q. Are the human beings on whom we are depending now of the same or different qualification and experience levels?

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A. Depending on the point you make the comparison, but prior to on-line systems we use to have officer coding boards usually made up of junior officers. Now coding boards are generally a thing of the past and enlisted men operating on-line equipment do this work. I would say, quality of personnel in some respects is down, particularly in the communications field, because reenlistments for hard driving communicators is not the best. In my opinion, the Navy is accomplishing with youngsters, that is with strikers and third class petty officers, that which commercial communication companies wouldn't attempt to do unless they had personnel with considerably more experience. Efficiency of personnel is a relative thing as I see it, associated with experience. We are operating a sophisticated communications system with a substantial percentage of first term personnel. On the officer side, we are doing the job with essentially a hard corps of LDO's and the rest are young reserve officers, the great majority of whom are short timers.

Q. When a message of the precedence of the two in question is received in a communications terminal, what if any alarms or other signals are used to alert the individuals at the receiving point that a particularly important message has arrived?

A. The communicators are governed by precedences. They do not have the time nor are they expected to analyze texts of messages in addition to determining importance. Flash messages are associated by either alarm bells or a warning light of some kind. As I recall, neither of these were flashed. Operational immediate messages and the practice in communications centers to shout out "op immediate coming through" or something similar so that personnel concerned have their attention drawn to the fact that an op immediate is being processed.

Q. Now, when you have hundreds of op immediate messages arriving in the same center, then I would imagine that this system collapses of its own weight?

A. I wouldn't say it collapses, but human beings might tend to lose respect for the precedence because of its obviously excessive use.

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However, wherever I have been, they say "op immediate coming through". Sometimes several times a minute - they still say it - they try.

Q. The point I am seeking, Captain, relates to the order in which these messages could expect attention by the individual who would first address himself to it after it left the mechanical and electrical machines in order to first identify, in this case, an error in routing indicator.

A. The basic rule of communicators is "first in, first out by precedence". Thus, if there were twenty op immediates in process and the 21st came in, it would wait its turn and then move along.

Q. Does my recollection serve me correctly, Captain, that during the period of time under consideration, the days preceding, and immediately following, the LIBERTY's attack, the circuits were relatively well choked; or perhaps that is an over-statement with FBIS intercepts and similar traffic transmitted at a very high precedence?

A. We were very busy with traffic of that nature, particularly with FBIS intercepts. All of which were at least op immediate. However, these conditions had little, if anything to do in directly causing the mis-routes.

Q. My point, Captain, is that a mis-routed message arriving - it seems to me would have to wait its turn to find the mis-route and identify it, is that correct?

A. You are correct, sir, it would wait its turn under the first in first out by precedence rule.

Q. My next question, Captain, relates to possible safeguards in the communications system wherein a message originated with a particular precedence and which experienced inordinate delay, what safeguards, if any are available for intermediate stations to raise the precedence where delays have been experienced up to the time of receipt where the delay is identified?

A. Here is where experience counts. An experienced communicator will notice this and do something about it. This is something you can't legislate, sir. A mechanical safeguard is not feasible, but an experienced person can do something about it.

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Q. Have you, in your career, had occasion to personally observe instances where precedences have been raised under such circumstances?

A. The assignment of a precedence is the responsibility of the originator, thus the communicators would not raise the precedence per se, however, depending on their experience, they could handle it in a manner as though it had a higher precedence; and this I have seen done often. For example, sir, in many cases there are either direct circuits or the NAVCOMOPNET available and messages can be sent over such circuits and taken out of competition with all other general traffic.

Q. Did Asmara, or does Asmara have such a NAVCOMOPNET?

A. Affirmative.

Q. I would gather then that the two critical messages in question did not enjoy this type of service, is that correct?

A. Certainly, the one message from COMSIXTHFLT was not routed over that circuit, it went over DCS circuits.

Q. Would the situation that we have just been discussing, Captain, come under the heading which you mentioned earlier, of lack of experience being a key to identifying a message that had been delayed, in this particular incident?

A. Possibly, sir, in the case of the COMSIXTHFLT message. This message was mis-routed by the Army's comm center in Asmara and sent to NAVCOMMSTA GREECE. The soldier who did the mis-route may have been inexperienced, or what have you, but then NAVCOMMSTA GREECE apparently was a little slow in getting this message back to Asmara and here experience might have been a factor. On the other hand, we know NAVCOMMSTA GREECE had been handling a lot of FBIS type messages and the delay could have been under the first in first out rule. Also, the NAVCOMMSTA GREECE personnel could have returned this message direct to NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA had the experience factor been present. Mind you, this business is surmised because I do not know the rate and enlistment time of the traffic handlers involved.

Let the record show at this point that Captain Raish has been asked to develop a set of questions for submission to communication officers,

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relay stations, and centers involved to ascertain the reason for the delays experienced by the two messages under discussion.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The Court adjourned at 0250 hours, 11 June 1967, to be reconvened at the call of the President.

The President, Counsel to the Court and Reporter proceeded to Souda Bay, Crete and boarded USS LIBERTY at sea enroute to Malta. The Court met aboard LIBERTY at 0630 hours, 12 June 1967, but adjourned until arrival of LIBERTY at Malta to meet with full court.

-SECOND DAY-

At Malta, the hour 0755, the date 13 June 1967. This Court of Inquiry is now in session again. All persons connected with the Court who were present when the Court adjourned in London, England on 11 June 1967 are again present in Court except that the Assistant Counsel for the Court who is now present will be sworn.

The Assistant Counsel for the Court, Lieutenant Commander Allen Feingersch, U. S. Navy, was sworn.

Ensign David G. Lucas, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your name, rank, organization, and present duty station.

A. Ensign David G. Lucas, First Lieutenant and Gunnery Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

Let the record show that this witness is being called out of order in order that he may be medically evacuated to a hospital ashore for

Blp and that he is experiencing considerable physical discomfort at this time.

Q. Mr. Lucas, as you are well aware, this Court of Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances attendant with the armed

attack on the U. S. Naval vessel, USS LIBERTY, which occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the court the circumstances of that incident that you recall?

A. Yes sir. We had a general quarters drill which secured shortly prior to 1400. After securing from the drill I came to the wardroom and was in the presence of Lieutenant Golden and Ensign Scott. Ensign Scott left the wardroom and we heard the word passed over the LMC to stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing engines. Very shortly after that word was passed we heard what sounded like a very loud thump or crash. Mr. Golden and I half jumped from our seats, we looked at each other, and both thought that the motor whaleboat had fallen from its davit onto the deck. We went to the closest porthole, pulled the curtains, and did see some dust and black smoke rising. It was at this time that the general quarters alarm was sounded, and we knew that we had been attacked. I went into the passageway outside the wardroom via athwartships passageway to the starboard side of the main deck and from there used the ladder to go to the bridge, the 03 level. Upon arriving on the bridge I got my battle helmet and my life jacket from the starboard gear locker and was just getting ready to go to my general quarters station which is on the 04 level, the flying bridge. We were hit by what I assumed to be the second pass of aircraft. Another man was next to me. I think he was a signalman. We both hit the deck just outside the starboard hatch leading to the pilothouse. Three or four shells hit in our area. After that shelling had ceased, I went into the pilothouse, didn't figure it was too safe to go to the 04 level at that time. Another pass was made and everyone in the pilothouse hit the deck. When I did enter the pilothouse, the officer of the deck for general quarters, LT O'CONNOR, had already been injured and had been carried into CIC, which is just aft of the pilothouse. The junior officer of the deck at general quarters, LT ENNIS, was lying in the after portion of the pilothouse and appeared to have a *BL* I can't recall what other personnel were on the bridge at that time. It consisted

of several phone talkers and a third class quartermaster, BROWN, was at the helm, which was his general quarters station. I left the pilothouse, came to the wardroom to learn the condition of LT O'CONNOR and LT ENNIS. Came down the ladder in the superstructure. When I got to the 02 level, the men were carrying the Executive Officer, LCDR ARMSTRONG, down to the wardroom for medical aid. At the time I saw him, he appeared to be in shock, was very pale, and was not saying anything. Mr. ENNIS had gotten partially down & they were having difficulty carrying him down and he was in the passageway outside his stateroom, waiting for attention to his

ble I came into the wardroom and there were at least half a dozen casualties in there being treated. Several of the enlisted men had been in the spaces forward of the superstructure, in the IC shop and the emergency diesel room. These areas had been shelled very heavily on one of the first passes. I found out the emergency diesel did not work and that the gyro was not functioning either. I left the wardroom area. Somehow we received word that there was a fire burning on the 01 level, port side. It was in the vicinity where two 55 gallon drums of P-250 fuel was stored. Some enlisted men in the passageways got a hose and were putting out the fire. The fire had spread aft of the P-250 cans and the four life rafts were burning on the 01 level. I can't remember the exact amount of time that I did spend in the superstructure area. When I was in the passageways, I hear we did receive some more shelling. I returned to the bridge. To the best of my knowledge, when I did return to the bridge, the only people present were the Commanding Officer, one phone talker, who was lying on the deck in the chart room, quartermaster BROWN on the helm and myself. Before I went back to the bridge, we had received word over the phones that were working, we had very little communications as such, the LMC was hit and not functioning. The only communications we had were via sound-powered phones. We had received the word "standby for a torpedo attack". It was very shortly after I returned to the bridge the Commanding Officer hollered in to pass over all circuits, "standby for another torpedo attack, starboard side".

The torpedo hit and it seemed like within a matter of seconds we had a ten degree starboard list. Shortly after that the Commanding Officer called me to the starboard wing, asked me to get some glasses to try to help him identify the patrol craft. He had been using his binoculars and was also taking photographs of the aircraft and of the three patrol craft. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. I was able to read the hull number on one patrol craft as it passed abeam to starboard, going in exactly the opposite direction that we were going, and it was at this time I told the Commanding Officer what the number was. He said, "log it." Which I did, in the quartermasters notebook. At that time, there was no quartermaster available. This was the first entry that I made in the log. I continued to make entries for approximately the next 45 minutes. There were still just the four people on the bridge. This was the Commanding Officer, third class quartermaster BROWN on the helm, and seaman LAMAR on the sound-powered phones, and myself. The Captain warned us to take cover, the shelling started again. Everyone took cover as best we could. There were shells, or fragments of shells, flying in through the starboard hatch, which no one had been able to secure. A quartermaster, when these shells started flying, stepped back from the helm to get as much protection from the corner of the chart room as possible. He still had his hand, one hand on the wheel. I was two paces to his left, and two paces behind him. A fragment hit him, I think from behind. It must have come through the bulkhead in the chart room. He let out a gasp, fell backwards into the chart room, and within say a minute, was dead. I grabbed the helm, noticed that I had no power at all, the gyro repeater was not functioning, the rudder angle indicator was not functioning. None of the instruments there were working. We had been attempting to get away from the area as fast as possible, on an approximate course of 000. The Captain asked what the current heading was. We were turning in a fairly good sized arc at that time. I had no indication of how much rudder I had on. I could not correct it to steer something close to 000 magnetic. We got the phone

talker to contact after steering and shifted control to after steering. Even after control was shifted, the people back there were having a difficult time. I think to start with, they were steering by hand. There was some firing from the patrol boats. They had periodically fired at us. There was now a lull in the firing. And yet, it sounded as if the men at mount 53, this would be the 03 level starboard side, aft of the pilothouse, it sounded as if they were firing at the patrol craft who at that time were within a thousand yards at an approximate relative bearing of 120. The Commanding Officer was on the starboard wing and had these patrol craft in view. He ordered me to tell the men on mount 53 to cease firing. A fire had started at this time on the starboard side. The hit had occurred somewhere in the vicinity of the bridge. The flames had gone back to the motor whaleboat, and it was burning rapidly at that time. I could not see mount 53 from the starboard side. I went out the port hatch. The first thing I noticed was mount 54 was vacant. The flames from the liferaft and the P-250 fuel had reached mount 54 and chased everyone out of there. I ran back to mount 54, looked over the skylight from the engineering spaces. Had a clear view of mount 53 from, say the waist level up, and there was no one on mount 53. The flames from the motor whaleboat were coming over the lip of the mount. I assume that the bullets that were in the gun, or bullets that were in a ready service ammunition box, very near there, were cooking off and firing. I ran back, reported to the Commanding Officer, that there was no one firing from mount 53, that the flames must be causing the bullets to cook off. Mount 51 and 52 on the forecastle had been long silent by this time. Many of the men, there were three assigned to each mount, many of the men were killed on the first strafing attack. When I first did look forward at the mounts, there was one man cut in half on mount 51, and it looked as if there were at least two men in mount 52 who were severed. After that time, I believe there was just one more shot fired. A seaman, LARKINS, was told to man mount 51, either told or he volunteered to, and he got off one shot, the Commanding Officer hollered for him to cease

fire, which he did. I can recall no further firing from either side after that time. The Commanding Officer hollered "cease fire", and it was approximately at this time the patrol craft were bearing approximately 160 relative. One of them was trying to signal us. The smoke from the motor whaleboat almost completely obscured the patrol craft from us. There was a second class signalman, DAVID, on the starboard wing. None of us were able to determine what the signaling was - the smoke was too intense. Shortly after that, another patrol craft approached us from the starboard side and did manage to get clear of the smoke. The signalman took the message, "Do you need help?". The Commanding Officer told signalman DAVID to give a negative reply. We still did not know the identity of the patrol craft itself other than the fact that we had gotten the hull number earlier. This appeared to be one of the same three boats that had attacked us earlier. The patrol craft then appeared to rendezvous at two to three thousand yards astern of us, a relative bearing of 200. A helicopter was sighted, and then a second helicopter. Signalman DAVID who is very knowledgeable on aircraft and who had also been looking at Janes Aircraft several days prior to the attack, stated, "those aren't ours, they're Russian made, Sikorsky models". One of the helos came close to the port wing, came down to our level, and we tried to communicate with each other, but had no success. I was told to go to the forecastle to see if I could aid in a sling drop. It appeared as if they wanted to lower someone on the ship. We still could not get our signals straight. When I did get on the forecastle, I saw the Commanding Officer waving his arms in a negative sign. We waved the helicopter away from the area of the forecastle. It went back to the port wing again. Eventually, someone in the helo wrapped up a package of some sort and threw it to the people on the bridge. To the best of my recollection the people on the bridge were the Commanding Officer, signalman DAVID and a chief petty officer THOMPSON. The package had a calling card attached to it and it either said, "U. S. Naval Attache, Tel Aviv", or merely, "Naval Attache, Tel Aviv". We did

get the numbers of both helicopters in the quartermasters log. They were either "04 or D4" and "08 or D8". There also appeared to be a "Star of David" on the side of the helo. The helo was waved away shortly after the calling card was thrown over, we saw no more of the helos. Now it was the matter of still trying to get the ship out of the area. We had no idea whether we would be attacked again or not. The list had held steady at approximately ten degrees. After steering was able to keep us on somewhat of a northerly course, although we were weaving anywhere from 30 to 40 degrees either side of our chosen magnetic course of 000. I was getting the rudder angles to steer for awhile called back to after steering and then the Commanding Officer was giving them after that. The Commanding Officer had been injured in his *Bo* on what must have been the first aircraft pass. He was bleeding profusely. The Captain had been administered first aid and he had a belt tourniquet around his *Bo*. He insisted on being everywhere that he could. He was on both wings, in and out of the pilothouse, taking pictures. I believe at the time I was giving orders to after steering the bleeding had started again on the Captain's *Bo*. I'm just theorizing that the shell fragment that was lodged in the *Bo* had been discharged by his movement. We called the corpsman, and the Captain was stretched out on the port wing, being administered first aid. He was still calling orders in to me to relay on to after steering. Bleeding did stop and the Commanding Officer once again was, well, this time he was placed in his chair on the port wing. He gave orders there for quite awhile. It was also a matter of identification. We, ourselves, were asking the question, "Who made the attacks?", "And why?". There was a time when I was in the pilot house that I heard the Commanding Officer holler to someone, perhaps signalman DAVID, to get the Ensign, the colors, off the deck. I went out to the starboard wing, and there was an Ensign on the deck. I went out a little bit further and looked up and we were flying our Ensign. I found that later all of the starboard halyards or hoists had been shot down and that signalman DAVID had run up another Ensign.

Things quieted down somewhat at this time. We still had no indication if we were still under attack or not. I know that there were several times later in the afternoon and early evening that we did take cover at the order of the Commanding Officer when some aircraft did approach at a distance. We were still doing the best we could to head due North. We still had considerable deviation from the base course. I can't recall what speed we finally did attain. I think we tried to make turns for 8 knots, and found it too difficult at that speed to hold the course, and dropped back to all ahead 1/3. We had main control make turns for five knots. There were several times when we were almost dead in the water. Believe that just before or just after the torpedo attack we had no turns. Another time that I can recall that lube oil suction was lost. Both boilers were on the line. We had to wait until that situation was corrected. Seems as if there were several other occasions when it was not possible to get power. After the attack from the patrol boats had stopped, and before we had steadied up, or successfully steadied up on an approximate course of 000, I was checking the fathometer, which was the only piece of equipment on the bridge that I know was functioning and it was only functioning on the 100 fathom scale at the time. Our readings started decreasing rapidly. Commanding Officer ordered me to go to the forecastle, get some men and to standby to let go an anchor. We proceeded to the forecastle, had the starboard anchor ready for letting go, the bridge said "make the port anchor ready". We were trying to pick up the chain stopper, but the pelican hook was up almost against the stopper and we could not raise the stopper. I grabbed a bar of some kind, another man grabbed a sledge and we were pounding at the stopper to try to raise it. We received an order from the bridge that was shouted to us from the Commanding Officer to let go the port anchor, and we could not let go the port anchor. We finally pried the stopper up, this was maybe a minute later, the ship was backing down at that time, all back 1/3. The readings were increasing, the fathometer readings. We received an order not to let go the port anchor. After backing down,

getting a sufficient depth under the keel, we then came around to our northerly course again. After we got on our northerly course, the Commanding Officer came in to his chair inside the pilothouse and gave all orders to after steering. Later, this would have been perhaps 1800 or so, steering was shifted from after steering back to the bridge.

Rear Admiral KIDD:

Q. I'd like to interrupt and ask you a question at this point. Was the Commanding Officer on the bridge all this time?

A. The Commanding Officer never left the bridge, was there from the time GQ was sounded. Perhaps he had stayed there since the drill had secured. He did not leave the bridge until, I'd say 0400 the following morning to make a head call. He made two or three head calls in the course of the morning, but he did not leave the bridge until the DAVIS was alongside the following morning at 0700, on the morning of 10 June. We weren't positive that our magnetic compass was responding correctly. Every now and then the Commanding Officer would go out on the wing and would make minor course adjustments by sighting the North Star. Sometime after sunset, a message was delivered to the bridge from radio central and it stated that the attack had in fact been made by Israeli forces and that they had extended their apologies. Prior to this message, we had received word from the Sixth Fleet that help was on the way. I believe, initially, they just said, "help". Later on we learned that two destroyers were coming to rendezvous with us. During the night, as I said previously the Commanding Officer left the bridge only to make a head call and all during the evening, night, and following morning, until the arrival of the DAVIS, there was an officer with him at all times. Either LT BENNETT, LTJG PAINTER, or myself.

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. To your knowledge, was the Commanding Officer requested to leave the bridge by the doctor in order to obtain medical attention?

A. I didn't hear the order, it's quite possible, but it would have taken ten people the doctor's size to even begin to get him off the bridge.

Q. How would you describe his reaction to his injuries?

A. He was in great pain, there were several times when he was still walking around, but it was obvious he was in great pain. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. At several times felt dizzy. He would not leave, but if he started to get dizzy, he would turn to me, or if Mr. BENNETT or Mr. PAINTER were there, he would say this is what course we're on, what speed to make. He would give instructions.

Q. Backtracking to a point during the heat of combat, did you observe the Captain when he was initially wounded.

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And he continued on in this condition without stopping for assistance by medical?

A. That is correct. It was quite awhile before he did slow down enough to have the belt tourniquet put on the *Bl* assisted with that. I used my belt, and after that a corpsman came up just long enough to adjust the tourniquet and take a look at the Commanding Officer. He did not want any further medical attention and he did not receive any more until the bleeding started a second time, when I think the shell fragment was worked loose.

Q. What period of time had elapsed?

A. Over an hour. I can't say for sure, but it had been at least an hour. How he managed to stay up on the bridge and keep on his feet, to keep the cool head the way that he did, is beyond me. He was giving orders to us in the pilothouse, he was taking photographs of the aircraft, the patrol craft, attempting to identify them with his binoculars, giving orders to the gun mounts when they were still manned, was directing the fire fighting parties, seemed like he was everywhere at one time. Also giving commands to get the ship out of the area, away from land as fast as we could.

Questions by Captain ATKINSON:

Q. Mr. LUCAS, approximately when did you receive word that the Israelis

had attacked - about how long after the attack?

A. It was right around sunset.

Q. Until that time, you all felt you might be subject to re-attack?

A. That is correct.

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. At this point I would like to interrupt your narrative testimony in order to present this exhibit to the record. I have in my custody as Counsel for the Court, the quartermasters notebook, USS LIBERTY. I show you page 102 dated 8 June and ask you if this is the page you referred to when you testified to making entries in it?

A. That is the page, starting with the entry at the time 1446, and I continued making entries until 1655.

Q. Let the record also show that page 102 is considerably splattered with what appears to be blood.

A. It is.

I request the reporter to mark this exhibit number 6. At this time, the Counsel for the Court offers the quartermasters logbook into evidence, a true copy thereof will be substituted in its place.

Q. Will you please read this first entry?

A. "1446, one gunboat tentatively identified as number 206-17." And this was seen by both the Commanding Officer and myself from the starboard wing. I mentioned earlier, the patrol craft was going exactly the opposite direction that we were. This number was read when it was abeam to starboard at approximately 500 yards.

Counsel for the Court:

It is requested that the Court note page 138 of Janes Fighting Ships for 1966, which has Israeli vessels described on that page 138. I will now ask the witness to identify the patrol craft on page 138, and ask if it is similar to the one he saw?

A. The patrol craft here, THOMAS, appears to be the exact same one that I identified. If I had had a camera and taken a picture of it, I would have gotten the same angle, same presentation, as is present here in this photograph. There is one slight difference, there is no dash between the first three and the last two digits, and what I thought to be 17,

I found out later from Mr. BENNETT, when I examined this book, that it was an Israeli symbol that looks like a 17, but is connected by a horizontal line at the bottom. It's quite possible that, well I know that, it was difficult to read the number, not because of the distance, but because of the bow wake coming over and obscuring the numbers.

Counsel for the Court: I will now ask the court members if they have any questions on the exhibits that have been introduced.

Captain ATKINSON:

Q. You say communications were bad. What communications were you referring to?

A. I don't know much about the communications or research setup at all.

Q. This is not the bridge communications?

A. That is correct. I believe that was outgoing communications from the transmitter room.

Q. Were there voice communications passed to the bridge?

A. Not from radio central. We had communications with main control, damage control central and after steering.

Q. In radio communications, do you know where the hieem net is?

A. We knew nothing of what was going on. All messages, outgoing and incoming were hand carried up to the bridge from the radio central personnel. We had been receiving, monitoring Sixth Fleet communications several days prior to the attack, but during the attack the only way we could get hold of somebody was after transmitter room and everything that was sent out or received came up to the bridge via handed message.

Q. Do you know specifically what circuits were being monitored when you said you were monitoring Sixth Fleet communications before the attack?

A. I don't know the call signs of the ships involved or still on the status board in the pilothouse. I can't recall.

Q. You mentioned that there were fathometer readings decreasing. Where were you getting this information from?

A. The only fathometer that was working was in CIC, just aft of the pilothouse, and at that time it was only working on the 100 fathom scale.

Q. Do you recall the depth?

A. I believe they rapidly approached the middle teens. You see, we had no radar. This was knocked out, evidently, on the first air pass. We had to DR from our last fix to give an approximate 1400B position. We included that position in the message requiring assistance.

Q. Were you in sight of land at about the time of the pass?

A. Yes, we were. After dinner, as is customary on here, we often go to the 01 level forward on deck chairs to soak up some sun.

Q. Excuse me, you mean noonday?

A. Noon. There were six officers on the 01 level forward until turn to at 1300. There was smoke visible from land off the port side and also during the general quarters drill. When I was on the 04 level more smoke was visible and the land itself was barely visible. This was through the telescope or high powered binoculars on the 04 level.

Q. In the first portion of your testimony, you mention shelling, what did you intend to convey by the word "shelling"?

A. The first hit, the first noise that LT GOLDEN and I heard when we were in the wardroom was obviously a heavy hit. I assumed this was aircraft and it sounded to us as if it hit on the starboard side. Like I said, we thought it was the motor whaleboat falling from its davit onto the deck. I mentioned shelling again just as soon as I had put on my battle helmet and life jacket on the bridge. This again, I would say was aircraft cause there was a whistling sound several seconds before the actual burst and noise itself came. After I had gone inside the pilothouse and was on the deck, there was another series of whistling sounds preceding the hits. Here again, I assume it was aircraft. When I had

come down to the wardroom, was lending a hand to getting the hose to fight the fire on the port side, there were more easily discernable whistling sounds, even in the passageways, that were aircraft hits. The two men who were handling the hose were keeping an eye out for aircraft. They would put out the fire until another plane came over and then they ducked back inside.

Q. Did the motor torpedo boats fire on you with ordnance other than torpedoes?

A. Yes, they did. This we could easily hear. I can recall it coming from the starboard side on several occasions. At the time quartermaster BROWN was on the helm, the fragment that caught him came from the starboard side and I can't be sure if it was from the gun boats or from our own shells baking off. I'm pretty sure it was from the gun boats. And there were several other occasions of obvious shelling from the torpedo or motor boats themselves.

Q. Do you have any idea how many aircraft were involved?

A. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. There were definitely three motor boats.

Q. Are you the Gunnery Officer?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. Do the surface lookouts come under your glance at general quarters?

A. There, at general quarters the lookouts are on the 04 level. The actual lookout training was done by the Navigator or another member of the Operations Department. They had received refresher training, this was sometime since we left Rota on the 2nd of June, and had been refreshed on reporting all surface contacts to include relative bearing, approximate range, and target angle. Had also been given refreshers on reporting aircraft properly, on elevation, what angle, other factors pertaining to properly reporting all surface and air contacts to the officer of the deck. This had been stressed heavily in the first week in June, before we did reach our operating area.

Q. Was their method of reporting via sound-powered telephone?

A. When we were normally steaming at our modified condition three, the lookouts were on the port and starboard wings, so it was just a matter of shouting into the officer of the deck directly. We had stationed, or had one man in each of the two forward gun mounts. We had ammunition at the guns, but not actually in the breech. These two men had sound-powered phones on. We could call them from the bridge anytime, but for them to call us on the circuit, they would blow a whistle and we would pick up the phone on the bridge. I can't recall what circuit it was, but at a toot of a whistle they could have someone on the bridge alerted to pick up the phone and talk with them.

Q. During the time that you were on the bridge, did you receive any lookout reports via sound-powered telephone?

A. During the attack?

Q. During the attack.

A. When I got up to the bridge, as I said I did not get to the 04 level which was my general quarters station. During general quarters, the two air lookouts were on the 04 level, but they had not made it up there either. I cannot recall seeing a surface lookout on either side of the bridge when I got there. The shelling from the aircraft had either injured them, or they had taken cover inside the pilothouse.

Q. During, and after the attack, did you have sound-powered communications with your gun mounts?

A. To the best of my knowledge, we never had contact with the gun mounts. Let me explain the connection there. My general quarters station is on the 04 level at gunnery control. To get an order to the gun mount, it was easier for the bridge to call a phone talker stationed on the 04 level. He in turn would convey the message to a second phone talker who had communications with all of the mounts. No direct communications from the mounts themselves to the pilothouse, and since no one was able to be on the 04 level, there was no direct communications. At one time, while the torpedo boats were firing at us, my man in charge of mount 53, seaman QUINTERO, hollered to me, "should I fire back?", and I gave him an

affirmative on that. This was before he and the other men in mount 53 had been chased away by the fire and flames from the motor whaleboat. On the forward mounts, I said we had no communications up there. My third class gunner's mate, THOMPSON, according to several witnesses, and to the members of repair two, which is located directly beneath mount 51, said that petty officer THOMPSON went to mount 51 when GQ sounded. He was below decks. His station is with me on the 04 level. Guess he figured he didn't have time to get up there. He went to the closest gun and from the account given by the people in repair two, it sounded as if he got off half a box of ammo at the aircraft. They somehow missed him on the first strafing attack. Several witnesses said that he had the aircraft under fire while it was circling for the second pass and it was during the second pass that he was cut in half by a rocket, but he had the aircraft under fire and got off at least half a box of 50 caliber ammo.

Q. Do you recall how long the Ensign was down?

A. I cannot recall for sure. From the first air attack, the radar was made inoperative, the antenna on the mainmast was damaged, obviously on the first air pass and the Ensign would be flying just below it and just aft of it. Evidently, the shelling that got the radarscope, well it could have very possibly severed the halyard lines at that time. I do not recall when the Commanding Officer saw the Ensign on the deck and told someone to pick it up, but I do recall going out on the starboard wing, looking up and seeing that there was an Ensign flying.

Q. Do you remember the time frame when you looked and saw the Ensign flying, was it during the surface or the air attack?

A. I can't set an exact time on it. I do believe that I recall that at this time the patrol craft was off our starboard side at an approximate bearing of 120. It seems to me that this might have been around the time when I investigated the firing coming from mount 53 and found it was bullets cooking off as opposed to men being there actually firing.

Q. Did you look and see the Ensign flying before the torpedo hit, or was it after?

A. I cannot honestly recall whether it was before or after.

Q. When did you receive your injuries?

A. As soon as I had gotten to the bridge and put on the battle helmet, I mentioned what I assumed were rockets from the aircraft hit in the immediate vicinity. I hit the deck and picked up several pieces of shrapnel in my *B6* one of them was bleeding enough that I took out my handkerchief and wrapped it around my *B6* the piece of fragment that hit me in the *B6* occurred much later, after I had been to the wardroom, returned to the bridge, and after the quartermaster had been killed on the helm. The commanding Officer came from the port wing into the pilothouse, and he said "standby for another attack". I don't recall if it was surface, air, or torpedo. He said "take cover", I heard some firing, some ricocheting off the starboard side. I assumed it was from the patrol craft. I was in the rear portion of the pilothouse and tried to crawl behind the water fountain as best I could, and I got most of me back when I felt something hit me just to the *B6* it started bleeding rapidly. I tore off the sleeve of my shirt, put it over the wound and just continued on from there.

Q. When did you receive treatment for your wounds?

A. I didn't know that I had any metal in me, as such, the bleeding had stopped on the *B6* I had no pain. I would guess the first time that I was looked at was on the 10th of June. I went back to sickbay. The night before I had a little bit of swelling, so went back to have the doctor have a look at it. This was just the *B6* injury. He took an xray and did find that there was a chunk of metal in there. I believe he said it was lodged between a

B6

Q. Do you recall that the patrol boats strafed the ship after the torpedo attack, and if so, how many times?

A. Sir, I cannot honestly answer that,

Q. Let me put the question a little bit differently - earlier in your statement you observed that the patrol boats were attempting to communicate with flashing light?

A. This was definitely after the torpedo attack.

Q. The flashing lights from the boats were after the torpedo attack?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. I also understood from you that the ship was unable to respond to the flashing lights from the boats?

A. To the first signalling, that is affirmative, because of the smoke that was between the patrol craft and us.

Q. And I believe, also, the starboard wing 24-inch searchlight had been shot away earlier in the action. Is that not correct?

A. The only signalling light we had available was a small portable light, the face of which was approximately six inches in diameter.

Q. I believe that is called an Altis lamp and the intensity of that light, from personal knowledge, would probably be completely inadequate to penetrate the smoke?

A. Yes sir. All power to all of the other lights was off. Even if it had been on, there was only one operative light on either the 03 or 04 level. The only one that had not been hit.

Q. To the best of your recollection, after the motor torpedo boats signalled, were there any further attacks from them?

A. No, there were not. After this first signalling, I don't believe so. After they signalled "do you need help?", and we answered in the negative, I am positive there were no more attacks after that time.

Q. With regard to the signal from the torpedo boats, when did you first observe the signalling, with respect to the torpedo attack?

A. The first signalling that I observed was the unsuccessful attempts to determine what they were signalling us, and of course, we did not have a chance to answer back to them. This was after the torpedo attacks. The only other signalling that I recall seeing is when we did successfully receive their message and sent a negative answer to it.

Q. Mr. LUCAS, did you bring with you any examples of ordnance or shrapnel recovered aboard USS LIBERTY subsequent to the attack?

A. With the exception of one fragment that was located this morning, the remainder of these fragments and shells were brought up to the pilothouse in the course of the evening and the following morning after the attack. These were turned in by various personnel throughout the ship. Several of these have been turned in since the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th.

Counsel for the Court: At this time it is requested that these examples be marked exhibit 7, that they be introduced into evidence and copies of photographs be made for record purposes.

President: Let the record also show that these fragments are but a cross-sectional sample of the type of bullets and shrapnel which "holed" the ship.

President:

Q. A question if you please - would you be kind enough to expand on the performance of duty of a young man mentioned earlier in your testimony, named LARKINS?

A. Seaman LARKINS helps man mount 54, 03 level, port side, as his general quarters station. He was on that mount, and stayed on that mount, until the fire coming from the 01 level chased him away. He did recall seeing a plane approaching from the port side and lobbing a cylinder that was attached under the wing. A cylinder five to six feet long, approximately ten inches in diameter. This cylinder approached the 01 level port side in an end over end fashion. After it hit, and the fire started, he climbed over the skylight to mount 53 and helped the gun crew there until the fire from the motor whaleboat drove all people away from that mount. I later personally saw him helping to extinguish the fire on the port side and still later, he, by himself, manned mount 51 and fired one shot before he received a cease fire from the Commanding Officer.

President: No further questions - before you leave to go to the hospital, the Court would like to express itself with a feeling of great pride to

be associated with the service's uniform you wear, young man, and we thank you very much for your cooperation and fine testimony.

Mr. LUCAS: Thank you, Admiral.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew,

The Court recessed at 1045 hours, 14 June 1967 from taking further testimony in order to examine exhibits received by the Board.

The Court opened at 1300 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons connected with the inquiry who were present when the court recessed are again present in court.

Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and present duty station.

A. Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

Let the record show that although the witness is experiencing considerable pain from shrapnel wounds in his *Bl* hat he willingly appeared at this hearing.

Q. Captain McGonagle, as you are well aware, this Court of Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances attendant with the armed attack on the U. S. Naval vessel which you command, USS LIBERTY. which occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the Court the circumstances of that incident as you recall it?

A. At the time of the incident, LIBERTY was performing her mission in accordance with JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967. At the time of the incident, the ship was operating under the operational control of Commander, U. S. Sixth Fleet. The ship had arrived in its assigned operating area on the morning of 8 June 1967 after having departed from Rota, Spain on 2 June 1967. The ship was steaming in international

waters and was so at all times. A condition of readiness three modified was set. The condition three modified watch consisted of normal steaming watch with the exception that one man was stationed in the forward two 50 caliber machine guns 51 and 52. Lookouts on the bridge were designated to man machine guns 53 and 54 in the event of surprise air or surface attack. Each machine gun had a box of ammunition attached to the machine gun with a round up to but not in the chamber of each mount. During the 0800 to 1200 watch on the morning of 8 June at about 1030, a flight of two unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship at about 10,000 feet three times at a distance of approximately two miles. It was not possible to identify any insignia on the aircraft and their identity remains unknown. A locating two report was submitted on this sighting. It is not known at this time whether the sighting report was transmitted from the ship or not. Records are not accessible at the time. It was also possible to see on the 8 to 12 watch in the morning the coastline of the Sinai peninsula. Aircraft activity of an apparent propeller patrol type flying at very low altitude and parallel to and over the coast in the vicinity of El Arish was noted. It is estimated that the altitude of this plane was approximately 500 feet. At no time did this plane approach the ship in any fashion. His distance remained approximately 12 to 15 miles. It was possible to visually sight the minaret which is quite conspicuous at El Arish. This was used as a navigational aide in determining the ship's position during the morning and afternoon of 8 June. It became visible at about 0930 and the ship's position was verified, and was within our established operating area. Radar ranges were taken on the nearest land on the same bearing as the minaret. The minaret was also identifiable by radar. There were no other conspicuous or outstanding navigational features in the area. At about 1056 in the morning of 8 June, an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about three to five miles. The plane circled the ship around the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed back toward the Sinai peninsula. A locating three

report was submitted. It is not known if this report was transmitted. This aircraft continued to return in a somewhat similar fashion approximately at 30 minute intervals. It was not possible to see any markings on the aircraft and the identity of this aircraft remains unknown. This aircraft did not approach the ship in any provocative manner. It made no attempt to signal the ship. The ship made no attempt to signal the aircraft. At 1039R the Minaret at El Arish was bearing 189°T, 17 miles. At the time the ship was on a course of 253 at speed five knots. At 1132, the ship changed course to 283 true, speed five knots and was on this course and this speed at the time of the attack. At about 1310, 8 June, the ship went to general quarters for drill purposes to conduct training for a mandatory non-competitive exercise to exercise the crew in chemical attack procedures. The drill was performed in a satisfactory manner. Nearly all of the top-side personnel were exercised through the chemical decontamination station and were absent from their battle station for varying periods of time while performing this phase of the drill. After top-side personnel that had been designated to proceed through the decontamination station (these personnel were all gun crew personnel and secondary con personnel) returned to their battle stations and the performance of the crew judged to be satisfactory the crew was released from battle drills at about 1350 and condition three modified was again set. At the commencement of the drill it was possible to see a large billowing cloud of black smoke rising from approximately 15 to 20 miles to the west of El Arish on the beach. The exact identity of the cause and the location of this explosion is not positively known, although it was believed to be near the beach in that area. This was noted at about 1300. At about 1330 a smaller cloud of black smoke was noted to the east of El Arish estimated five to six miles and also along the coastline. Before dismissing the crew from general drills, I gave the crew a short talk on the PA system, reminding them of the importance of expeditiously responding to general quarters and the setting of condition Zebra for drills and in the event

of an actual attack. So that they would be impressed I pointed out to the crew at that time that the column of black smoke on the beach should be sufficient evidence that the ship was in a potentially dangerous location. I had no evidence or indication that an attack would actually be made on the ship at the time that statement was made to the crew. The statement was made to encourage them to set condition Zebra in a more expeditious manner than they had done for the drill held that afternoon. As I recall all battle stations were reported manned and ready within three minutes for the afternoon drill, but the report of condition Zebra had not been received on the bridge until about four minutes forty-five seconds after the drill commenced. This I considered to be excessive. After conducting general drills, it is my usual practice to go to the wardroom and have a cup of coffee and critique the drill with the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Armstrong, the Engineering Officer, Lieutenant Golden, and the Damage Control Officer, Ensign Scott, if I have not been particularly satisfied with the drill. If the drill has been satisfactory, usually I contact the officers on an individual basis at some later time during the day and indicate to them that I was satisfied with the drill and point out some of the errors in which improvement could be made and point out also to them the things that I felt had been done properly. With the exception of the length of time that it took to set condition Zebra I was satisfied with the performance of the crew for the afternoon drill and did not assemble the above mentioned officers in the wardroom for a critique. After general quarters was over from the drill, I lingered on the bridge for a few minutes. As I recall, the following officers were present on the bridge: LCDR ARMSTRONG, LT ENNIS, LT O'CONNOR, who is normally officer of the deck during general quarters, LT TOTH, the Operations and Navigator, also Intelligence Officer. LTJG PAINTER came onto the bridge after general quarters to assume the watch as the officer of the deck. As he assumed the officer of the deck watch, he indicated that he was having difficulty in obtaining an accurate ship's fix. At that time, and the

time was approximately 1400, I personally sighted the Minaret at El Arish to be on a bearing of 142 from the ship and the range as I recall from the radar was approximately 25.5 miles. I do not know that this radar range can be verified from the records available at this time. I had also earlier in the day established a danger bearing on the Minaret at El Arish to be 119 degrees true from the ship. The danger bearing was established to insure that the ship remained clear of shoal areas to the south of the southwesternmost edge of our operating area. It was not known if the Minaret would still be visible when we approached the southwest corner of our operating area or not, but the danger bearing was established to be used if the Minaret was visible when the ship arrived at that location. At this point in the preparation of my statement, I referred to the quartermaster's notebook. 12-1600 watch, Thursday, 8 June 1967. I referred to this log for the purpose of refreshing my memory as to the initial moments of the unexpected attack. The log shows that at 1355, LTJG PAINTER relieved LT O'CONNOR as officer of the deck. The log also shows that at 1355, ENS O'MALLEY, as junior officer of the deck under instruction assumed the con. The 12-1600 watch on Thursday, 8 June 1967 has no entry from the time frame 1356 until 1446. I shall relate in my own words and to the best of my knowledge and belief all events of which I have personal knowledge which occurred during that time frame. About 1400 the lookouts, who were stationed on the 04 level, immediately above the bridge, reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical to the two aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135. Its position angle about 45 to 50 degrees. Its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction as the ship. While I observed this

aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level, portside amidships, were burning furiously. It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'CONNOR was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level starboard side, immediately aft of the bridge. Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. O'CONNOR and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. At this time, I grabbed the engine order annunciator and rang up all ahead flank. Up to this time, the ship had one boiler on the line steaming at speed five knots. The other boiler was not on the line but pressure was being maintained in order to be able to respond to speeds in excess of that which is capable with one boiler, approximately 11 knots, should it be necessary. Earlier in the day, the Engineering Officer had requested permission to let number two boiler cool so that he could replace a steamline gasket. This permission had been granted and the boiler had started to cool from about 1200 on 8 June. I do not know whether the engine room acknowledged by the engine order telegraph the flank bell or not, but smoke immediately commenced coming out of the stack and I assumed that they did. It seemed to me that shortly thereafter the ship increased speed. At this time I ordered a person, who

I believe to have been LT BENNETT, to report to CNO via the highcom that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required. I do not recall whether I ordered any course changes to have the ship zig-zag or not, One helmsman was seriously injured in the starboard bridge bomb blast, and he was replaced by Quartermaster Third BROWN. I do not recall who had the helm at the time of the initial attack. The response of the crew to general quarters was very expeditious. I do not recall whether all of the bridge personnel ever arrived on station or not, but the public address system, the 21MC, and most sound powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the initial first or second of the total number of six to eight strafing attacks that occurred, It seemed to me that the attacks were made in a crisscross fashion over the ship, with each attack coming at approximately forty-five second to one minute intervals. After the starboard bridge bomb hit, I ordered personnel to be organized for a fire fighting party to put out the fire in the vicinity of the whaleboat. The whaleboat was burning furiously. It is estimated that the total air attack was completed in approximately five to six minutes. About midway during the attack, Ensign LUCAS was noted on the bridge and at that time he became my assistant and assisted me in every way possible. Runners were used to relay my orders to the repair parties, to main control and other vital stations. Sometime after the starboard bridge bomb hit while on the starboard side of the pilothouse, another attack from the starboard quarter proceeding forward was made and I was hit with flying shrapnel. I was not knocked off my feet, I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence, I noticed slight burns on my *B4* and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers *B6* Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries, Shortly after this I opened the bridge safe and took out a camera which was maintained on the

bridge to take pictures of foreign ships and aircraft. I immediately took the camera to the port wing of the bridge and there was able to take several pictures of the planes as they had passed over the ship after their attack. In an effort to obtain documentary evidence to establish the identity of the aircraft, I retained this camera in my possession throughout the remainder of the attack. Later I took pictures of the torpedo boats before and after the torpedo attack, also the helicopters which approached the ship after the attack was over. This film has been turned over to the USS AMERICA for development and further disposition. On what appeared to be the last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship. This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to 100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no explosion from this object, but it shattered into several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have been an empty wing tank but I am not certain of this. In the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about 15 miles. The ship at the time was still on course 283 true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots. At no time did the ship stop during the air attack. It is believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats, the time was about 1420. The boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards apart. It appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude, and since I did not have direct communication with gun control or the gun mounts, I told a man from the bridge, whose identity I do not recall, to proceed to mount 51 and take the boats under fire. The boats continued to approach the ship at high speed and on a constant bearing with decreasing range. About this time I noticed that our Ensign had been shot away during the air attack and orderd DAVID, signalman, to hoist a second

Ensign from the yardarm. During the air attack, our normal Ensign was flying. Before the torpedo attack, a holiday size Ensign was hoisted. I alerted the crew as best I could to standby for torpedo attack from starboard. I did not have an accurate ship's position at this time, but I knew that to the left of the ship's course at that time lie shoal waters and by turning to the left I would be approaching land closer than had been given me in directives which I held in that instant in time. I realized that if I attempted to turn to starboard, I would expose a larger target to the torpedo boats. I elected to maintain a heading of 283 at maximum speed. When the boats reached an approximate range of 2,000 yards, the center boat of the formation was signalling to us. Also, at this range, it appeared that they were flying an Israeli flag. This was later verified. It was not possible to read the signals from the center torpedo boat because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. At this time, I yelled to machine gun 51 to tell him to hold fire. I realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error. I wanted to hold fire to see if we could read the signal from the torpedo boat and perhaps avoid additional damage and personnel injuries. The man on machine gun 51 fired a short burst at the boats before he was able to understand what I was attempting to have him do. Instantly, on machine gun 51 opening fire machine gun 53 began firing at the center boat. From the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level, I observed that the fire from machine gun 53 was extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat. It was not possible to get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge. I sent Mr. LUCAS around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell QUINTERO, whom I believed to be the gunner on machine gun 53, to hold fire until we were able to clarify the situation. He reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53. As far as the torpedo boats are concerned, I am sure that they felt that they

were under fire from USS LIBERTY. At this time, they opened fire with their gun mounts and in a matter of seconds, one torpedo was noted crossing astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time that this torpedo crossed the stern is believed to be about 1426. About 1427, without advance warning, the ship sustained a torpedo hit starboard side forward, immediately below the waterline in the vicinity of the coordination center. The ship immediately took a 9 degree list to starboard. Oil and debris were noted coming from the starboard side following the explosion. There was no major resultant fire from this explosion. The explosion caused the ship to come dead in the water. Steering control was lost. All power was lost. Immediately, I determined that the ship was in no danger of sinking and did not order the destruction of classified material and did not order any preparations to be made to abandon ship. It was my intention to ground the ship on shoal areas to the left of the ship's track to prevent its sinking, if necessary. I believed that, if the ship was in a sinking condition, we would not be able to reach sufficiently deep water to avoid recovery of classified material on board. Immediately after the ship was struck by the torpedo, the torpedo boats stopped dead in the water and milled around astern of the ship at a range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the boats signalled by flashing light, in English, "Do you require assistance"? We had no means to communicate with the boat by light but hoisted code lima india. The signal intended to convey the fact that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty and that they should keep clear. Reports received from damage control central indicated the location of the torpedo hit and that flooding boundaries had been established and that the flooding was under control. During the strafing by the torpedo boats and immediately prior to being hit by the torpedo, quartermaster third BROWN, who was acting as helmsman at the time, was felled at his station. The mess decks were designated casualty collection station and casualties were taken to the collection station by repair party personnel and other members of the

crew able to assist. Following the torpedo hit, those personnel from the research area who were able to do so, left their stations. One of the torpedo boats was identified by a hull number of 204-17. Pictures were taken of the torpedo boats prior to and subsequent to the attack. About 1515, two helicopters approached the ship and circled around and around the ship at a distance of about 100 yards. The ensignia the Star of David was clearly visible. Hull number on one of the helicopters was 04 or D4. The other had a hull number of 08 or D8. It was not known whether these helicopters intended to strafe the ship or not. However, they did not approach the ship in a hostile manner, but kept pointed parallel to the ship as they continued around and never made a direct approach as such. They were not taken under fire by Liberty, nor did they fire at us. The torpedo boats left the general area of the ship at about 1515. About 1537, after they had departed the ship and gone to a range of about five miles, they again headed toward the ship at high speed. Their intentions were unknown. At about this same time two unidentified jet aircraft were also noted approaching the ship from our starboard side, in similar fashion to that which preceded the initial attack. All hands were again alerted to the possibility of repeated attacks. No attacks occurred however, and the jets disappeared from the scene. To further assist in identification of the ship, at 1611 I ordered the ship's international call sign hoisted. Both boilers had been put back on the line at approximately 1520, but at 1523 lube oil suction was lost to the main engines and the ship again became dead in the water. The heading of the ship at this time is not known. About 1555, communications were restored, and at 1600 a message was sent providing additional information concerning the attack by unidentified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats had been identified as Israeli. Preliminary estimate of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the condition of the ship, was also provided. At the time this message was being dictated to Lieutenant Bennett on the port wing of the bridge, I was laying on the deck with a

tourniquet being applied to my ^{B4} A few moments prior to this I felt myself blacking out from loss of blood, and called for assistance of CT1 Carpenter to apply a tourniquet. I had assumed the con immediately upon the air attack and retained the con until rendezvous was effected with the destroyers about 0630 on the morning of 9 June 1967, leaving the bridge only about 3 times during the night hours to make brief head calls on the 02 level. No bodies were noted in the area of ship following the explosion. Several life rafts, however, were released and placed into the water by various crew members whom I was unable to communicate with prior to their placing the boats in the water. They exercised their initiative on the scene, and no fault can be found with their estimate, not having the information that I had. When the messenger was sent to tell them to leave the lifeboats alone, that the ship was in no danger of sinking at that time, but that the lifeboats might be needed at a later time, no additional lifeboats were placed in the water. Misinterpretation of the situation by personnel in combat following the order to prepare for torpedo attack to starboard also resulted in the ship's radar being purposely destroyed. Again, I find no fault with this action under the circumstances. At about 1637, the torpedo boats commenced retiring from the area without further signal or action. At this time, the ship was attempting to make good a course of 340 magnetic, at speed 8 knots. Emergency manual steering was being conducted from after steering. The amount of rudder was given to after steering over emergency rigged sound powered telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the ship's heading most of the time. The exact position of the ship was not known at this time. At 1653 an attempt was made to steer and make good a course of 000 magnetic. It was not known what effect the nearby explosions might have had on the pilot house magnetic compass. The gyro compass was

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out. It was not known what the azimuth of the setting sun was, but this was used as a rough guide and it appeared that the magnetic compass had not been unduly affected. The ship's fathometer in combat was working following the attacks. At about 1650, the fathometer sounding reported approximately 26 fathoms under the keel. I realized at this point that the ship might be south of its track and could be approaching the shoal areas outside of our operating area. Since I was not positive of the ship's position, I ordered Mr. Lucas to round up as many personnel as he could, and proceed to the forecastle and standby to anchor. My intentions was to anchor until it became night so that I could visually sight the North Star to see whether the magnetic compass had been unduly affected or not. Once I was able to sight the North Star, then I would know in which direction the ship was actually proceeding. Mr. Lucas and personnel did go to the forecastle, and at one point I did order the port anchor to let go. But before the port anchor could be let go, I reversed my decision and backed all engines two-thirds to see if I could back clear of the apparent shoal area. I commenced backing the ship at about 1704 and continued backing until 1722, at which time the fathometer reading was approximately 48 fathoms under the keel. With the ship going ahead two-thirds and right full rudder we quickly came to a magnetic heading of about 350 magnetic and continued on to a heading of 025 magnetic about 1729. The ship was at this time making a speed of about 8 knots. At 1730, the ship lost lube oil to the main engines, and all engines were stopped. At 1731, the ship was on a heading of 022 magnetic with 50 fathoms of water under the keel. Lube oil pressure was regained to the main engines within a very short period of time, and the ship continued right to a magnetic heading of 040 at 1737, at which time 72 fathoms was indicated under the keel. At 1743, the ship's heading was 068 magnetic and 82 fathoms of water under the keel. At this time I considered the ship to have stood clear of the immediate danger of grounding and at 1748 increased speed to ten knots on a magnetic heading of 050. The ship remained at general

quarters, and reports from damage control central were to the effect that all watertight boundary bulkheads were holding satisfactory. Dr. KEEFER, and the two corpsmen, were doing outstanding work in assisting injured crew members. They advised me from time to time of the number of casualties, the extent of injuries, and efforts being made. At 1750, a message was received from COMSIXTHFLT to the effect that escorts were on the way and that the ship was to proceed on a course of 340 magnetic at maximum speed until 100 miles from present position, then turn 270 magnetic. The ship attempted to carry out this directive. At 1757, COMSIXTHFLT advised that escorts were proceeding to rendezvous with us at maximum speed of destroyers. At 1841, an Israeli helicopter approached the ship and hovered at bridge level approximately 30 feet from the ship. They made various attempts to indicate by visual means that they wished to land a man on board. At one point, I considered granting the request, but considering the obstructions in the area of the forecastle, signalled a waveoff to them. Lettering on the tail of the Helicopter was SA32K. On the fuselage were the numerals 06 or D6. At 1857, the helicopter dropped a message on the forecastle. The message was written on the back of a calling card, identified as Commander Ernest Carl Castle, Naval Attache for Air Embassy, USA. The message on the back read as follows: "Have you casualties". We attempted to advise them by flashing light with an Aldis lamp that, "affirmative", we did have casualties. It was evident that they were unable to understand what we were saying. After some ten to fifteen minutes of unsuccessful efforts to communicate between the helicopter and the ship, the Helicopter departed from the area, at a time unknown, but as dusk was approaching the ship. Three musters were taken during the night to identify the dead, the seriously injured, and to determine those who were missing. It was believed that those initially reported as missing are entrapped in compartments in the forward part of the ship as a result of the torpedo explosion and resultant flooding. As of 1900,

11 June, two of the persons previously reported missing, have been recovered. One by removing him directly from the space on board ship. The other was recovered by the PAPAGO, a Fleet tug steaming approximately six miles astern of the ship on the morning of 11 June. It is not known at this time whether any of the other individuals reported missing have drifted free of the space through the torpedo hole and vanished from the area. It will not be possible to determine until the ship has been drydocked and the compartment dewatered and remains recovered. Preparation of casualty messages were completed as expeditiously as possible upon the completion of the musters, and necessary message notifications sent. The ship rendezvoused with the two destroyers on the morning of 9 June. Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve reported on board to inspect damage and confer with the Commanding Officer. Personnel from the USS DAVIS immediately boarded the ship to render assistance with damage control and treatment of injured personnel. I have no complaint to lodge against any officer or man on board USS LIBERTY for any acts of commission or omission during the attack and post attack phase. I have nothing but the greatest admiration for their courage, their devotion to duty, and their efforts to save the ship. As the result of my personal knowledge of the manner in which the following personnel performed their duties during the attack and post attack phase, I intend to commend Ensign LUCAS; Signalman DAVIS; Quartermaster Third BROWN; Lieutenant George GOLDEN, Engineering Officer; and Ensign SCOTT, Damage Control Assistant. I have requested the officers and the petty officers of the ship to advise me of any other individuals, who, to their personal knowledge, performed in such a manner as to warrant special recognition. I also intend to address a letter of appreciation to Lieutenant Commander Bill PETTYJOHN, Chief Staff Officer, COMDESRON TWELVE, for the outstanding manner in which he has assumed the responsibilities of assisting the Commanding Officer in sailing the ship from point of rendezvous to destination of Malta. A message of condolence from the ship has been sent to BUPERS with the request that it

be delivered to the next of kin at the funeral or memorial services conducted for the deceased and those missing in action. A personal letter from the Commanding Officer to the next of kin will be prepared and sent at the earliest possible time. Dr. KEEFER, and the two pharmacist mates will also be awarded letters of commendation from the Commanding Officer. It is not known at this time the extent of probable compromise of classified material. Destruction of superceded RPS-distributed material was conducted immediately prior to the attack. Lieutenant PIERCE, Communications Officer and RPS-Custodian discussed the matter with the Commanding Officer on the morning of 8 June, and it was decided at that time that we would make the June burn before the scheduled 15 June date, in view of the location of the ship, and we intended to burn superceded key cards on a daily basis as they were superceded. A report to this effect was released by the Commanding Officer. It is not known, however, whether this message was transmitted or not.

The court recessed at 1620 hours, 14 June 1967

The court opened at 1645 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons connected with the inquiry who were present when the court recessed are again present in court. Commander William McGee, U.S. Navy, resumed his position on the stand as a witness.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Captain, will you please continue with your description of the incident.

A. I would like to relate some additional information which may be of some help to the court. USS LIBERTY departed Norfolk, Virginia 2 May 1967 in accordance with COMSERVRON EIGHT message dtg 281502Z April 1967.

This was to be the fifth deployment of the LIBERTY to foreign station since its conversion and commissioning as a technical research ship in Seattle,

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Washington 30 December 1964. The deployment initially commenced under the operational control of COMSERVRON EIGHT. The first port of call was Abidjan, Ivory Coast with a scheduled arrival of 22 May 1967. LIBERTY arrived at Abidjan, Ivory Coast on the scheduled date. LIBERTY was scheduled to spend four days in Abidjan, Ivory Coast to depart on 26 May 1967. The operation order was similar to that under which the LIBERTY had deployed on four previous occasions. On the morning of 24 May, approximately 0345Z, a message was received from COMSERVRON EIGHT with a dtg of 240020Z, May 67 in effect directing that LIBERTY get underway immediately and proceed to Rota, Spain for further operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Immediately upon receipt of this message, LIBERTY commenced preparations for getting underway. It was not possible to get underway, however, until about 0730 on the morning of 24 May 1967. The delay was due to awaiting for pilot, tug, and proper tide conditions for transit of the Vridi Canal. USS LIBERTY cleared the Vridi Canal approximately 0745, 24 May 1967, and set course via coastal route direct to Rota, Spain at best speed. An average of about 15 knots was maintained during the transit. During the transit from Abidjan, Ivory Coast to Rota, Spain, operational control of LIBERTY was changed from COMSERVRON EIGHT to USCINCEUR. The reference for this operational control change is COMSERVRON EIGHT 300202Z May 1967. This reference is not immediately available to me. Operational control of LIBERTY was again shifted from USCINCEUR to CINCUSNAVEUR in accordance with USCINCEUR 300932Z May 1967. This change of operational control occurred as LIBERTY arrived at the sea buoy off the port of Rota, Spain at about 0930 local time, 1 June 1967. After completion of fueling, loading provisions, and accomplishing repairs to the special communications relay system (TRSSCOMM) the ship was RFS at about 1330, 2 June, and at that time got underway in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR move order 7-67, dtg of this move order was CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 311750Z May 67 modified by CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 011305Z June 1967. JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967 is considered pertinent in LIBERTY's schedule from the period 02 June until the time of the incident. This message gives departure date from Rota, route to

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follow, point to proceed to, and the operating area of Liberty during the period of 9 to 30 June 1967. Paragraph 1C of this message is particularly pertinent. At 070001Z June 1967, operational control of Liberty again changed from CINCUSNAVEUR to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 061357Z June 1967. This change of operational control was made by message in which Liberty indicated to COMSIXTHFLT that Liberty was reporting to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with the CINCUSNAVEUR message 061357Z. This message also included Liberty endurance and provisions, dry, frozen, and chill. It indicated that the ship had on board approximately 85% fuel and utilized approximately 1% fuel per day while on station. The message also indicated that Liberty self-defense capability was limited to four 50 caliber machine guns. The dtg of this message is 062036Z June 67. USS Liberty was operating under the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT at the time of the incident. No additional messages were in hand onboard Liberty concerning area of operation or other guidance for the performance of our mission than previously mentioned in the JCS message of 011545Z June 1967. COMSIXTHFLT message dtg 080917Z June 1967, which directed Liberty to proceed and operate within a 25 mile radius of 33.40 North, 32.30 East until further notice was not received until delivered by hand on 10 June 1967. Had this message been received anytime prior to the attack, Liberty would have attempted to open the range on the coast of the countries indicated in the message to at least be 100 miles specified. The existence of this message was not known by the Commanding Officer of the Liberty at the time of the incident and no action was taken to comply with it. During the four previous deployments of USS Liberty, the ship aroused unusual curiosity only during the first and second deployments. The configuration of the ship with unusual mast antennae arrangements and deckhouse structures caused, so I understand inasmuch as I was not on board as Commanding Officer at the time, some surveillance, primarily surface, from the Southwest African countries during its first two deployments. Lieutenant GOLDEN, who was aboard at the time, may be

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able to provide the Board with additional details in this area. There are probably many reasons why the aircraft were unidentified. One reason would be that the distance, and the speed at which the aircraft flew, was such that it was extremely difficult to make out any distinguishing characteristics by personnel on board who do not normally observe any jet aircraft in the area of the ship's operation. The ship normally steams on independent duty along the West Coast of Africa. These countries do not have sophisticated air forces with the possible exception of Angola. Angola does have some jet aircraft but they have been noted to fly over the ship only on one occasion to the Commanding Officer's personal knowledge, while the ship was at anchor in Luanda Harbor. An occasional piper cub or helicopter working an oil rig along the coast and infrequently commercial jet aircraft is about the extent of air activity observed by personnel aboard LIBERTY. A recognition manual for Israeli, UAR, aircraft and surface ships was not on board prior to proceeding to the area. General ship characteristic and plane characteristic recognition manuals are on board and were used to hold occasional recognition training sessions. These sessions were primarily devoted to ship recognition. It was not known whether any U.S. aircraft were in the area, but no known U.S. aircraft were sighted by anyone onboard at any time prior to or after the incident. On further recollection of the event involving machine gun 53 firing, the effectiveness of the firing leads me to believe that a person, whom I believe to be QUINTERO, Boatswain Mate Seaman, to have been on station at machine gun 53 and took the torpedo boats under fire. It is possible that he evacuated his station as a result of the fire and flames from the motor whaleboat prior to Ensign Lucas' arriving to determine who was on the mount. For clarification purposes, the 50 caliber machine guns that are onboard USS Liberty are Browning machine guns, M2, heavy barrel, with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. These machine guns are mounted on a pedestal and are aircooled weapons. Two men can effectively serve the gun. One as gunner, who uses

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an open sight; the other individual, the loader, who keeps ammunition up to the chamber. These machine guns are manually controlled. There is no director means of controlling the fire. The limiting stops for arc of fire of these weapons consist of piping, bent in a shape to prevent the gun barrel from being pointed at a direction which would harm the ship or any portion of its structure, and the outer edge of the gun tubs themselves which offer very limited splinter protection. The machine guns themselves do not have any splinter shields attached. These machine guns are not considered mounts in the normal Navy terminology of a mount. They should be considered more as pedestal mounted machine guns. The time gap in the Quartermasters notebook resulted from the fact that there were insufficient number of people in the bridge area to maintain an accurate record of events as they occurred and execute the orders of the Commanding Officer simultaneously. With communications to various stations limited various personnel, as they were noted on the bridge, were used as messengers. At one time during this time frame, the only individuals seen on the bridge were Quartermaster BROWN, who was on the helm, Ensign LUCAS, and Myself. Ensign LUCAS was busy relaying my instructions to the various battle stations. The smooth log will be a reconstruction of events as recalled by the Commanding Officer, who was present on the bridge throughout the entire incident and maintained his faculties at all times during the incident. At this time, I have related all of the events that are considered pertinent and should be brought to the attention of the Board of Inquiry. One additional fact, which should be noted by the board, is the fact that the chart used for plotting the ship's position and for laying out the operating area is identified as Portfolio A3259, Chart BC3924 Nov, Second Edition, September 30, 1963 (revised 5/4/64). This chart shows the approach to the operating area that the USS LIBERTY made, a diagonal transit from northwest to southeast. It lists point A, B, and C as the proposed southernmost limit of the operating area and the intended track of LIBERTY.

Q. Captain, you mentioned in your testimony that a helicopter hovered over Liberty and that an object was dropped which you recovered. I show you this card, and ask you if you recognize it?

A. Yes sir, I do recognize this card. It is a calling card.

Counsel for the Court: I'd like to offer this into evidence as exhibit number 8, and to serve as identification, if there is no objection, I would like you to read it now?

A. I read from the card I now hold in my hand. It is a calling card from "Commander Earnest Carl Castle, United States Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Embassy of the United States of America, Tel Aviv." This is on the face of the card. On the back of the card is written, "Have you casualties?"

It's noted that this card is smeared with oil smudges on both sides.

Q. Thank you very much. You also mentioned in your testimony that you took a camera out of your bridge safe and were able to start to take some pictures. I show you developed pictures and ask you if you recognize them?

A. Yes, I recognize most of these pictures as having been taken by myself during the attack. Some had been taken by another individual unknown, but I do recognize the scenes depicted therein.

Q. Therefore, will you mark the back of the pictures for record purposes so that identification will be known? and I offer them in evidence as Exhibit 9.

A. Yes sir, I will mark them so that they, the scene or object depicted will be clearly indicated.

President: I'd like to, at this point ask the Captain -- Did you not have wounded still lying about the deck at the time this helicopter was hovering over the ship?

A. Admiral, if you mean the helicopter ~~which~~ the attache was in, I'm not sure that the wounded were still lying around the deck, as such. By that time, most of our wounded had been taken to the casualty collection stations.

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But there were people that were wounded. Whether they were evident to the Naval Attache from his position in the helicopter I do not know. There were injured on deck, however.

Counsel for the Court: In amplification of the Admiral's question, was there not a considerable amount of blood on the decks that would be obvious from a reasonable distance?

A. That is correct. There were numerous blood streams the full length from the 01 level on the forecastle to the main deck, at machine gun mount 51, where one body was still lying. I do recall that now. With his head nearly completely shot away. As I recall now, there was also another body in the vicinity of mount 51. The seriously injured were cared for before those obviously beyond help; were taken care of and removed from the place where they were hit.

Counsel for the Court: I'd also like to introduce in evidence at this point, separately from the chronological file of messages, DAO Tel Aviv 082100Z, as Exhibit 10.

Counsel for the Court: You have in your custody, USS Liberty charts that were used on the day of 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: I request the recorder to mark such charts exhibits 12 and 13, and request photos be substituted in the record.

Counsel for the Court: Will you please read the information relative to this court?

A. From exhibit ¹¹ 12, this is a chart of the Mediterranean Sea from Antalya Korfezi to Alexandria including Cyprus. It is further identified by Chart No. BC3924 November, second edition, September 30, 1963, revised 5--4-64. This chart shows points A, B, and C. These three points limit the southern operating area in which Liberty intended to operate in carrying out the directives of the JCS message 011545Z.

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Captain Lauff: Do I understand those to be the southernmost limit of your operating area?

A. These points represent a point greater, a distance from the beach, greater than that specified in the JCS message, but closely approximate those limits. The lines between point A, B, and C were the intended track of Liberty during the forenoon and afternoon watch of 8 June 1967. It was planned on arrival at point C to reverse course to the right and proceed again to point B, thence to point A, and continue a back and forth motion along these tracks during our entire stay in the operating area. It was planned to move point C to where longitude 33°W bisects the 100 fathom curve should it not be possible to obtain accurate fixes as the ship approached point C. The latitude and longitude of these points are as follows: Point A -- 31.27.2N 34.00E. This point is thirteen nautical miles from the nearest land. The coordinates of point B are: 31.22.3N 33.42E. This point is 14.6 nautical miles from nearest land. The coordinates of point C are: 31.31N 33.00E. This point is 18 nautical miles from nearest land. Closest point of approach to nearest land on a line between points A and B is 13 nautical miles. The closest point of approach to nearest land between points B and C is 14.1 nautical miles. Verbal instructions to the officers of the deck were that the ship was not to be to the south of a line connecting these points at anytime. Exhibit number 12 is a chart. The course between point A and B is 253 true. The course between point B and C is 283 true.

Counsel of the Court: Do any of the members of the Court desire to question the witness?

No response.

Witness: Exhibit number ¹²~~23~~ is a Mediterranean Sea chart of Egypt and coastline from Damietta to Alarish. This is further identified as chart No. 3975, seventh edition, March 1931, revised 2/3/64. This chart has on it the previously described points A, B, and C. It also has on it the danger

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bearing established on the conspicuous Manaret at Alarish of 119 degrees true from the ship. The shoal areas of five fathoms or less are circled in red to easily call attention to their location.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you in your custody, a CIC log and the radar bearing book for USS Liberty?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the radar bearing book as exhibit number 13 and the CIC log as exhibit number 14. I now offer these exhibits into evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Do any members of this Court desire to question the witness concerning the charts, exhibits 11 and 12, or the radar bearing book and the CIC log, exhibits 13 and 14.

No response.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Junior Grade Lloyd C. PAINTER, United States Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank and organization?

A. Lloyd C. PAINTER, Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

Q. On 8 June 1967, at about 1400 hours, an incident occurred aboard USS LIBERTY in which the vessel was attacked. Would you please relate to this Court of Inquiry what you recall concerning that incident?

A. Yes sir. I was at this time, the officer of the deck. I had the 12 to 1600 watch that afternoon, and we had had a practice general quarters drill at 1300 and secured from that at approximately 1345, 1350. And during general quarters I left the bridge and went to my general quarters station, which is repair three, located on the mess decks. After this drill was over, I went back up to the bridge to relieve the watch, and when I came up to the bridge, I was

Q. What time was that?

A. Sir, I think it was 1350, thereabouts. I came back up to the bridge and relieved Mr. O'CONNOR who was the general quarters OOD, and assumed the watch. The first thing I was concerned with was getting a fix, and I remember distinctly checking the radar, and the nearest point of land on the radar at approximately 1355 was 17.5 miles. And I remember distinctly asking the Captain if I could come back to our base course, which I believe was set at about 14 and a half miles. We were about three miles outside of base course. About this time, it was around 1400, the Captain was on the starboard wing. He was watching some jet aircraft. The Captain was on the starboard wing, and he was looking up in the air at a couple of jet aircraft. He called me out there and said, "you'd better call the forward gun mounts." He saided me "I think they're going to attack," or words to that effect. So, I ran into the bridge area and tried to call the port and starboard gun mounts forward. I couldn't get them; I called them about three times, and about the third

time I said, "bridge, gun mounts 51 and 52." They were hit. I can't testify exactly which one was hit first, port or starboard; they were both hit so fast. I believe the starboard one was hit first. At this time, I still had the phone in my hand, I was looking through the porthole at the gun mounts. I was looking through the porthole when I was trying to contact these two kids, and I saw them both; well, I didn't exactly see them as such. They were blown apart, but I saw the whole area go up in smoke and scattered metal. And, at about the same time the aircraft strafed the bridge area itself. The quartermaster, quartermaster third class POLLARD was standing right next to me, and he was hit, evidently with flying glass from the porthole. I don't know why I came out without a scratch. I was standing, as I said, right next to him. Finally, about this time they started strafing and we both hit the deck, as well as Mr. O'MALLEY, who was my JOOD at the time. As soon as the first strafing raid had been made, we sounded general quarters alarm. The Captain was on the bridge, He was in the pilot house at this time. I don't know whether he was hit then or not, I can't remember. It was so smokey. I took off for my general quarters station, which, as I said before, was repair three on the mess decks. On the way down I was running as fast as I could. By the time I got to the Chief's Lounge, the entrance through the lounge to the mess decks, I saw SPICER, our postal clerk, lying there out in half with strafing and the hospital corpsman was applying mouth to mouth resuscitation. This I later found out failed. He died right there. Well, anyway, I got down to the mess decks and all my men were assembling there as fast as possible. They went to full battle dress, and so did I. I can't recall exactly how long we were waiting for the strafing raids to be over, but I believe it was approximately 20 minutes. At this time someone, I believe it was one of the quartermasters, came down and called me to the bridge. He said, "the Captain's hurt and the operations officer was dead, and the executive officer was mortally wounded." I ran up to the bridge. And when I got up there, the Captain was laying on the stretcher up there while trying to get underway. He thought for a while I think, I'm not sure, that he would pass out, and he wanted somebody up there to take over. He wanted somebody up there in case

he did. I'm not sure, but I think that is why he had called me up there. I don't know whether he called me up there, or the quartermaster just took it on his own to get me up there. I never found out. So, I was up there for a few minutes and it looked like the strafing raids were over, and some of the people were coming out and looking around and my repair chief had come out to assess some of the damage. When I saw him on the Ol level aft, I told him to take over Repair Three as I would be on the bridge. Well, by this time, the Captain had regained consciousness and told me that I would best be needed in Repair Three.

Q. Was that the Captain?

A. Yes sir.

So I left and went back to Repair Three, and, I don't know how long, time was slipping by so fast at this time, after that we had our first torpedo attack. It came over, well the LMC was out, it came over the sound powered phones, "prepare for torpedo attack starboard side." So, we prepared for a torpedo attack starboard side, which we received in midships. I can't say exactly what time it was, maybe 1435. Well, the ship at this time as soon as the torpedo hit midships, we began to develop a starboard list very quickly. So quickly that I felt as though we were probably going to lose it. At this time, the DC central passed the word to prepare to abandon ship. We then filed out to our life rafts which were no longer with us because they had been strafed and most of them were burned, so we knocked most of them over the side. At this time the torpedo boats, three of them, that had torpedoed us, were laying off, waiting for us to sink, I believe. Anyway, they didn't come near us at this time. However, we were able to maintain the ship and stabilize it. It didn't sink. So the Captain said that everyone could go back to general quarters stations. At this time I went back to Repair Three on the mess decks along with the rest of my repair party. All during this time in Repair Three, my men were fighting fires and knocking burning liferafts, etc. So we were kept fairly busy down in Repair Three the whole time. Also they were checking bulkheads and shoring where needed. After I went back there, after the torpedo attack, we waited for what seemed like many, many hours, but I

imagine it was only 20 or 30 minutes; and in that time we were checking out the torpedo hit midships and doing what was necessary to prevent further flooding. About 30 minutes later we had word from the Captain that torpedo boats were approaching us again and to prepare for another torpedo attack starboard side. And I know that if another torpedo had hit us, it would have sunk us, so I told the men to standby to abandon ship. We prepared to abandon ship in case we were hit the second time. At this time we were dead in the water with no steerage. However, we were able to regain our steerage by manual means and able to make approximately five to six knots. The pit log was out, we were just guessing by the number of turns that were being made. We tried to maintain a course, this time, I'm not really sure, it was either 300 or 320 to take us out of there. After we had gotten underway, an Israeli helicopter came out and asked us if we wanted aid; well, they didn't ask us, they just came along side and acted like they wanted to help, but we waved them off. We maintained this course as best we could throughout the night. I was up on the bridge most of the night with the Captain, up until the destroyer, DAVIS, I believe it was, came alongside the next morning. Repair three on the mess decks was designated a casualty station because the wardroom, which was the normal casualty station, was so badly strafed that we couldn't keep them up there. The mess deck was a bloody mess that night. People were dying. It was a ghastly sight. That's about all I have to say.

Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see the national ensign flying?

A. Yes sir, I did. I saw the national ensign flying after the, it was at the time I believe when we were going to abandon ship. I ran out on the main deck to get the life rafts ready. I remember distinctly looking back up and seeing the Ensign flying. This was, I think, after the air raid, after the torpedo attack.

Q. Had you seen it earlier that morning?

A. I saw it earlier that morning when I came up, I don't know when it was.

I came up on and off that morning checking a patrol plane that had been flying over us. The quartermaster, DAVID QM2, had told me that the night that he was wounded that he had put the flag up at 0730 that morning.

Q. So you, in recollection, recall seeing the flag flying in the morning and after the torpedo attack?

A. Yes, before and after the torpedo attack.

Q. Do you know whether or not it was the same flag?

A. I couldn't tell you sir. The way I thought at one time, what the heck was it, I noticed there was something funny about it. I might have seen the flag twice, because once I saw one that had been shot up and it was ragged, and the next time I looked at it I didn't notice whether it was ragged or not. I couldn't say either way whether it was the same flag.

A. Earlier in your testimony you mentioned that the LIBERTY was 17.5 miles from nearest point of land. How did you arrive at this?

A. By radar navigation.

Q. Did you take a fathometer check?

A. Fathometer checked, yes sir. Either 33 or 31 fathoms under the keel at this time.

Counsel for the Court: Does any other member of this Court have questions of this witness?

President: No further questions.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Ensign John D. SCOTT, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your full name, rank, and organization?

A. John D. SCOTT, Ensign, NSNR.

Q. Mr. SCOTT, you know that this Court of Inquiry is interested in the incident involving USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Would you please tell the Court what you recall of that incident?

A. Yes sir. On the morning of the 8th, I had the 4 to 8 officer of the Beck watch on the bridge. It was a routine watch. The only thing out of the ordinary was we had one reconnaissance plane that flew by us and made a few circles off our port beam. He circled around about three or four times, then took off.

Q. About what time?

A. About 0515. I was not able to identify the aircraft. We looked at it with the binoculars. Due to the distance we could not see any markings or insignia of any sort on it.

President: That was local time, Mr. SCOTT?

A. Yes sir. The plane circled around several times then took off in a true direction towards Tel Aviv. About 30 minutes later I got a call from coordination, sir, and Chief CT SMITH was on the phone; wanted to know if I had an air contact that was fairly close in the last half hour. I told him I did and he wanted to know which direction it went after it left the vicinity of the ship. I told him, "Tel Aviv." He said, "Fine, that's all I want to know." I did manage to take four pictures of the aircraft with the camera on the bridge. I didn't know what type it was. It was a double fuselage, twin-engine type. It looked somewhat like an old P-38 or a small flying boxcar. That's about the only significant thing that happened on the 4 to 8.

Q. Do you recall the flag or the national ensign flying?

A. Yes sir, it was flying. I noticed at first light that the ensign was flying. I looked up to it to check the wind direction just in the event I had to blow tubes and I wanted to have a favorable wind direction. That's about all I recall about the flag being upon on the day and night while we were over here. I don't recall seeing it down at all. That's about all I have to say about the 4 to 8.

Q. Continue on during the day?

A. I wasn't aware of any aircraft overhead. I did notice that at about the noon hour there was smoke on the horizon. Could see results of bombing on the horizon. I had gone out and taken a picture. I wasn't aware of aircraft. After we secured from general quarters, I came in to

the wardroom and I just left when I heard the first hit. With that, I took off running to DC central. I did not come topside again until about 0500 the following day.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness. Does any member of the Court?

President: Tell us a little bit about your damage control measures when the ship was hit from starboard?

A. Yes sir. When we were first hit, the first orders we got were, "two fires, one port side in the vicinity of the gas drums, one starboard side vicinity of the motor whaleboat." I ordered fire fighting parties out. Next we were ordered to pick up the wounded. We had a number of calls, repeated calls to pick up the wounded. I called back and said that every available stretcher was in use. They were using blankets and mattresses to haul the people back. After the fires were out, they burned for quite awhile before we got them under control. The next thing, we were told by the bridge to stand by for torpedo attack starboard side. The torpedo hit at approximately, somewhere between 1425 and 1445. As soon as the torpedo hit, I called main control. I don't keep a damage control log as such, my repair parties do. They log messages they receive in a book. Neither one of them, as soon as the attack started, kept a log. I kept message blanks coming into repair parties, but they were not timed. I had about ten or twelve message blanks prior to the torpedo hitting. I had the main damage, I had the large hole in the back berthing compartment, I had the hold in the diagnostic room, I had the two fires, the fires under control and one of them logged as out. But when the torpedo hit, the logroom in damage control central was in a shambles, the safe door blew open, logs went flying off the shelves, we were knocked on the deck, and shortly thereafter the order was passed down to set the destruction bill. And with that, we didn't bother to write down our messages anymore. Myself, my 1JV talker, and my 2JZ talker commenced burning all confidential messages and pubs in DC central.

Q. That's fine. Tell me a little about your shoring?

A. It was necessary, after we investigated the diagnostic room, which is directly above the vicinity which the torpedo hit, I went in, it was next to DC central, I went in with the DC investigator from repair two. We saw the level of the water rising. I stuck my hand in the hole. It came out with black, black oil. With that I said, "It's still rising, we're going to have to shore it." We brought shoring in and mattresses from the engineering berthing compartment and commenced shoring. We found another rupture out in the passageway and it was bulged out, but we had that area pretty well under control.

Q. To establish the watertight boundary after the torpedo attack, was there any question about anyone being left alive in the spaces below?

A. No sir. When I saw the black oil coming up, I knew it had ruptured the fuel tanks. I went down to main control. I called them first and told them I had ruptured tanks up here, and told them not to take inspections from these tanks. Later on in the morning, I went down to main control and told them to take inspections from starboard tanks but not those two to correct the list. We went over to twelve degrees, and came back to ten. About 0500 in the morning we were down to about a 6 degrees list.

Q. Who was in charge of the forward repair parties at that time?

A. Ensign TAYLOR. He was the Repair Officer. He was hit before he ever got to the repair locker. He wandered off on his own. He came down the passageway, stuck his head in DC central. I could see he was hit very bad. He said, "Scottie, I've been hit." I said, "I can't help you, go to the mess decks. I'll call them and tell them you're coming." I don't have a plotter or messenger, and there were just three people in DC central, so none of us could leave. Next, there was Chief THOMPSON, and I got the word that he was hit, but not bad. A little later the bridge called wanting a signalman. Both my signalmen had been hit, and I called repair and asked them if they had any signalmen, anybody, even enlisted men. Chief THOMPSON volunteered and went to the bridge. Then DEMORI, shipfitter third, took over.

President: This was Chief THOMPSON who volunteered, who was already wounded?

A. Yes sir. And DEMORI was the on-scene leader.

Q. Is DEMORI still around?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Have you been to damage control school, Scottie?

A. Yes sir, I went ten weeks ago.

Q. Was it worth it?

A. Yes sir. I'd recommend it to anybody.

President: Scottie, I'm proud of you. Thank you very much, son.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant George H. GOLDEN, United States Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. George H. GOLDEN, Lieutenant, Engineering Officer, USS LIBERTY.

Q. Lieutenant GOLDEN, you know that this Court of Inquiry has been convened to look into the circumstances incident to the attack on USS LIBERTY. Will you please tell the Court what, if anything, you recall about that incident?

A. Yes sir. At approximately 1145, I completed eating lunch, and went to the 01 level forward to sunbathe along with the Captain and some of the other officers. I have a lounge chair, most of us do have; while laying on my back sunbathing, I noticed a plane flying over. I dozed off, and approximately 25 minutes or so later on, I woke up and saw a plane circling again coming from the port beam, crossing the ship. While watching it, I glanced up and noticed it just crossing over the stack area, and I noticed a small amount of smoke coming out of my stack, and also the flag was flying.

Counsel for the Court: Was it extended?

A. Yes sir, there was a slight breeze blowing.

Q. Where was the flag flying from, Lieutenant GOLDEN?

A. The foremast.

Q. And it was standing out where it could be seen?

A. Yes sir. Not completely the full length, but it was standing out. At approximately 1255, I left the 01 level forward, and then went forward because I knew that the Commanding Officer was going to have a surprise chemical attack for a drill between the crew. We went to general quarters at 1310. Immediately after we went to general quarters, the Commanding Officer addressed the crew concerning setting Zebra. He explained to them that anything could happen at any time. It took us four minutes to set Zebra, we should improve on that time. He explained that there was smoke coming from the beach area, and that there was possible fighting in that area. After completing general quarters, I came from the engineering and went to the port side of the ship, the motor whaleboat started smoking instantly, and walked into the wardroom to have a quick cup of coffee before going to my office. I sat down in the forward part of the wardroom, and I had no more had set down when the word was passed to stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing. Immediately, there was a bang, and the first thought came to my head that the whaleboat had been dropped into the water. I jumped to the porthole, looked out, and there was black smoke coming up from the side of the ship. I immediately ran to the door to the wardroom to go outside. The second I hit the door, I heard the word passed, "General Quarters, all hands man your battle stations." And then the alarm went off. Before I had gotten clear of the door, the word was also passed over the PA system, which sounded like the Commanding Officer's voice, telling radio central to notify high command that we were under air attack. When I hit the deck plate in the engineroom main control in front of the throttle board at 1405, I knew it was this time because the tachometers were ringing up at the same time flank speed. I had informed over the LMC the Captain it would take me a couple of minutes to bring the other boiler on the line, as we had just secured it to repair a gasket. The Commanding Officer told me to get it on as soon as possible and give him all the turns possible. Within a few minutes we were doing 86 rpms, until there

was a hit and I lost electrical power. We went dead in the water.

Counsel for the Court: Lieutenant GOLDEN, how many years have you been in the naval service actively?

A. Twenty-six years sir.

Q. This Court has heard many instances of loss of life, and the Court has viewed the inordinate amount damage to the vessel. Would you please tell the Court the nature of your personal possession loss incident to the damage to your stateroom?

A. There were two shells which could be 20mm, I'm not sure. There was one six inches in diameter, and another one approximately 7 or 8 inches in diameter, just aft of the center of my stateroom. Fragmentation from these two shells damaged the stateroom considerably. One came through the overhead of the stateroom. Bullets of unknown caliber came through the closet where my clothes hanged. The bullets went completely through one of them through the other, ripping all of my clothing apart. Bullets entered the bottom of the room, into the drawers where I keep my shoes, tearing those up. The fire fighting water from where the repair party was fighting the fire on the starboard side of frame 80 came through these holes, both from the 01 level and the 02 level, and ruined the tape recorder which I had setting on my desk.

Counsel for the Court: Value of the tape recorder?

A. \$219.00 sir.

President: Let the record show at this point that Lieutenant GOLDEN's testimony on his personal loss is introduced as being typical of the type of personal loss realized by the officers of the LIBERTY. The effectiveness of aircraft strafing and rocketry against the topside of the ship virtually eliminated the useability of any and everything inside the staterooms themselves.

Counsel for the Court: Mr. GOLDEN, as Engineering Officer, do you have in your custody, engineering logs?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Do you also have the gyro compass record in your custody?

A. Yes sir, I do. I have that one particular record with me at this time, sir.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the engineering log as exhibit 16, the gyro compass record as exhibit 17, and request they be accepted into evidence as 16 and 17.

Counsel for the Court: Would you please read pertinent extracts from these logs?

A. Aye, sir. In the engineering smooth log on the 12 to 1600 watch on 8 June 1967 - The log is signed by R. J. BROOKS, Machinist Mate Chief, at 1405, general quarters under attack. 1406, granted permission to fire room to light fires in number two boiler. At 1406, informed throttlemen to maneuver at various speeds, to draw steam no less than 400 pounds. 1407, reported Condition Zebra set. 1408, secured number one and number two distilling units in order to have more steam or speed. 1435, lost electrical power due to hit believed to be torpedo. There was a vibration from this hit that knocked two people in the engine room off of ladders from the upper platform to the lower platform. It vibrated a light out of its socket. It knocked both generators off the line. Also lost communications to the bridge at this time. 1450, put number three generator to atmospheric ballast. 1453, generator on the line. During this period of time, there were both 20mms and two other smaller caliber bullets coming through the bulkhead from the starboard side from approximately frames 80 to 95. The last entry in the engineer's bell book was for 1405 when the bridge rang up for flank speed. There were no more entries in the engineer's bell book after 1405.

President: Tell me again, Lieutenant GOLDEN, how long your records or your memory indicates that you were without power after your circuit breakers tripped out and you lost the load?

A. From 15 to 20 minutes, I think sir.

Q. And your record shows that you lost the load at what time?

A. Lost electrical power at 1435 and regained electrical power at 1453.

President: Let the record show at this point, as a matter which is germane to all of the testimony wherein sequential and accurate times are

desirable but unavailable. That the early rocket attack against this ship shot and stopped, in some cases permanently and in others only temporarily, ships clocks through the ship. This fact has become increasingly evident throughout testimony received as well as in informal discussions with LIBERTY personnel.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Ensign Malcolm Patrick O'MALLEY, United States Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank and organization?

A. Malcolm Patrick O'MALLEY, Ensign, USS LIBERTY AGTR-5

Q. And your duty status?

A. Assistant Operations Officer and Ship's Secretary.

Q. How long have you been in the Navy?

A. Since January 13th, 1967.

Q. Approximately six months?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Mr. O'MALLEY, directing your attention to 8 June 1967, will you please tell this court what you recall of the attack.

A. Yes sir. I had the con on the 12 to 1600 watch. From 1220 to 1230 is when an Israeli twin-engine plane, well we didn't know it was Israeli, just a twin-engine plane very similar to a flying boxcar, circled us once in a long elliptical circle and they drew near. We found out on questioning, after they went away, Mr. ENNIS said the plane had come out almost periodically every 20 to 40 minutes, and would make one pass in a high circle and head back to land. At 1310, I was relieved on the con by Mr. ENNIS, who was the JOOD for general quarters. Mr. O'CONNOR wasn't there so he stepped in the deck and relieved the con. When we went to general quarters, I went to my general quarters station in CIC. It was an extremely dull general quarters - we didn't do anything. We didn't have any contacts or anything significant to do. Some place between 1335 and 1350 I again assumed con from Mr. ENNIS. At about 1402, 03, or 04, something like that, I was looking at the radar screen and

trying to get a fix. I noticed three contacts coming off the shore and I said, "Lloyd, I think I have three contacts here." He said, "I think I'll talk to the gun mounts on the phone circuits." He tried to talk to them, and before I knew it, just as he was about to say "gun mounts 51 and 52" a jet opened up. It was just, "boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom," and all of a sudden I found myself down on one knee. Someone yelled general quarters, I yelled general quarters, and I left the bridge, and as I went passed, I noticed that the general alarm was sounding. I went into CIC. To return to what had elapsed, well, by the time I took over the con it was 12 o'clock, and the time I was relieved it was approximately 1345.

Counsel for the Court: Who relieved you?

A. Lieutenant James Ennis.

When we got up there, we only had one thing to shoot, and that was a tower, a signal tower. I can remember how it stood on the beach. What happened, was Mr. Painter and I were trying desperately to get a fix, to get an accurate fix, what we were trying to do was get a fix and we couldn't do it.

Counsel for the Court: Do you recall the national ensign flying?

A. No sir, I don't because we were not allowed to go to the 04 level, and from here I couldn't see it. I did see the torpedo boats when I came up to the bridge.

Captain ATKINSON: Are you also the CIC officer?

A. Yes sir

Counsel for the Court: Mr. O'MALLEY, do you have in your possession the DRT log?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Q. Do you have the radar bearing book of USS LIBERTY also?

A. Yes, I do.

Request the recorder to mark the radar bearing book as exhibit number 18

and the DRT log, exhibit number 19. I now offer them into evidence, and request Mr. O'MALLEY to read pertinent extracts from 1400 hours, on the 8th of June.

A. The radar in CIC went out on the first attack.

Q. Try 1200 hours.

A. I have at 1145 a bearing on 173 at 13.9 miles.

Q. Any subsequent entries? DRT from 1300 on hours?

A. Nothing from 1300 hours.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness.

Does any member of the court desire to question the witness?

Captain ATKINSON: What was the last entry in the DRT log?

A. I believe it was 1300. 1300, yes.

President: What would be the reasons for no DRT entries after 1300?

A. I don't have any idea. Mr. Toth use to help me with the thing.

Q. What do you mean, he use to help you?

A. Well, he use to take charge of CIC.

Q. During general quarters?

A. No, not during general quarters. Actually, it was Mr. BENNETT's station. I was there in training. Mr. BENNETT wasn't there on that day.

Counsel for the Court: Mr. O'MALLEY, you indicated you were in the Navy for about six months?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Is this your first time at sea?

A. Yes sir, four months on the LIBERTY, sir.

Q. And your primary duty on USS LIBERTY is?

A. Ship's Secretary.

Q. Ship's Secretary?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Collateral Duty?

A. My collateral duty is Assistant Operations Officer with CIC.

Captain ATKINSON: Was the navigation plot maintained in combat?

A. No, we he maintained our navigational plot.

Q. Who's he?

A. COCNAVITCH did, but he was doing what he said was contour fixes and he was just checking if they agreed with the OOD on the bridge in the chartroom. You see, we had two charts. We had one in the chartroom and one in CIC. We did have fixes - like I had a 1220 fix spotted on the chart when the tower was bearing 148, 16.5 miles.

Q. In combat?

A. No, in the chart house.

Q. What happened to that chart?

A. There was an overlay.

President: Would you repeat that fix and time again, Mr. O'MALLEY?

A. At 1220 the tower beared 148 at 16.5 miles.

Q. Was it normally the ship's practice to use an overlay on a chart which they planned to use for a protracted period in a particular spot?

A. To my knowledge, no. This was the first time that I had seen it. As a matter of fact, he was putting it on when I came up.

Q. Have you ever been in a ship when it had a patrol station in a spot for a protracted period before this?

A. No, not really. We had gone up and down the coast of Africa, but that was not a patrol.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I may have missed what you said before. I'm not clear as to whether it's normal practice or not to maintain a navigational track in CIC?

A. The reason why we didn't have it up in CIC, the reason why we hadn't been doing it for a long period of time, was because we had just come in sight of land on the previous watch, and that is why.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Counsel for the Court: The next witness will be LTJG Malcolm N. Watson, United States Naval Reserve.

Lieutenant Junior Grade Malcolm N. Watson, United States Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Counsel for the Court: Will you please state your name, rank, and duty station.

A. Malcolm N. Watson, Lieutenant (jg), I'm MPA aboard the LIBERTY.

Q. Mr. Watson, did you know this Court has been convened in order to ascertain the circumstances attendant with the attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967? Would you please tell the Court what you recall of that incident?

A. Well, we had a practice GQ approximately 1310. My GQ station was the fire room down in the engine room. When we had secured from the practice GQ, I had come up. I was standing by the wardroom pantry when the attack came. I ran back down the officer's ladder and went down to my station in the fire room. And shortly I was called up to sick bay. I'm narcotics custodian, and I had to open the narcotics locker. I came up from the fire room, went through the mess decks, up to sick bay. I got the key from ^{the} first class corpsman, and a seaman KERNER went with me back down to the mess decks, forward along the passageway, into the engineering berthing compartment, down the hatch, into the narcotics locker. I opened the locker, removed morphine, gave half of it to KERNER and told him to go on back up and I took the other half and left the safe unlocked but closed. I locked the door behind me, I came back up. As I passed by DC Central, I stopped in there and told them I had opened xray fittings to get down to the narcotics locker and had reclosed it. At this time, DC Central is just forward of the diagnostic room,

under which the torpedo hit. And at this time the torpedo had not hit the ship cause I would have known it because of the way the passageway was torn up. I went back up into sick bay with the morphine that I had, and gave the key back to the first class corpsman and told him what I had done and that I had left the locker open. There was a seaman laying on the operating table, and they didn't have too many people helping in sick bay at the time, so I helped them move the seaman off the operating table, and I helped move third class gunners mate EASON onto the operating table. The Doctor told me where to get two bottles that he wanted. I thought we were done. And I helped him prepare things for operation, and by that time more people had just come into the sick bay to help out. So I said, "If you don't need me, I need to go back to my GQ station." And he said at the time, "go ahead". So I went back down to my GQ station and from then on in we had one machinery casualty right after the other. High water, low water in the boilers, I lost the lube oil, just all kinds of machinery casualties. From then on out, I really don't know the sequence of events of anything that had happened. But I know that when I happened to think to look at my watch, it was 7 o'clock in the evening.

Counsel for the Court: Excuse me, any time prior to the attack, did you notice the national colors flying?

A. Yes sir. At lunch that day, we were discussing the situation and Mr. Golden made the statement that someone had said something about the ensign flying so the people would know who we were. Mr. Golden made the statement something like, "Don't we have a bigger flag we can fly, maybe the holiday colors?" Then after lunch we went out on the O1 level forward and most of the officers were around there sunbathing immediately preceding 1300. At approximately 1245, an aircraft flew over approximately 5,000 to 8,000 feet, and his line of flight took it over the radar mast, and I was watching it and made a comment about it that it looked.

like a C119 flying boxcar. And as it flew over the radar mast, the ensign was flying from the gaff. I noticed that it was flying, at this time there was a breeze.

Q. Extended?

A. Yes sir.

President: Was it flying from the mast aft or the mast directly over the bridge?

A. The mast directly over the bridge, sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Richard F. Pfeiffer, MC, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Counsel for the Court: Will you please state your full name, rank, and duty status.

A. Richard Frank Pfeiffer, Lieutenant Medical Corps, duty station U.S. Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Q. On 8 June 1967, where were you at this time?

A. I was attending to my duties as medical officer, USS LIBERTY.

Q. Will you please tell this Court the circumstances as you recall them incident to the attack on the USS LIBERTY?

A. Well, we had secured from the General Quarters drill. I was standing in the passageway outside the pantry, which is on the main deck.

Suddenly, we heard a sound as a jet plane flying low and the steward to whom I was talking and myself thought that something had happened to one of the steam lines. Immediately after that, we heard an explosion, and we sounded general quarters. My general quarters station is on the main deck aft, the main battle dressing station. I went across the main deck, and at that point I saw another plane passing over the ship and letting loose its supply of rockets on the ship. It was passing from the starboard bow to the port side and aft. I went into the main dressing station as quickly as possible and awaited the flow of casualties that would come in.

We sent the third class corpsman to the forward battle dressing station

which was in the wardroom. In the main dressing station was the first class corpsman and myself. When I was in the main battle dressing station, we were relatively sealed off and we didn't hear very much of what was happening outside. At that point I would have thought it was a single or two planes that had strafed the ship once or twice. I didn't have an idea exactly how much had been done. And when they brought in the first aid patient who was a seaman with a collapsed lung, we thought he would be one of the few casualties that we got, and immediately took care of him, which involved an incision in his chest and packing of a pretty good sized chest cavity to remove the blood and air to make it possible for him to breathe again. We then found Mr. Watson, who had the combination to our narcotics safe in the medical storeroom. I sent the corpsman to get Mr. Watson to get me a supply of morphine and we started administering to the men. The time at this time was about a quarter to two, and it would be before the torpedo had struck. Someone told me that they wanted me on the bridge, and to get there I went through the mess decks which had a number of casualties there already, I passed the wardroom and found the forward battle dressing station was somewhat flooded by casualties, and went to the bridge where at that point, the Captain was the only person who was still functioning and the Captain had the helm. Again, the Captain had not been injured at that time. I took a look outside the bridge and saw two decks below the remains of our Navigator, Mr. Toth, The helmsman had died where he stood at the helm, and at that time there wasn't anything I could do for any of the men on the bridge except administer morphine to those who were injured and yet living and get men up with stretchers to evacuate them. It so happened the fire in the starboard side, the men had under control, and I returned to the wardroom where again we started caring for the casualties as best we could. We took care of the men in the wardroom and in the passageway on the main deck there were men wounded sitting shoulder to shoulder the full circumference of the passageway. On the port side in a stretcher was the executive officer who had compound

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senior research officer, Mr. Lewis, who had 36

and had been 36

and all the men that had been injured.

I found our third class corpsman, Shulman, with our mail clerk, Spicer, who had *B6* and was having difficulty breathing. Shulman was performing, or had finished performing an emergency tracheotomy on him in an effort to help him breathe.

President: Shulman's a third class?

A. Yes sir.

And, one of the other men had his arm in a sling and was operating the foot-powered suction pump enabling him to activate the man's trachean lungs to get the secretions from there.

President: Doctor, is this the foot-powered trachean pump which supports the microphone into which you are speaking?

A. Yes sir.

Sir, in the chief's mess, we found another man, this was Payon, who was also having difficulty breathing. He had a wound of *B6* and at that time we did not have the facilities on board to care for a second tracheotomy or to do an insertion of a tube into his chest, so the only thing I could do at that point was insert my finger in his chest wall and to allow as much blood to be drained out of that as possible. There was another man with a broken leg who we were just able to splint. As it turns out the last thing that we bought before we left Norfolk was a supply of air splints that were just coming in and being used as many as we had, and we could have used more. Then I returned to the main dressing station. At this time again I was going through the mess decks and there were more people there. I got to the main dressing station and found people on the floor, people in the beds, in the isolation room, and the clean room. One of the men in the bed was Blanchard, a man who had sustained a shrapnel injury in his back. The first class corpsman and I had examined him and we realized that we might have to operate on him. At that point we had also agreed though, unless it was an absolute matter of being certain he would die otherwise, we would not do anything to him. Then someone told me in a moment that the wardroom had been hit, and that the Captain

had been hit. We went by the wardroom and found fortunately that the hit had been away from where the people were being taken care of. A message while I was in the main battle dressingstation, they had announced to be prepared for a torpedo attack, and the torpedo hit and suddenly the ship started listing to starboard, rolled, becoming 9 degrees in a matter of a few seconds. At that time, Van Cleave and myself and as many people as we could get, we went down to the mess decks to try to evacuate anyone that we could from there in case the ship started going down. We were told that the destruction bill had been put into effect. The ship was stabilized after a couple of minutes and then I got the word to go to the wardroom and to the bridge. When I got to the bridge, the Captain had put a tourniquet on his *B6* He had lost a large amount of blood, but there was nothing I could do at this time. He was the only officer aboard at that time. The only other officer that I could find was Ensign O'Malley. I told him of the situation on the bridge, where the Captain had been injured and was the last officer I could find up there and suggested that he be prepared to go to the bridge if necessary. We then returned to the main dressing station, just in time to have a rocket land on the overhead near the clean room, and at this time the lights in the main dressing station went out. We decided at that time that we certainly couldn't care for the wounded in the situation that we were. We were told to brace ourselves for a second torpedo attack, and the only thing we could do was go inside and find a couple of the wounded on the floor to find places where they weren't wounded and lay across their bodies so in case the torpedo did hit they wouldn't be thrown around. I could hold on to one of the uprights, but they certainly couldn't. We decided at that time, that the only place where we could take care of the men was on the mess decks. The ship had stabilized. We went to the engine room to find out what had happened, if the engines had been damaged, or, if it would be a point of moving the men to the mess decks and then having the ship go down than having them die there. We found that as far as it went that the damage had been brought under control. We evacuated the men to the mess decks. We had just that morning finished resterilizing supplies in the

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forward battle dressing station. They were still in the autoclave. When we went to the autoclave, we got as many men who could walk as possible, took them to the main dressing station and gave them supplies, it was dark and we couldn't really see what we were handling then, and they took it to main deck and piled it on the table. At that time was the first time we could evaluate the condition of the wounded. There was no question of our ability to keep records or anything at that point. We just couldn't. The only way we could tell if someone had been given morphine, when we gave it to him, we stuck a needle through an article of clothing on him. We got some gauze and hung the bottles from the lights in the mess decks. At that time it became evident that many of the men were going to require further surgery, but we established in a major hospital surgery is something that is done by three doctors, two nurses, and a support team outside, and that here we would be able to have myself and one corpsman. We obviously weren't going to do any unless it was a life or death emergency. So we went on with it and tried to stabilize the people who were in shock, giving fluids. Then I organized a couple of teams of men. At that time we still had not found out what had happened. The men were confused, they couldn't understand where was the Sixth Fleet or where was the Air Force. Someone had told us that there was an Israeli helicopter outside, and it bolstered our morale a little bit, but we tried to find out the answers to the question, "Is anybody going to help us?" "Or can we get messages out?" "Does anyone know we're hit, and how badly?" At this time, sir, we had organized teams to start from one end of the mess decks, we'd gotten surgical soap and water, supplies of sterile dressings, and started cleaning the wounds again as best we could. I went up to the bridge to see the Captain. The Captain had lost a tremendous amount of blood and was showing symptoms of early shock. The men who were showing symptoms of shock, the people that we couldn't get fluids to had just overrun the medical facilities for the while. We had been giving out water, salt pills, bicarbonate soda, just to replace the fluids with anything that we could.

Now we had intravenous fluids that we were able to give them, but the Captain was showing the early symptoms. He said that he was feeling weak every time that he got up and was perspiring and was beginning to show one of the earlier signs of shock which is excessive anxiety. It's hard to think of how anxiety at that point could be described as excessive, but he had been talking about medical things that he had ascribed as a tremendous urgency to, and I just had interpreted this as a sign of shock. I told Mr. Lucas, the First Lieutenant, who was at the bridge about this and told him to be on the watch for this, dress the Captain's *ble* remove the tourniquet, and went back below. There's not really much more to tell of this, except how we should give the individual men, at that time someone had gotten a supply of brandy down to the men below and we were dispensing this to the men who were dazed or who were confused or anything, or excited. At one thirty it became obvious that Blanchard was not going to survive the night without an operation.

President: One thirty in the morning?

A. One thirty in the morning.

We went to the mess decks again, got some empty blood transfusion packs, collected two pints of blood from men who were his blood type, and took him to the wardroom to operate on him. Unfortunately, his wounds were such that any attempts were hopeless. We determined this and closed the incision. We rendered final anesthetic which the first class and I administered, but he died during the operation. Again, after that, it was just a question of finding, doing certain mechanical things for the men, getting them all cleaned, getting new dressings on, treating their pain if this was required, and awaiting the arrival of help.

Counsel for the Court: Of the many injured, was Blanchard the only one who died after an operation?

A. Blanchard was the only one that died. The Executive Officer died soon after having been brought to the mess decks but we had seen him on the main deck, and the next time I saw him on the mess decks was to

pronounce him dead.

Q. How many other operations of a major nature did you perform?

A. Only this operation and the insertion of the tube in the man's chest.

Q. How long were you on your feet before you were able to rest?

A. 28 hours.

Q. Do you have a list of the personnel who died as a result of the attack?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: Request the reporter mark this exhibit number 20.

I now offer exhibit number 20 into evidence. Will you please read this for the record?

A. The following is a list of the dead personnel. The bodies' of these persons have been recovered.

LCDR ARMSTRONG, Philip M.	569825/1100
SN BLANCHARD, Gary R.	771 77 22
QM3 BROWN, Francis (n)	778 76 70
CT3 HIGGINS, Alan (n)	788 62 97
SN HOAR, Carl	774 46 48
CT2 MENDLE, Anthony	777 62 87
ICFN SKOLAK, David	B50 17 83
PC2 SPICHER, John C.	473 41 77
CMG3 THOMPSON, Alexander	770 47 21
CT3 THORNTON, Thomas R.	997 97 91
LT TOTH, Stephen S.	669613/1100
CT1 WALTON, Frederick J.	236 31 86

Q. Did you bring a list of personnel who were declared missing in action during the attack?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Counsel for the Court: Request the reporter mark the missing in action list as exhibit number 21. I now offer exhibit number 21 into evidence. Will you please read this for the record?

A. Personnel missing

CT3 William B. ALLENBAUGH
CT2 Ronnie J. CAMPBELL
CT2 Jerry L. CONVERSE
CT2 Robert B. EISENBERG
CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES
CTSN Lawrence P. HAYDEN
CT1 Warren E. HERSEY
CT2 Richard W. KEENE
CTSN James L. LENAUE
CTSA David W. MARLBOROUGH
CTC Raymond E. LINN

CT3 Duane R. MARGRAF
LT James C. PIERCE
CT1 John Caleb SMITH
CTC Melvin D. SMITH
CT3 Phillippe C. TIEDTKE
CT3 Carl C. NYGREN
CPL Edward E. REHMEYER
SGT J.L. RAPER
CT3 Jerry L. GOSS
CT1 James M. LUPTON
Civilian Allen M. Blue

Counsel for the Court: Did you bring a list of the injured with you that you treated during the attack?-

A. Yes sir, I have.

Counsel for the Court: Request the reporter mark the injured list as exhibit number 22. I now offer exhibit number 22 into evidence and will you please read it?

A. : Wounded Transferred

B6

Rate	Ser	No.	Diagnosis
SN	796	66 15	Compound Fracture Skull
SN	913	50 66	Compound Fracture Skull
SN	997	55 71	Wound Left Eye, Left Forearm
SM2	609	22 48	Mult. Puncture wounds, Pneumonitis
CTSN	998	13 79	HEMOPNEUMOTHORAX
CM3	969	84 98	Pneumothorax
EM3	773	35 21	Perforated Bowel, Hemothorax
CTL	594	81 55	Cpd.Fx. L. Tibia and Fibula Pneumothorax
LT	671765		Penetrating wounds, back & Kidney
EM3	775	76 78	Hemopneumothorax, Post Laparotomy
SN	999	88 63	Penetrating wound back-to colon
YN3			Multiple Puncture Wounds
EFN	914	73 89	Fracture L. Tibia Remained aboard
SSGT			Flash burns face
LT			Cpd Fracture L. Femur
LCDR			Flash burns, face & eyes
EM3			Compound Fx. Radius & Ulna
CTL			Multiple Punctures, Cervical Sprain
EMS			Multiple Puncture wounds
ICI			Fracture --Forearm
SN	(Deck apt)		Multiple bullet & Shrapnel wounds
SN	"		Multiple Shrapnel wounds
SN	"		Multiple Shrapnel wounds
SN	"		Multiple Shrapnel Wounds
SN	"		Shrapnel-chest, amputated toe
SN	"		Shrapnel Neck, Fractured Mandible
SN	"		Shrapnel hand, leg
SM2	"		Shrapnel wounds, leg&Back
SN			Shrapnel, Guteal area
SM3N			Shrapnel, L. Ankle
CM3			Shrapnel, R.Flank
CTSN			Multiple Shrapnel wounds
TN			Shrapnel, Knee

Name

Rate

Ser No.

Diagnosis

SN

Shrapnel, Guterol & R.
Thigh

CT1

Fracture, L. Ankle

CT5

CRSN

Multiple Shrapnel wounds

CT5

CT1

Multiple Shrapnel wounds

CT1

Multiple Shrapnel wounds

CT2

Multiple Shrapnel wounds

CT5N

Sharpnel wounds Skull

CT5N

Multiple wounds sharpnel

CT5

Multiple shrapnel wounds

CT2

CT2

CT5N

Shrapnel, abdomen

CT5N

CT5N

CT1

CT2

EMS

710515/1105

Foreign bodies R.Temple,
hand, L.arm

CDR

494467/1100

Puncture wounds-multiple-
with F.B.

LT

625125/1610

Mult Puncture wounds-
flash burns face

LT(NC)

Puncture wound hand-

lacerations mult contusions

CTC

471 37 37

Foreign body left wrist

IM1

298 39 72

Lacerations R. hand

IM3

353 93 33

Contusions and Abrasions--
back

FM

LEUC

692274/1105

Foreign body, 2nd digit R
Lac. R.hand. Hematom. R.
flank

CTC

518 69 45

Lac. R.hand, contusion back

SM5

546 85 16

Abrasions L. calf

SH

796 43 22

Puncture wound R.shoulder

BT3

B70 41 42

Mult. contusions, arms, L.
knee

BR2

549 85 64

Mult. contusions, F.B. R.
hand

FM

692 53 81

Contusions L. shoulder

IM3

776 08 93

Contusions L. hand

IM3

Back strain, contusions
shoulders

SH

918 44 65

Mult. lacerations hands/arms

CS3

904 30 77

Lac. L. hand

FM

779 52 59

Lacerations and contusions

IM3N

998 07 12

L.hand, burns L.arm

Abrasion & contusion R.leg
& calf

CS3

B10 42 33

Fracture Tibia

SA

998 70 04

Contusion L. lower leg

FM

B10 22 23

Cerebral concussion

FM

290 54 06

Abrasion R. calf

FM

354 81 55

Lac R. arm

SA

251 81 36

Contusions chest, arms, legs

FM

917 52 08

F.B. L 5 (digit (hand))

CS3

796 37 08

Mult. contusions ext's

FM

B10 43 15

Mult. lac hands

CRSN

261 44 71

Lac. arms (mult)
Lac, cont hands, knees,
chipped R.low. can

FN 916 29 05
CTSN B20 04 91

FN 796 18 83
SK2 370 92 58
M13 998 19 47
SK3 776 42 83
RD3 794 71 33

CS2 428 92 84
CT1 539 00 34
CT2 796 85 28
CT3 775 06 25
CT3 795 25 54
CT2 774 27 59

CTSN 777 19 71
CT2 914 81 10

CT1 535 78 10
CT2 599 79 51

CT3 918 25 70
CTSN 797 04 78
CT2 776 28 26
CT2 778 80 00

Contusions Legs (bil)
Burns R. Foot, Soft tissue inj.
R. Knee
Contusions, Knee, bil
Abrasions and Strain-Lower Back
Burns Arms
Contusions, R. Calf & Thigh
Abrasions, Lac., contusions R.
Forearm
Abrasions, Cont, R. Lat Thorax
Abrasions Lets, Bil & Gluteal
Abrasions L. Thigh
Low Back Strain, Lac Fingers
Mult. Contusions lgs, bil
Punct. Wd. R. Knee, Burns R.
Leg
Traumatic Hemarthrosis R. Knee
Lac. Finger, Puncture L. Calf,
Thigh, Arm
F.B. Thigh, Contusions R. Arm
Puncture R. Thigh, Contusions
Buttocks
Lac R. Hand
Lac. L. Leg
Lac. R. Shoulder, L. Calf
Lac. R. Parietal, L. Calf

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness. Do any members of the court have questions of this witness?

President: Approximately how many patients during this period did you have, Doctor?

A. At nearest number, 200.

Q. 200? How many men are on the ship, Doctor?

A. I think approximately 300.

Q. Then we had two thirds casualties, one way or another?

A. Yes sir.

Captain ATKINSON: Are you a surgeon?

A. Yes, I am.

President: From this very harrowing experience that you went through, do you have any thoughts or ideas that the Navy might find useful?

A. Yes sir, I have.

Q. What are they?

A. First, when we were on the mess decks, as I said, we had placed our equipment into a single pile, and in somewhat a disorganized fashion.

When we would start a single intravenous transfusion on a person, what we would need was a bottle of intravenous solution, a supply of gauze to hang the bottle from one of the light fixtures overhead, a second set of tubing for this bottle, a needle through the man's shirt, some alcohol sponges to clean the area. This is a bottle containing a sweeter, a sterile dextrose, or sale and water which is administered intravenously. And, I think, many of these things are disposable, when they find themselves with the wrappers for them in their hands and no where to put them. One also finds with needles in hand there are some of the metal things that have been the seals that have been taken off the bottles. What I thought might be useful would be a vest sort of garment they could put on with large pockets in front with a supply of gauze, tape, needles, alcohol sponges, morphine syrettes, and a pocket in the back into which waste might be placed to enable one to more efficientlt go through a large area and take care of more than one person on one trip. A second thing might be, as I put it out before, when we give an injection of morphine, about three hours later if the man was complaining of pain again, we would not know - we'd know if he had been given morphine, but we wouldn't know if he had been given it ten minutes before, and that his pain was still pain that he had because the morphine had not had a chance to be absorbed in his blood stream, or that it had been given three hours before and that his pain might just be a recurrent sort of thing, or that he had been given none and that his pain might be an early symptom of shock and at time the morphine might take away his body's protective mechanism. What I thought might be useful there would be a strip of copper with a oxidizing agent to it that could be taken off and pasted on the patient, that the mixture of copper and catalyst might be such that the copper would oxidize and thus change color from red to green in a specific amount of time, and that by then looking at the patient you would be able to tell; first, had he had morphine; second, how

long ago had he had it. A red strip would tell you give him no more, but a green strip would be the green light to tell you to go ahead and give him some. And that something of the same sort of an oxidizing copper strip might be available for use with intravenous solutions. As we did when a patient received intravenous solution, we just left the bottle hanging over him so that at a glance you could tell that the person had received one liter, three liters. If the person had received sugar, solution, salt, plasma, or blood. But, again we'd probably do well to have the period in which they had been administered those.

President: Did you have enough medical supplies?

A. Yes sir, we did.

Another thing I forgot to mention was also during the night we broke into our supply of penicillin and the first class corpsman showed one of the seaman how to dilute this with sterile water and this man prepared a supply of diluted penicillin, and again we started all the men on antibiotics, so that by the time the other doctors from the Davis, and the Surgeons from the carrier came aboard, we could tell them that all the morphine had been taken care of. Everyone who was in shock had been taken care of. All the people had been started on antibiotics as a preventative measure for addiction.

Counsel for the Court: What was the primary cause of death?

A. Primary cause of death on some men was penetrating wounds of chest and lungs which made it impossible for them to breathe. Would to the heart, contracting injury with damage to brain. On The Executive Officer, I don't really know because of the way he died. Blanchard, the man on whom we operated, had massive injuries to his liver and to his right kidney, and he just died of blood loss and shock.

Q. Did you see many burns?

A. We had a moderate number of burn injuries. None of which were major burns.

Q. Was there any substance similar to napalm causation?

A. Some persons may have been. I never inquired of anyone because again we had burns of hands, a few flash burns of face. But I didn't treated anyone that I would think of as having a napalm burn.

President: We have no further questions, Doctor. We have nothing but the highest admiration for the success which you enjoyed. It's my understanding that none of those you treated and evacuated has subsequently died. Is that correct?

A. That is true, sir.

President: This speaks volumes for your professional competence and the efficacy of your preliminary casualty treatment. Let me ask you one question here that just occurred to me. What did you do and who did you use to do it to get the dead out of the way so that they wouldn't clutter up your sick bay?

A. Well, anytime we needed one volunteer we'd get ten. That, if anything had to be done, people to be put on the stretchers, there were hands everywhere. When we asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, we had people on the adjoining tables who were saying, "if you need some, I have this type."

President: These were people already wounded?

A. These were people already wounded.

Q. What would you say about the morale ^{situation} ~~situation~~ on the ship during that trying period of the action and person of the Commanding Officer?

A. The Commanding Officer at that time was like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves. To know that he was on the bridge grievously wounded, yet having the con and the helm and through the night calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men, "we're going to live." When I went to the bridge and I saw this, I should say that I knew that I could only insult this man by suggesting that he be taken below for treatment of his wounds. I didn't even suggest it.

Q. Although it was needed, medically?

A. Yes sir.

President: Well, Doctor, I am very proud to be wearing the same uniform that you are. Thank you very much for your most informative, professionally competent, illuminating, and very valuable statement. I'm very grateful to you.

Doctor: Thank you sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Chief Communications Technician Harold J. Thompson, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your full name and rate.

A. Harold Jessie Thompson, Chief Communications Technician, U.S. Navy, USS LIBERTY AGTR-5.

Q. Do you know this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain facts incident to the attack on USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Would you please tell this Court the event you recall of this attack?

A. We had just secured from general quarters drill and I had gone on main deck with petty officer HAROLD to discuss training and some of the attitudes toward training, when I heard a rocket come past and hit. At this time, I wasn't sure it was a rocket. I thought it was a shore battery, and I was either knocked down or I ducked quick. Then I got up and started running across the deck to repair two locker which is inside the forecastle. I was knocked down again, but made it inside to start breaking out the damage control equipment, getting stretcher bearers on deck, and taking stock of the situation. The attack appeared to last, I would say about 20 minutes to half an hour. Time is difficult to recall. Then I was alone and word was passed over sound powered phones to DC Central to standby for a torpedo attack. This was passed two or

three times, and I believe it was on the first time it was passed that we got hit. It seemed to take quite awhile for the torpedo to hit. The explosion wasn't too loud where we were. The deck lifted about a foot I'd say, and then we settled right away to a starboard list to about ten degrees. Although at the time it seemed a little greater. Then we were strafed at about the same time. I couldn't say whether it was before or after by the patrol boats. At first I thought it was the ammunition box over the repair locker where the ammunition had gotten hot and was exploding, then we determined that it was a strafing attack. The sound would coupled with my sighting of the torpedo boats later would indicate 50 caliber and 40 mm. There were several holes in the forecastle and the area around the repair locker. Nobody was hit inside. Later on the bridge asked for signalmen from various places on the ship. Nobody seemed to be available so I said I couldn't read flags but I could read light. They said they didn't need me at this time and that they wanted me to stay in the repair locker. Word was passed again to standby for torpedo attack starboard side and again the word went out for signalmen. Once again I told them I could not read flags, but if I could be of service. I was asked to report to the bridge, which I did. When I got up there, signalman David was attempting to rig a hand light. I assisted him. We went to the starboard wing of the bridge and one torpedo boat was making a run straight at us off the starboard beam while the other two stood off. At the Captain's directions, David sent, "US Naval Ship" "US Naval Ship." When they were about 500 yards off, the torpedo boat turned astern and came up on the stern on the starboard side and flashed, "do you need help?"

Q. Was this before the torpedo hit?

A. This was after the torpedo hit us, and we were surprised by the attack. The Captain was giving us word. He said, "no, thank you." We sent this back to the boat, and our steering was somewhat erratic and they came up on the port side then. David went across, I followed him, and saw on the last part of that message, David said, "Do you want us to

standby?" I passed this word to the Captain. He said, "no, thank you." We sent this to the patrol boat. They came up along port side, I say roughly 100 yards off, flashed "good luck" and dropped astern along with the other two which had come up to the stern, to a mile or a mile and a half back, just about out of sight. Then they made one high speed run directly astern and somewhere between a quarter and a half mile back made a U-turn and disappeared. That was the last we saw of them. Shortly afterwards, an Israeli helicopter came, hovered off the bridge and tried to hand signal us, and dropped a note on the forecastle which was brought to the bridge. It was a card from the Naval Attache, U.S. Naval Attache in Tel Aviv, asking if we had casualties and could he come aboard. The Captain signaled to him, "Yes, we did have casualties, and no, he did not want him to come onboard." One time I forgot to mention is after the torpedo attack, before I went to the bridge, there was a pass made by an Israeli helicopter. One of the men in the repair locker stepped outside the forecastle and said it was a helicopter with a blue star on a white shield, I believe the colors are, and we determined it to be Israeli by this, I stayed on the bridge with the Captain and signalman David, who finally went below for medical assistance. We then posted a lookout and maintained a watch throughout the night. I was on the bridge off and on and on the mess decks.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness.

Does any member have questions of this witness?

President: Have you been to damage control school, Chief?

A. Yes sir. I went the last in-port period.

Q. How long?

A. I went to one week basic, and one week advanced.

Q. Have all of the research personnel gone to damage control school?

A. No sir. We sent a number, I can't give any figures, but people who we assigned to repair parties as their QQ station, we sent them to either fire fighting or damage control school. We have to have a damage control petty officer in research, and we have one in each watch section, sometimes

two, and these people we always send to DC school and the others when we can, to fill out the ship's quotas for fire fighting school.

Q. What was the condition of the Captain during the period you were on the bridge?

A. When I arrived on the bridge, the Captain was lying on the deck by his chair on the port wing of the bridge with his *Bl* applying a tourniquet. It seemed to me a *Bl* He was perfectly rational, in command. He asked for the Executive Officer to report to the bridge and was told the XO was wounded, and he said, or indicated that he got the message. The Captain stayed on the bridge all night and propped himself in his chair. He'd get up periodically to insure circulation.

President: Thank you very much, Chief, I certainly appreciate your kindness.

Chief Thompson: Thank you very much, sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Carl Francis LAMKIN, CTC, USN, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, warned of Article 31, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. States your name, rank, organization and place of duty?

A. Carl Francis LAMKIN, CTC, USN

Q. You are aware Chief that this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain the facts concerning the attack on the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Would you please relate what took place on that day?

A. Yes, sir, I was secured from GQ drill shortly before the attack and at the time of the attack I was in the disbursing office, I noticed the initial shock and immediately headed for my GQ station which is repair three. As I was going to my GQ station the word was passed that we were being attacked by aircraft. Upon arriving to my GQ station I immediately started dispensing the gear, settling the men down.

Q. Your GQ station is where?

A. Repair Three. After there we got together. We had the men lay low on the deck, you could hear the strafing. At this time the word was passed that they had a fire in shaft alley and I took approximately four men and went down to shaft alley. The fire in shaft alley was under control in a matter of minutes. When I came back up they were calling for stretcher bearers and the men were dispensed for that. At this time they said they had a fire on the bridge in the motor whale boat and they were calling for assistance. I took repair three alpha plus some other men that were there and headed for the motor whale boat. As I was up on deck, portside by the U boat I was knocked down by some sort of explosion. I got up and went up and the men were already fighting the fire in the whale boat. It was pretty well destroyed at the time. As I was standing there we were strafed again and one of the men to my left fell. I don't remember his identity, he was picked up and drug inside. I turned to run forward when I came across the body of Mr. Toth who was pretty well messed up. I remember getting kind of sick at my stomach for a second or so. At this time I remember they had the fire pretty well under control. I went back down to my GQ which is repair three. I don't remember any of the time lapse during that time but I do remember them announcing to prepare for a torpedo attack starboard side. I told the men to brace themselves, to lay down on the deck if at all possible. The torpedo hit, it seemed like it was quite a while before the torpedo actually hit and the time we were told to prepare ourselves. The torpedo hit, there

was an explosion, immediate smoke and immediate list. Again we sent parties forward to investigate the resulting damage, so on and so forth, and any assistance that was needed. At this time I went back up, I was going to radio central I asked the men there if any kind of message had gotten out and they said it had. I asked them if they had means of communication there and they said they hadn't a voice transmitter they could key there in the blind. They weren't keying it at the time. I told them to keep keying it in the blind as often as possible. They immediately did so. From this time on I just spent most of my time from repair three and the radio transmitter room. There was quite a time lapse, I don't remember exactly how long. The thing I do remember is I started out the door and I could hear the motor torpedo boats or at least one of them to our port side. I looked out, but all I could see was the top of it. I immediately came back in and told the men to hit the deck. There was no firing or anything like this which surprised me, because at the time I figured they were just coming in to finish us off. Again, I say I don't remember the time lapse, but I was in there quite awhile when I heard aircraft. They first announced that an aircraft was coming in our area. I told all men to stay inside and keep low.

Q. How did your men react to this?

A. The men reacted fantastic as far as I'm concerned in the repair party. We had men that had never had experience before. There was one occasion where a man panicked on me, he started crying and screaming. I gave him a hit, and he came out of it. I remember seeing one boy throwing up. He had evidently seen one of the bodies that they had brought down. Other than that the response was excellent. There seemed to be naturally the fear that you would expect, but no panic.

Counsel for the Court: Very good, are there any questions from members of the Court?

President: What can you tell me with a little more detail, chief, about this keying the transmitter? Who was in there in charge?

A. I can't remember his name sir, our second class radioman. I'm sorry, I can't think of his name. I remember the man explicitly, he was in there, there was a couple of radiomen in there, there was also an ET in there, working with the different transmitters. They told me they had them transmitting and a message had gotten out. The ET was doing everything possible checking the various transmitters. They only had one that was capable of transmitting voice at that time. I did tell them to keep keying it regardless. Each time he was keying it he noted that he was keying in the blind.

Q. But no receivers?

A. Yes sir, no receivers. He did keep trying it continuously.

Q. What was he transmitting?

A. The exact words, I can't remember but he was transmitting, I don't remember the call, he was transmitting that we were under attack, we had been attacked by aircraft, we had sustained a torpedo hit, and the list I believe of the ship. Counsel for the Court: Did you hear any report of the possible jamming of the transmitter?

A. Yes, sir I did. I heard this later from Radioman Chief SMITH. He said that definitely that he had notice that the jamming was so loud that, the jamming was so loud that he thought at first that it was our transmitters which were malfunctioning but he noted, regardless of frequency, this loud jamming noise. At that time we weren't aware of what they were transmitting at radio central. This is one reason I stressed the fact that the men keep transmitting. Mr. Feingersch: Do you know Chief what circuit they were trying to transmit on, which net they were on?

A. No sir I don't, all I know is that it was voice transmission and I really couldn't say. I did ask them if they had receiving capability and they said no they were transmitting in the blind.

President: What repair party has the responsibility of buttoning up up there in the research spaces?

A. The research spaces up forward, I believe that is repair two sir, But at this time there were men dispensed all over. I had repair three men up there, also repair three alpha, which is an assist party. They were dispensed. We were also fighting this fire.

President: What outfit was up there after the torpedo hit? Would that have been repair two?

A. We dispersed repair three then, immediately, I was trying to think because right after we sustained the hit, I believe it was petty officer Neece, which is one of damage control petty officers. I have two damage control petty officers, petty officer Neece and Smith, and to my recollection it was Neece who grabbed the men and went up there.

President: Thank you very very much. We certainly appreciate your kindness.

The next witness will be Chief Wayne Smith.

Chief Wayne Smith, United States Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Counsel for the Court: State your name, rate, and present duty station.

A. Wayne L. Smith, RMC, duty station aboard the USS LIBERTY.

Q. Chief Smith, as you know, this Court of Inquiry is investigating the circumstances of the attack on the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Will you please tell this Court the facts that you recall on that date?

A. Yes sir. On that date at approximately 1400 local time, we had heard a loud blast. I was in radio central at the time with my second class who was on watch at the time. We immediately set Zulu and closed the porthole covers, and as soon as we had gotten them closed, the second blast sounded and the word was passed on the LMC to pass over hicom that we were being attacked, to any station. I immediately picked up the hicom transmitter which was on UIC 32, auxillary radio. We started to transmit with it. No station heard us, and five minutes or so later the transmitter was reported to have blown out. I immediately switched to a work two transmitter in the transmitter room, and we couldn't get out on that either, so, in between attacks by this time, I had went down to transmitter room and I found or discovered that somebody had accidentally knocked the frequency dial one KC off. I corrected this and ran back to the radio shack and we got hold of stations schematics on which we passed the attack message. We did authenticate, and he authenticated correctly because he got a roger for it, my second class. Immediately after that, after we passed the word on the bridge that the message had got out, we had a power failure. After the power failure, I discovered that my control lines, remote lines were disconnected or in some way ineperable, so we passed control on the transmitter direct, but we still maintained a receiver on hicom. From that time on we passed all our traffic from the transmitter room and at 1227 they took control.

~~SECRET~~

Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see the national colors flying?

A. Yes sir. At the time I ran out of the radio central space to the transmitter room.

Q. What time was this?

A. I would say about 1225, this was about two minutes either way. And this was Zulu time because I'm basing it on the log here. I had occasion to look at it because I was under the impression we were being attacked by UAR, and I wanted to see, and by the time that report came down to us from the bridge that they were Isralites, I wanted to check myself personally to see if our flag was flying because I couldn't understand it. For some reason I saw the flag flying at that time. If this was the original flag or not, I do not know sir.

Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have with you today in your custody the radio log for the 8th of June 1967 for the USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I do. I have the original log from 1227Z on, and I have the smooth log covering the total time at 1158Z. At this time, from 1158Z to 1227Z, it is a reconstruction and we did not keep a log in radio central.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the original radio log exhibit number 23, and the smooth log exhibit number 24. I now request that they be admitted into evidence and request you read the pertinent times to the Court.

A. In our log 0430Z was the last entry, on hicom log. At 1158Z is when we started to call any station, this is ROCK STAR. We passed a Zulu precedence to this message. At 1200Z ROCK STAR was called by schematic saying "you are garbled". "Say again". We repeated three times to them that we were under attack. At 1204Z we had to switch transmitters. We called at 1208Z schematic and repeated three times that we were under attack. Immediately after 1208Z, still in the same minute, they rogered for the message. At 1209Z we repeated again we are under attack and this time we added "we need immediate assistance". At this time schematic asked ROCK STAR for authentication, at which time we gave them the correct

~~SECRET~~

authentication. At 1214Z they rogered that. About 1217Z we called schematic again saying "be advised that we have been hit by torpedo, listing about 9 degrees, request immediate assistance". At 1220Z this message was received and rogered for. At 1224Z three unidentified aircraft approached the ship. We told this to schematic. At 1227Z they rogered for that message and that's when we had our power failure. We immediately shifted to the transmitter room.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Which hicom?

A. E4.4.

Q. You're sure chief - the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net - E4.4?

A. Yes sir. E4.4.

At 1233Z we had placed the emergency destruction bill in effect and I took it upon myself, not having any communications with the bridge, to hold emergency destruction. I only started emergency destruction on phase 1 and phase 2, which does not include unclassified matter. It only included RPS material that I had on hand. Well, we started to burn, and then the word came down from the bridge, finally, that there was never any order given to do this, so I had them halt and replaced all the ashes and the foreign material in the weighted bags.

Q. Did you throw anything over the side?

A. No sir. Nothing was thrown over the side. I have everything that we had up there. From 1233Z until 1323Z no signals were sent or received via hicom. All the traffic that we wanted to get out was out by the time the attack was over. At 1355 power was restored, passed down from radio central that the phone was inoperable and we shifted the control to transmitter room complete. By this I mean we had the receiver earlier. We gave them the receiver too.

Q. Did you note any jamming on the hicom circuit?

A. Yes sir. We did have jamming in my estimation. I was unable to determine this exactly, but every time it seems when an attack was made on us, or a strafing run, it was preceded by, anywhere from 25 to 30 seconds, carrier on our hicom circuit, and I had ascertained to check

~~SECRET~~

this by calling the transmitter room and they said that they had not keyed the transmitter. This prevailed during the attack and quite a bit after the attack, intermittently.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Chief, can you tell me ordinarily what circuits are you normally up on?

A. We're normally up on hicom, and we carry 500KCS receive only for distress and our 243.0 and 121.5 distress. On this occasion we had 339.4 set up, which, I'm not sure what frequency it is but it's a COMSIXTHFLT frequency.

Q. This is in addition to the hicom?

A. This is in addition to the hicom, yes. And we did have 277.8 fleet common up at the time.

Q. How do you normally handle your ship-shore traffic that's classified?

A. All traffic went out from down below except those they couldn't get on regular skeds. In which case they would off-line and we would send them out CW and this was no schedule, this was just on a case basis.

Q. The ship's general communication spaces doesn't have on-line capability?

A. No sir, they pass all traffic from down below on these circuits.

Q. What do you mean by down below?

A. I mean crypto one and crypto two. They had the equipment.

Q. I assume you copy fleet broadcasts in your spaces?

A. No sir, we do not. They copy fleet broadcasts down below.

Q. Do you know when the ship shifted from KR to JR?

A. This I have no knowledge of at all.

Q. You said that at the time 1204, I understood you said that prior to that time you had transmitted an attack report to schematic?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did they acknowledge?

A. I am not able to say right now.

Q. And you said that you did not authenticate under initial transmission?

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

A. No sir, we did not.

Q. Authentication took place at time 1214?

A. That's when they rogered for it, yes sir. We authenticated at 1209.

Q. Were you challenged?

A. Yes sir, we were challenged by schematic.

Q. And at 1214 they rogered for your authentication?

A. Yes sir. The first rogered transmission was at time 1208 and the first rogered authenticated transmission was at time 1214 on the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net between LIBERTY and schematic -- CTU 60.2.9.

Counsel for the Court: As Counsel for the Court, I hereby submit exhibit number 25, which is a statement by Captain R. L. Arthur, Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer. I now offer it into evidence and will read it.

" 1. A preliminary estimate of the time required to make permanent shell repairs and repairs to necessary associated interior strength members is two to three weeks.

2. A firm estimate will require a detailed survey, not expected to commence until 15 June."

THIRD DAY

Let the record show that the Court reconvened at 0820 on 15 June 1967, and the first witness having already been sworn and duly warned will be Eugene Aiken Platzek. Commander would you be kind enough to state your name, rank, and duty station.

A. Eugene Aiken Platzek, Commander, United States Navy, 433313. Counsel for the Court: Commander this Court is convened to look into the prior circumstances and aftermath matters related to the incident involving the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. It is the Court's understanding that you arrived at the scene in Malta in a technical capacity. If that is correct, will you tell the Court the capacity in which you are currently on board?

A. I'm currently on board as the representative of the Director of the Naval Security Group, OP94G, and I am part of the Task Force 100, designated as 100.4, under Captain Carl M. Smith.

President: Commander, the first question this morning, we will handle separately and introduce this part of your evidence into the medical portion of the report. In order to provide a record that is not disjointed, we will introduce you a second time, formally, and place that testimony in the material side if this is agreeable with you?

A. This is agreeable.

Q. The first and only question, then, relative to the medical side has to do with your personal continuing participation in the recovery of those in compartments which were flooded by the torpedo explosion and the question goes like this -- You were in the space the whole time assisting in the recovery of the remains. This was from my personal observation. From those remains recovered by you what in your judgment was the possibility of any of those remains having been alive after the initial torpedo explosion?

A. There was no possibility of any being alive after the initial torpedo explosion.

Q. As I understand it, Commander, the degree of dismemberment and conditions of the remains are the facts which cause you to arrive at this conclusion. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Maurice H. Bennett, United States Navy was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Do you think anyone could have survived after the torpedo struck the compartment?

A. There is no possibility of any of the people being alive after the torpedo hit. This conclusion was reached, or is based on the degree of dismemberment and conditions of the remains upon recovery.

President: Thank you very much Lieutenant Bennett.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Material Section

Commander PLATZEK was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

President: You, in your technical capacity, are knowledgeable on installation and acquisition costs of the technical equipment in LIBERTY at the time of the attack, which now will require replacement, and/or rehabilitation of remaining equipment where possible. Would you be kind enough to address yourself to this area and give the Court of Inquiry your best estimate at this time of how long it would take to reacquire LIBERTY's technical capability through the acquisition of long-lead time procurements, new purchases, and rehabilitation of old equipment, in terms of time and dollar cost, if you please?

A. The equipment aboard the LIBERTY is relief equipment as much as it is research equipment. The length of time it would take to acquire this equipment would be approximately one year. The cost of this equipment, in my opinion, would be approximately six to eight million dollars. This

does not include the installation costs of this equipment. This is strictly procurement dollars.

President: Thank you Commander PLATZEK. Does any other member of the Court have questions at this time to which Commander PLATZEK might address his particular technical competence?

Counsel for the Court: Will the repairing of this equipment be done in the United States?

A. The repairing of this equipment will have to be done in the United States. I don't believe anyone else has the technical capability.

Q. What would be your estimate of completion date of repairs needed?

A. This I couldn't say until such time as I found out the extent of damage by actually taking equipment and testing, but I presume with all of the shocks that this equipment has taken, that it would have to be completely remanufactured or procured new. ~~Now~~

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court: Captain Russell L. ARTHUR, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, UCMJ and examined as follows.

Q. Captain, would you be kind enough to state your name, rank, and duty station, and the reason why your technical competence finds itself here on this scene at this time?

A. Captain Russell L. ARTHUR, 415894, my permanent duty station is Fleet Material Officer, Service Force, COMSIXTHFLT. I have been ordered here in connection with the repairs to LIBERTY and have been designated as Task Group 100.2.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, Based upon your preliminary estimate of both the topside structural and internal damage resulting from the attack on 8 June, what is your estimate in terms of time and dollar cost for the complete restoration of LIBERTY into the condition she enjoyed prior to the attack in question?

A. Admiral, including ripout restoration of all structure, foundations, cabling, and on the assumption that the equipment that is necessary to

install is pierside at the time we require it during the period of the reconstruction program, I would estimate that we could restore everything to the condition existing prior to the attack in approximately four months for a cost of about two million dollars. This includes everything except the cost of the equipment, installation, checkout, testing, and restoration of all of the habitability features that were existing.

President: Captain, as a professional shipbuilder, would you be kind enough to explain in simple terms for the Court of Inquiry how Commander PLATZEK's estimate of one year for long-lead and procurement relates to your statement just made of four months for accomplishment of the repairs. How, in the shipbuilding business is this time separation or apparent disparity accommodated?

A. Generally, on new construction ships, of course, this is planned so that the equipment is dockside in accordance with the erection schedule. In this case, the ship would be immobilized and unable to carry out its mission until the equipments were actually provided, and the estimate that I gave was based strictly on the structural and the reinstallation of existing items before. But the only way we could accommodate this is to delay the ship which would add to the cost of the repairs.

Q. Let me see if I understand this now, in simple terms, your estimate of four months presupposes availability before you start, of everything that is going to be in the ship at the time you finish?

A. Yes sir.

President: Do the other members of the Court have any questions?

Counsel for the Court: Your figure did not include cost of equipment?

A. No sir, not at all.

Q. For record purposes, the cost to repair the damage to the ship itself would be the figure you stated?

A. Yes sir, approximately two million dollars.

Q. In four months?

A. Yes sir.

Captain ATKINSON: And this includes all equipment plus hull repair exclusive of research equipment, is that correct?

A. Yes sir.

President: Now for the summary which I feel might be appropriate at this time, as I understand it, Captain, we would properly add your two million to Commander PLATZEK's six to eight million and come up with a high figure of ten million dollars and one year loss of the capability of this ship?

A. Yes sir, that's correct, Admiral.

Q. That's the way you do this, is that correct?

A. Yes sir.

Counsel for the Court: One last question, Captain. At the last meeting of the Court, not knowing you would be a witness before this Court, I had a statement received from you entered in the record, in which you indicate that it would be two or three weeks time to make the necessary shell repairs in order for this vessel to proceed back to the United States. What is your estimate of the cost of temporary repairs being made in this shipyard?

A. About fifty to sixty thousand dollars, and I have received no estimates from the yard. This is a rough estimate based upon the knowledge of how much general costs are in this area.

President: So that three week period and sixty thousand dollars would be additive to your two million and six month figure, is that correct?

A. Two million and four months, yes sir, that is correct.

President: Any further questions?

President: Thank you very much, Captain. Before you leave, would you be kind enough to confirm my understanding that you and Commander PLATZEK are having photographs taken, under your personal supervision, of the internal torpedo damage and the external hull damage, significant parts thereof, for inclusion in the record which we will introduce upon processing of the film?

A. Yes sir, that's being arranged now, Admiral.

President: Thank you very very much, Captain. We certainly appreciate your time. (The witness was duly warned and withdrew).

Let the record show at this point that for completeness, this Court of

Inquiry does not consider itself competent at this time, with witness available, to address itself to such hidden cost as salaries of personnel, gratuities to those lost, loss of service of personnel injured, hospitalization costs, loss of use of the vessel, and similar cost which are incalculable based upon available information, but which should and must be included if there is an effort made to arrive at a total dollar value loss of this particular attack against the United States Navy.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

The witness took the stand, was duly sworn, and advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and examined as follows:

Counsel for the Court: Please state your full name, rate, and present duty station.

A. Joseph Paul Carpenter, 794 84 55, CT2, USS LIBERTY.

Q. You have been called before this Court of Inquiry to give information which you may possess concerning an incident which occurred on 8 June 1967, namely the attack on USS LIBERTY. I now turn over questioning to the Assistant Counsel for the Court.

Q. CARPENTER, I understand that the ship maintains, other than distress frequencies, that basically communications topside here consists of the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net, unclassified voice hicom net. I'm curious, if you can tell me what broadcast you were copying upon inchop to the Med, and then whether or not you shifted to any broadcast there, and what broadcast you shifted to?

A. When we came into the Med, we were copying XR broadcasts and KR broadcasts, and then, I can't remember the exact day but I think it was approximately 4 June, we shifted to JR broadcasts.

Q. It's significant when you shifted to JR, and I'd like you to try and be sure, and if you're not sure, then I think we may have to try and research a little bit and come up with a specific time of shift. Now, after you switched to JR, do you recall any difficulty in copying the Asmara fleet broadcasts?

A. Sir, every time I was on watch, the JR broadcast was up five by, we had no missing numbers.

Q. Now, you say every time you were on watch, do you remember what time frame we're talking about commencing with 070001Z June?

A. On 7 June, I had the evening watch, that was from 1600 to 2330 that night and then I had the day watch which started at 0630 in the morning.

Q. Now when you came on the watch at 071600 local time, were you missing any numbers since shift time according to your records?

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A. Well, sir, to my knowledge, we had no missing numbers at that time.

Q. Could you tell me what your procedures are when you are missing numbers?

A. When we're missing a number, the first thing we do, we have a missing number sheet, we mark it down on that sheet. And it stays on there until it comes back again, and then we will cross it off, we will mark how it came back, whether we serviced it or whether it was a rerun, but on JR broadcast they have so many reruns that everything came back. We never had to service it.

Q. What would you estimate on an average, was the period of time that you are actually missing a number until it was rerun without a rerun request?

A. Is this on a JR broadcast?

Q. JR.

A. On the JR broadcast we'd usually wait about a day and a half because they rerun so much. We found out that on that broadcast they'd rerun as many as two to three times each day.

Q. I don't understand what you mean by a day and a half. Do you wait a day and a half, then if you didn't get a rerun you would request it?

A. Yes sir, because they would rerun three times. We figure if we're going to miss it three times, we better service it then.

President: Let me ask a layman's question here. Does this mean that the JR, and I'm really addressing this question to Commander FEINGERSCH, in his technical communications competence, does this mean that the load of Asmara would be so low as far as units are served that they could afford the luxury of rerunning a whole schedule three times, is that what he's saying?

A. Yes sir, Admiral. Asmara only has a handful of subscribers and they can run up to a thousand messages a day and they're probably running in the neighborhood of two or three reruns.

President: At this point let the record show that the accommodation of communication traffic in LIBERTY was physically arranged where the torpedo hit has eliminated records to which the present witness and the following witnesses on the matter of communications, might logically be expected to

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refer to. Therefore, any hesitancy or inability of communication witnesses must necessarily be viewed and read with this fact in mind. They are dealing entirely from personal memory. That's true?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You say that while you were on watch you had no trouble of copying JR?

A. On the JR broadcast, we never had very much. Down by Africa we had trouble.

Q. No, I mean while you were in the Med?

A. While in the Med, we, just when the actual changeover, we had a little bit of trouble first getting it in. Just what I've been told, I was not actually on watch.

Q. More specifically, getting to the 8th of June, let us say from 080001Z, do you recall whether you were missing numbers on that particular day?

A. I recall one time when I was down there that WALTON, CTL was down there, and he mentioned that he had no missing numbers at that time. I believe that was the day before the attack. He was the one that was primarily watching the broadcast at that time because we were so busy in the other room. We had such a backlog.

President: Where's WALTON now, son?

A. He's dead now, he was trapped in crypto.

Q. Do you recall missing very many numbers on the 7th of June on JARAD?

A. I don't recall, sir. There might have been a few KR numbers but no JR numbers.

Q. Getting away from the broadcast for a moment - now, on your ship-shore termination, what type terminations did you establish, how often, and with whom?

A. Well, for the past few days we had come up anytime we were able to, and we would come up ship-shore to Greece most often because they were the best as far as ship-shore ORESTES were concerned. We had one sked, I believe, in the last two days we were out and it was with NAVSECGRU Morocco, and we went through Greece, using their transmitters and their antennae in passing it from there to Morocco.

Q. I understand that you do not maintain a permanent ship-shore termination neither ORESTES nor VFTG. Is a ORESTES circuit that

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you come up with when you have traffic periodically?

A. Yes sir. And then only real hot traffic.

Q. Without stating the reason, are there reasons why you, at certain times, can't come up on ORESTES ship-shore circuit due to what the ship may be doing?

A. Definitely, sir.

Q. Definitely there are reasons why you cannot?

A. Yes sir.

Q. During these periods when you cannot come up are they usually extensive periods of time, specifically can you recall on the 7th and 8th of June having extensive periods of time, where because of what the ship was doing, you could not come up and terminate the circuits and request missing broadcast numbers if you wanted to do so.

A. Yes sir, there were some times, it wasn't necessarily a long period of time that we couldn't come up, it's just that we didn't have enough time in between to get everything set up and get going before they would tell us to shut down again.

Q. What the ship was doing?

A. Yes sir.

President: As I understand it, young man, these limitations on ability and inability to come up on a transmitter whenever you might wish to deal in this area of your technical research. As I recall, Admiral MARTIN mentioned you did some work on wave propagation, and from a layman's point of view, would it be reasonable to even assume that a transmitter of high power would affect your wave propagation research efforts?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Then, to be sure we're perfectly clear on this point, on missing numbers on the 7th and 8th of June, very possibly could have not been requested because of the transmitter interfering with the ship's research mission?

A. Well sir, we got all the general service out on the 7th. Every general service message that we had that I can remember.

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Q. I'm talking about broadcast traffic missing numbers coming in from Asmara, particularly on the 8th?

A. You mean we wouldn't be able to service this?

Q. You wouldn't have asked for a rerun because the ship was involved in its research mission, and you couldn't just come up on a transmitter because you were missing, say five numbers?

A. No sir, we probably couldn't have.

Q. Then, you would wait for the second or third rerun, which could take maybe 24 to 36 hours, in lieu of disrupting what the ship was doing?

A. Yes sir.

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Q. Do you recall any missing numbers on the 8th, JARAD?

A. No sir, I don't.

President: Young man, is this procedure that you have described typical of the condition that exists aboard this ship anywhere you might be operating?

A. Yes sir, it is.

Q. In other words, this is not something new?

A. No sir.

Q. In other words, you have never felt compelled to service a number immediately, you have always felt comfortable in waiting for a rerun whether it was coming from Asmara, Anapolis, Philippines, Guam, or wherever, is that correct?

A. The only time we would service immediately is if we had had an outage of a period of time, say ten, fifteen, twenty minutes, as quite a few numbers would have been missed.

Q. You mean a receiver outage?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And you had no such receiver outage?

A. No sir.

Q. Let me put that question - it will be the same question, son, but put a little bit differently. You have had no cause for concern to feel compelled to take extraordinary measures such as telling somebody you had to stop listening to the moon, for example, in order to get a service on Asmara. Is that correct?

A. No sir, we never did.

Q. You never had to do that?

A. No sir. We did it once when we had some flash traffic to send out, and some immediate traffic we'd tell them what we had to get out, and then they would...

Q. I'm talking just about traffic you would be receiving, I'm not talking about outgoing traffic,

A. As far as traffic we were receiving, they never bothered us at all.

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Q. Ordinarily, how many KW37's do you have on a broadcast simultaneously?

A. We have two KW37's and we try to keep both of them on different signals so if one will drop out we have the other one as a backup. At that time I don't believe we did because we couldn't handle more than two signals and we had those two in diversity.

Q. Ordinarily, you have no reason to suspect copying two freqs on the same broadcast simultaneously. You have no reason to suspect that you're going to miss a number?

A. We had no reason at that time to suspect that we were going to because they were so five by.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I have nothing else.

Captain ATKINSON: One question, on the average since LIBERTY chopped in the Med, what was your daily traffic addressed to LIBERTY?

A. Addressed to LIBERTY, I would say around - well, it would vary from day to day. I'd say at the most we would get 25 and at the least we would get 7 or 8.

President: Would this be a comparably normal load, son?

A. That would be a normal load, yes.

Q. For any day, any place?

A. For any day, any place, sir.

President: Does any member present have for the record a feeling toward the number of subscribers of Asmara?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Yes sir.

Q. Is it in the hundreds?

A. No sir, just COMIDEASTFOR basically. No sir, it's KR they use ordinarily. And a ship like the LIBERTY, very few. Five or six, not even a dozen, sir. Very few, except if we had a contingency in the Red Sea and we sent additional ships down.

President: Is this your first ship in the Navy?

A. Yes sir, this is my first ship.

Q. So you have nothing to compare, equipment-wise, from personal experience, the equipment on this ship with any other ship?

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A. Well, I've been in the radio shack in other ships.

Q. What would be your opinion as to the comparability of the equipment that you were using in LIBERTY and the equipment as far as being modern, up to date, and the equipment in some of the other radio shacks you've been in?

A. I guess I could best describe that by what I heard a workman say when he came down there. He said "you have the best equipment I've ever seen in any radio shack anywhere."

President: Thank you very much.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I have one more question that may be pertinent, Admiral. Do you recall ever getting much off-line encrypted top secret traffic on JARAD or KR aboard LIBERTY?

A. As long as I have been on here, we have never received anything off-line. Top secret off-line, never on JR broadcast. We never even received anything off-line.

Q. How long have you been aboard the ship, son?

A. This was my third cruise.

President: Put on your thinking cap, son. Try to remember back, what you had till midnight on the 7th?

A. My watch on the 7th was the evening watch from 1600 local to 2330.

Q. On the 7th?

A. On the 7th, yes sir.

Q. And did we establish that when you came on watch, you did or did not have any known missing Asmara numbers?

Q. From a technical point of view again, we're using Commander FEINGERSCH as a technical expert. Would that JARAD number have been transmitted by 1600 on the 7th?

A. Yes sir. Probably for the second time.

Q. Probably for the second time?

A. Yes.

President: And the witness indicates that to the best of his knowledge, that there were no missing numbers. What conceivable explanation, and again we're theorizing and the Court is asking a technical witness in the

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person of Commander FEINGERSCH, what could be an explanation for this apparent non-delivery?

A. To be perfectly honest, Admiral, there is none. A message receives a signed broadcast number, and then each subsequent message gets a consecutive number. Asmara has their logs where here, of course, they've been destroyed. Asmara has checked their logs and has said this number, and it's a repeat though garbled, was transmitted at such an such a time. I think we have to assume that Asmara, since he does have his logs, that this message was in fact sent at this time and the ship in fact did miss it.

President: I do not accept that. Just because I'm hard headed. I will accept it if we can find two other users of Asmara who can prove to this Court that they received that number prior to this young man coming on watch at 1600 on the 7th. And that alone will satisfy me that that message went on the JARAD as advertised. And the reason for my doubt is because we already know that Asmara has made critical errors before.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: We can, if you so desire, sir, verify this.

President: Make that so, by phone, this morning to CINCUSNAVEUR.

Captain ATKINSON: One final question - did you have any missing numbers when you were relieved?

A. As far as I can remember, there was no change in status on relief.

President: Now, from a layman's point of view and in anticipation of there being other laymen vis a vis communications, reading this record, what way does a subscriber have of knowing that there is a message for him that he has missed?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: He does not know the missed number is specifically addressed to him, sir. He only knows that he has missed a message and he is required to maintain a continuous file of numbers. So, he must somehow, somehow, get that missed number and then he can determine whether or not if it is for his info or action. By the number itself, there is no way. He must see the message.

President: Let the record show at this time that the lack, as the result of destruction of LIBERTY records and files, combined with LIBERTY communications procedures, which will be expanded upon by subsequent testimony by

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Lieutenant GOLDEN, the ship's communications officer, that if LIBERTY missed a JARAD number, and for example, had outgoing traffic to send, of both a technical nature relating to her mission and operational nature, all of this type of traffic had been and would have been in the hypothetical case being discussed, packaged together and sent to a single addressee for action, namely Naval Security Group Morocco. It is the Court's understanding that the burden would then be on the Naval Security Group Morocco to sort out the traffic received from LIBERTY, transmitted during one of the periods she could afford to transmit without interference with her technical mission, and then the recipient, Naval Security Group Morocco, in the case of missed JARAD numbers, would have informed radio Asmara via NAVCOMMSTA Morocco of LIBERTY's requirements. This is going to be possibly germane to this Court's inquiry to determine whether or not such was done, and the time delay experienced in Morocco which station is understood to have been saturated during this period of Middle East Tension, despite the fact that radio Asmara, by virtue of few subscribers, would have had a relatively low operationally load.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Maurice H. Bennett, Jr., United States Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and testified as follows.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. Maurice H. Bennett, Jr., Lieutenant, USN, 628125, present duty station USS LIBERTY.

Q. Lieutenant Bennett, as you are well aware, this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain the circumstances attendant with the attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. The Assistant Counsel for this Court will now ask you a few questions pertinent to the attack and to the duty station that you had.

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Q. Do you recall whether any JARAD numbers were missing on the 7th and 8th. Was it reported to you that any numbers were missed?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no numbers were missing. I was not the communications officer at the time of the incident, therefore, I have no reason to have direct knowledge of any missing numbers.

President: Who was the communications officer, Lieutenant Bennett?

A. Lieutenant James C. Pierce, who is now deceased. He was killed in the attack.

Q. Was the mission of the ship such on the 7th and 8th that it would have disrupted the mission of the ship if you had transmitted excessive messages at this time?

A. Excessive transmissions would. If I might add, however, the very nature of the situation dictated that we did come up in communications more frequently than normal in order to pass pertinent high precedence traffic originated by the ship.

Q. Who did you pass this traffic to on the 7th and 8th?

A. On the 7th and 8th of June, due to the inability to contact NAVCOMSTA Morocco, the majority, if not all, of the high precedence traffic was off-line encrypted and passed to NAVCOMSTA Greece for further delivery.

Q. During these periods of transmission, if you were in fact aware of the missing number, would you have serviced it at that time?

A. In most instances, no, because it was an individual message which dictated that this message go out, and again going back to the mission of the ship, to preclude undue interference with the mission, we only came up long enough to get the one or two high precedence messages out and then the transmitters were shut down.

Q. Why did you shift the JARAD on the 7th of June?

A. I don't know the exact reason. It was my understanding that this is hearsay, and where I heard it from I don't recall. But, in communications instructions from whom I don't know, that there is a designated geographic point that you shift broadcasts.

Q. This is 100% true. It is in JANAP 195. I was just curious if you were directed to shift to JARAD for any particular reason, or if you shifted just as a matter of normal communications procedure?

A. To the best of my knowledge we shifted in accordance with the known communications procedure. And, again to the best of my knowledge, and in accordance with past known practices, Mr. Pierce who was the communications officer, notification of the shift is usually sent out, I would presume within 24 to 48 hours in advance.

President: I'd like to ask a stupid question. I just don't understand why, when you're in the Eastern Mediterranean, you listen to radio Asmara which, even to my unpracticed eye, is closest, and yet when you want to talk to somebody, you go to Morocco, and everybody I've heard comment indicates that they have had difficulty copying Morocco. Now, is Asmara incapable of listening?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: No sir, Asmara is not incapable of listening, but in the case of this particular ship, and the type of research traffic they are passing, the traffic is destined, or initially destined, to go to NAVSECGRUDET Morocco. It would serve no purpose to the ship to send it to Asmara because Asmara first of all would have to be off-line encrypted because Asmara would not be permitted to read it, and Asmara would have to relay it to SECGRU Morocco, it would have to be decrypted, and would just introduce many many delays. It would serve no advantage in the case of this particular ship to send it to anyone but NAVSECGRU Morocco.

President: Now, would you expand on that a little bit more and tell me how Navy Radio Marathon fits into this picture, which is still even closer than Morocco but not as close as Asmara?

A. In the case of this ship they had difficulty, I understand, in establishing their on-line secure circuit with NAVSECGRU Morocco. Consequently, they terminated a circuit with Greece and they used Greece transitists to take this circuit and pass it on to NAVSECGRUDET Morocco. So the signal is going through Greece encrypted electronically and it gets

a boost, so to speak, at Greece, but it still winds up in Morocco. If it's general service traffic that Greece personnel can read, they would have terminated the circuit, which they did on high precedence general service type traffic.

President: But, not always?

A. But, not always.

Q. In other words, this package transmission that we talked about would go to Morocco off-line encrypted?

A. If it went to SECGRUDET it would have went on-line all the way, sir, because the proper people are handling it at the other end. This was a mixed package as recalled.

President: Does the Court have any further questions of Lieutenant Bennett?

No Response.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Communications Technician Second Class Thorp L. Long, United States Navy, took the stand as a witness was duly warned, advised of his rights under article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and testified as follows.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rate, and present duty station.

A. My name is Thorp L. Long, CT2, present duty station is USS LIBERTY.

Q. Long, you've been called before this Court of Inquiry because of the circumstances attendant with the attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967.

The Court is very interested to ascertain certain information from you which you might possess. Would you now answer questions that the Assistant Counsel for the Court will put before you.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you stand watch as far as the broadcast is concerned on the evening of 7th and 8th of June?

A. Yes, I did sir. On the morning of the 8th I had the mid watch. I got off work at about 7 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Do you recall any difficulty in copying the JARAT broadcast from Asmara during that period of time.

A. No sir. It was fairly clear. There were a couple times that we had some problems because some equipment went down and we had to get out material man to repair it, but on the whole it was a good signal and we were able to copy it.

Q. When you say equipment, did you drop out of ~~sync~~?

A. No, it was the printer. The page print was being garbled because of some malfunctions within the gear.

Q. Were you getting the tape?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And the tape was five by?

A. Yes sir.

Q. When you relieved the watch, do you recall any report or any indication that any numbers on the JARAD broadcast had been missed?

A. There were some that had been missed. I'm almost positive.

Q. Do you have a feel for the volume. Was it a matter of a few, or was it a matter of a whole block indicating maybe you dropped out of ~~sync~~ for an hour?

A. It appeared to me, as I remember, it may have been four or five, or maybe six messages that had been missed through some malfunction.

Q. Now, this is on the morning of the 8th, do you recall whether these messages were basically missing over a period of 12, 24, 48 hours, I knew it's hard but generally speaking, do you have any feel for that?

A. No sir. The ones that I remember, there was a blank space on the message number log that we kept.

Q. As best your memory serves, while you had the watch and you had some trouble, can you recall at the time you were relieved of the watch, whether or not any numbers were missed during your time of watchstanding,

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from 080001 to 7 or 8 o'clock in the morning?

A. I don't believe we did, sir, because when we came on watch, we thought that we would very possible be very busy, and we switched - we were using the reprinter from one place and the page print from another place, so that we could use the good page print for running off copies that had to be distributed. We did this right at the beginning of the watch. We had some malfunction with the page printer, but we checked the tape to see how many of the messages that we did not have page prints on were to us.

Q. Under normal procedures when you come on watch or you've just been relieved, do you more or less depend on your log of consecutive numbers - take a glance at that to see if there were any missing numbers, or is it usually passed word of mouth, or just how do you know when you come on watch whether or not you're missing numbers on any particular gear regardless of what broadcast you're copying?

A. If the message had been missed that day, there would be blank spaces on the message number log. If it had been prior to that day, there was another page where numbers of all missing messages were noted, and when we got out a message or received a repeat on it, if we did not need it then it was logged out that we didn't need it; if we did need it, then it was copied down.

President: Then, on this sheet which was sort of a backlog sheet for time prior to the watch, were there any numbers on that backlog sheet for a couple, three days before?

A. Yes sir, there were. When we first picked up the JR broadcast, we were having bad copy with them it would keep going out and we missed several numbers.

Q. When you say, it would keep going out, we're not communicators, what's going out?

A. The signal was fading. The transmission was weak. We were just having trouble from the weak signals we were receiving. And we just don't know if there were some missed because of that. It would be good for awhile and then it would fade out. It would become too weak for awhile. It would go good and it would go bad. It just kept doing that.

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Q. Now here's a real hard one - during the period of 6, 7, and 8 June; or I should say 7 and 8 June, could you give us any feel for what percentage of reliability JARAD was having, was it 50% reliable, was it 98% reliable, what would be your feelings?

A. It seemed to me that it was 85 to 90 per cent reliable. It was very good. I had the day watch on the 7th and I didn't lose the signal once. I copied it all day and didn't have trouble.

Q. On the 8th when you had the watch, did you establish a ship-shore termination to pass traffic to the beach on ORESTES. Do you know if one was established when you had the watch?

A. On the 7th, they tried to, but there were some problems that came up and they never did get established as far as I know.

President: I just haven't got a feeling for what I heard. Now you said that you copied solid on the 7th when you had a day watch. You had a readable signal throughout.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now, does that mean that you had no missed numbers on your watch?

A. I cannot remember any, sir. To the best of my knowledge, there were none.

Q. There were no missed numbers on the day watch. That would have covered what period of time, on the 7th?

A. The day watch started -- we relieve about 6:30 to 6:45 local in the morning and we relieve for lunch at approximately between 11 and 11:15. We ate and came right back. I don't know exactly what time that was but we ate and came right back to work. We were relieved again approximately 4:30 in the afternoon.

Q. So, from 6:30 you can testify to the best of your knowledge you had no missed numbers on JARAD?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And when you came on watch in the morning, there were some missed numbers, is that correct?

A. I seem to remember some.

Q. How many on that missed number sheet could you recall checking off on the reruns that occurred during your watch?

A. None, sir, because the JR broadcast was sending reruns from a period before we started the copying. They had not reached the missing numbers that we had.

President: I see. Well this is interesting then. The rerun repeats that we hear Asmara has been able to do two or three times in a 24-hour period does not necessarily constitute 100% reruns?

A. No sir. The numbers we were receiving on the rerun were numbers from earlier in that month.

Q. Earlier in the Month?

A. Before we had started copying the other broadcasts.

Q. Now, a technical question, a procedure question for Commander Feingersch (asst counsel), How does a transmitting station decide what they're going to rerun. Are they requests from users?

A. That's one source. They'll be requested from various people then during certain periods of the day when they feel that their propagation is at the least bit of efficiency, they will take the numbers that were run during that period of day without any requests and rerun those if capacity of work units permits. If they run 500 numbers and they have a capacity of 900, there's no reason why they shouldn't take 400 of those 500 and rerun them anyway. The transmitters there, traffic's off the air. But it's requests, and it's to their professional knowledge of propagation and location of ships, how many minutes do we run, what numbers do we run.

Q. One last question, son. When you were relieved of the watch, and turned over to your relief these sheets of paper showing missed numbers, I want to ask you again, had you added to that list in your handwriting, during your period of time on watch?

A. I don't believe that I had, sir. If I did, I might have added some numbers while we were having trouble with the page print and then I remember I went back and I checked the reproof tape and read on to see if it was for us and checked them off.

Q. So, you didn't add any new ones. You don't remember whether you checked off any old ones?

A. I know that I did not check off any old ones.

Q. You did not check off any old ones, and as I understand you that was because what they were rerunning was stuff before you even picked up the broadcast?

A. Yes sir.

Q. When you assumed the watch on the 8th, you said there were some numbers missing before they shifted to the JARAD broadcast. KR numbers you said. Do you recall after shifting to the Asmara broadcast of anyone taking any action to get the, regardless of the number, missing KR numbers?

A. No sir, I don't. I was not on watch when they changed broadcast. They changed broadcast they were copying while I was in between strings of watches. I was out on a break when they changed, so I do not know if they took any action or if they did, what action they took.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Chief Warrant Officer Jack E. WICKHAM, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, USMJ and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court.

Q. Please state your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. Chief Warrant Officer Jack E. Wickham, 537928/7742, I am the assistant salvage and diving officer for Commander Service Squadron Eight, Norfolk, Virginia.

Q. You are well aware this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain

certain information attendant with the attack upon USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. You have been called as a witness, to answer certain questions you may be able to answer. At this time, the President, Admiral Kidd would like to ask you a few questions.

Q. Mr. Wickham, your reputation is known to me in the salvage business, and if I recall correctly you have been involved in salvage operations, the recovery of the remains, and lengthy details incident to marine salvage for some 20 years. Is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. The question that I am going to ask you will be included in the medical portion of this report, and it goes like this. In your professional experience and based thereon what would be your opinion, from your duties yesterday incident to the recovery of the remains from the torpedoed compartment of the USS LIBERTY, as to the possibility or probability of any of those remains having been alive after the explosion?

A. In my experience with explosion of this type aboard naval vessels, I have no doubt of any kind that any person could have survived the initial explosion down there. I think death was instantaneous for every person in the immediate area.

Q. Now, to extend just a bit. Some of the people down there got out. There is the ever present possibility in the minds of next of kin, that in our determination to button up the ship quickly, that we might inadvertently trap men below. Now, would you comment on this aspect of this situation. As I understand it, from what you said, those who got out, got out because they were able to get out, and the rest were dead on the explosion?

A. Yes sir, that is my opinion.

Q. And from previous discussions with you, I understand that this opinion derived from the degree of dismemberment and like facts which caused this conviction?

A. Yes sir. Every body that I observed down there, there is no doubt in my mind that that person was dead at the time of the explosion.

President: Thank you very very much, Mr. Wickham.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Commander William L. McGonagle, was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court.

Q. Captain, did you bring with you today the gyro compass record for USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. Is this it?

A. Yes sir, it is.

I request the recorder to mark this as exhibit number 26 and offer it into evidence as exhibit number 26.

Q. Will you please read pertinent extracts from that.

A. The ship's gyro was last inspected by the USS VULCAN qualified gyro inspection and repair personnel on 30 March 1967.

Q. Is that 30 March 1967 a timely inspection?

A. Yes sir, it is. The ship's gyro is required to be inspected whenever possible by tender or yard personnel specifically trained in this responsibility once each quarter. I would like to indicate that the log shows that the error at the time of this inspection was .1° westerly.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions. Does any member of the Court desire to question the witness?

President: Captain, in our previous discussions, you told me a story which I have since come to identify as remarkable humility and selfeffacement on your part which I presume has caused you not to mention in testimony the way you navigated this ship out of dangerous waters after the attack. Will you please tell the Court how, while lying on your back, with no compass except the magnetic compass, and based upon your recollection of

your magnetic compass error in relation to the gyro compass book, you used the sun and subsequently the North Star to clear the area.

A. Admiral, after a time on the bridge, when I had received minor injuries, I lost considerable blood and attempts to stem the flow of blood by self-help were unsuccessful, I noticed myself beginning to lose consciousness. I immediately layed down on the deck flat on my back on the port wing and raised the *BLE* as possible, resting it on my port bridge chair, and there a first class communications technician by the name of Carpenter and other persons who I don't recall at this time, applied a tournaquet to my *BLE* which effectively stopped the flow of blood. I, at no time, lost consciousness and had my full faculties at all times. I realized by that time I had lost considerable amounts of blood because it was sloshing in my shoes and *BLE* was completely soaked with blood. They cut the *BB* pant *BLE* I looked at my wounds at that time and they still did not appear to me to be serious and since the flow of blood had been stopped I gave no further consideration to - I didn't consider I had any more problem in that area. I asked them to bring me coffee, fluids, a couple of salt tablets, and so forth. I comned the ship by looking aft and by being able to see the wake of the ship I was able to tell after steering which way to apply the rudder and how long to leave it on to attempt to average out the best course that I felt the ship should travel on to stand clear of possible shoal areas. I remained on my back for approximately an hour and a half. I then felt that I had regained sufficient strength that I was able to get up from the deck and con the ship from the wing of the ship and from the pilot house. I couldn't get my *BLE* a comfortable position so I moved from one place to the other. I couldn't stay in any one place for too long a period of time. It seemed to me that my remaining on the bridge, this would be able to lessen the shock that the rest of the crew had received.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, predicated on your testimony at the last hearing in which you testified, the Court propounded certain questions for you to answer. Will you please now give the Court the answers to those questions?

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A. Yes sir, I will. The questions concern the following:

Q. The basic directives for your operations in the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be those contained in JCS message 011545Z which indicated you would operate south of 32°N during the period 9-30 June. Did you receive any directive to commence these operations before 9 June?

A. Directives received both before and subsequent to JCS 011545Z indicated the urgency of initiating operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as possible. For example: COMSERVRON 8 message 240020Z directed LIBERTY to depart Abidjan immediately and proceed at best speed to Rota for logistics and subsequent employment in the Eastern Mediterranean. My 241732Z indicated ETA Port Said area about 061400Z June. This estimate allowed five hours at Rota to fuel, reprovision, and again get underway. Heavy seas and a boiler casualty delayed LIBERTY's arrival Rota. Repairs to an antenna system were undertaken at Rota and the ship was directed to remain at Rota until repairs were completed. On the basis of telephone authorization LIBERTY departed Rota at 021230Z for the Eastern Mediterranean and reported that best speed would be utilized enroute (LIBERTY 022108Z).

LIBERTY 021330Z indicated that the ship would arrive at 32-00N 33-00E at 080300Z and commence operations within 50 miles from 32-00N 33-30E.

LIBERTY SITREP 070908Z indicates that pim would be stationary at 072300Z and operations would be within 30 miles of 31°45N 33-30E.

CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z, which refers to both LIBERTY 021330Z (MOVREP) and 022108Z (SITREP on departure Rota), directed that COMSIXTHFLT operate LIBERTY to derive maximum benefit from special capabilities.

LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT by message at 070001Z.

No messages were received which would indicate that the expressed intentions of LIBERTY was at variance with the implied desires of all higher commands concerned to effectively employ the unique capabilities of LIBERTY at the earliest possible time. Daily SITREPS/PIM reports were

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submitted LIBERTY messages: 032020Z June, 042050Z June, 051934Z June, 061844Z June, 070908Z June, 080634Z June pertain.

In spite of the fact that outgoing transmissions were undesirable for research purposes in view of the operational importance of these messages to the ship's technical/operational commanders I directed that the SITREPS that these messages be sent irregardless of their undesirable effects on the effectiveness of the research mission, especially in view of the increased precedence for transmission directed and prior length of time to obtain TOD for further routing of the SITREPS submitted 3, 4 and 5 June.

JCS 062050Z June Priority (TOR 08/0555Z Jun) contains procedure to be utilized in developing and promulgating LIBERTY schedule and changes while operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility. Note that LIBERTY is not included in the framework of developing the schedule or changes and a specific note was included in paragraph 3 of that message to the effect that "... on all messages pertaining to skeds for (sic or) sked changes ... USS LIBERTY is not an addee on these msgs." Since LIBERTY was not privy to background of schedule of changes there was no reason to believe that the reported actions and intentions of LIBERTY were not acceptable to operational/technical commanders nor was there any way to know that they were considering revisions to that schedule until a message is received which directs the ship to change its area of operation.

President: During your testimony yesterday, in relation to the loss of your quartermaster, the loss of your navigational capabilities, and related circumstances making it difficult to reconstruct navigationally and cronologically exactly what occurred, you were asked to develop in conjunction with your ships officers and through the assistance of any other assets available, such as your engineer's bell book, the CIC log, recollections of ships personnel the best available story, cronological in words and pictorial on charts and why for what happened. Have you done this?

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A. Yes sir, we have.

President: Would you be kind enough to submit into evidence at this time, those documents?

Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have the chronological listing of events relative to USS LIBERTY on 8 June.

A. Yes sir, I do.

Q. Would you provide it, please?

A. Here it is.

Counsel for the Court: Request this be marked exhibit number 27 and request that it be introduced into evidence. Will you please now read exhibit number 27 to the Court?

A. Exhibit number 27 is COMDESRON TWELVE Secret Message 150016Z JUN 67 to CINCUSNAVEUR.

FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN FROM KIDD. DELIVER AT _____
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, YOUR 141740Z NOT RCVD AS OF 142355Z; HOWEVER
REQUESTED 8 JUNE CHROMOLOGY FOLLOWS:

A. APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT 13 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-~~00~~E (POINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE TO 31-31N 33-~~00~~E, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK UNTIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED, SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS TRACK LINE AT ALL TIMES, IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY OBTAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED TO HEAD DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 1~~00~~ FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED AND THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NORTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND FORTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 1~~00~~ FATHOM CURVE. NORMAL STEAMING SPEED WAS TO BE FIVE KNOTS. NORMAL STEAMING COLORS WERE FLOWN AND NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS LIGHTED AT NIGHT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO STEAM AT DARKEN SHIP AT ANY TIME

AND THE SHIP DID NOT EVEN EXERCISE AT DARKEN SHIP DRILL DURING THE DEPLOYMENT

2. ALL TIMES BRAVO UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

0754 STEAMING ON 130T, SPD 10 KNOTS

0849 PASSED THROUGH POINT ALPHA CHANGED CSE TO 253T

0850 SINGLE JET A/C (UNIDENTIFIED) CROSSED ASTERN DISTANCE 3 - 5 MILES - CIRCLED SHIP FROM STBD TO PORT AND RETURNED TO UAR MAINLANT. LOCATING TWO TRANSMITTED (LIBERTY 080742ZJUN).

0905 DECREASED SPD TO 5 KNOTS

1056 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP-HIGH

1126 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP LOCATING THREE DRAFTED FOR TRANSMISSION AT 081022Z (BUT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED)

1132 PASSED THROUGH POINT BRAVO C/C TO 283T

1310 EXERCISED AT G.Q. DRILL

1348 SECURED FROM G.Q. DRILL.

1351 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32.000 YARDS BEARING 082T - REJURED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT

1353 RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS.

1358 SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE 5 - 6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 7000 FT.

A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP

1403 LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS

1405 SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85, 01 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.

1405 ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH.

1405 - 1410 SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF SHIP WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR A

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ATTACK, ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE #1 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREA FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS.

1411 BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS.

1424 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD

1BEAM DISTANCE 4 -5 MILES

1426 NOTICED NORMAL STEAMING ENSIGN SHOT AWAY DURING AIR ATTACK HOLIDAY SIZE ENSIGN HOISTED ON PORT YARDBARM.

1428 MTB SIGNALLING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STEAD QUARTER. LIGHT OBSCURED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALEBOAT.

1430 ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE GUN 51. C.O. ORDERED HOLD FIRE.

1431 MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE. C.O. SENT ENS LUCAS AROUND PORT SIDE OF BRIDGE TO GET MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING

1431 WORD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD.

MTB COMMENCED STRAFING STARBOARD SIDE OF SHIP

1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF SHIP.

1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS.

TWENTY SIX MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB STRAFING FIRE.

1435 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.

1436 LOST STEAM PRESSURE - SECURED ENGINES AND BOILERS -

MANY GAUGES AND METERS IN FIREROOM AND ENGINE ROOM WERE KNOCKED OUT. TORPEDO HIT IN RESEARCH COORDINATION CENTER WHERE APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MEN WERE AT G.Q. STATIONS. THESE SPACES FLOODED INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THIS SPACE DIED OF EITHER BLAST OR DROWNING. NO SIGNS OF LIFE EMANATING FROM COORDINATION CENTER AND ADJACENT SPACES WHICH COULD NOT BE OPENED WITHOUT

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DANGER OF FLOODING OTHER SPACES.

1440 MTB'S STANDING AWAY FROM THE SHIP. ONE MTB HAS HULL NUMBER 206-17

1503 ONE MTB RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALLED "DO YOU NEED HELP" IN ENGLISH C.O. SIGNALLED "NEGATIVE"

1505 MTB'S RETIRED TOWARD SHORE

1507 HELICOPTER BEARING STAR OF DAVID MARKINGS APPROACHED SHIP, PORT SIDE, HOVERING AT ABOUT 500 YDS DISTANCE.

1508 SECOND HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP.

MARKINGS ON HELICOPTERS ARE 04 AND 08 OR D4 AND D8. HELICOPTER MADE REPEATED PASSES AROUND AND OVER SHIP. THEY WERE NOT OBSERVED TO PICK UP ANY BODIES, PERSONS OR DEBRIS.

1519 POWER RESTORED TO BRIDGE BUT RUDDER DID NOT ANSWER - CONTINUED STEERING FROM AFTER STEERING.

1536 MTB'S APPROACHING SHIP STARBOARD SIDE 7-8 MILES DISTANT. DURING NEXT HOUR AND A QUARTER THE MTB'S RETURNED TO THE SHIP MOVES AND BY 1713 THEY HAD RETIRED OUT OF SIGHT OVER THE HORIZON.

1615 TWO UNIDENTIFIED JET A/C APPROACHED SHIP FROM THE STEB SIDE AND RECONNOITERED FROM A DISTANCE.

1620 ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR AREA STEERING NORTHERLY COURSE AT SPEEDS VARYING FROM 0 TO 8 KNOTS. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WERE TREATED IN THE WARDROOM ON A CONTINUING BASIS, DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE FIGHTING CONTROLLED FLOODING AND DAMAGE, ENGINEERING CASUALTIES WERE RESTORED BUT STEERING WAS BY HAND FROM AFTER STEERING.

1845 ISRAELI HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP - CIRCLED CLOSE ABOARD AND ATTEMPTED TO SIGNAL - THEY APPEARED TO DESIRE TO LOWER SOMEONE TO THE DECK - C.O. CONSIDERED RECEIVING HIM ON FORECASTLE BUT RULED THIS OUT AS TO HAZZARDOUS, REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO

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COMMUNICATE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AND AT 1852 COPTER DROPPED
A MESSAGE PACKET ON FORECASTLE, THE MESSAGE, WRITTEN ON A CALLING
CARD OF THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE TEL AVIV, ASKED "HAVE YOU CASUALTIES"
SHIP TRIED BY SEVERAL MEANS TO INDICATE, DURING NEXT
TEN MINUTES THAT THERE WERE MANY CASUALTIES BUT THERE WAS NO
INDICATION THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERSTOOD, THE MUTILATED
BODIES OF THREE DEAD CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT YET BEEN REMOVED
FROM THE FORECASTLE AND MUST HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE
HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED THE SHIP SHORTLY BEFORE
SUNSET (ABOUT 1905) SHIP CONTINUED STEAMING THROUGH NIGHT TO
RDVU WITH ESCORTS DISPATCHED BY COMSIXTHFLT

3. FOREGOING CONSTITUTES DETAILED RECONSTRUCTION FROM QM NOTEBOOK,
CIC LOG, BELL BOOK AND BEST RECOLLECTION OF CO/CHIEF ENGR/
GUN OFF/BRIDGE PERSONNEL. ALL CONCUR

GP-3

BT

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you today your readiness file and your gunnery procedures?

A. Yes sir, I have.

Counsel for the Court: This will be exhibit number 28, the modified condition of readiness three. Exhibit number 29 will be the guide for gunnery officers. I request that they be admitted in evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you today another chart which was requested by the Court of your projected track in relationship to the prescribed areas of operation.

A. Yes sir, I have, and the information requested by the Court has been placed thereon.

Counsel for the Court: I request this chart be marked by the reporter as exhibit number 30 and be admitted in evidence at this time. I also request that the reporter mark the following three exhibits, 31, 32, 33, exhibit 31 and 32 are maneuvering boards, exhibit 33 is bullet and projectile mark photographs. I request that these exhibits be entered into evidence as exhibits 31, 32 and 33.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you information as to the number of bullet marks on USS LIBERTY as a result of the attack on 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I have had a topside inspection of the ship made and have recorded the number of projectile hits in various areas of the ship.

President: What was the total number of hits you took, Captain?

A. We took a total of 821 plus one torpedo hit.

Counsel for the Court: That does not include shrapnel marks?

A. No sir, that does not include shrapnel marks which are innumerable.

Counsel for the Court: Does the Court desire to question this witness further?

Captain ATKINSON: One question, on your open fire doctrine, what is your open fire doctrine?

A. The open fire doctrine is that, except in a melee, all fire will be controlled by the Commanding Officer through his normal gunnery control organization. At surprise air and surface attacks, the gunnery personnel

on the mounts are authorized to open fire if they are unable to communicate with gun control or the bridge.

President: Let the record show at this point that the grizzly business of recovery of remains from the torpedoed compartments yesterday and last night resulted in starting out looking for 22 unrecovered bodies. We actually recovered 18 of whom we are reasonably confident that we identified accurately 15. Wholesale dismemberment resulting in many remains virtually being blown to bits made the recovery particularly difficult and identification even more complicated. It cannot be conclusively determined that the four missing of the 22 being sought are not in pieces in the spaces themselves. On the other hand, it is possible that we did lose four floating free after the attack or we may have lost those four immediately at the time of the attack dropping through the hole in the bottom. The degree of dismemberment was so extreme as to be typified by the fact that the last few cases we packed in the small hours this morning contained for example, a head, and an arm in one and similar partial bodies.

The Court recessed for lunch at 1200 hours on 15 June 1967.

After recessing at 1200 hours on 15 June, the Court met again at 1330 hours on 15 June 1967.

Counsel for the Court: All persons who were present when the court recessed are again present in court. The Captain, USS LIBERTY is still on the stand and under oath. Commander, do you have anything else you'd like to present?

Commander McGonagle: I gave the list of recommendations to the yeoman and I hadn't completed writing out the last one, but the last one in substance that I would recommend that ships that are engaged in special operations of this type or others of which I'm not aware but that may be of critical importance that they be advised of the decisions of higher authority which are under consideration and could be of value to the ship in being able to respond to the desires of higher command in more timely fashion.

Counsel for the Court: Do any of the members have questions of this witness?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Yes, I have a question, Captain, if I may.

In general, could you tell me what the normal everyday procedures are, as relates to determination of when to come up on a transmitter for the purpose of establishing a ship-shore circuit.

A. Usually, the number of messages - of course, we have no way of knowing what the contents of a missing message number is. I check with the communicators, it is my usual practice to go to the research spaces every morning. At about 0815 there, I receive a sort of informal briefing on the research operations, I review the special traffic. The general service board is usually brought to me before I go down to the research spaces. And, the decision as to whether to come up on a transmitter or not would depend on the urgency of the message that I wanted my superior to be aware of. Generally, I try to deal with routine messages to the maximum extent possible. There are many items which cannot be handled at this level of course. With our defcon operation there were times where there would be only a few hours difference when it was working between coming up on a normal transmitter and reducing our research effectiveness, or waiting a matter of a couple of hours until we get moon time to relay via the moon. In this case I might say wait and send this one by the trsscon if possible. There were a couple of times after minimize was imposed in the area where I felt that I could send a

[REDACTED]

message not meeting minimize criteria by the trascom system because it would not involve any of the mediterranean ships that were a transmitter receive station. I was disucussing the matter of that I had authorized release of a routine message which would not normally qualify for transmission under minimize conditions. I specifically put on the bottom of this message "transmit via trsscon equipment only" and it was for a spare part for the trsscon system and we knew that this would go from the ship direct to Washington via the moon in fact the relay station.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I was wondering, Captain, in your routine scanning the traffic, was it a normal function for the Comm officer or what have you some personnel to inform you or to keep you cognizant about numbers of missing messages from broadcast files?

A. Not as an everyday occurrence. I did check to see what the backlog of outgoing messages were, sometimes two or three times a day. As usual there would be many times when we would have a backlog of several messages without specifying the number. They would usually let me know in the morning also what the backlog of messages for the night was. This leads me to believe that if we were able to get out we usually had no problems with incoming traffic.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Would there have been any reason, Captain, on the days of 6,7, and 8 June for it to be unwise to transmit on a ship-shore circuit terminating with a NAVCOMMSTA?

A. I'm not sure what you mean by unwise.

Q. You are steaming along doing your job, at 1500 on June 7th, let us say, would it have hurt things if all of a sudden you came up with a 500 watt transmitter on the line?

A. I can't answer that question specifically because I'm not an expert in that area, although my research officer requested that we hold the number of transmissions to an absolute minimum because we did know that whenever we transmitted our research capability was reduced, and I did this for the most part and the primary exception was the messages which I directed to be sent, PIM reports specifically, that I knew my operational and technical commanders were vitally concerned with receiving in a short period of time. I directed

[REDACTED]

the transmitters come up and transmit those messages regardless of the consequences upon the research function.

Q. The comm officer is deceased, I understand?

A. Yes, he is.

Q. Was he an Ensign?

A. No sir, he was a Lieutenant. A very capable individual. He had been in his particular specialty for a considerable period of time, the exact number of years I'm not sure, but he had been associated with tem for ten or fifteen years anyhow. The last seven or eight as an officer, and he had been on the ship approximately 11 months at the time.

Q. He was more of specialist than an operational type of officer, is that right?

A. Yes, he was and LDO and quite competent in his duties, and very thorough and conscientious.

Q. President: Captain McGonagle, before you is a message (Defense Attache Tel Aviv 091520) provided by the Court of Inquiry, purporting points advanced by the Israeli Government as justification for their unprovoked attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June. Would you be kind enough to address yourself to those points.

A. Yes sir, LIBERTY never approached the nearest land closer than 14 NM. The ship was in international waters at all times prior to, during and after the unprovoked attack. To my knowledge there was no declared war zone recognized or sanctioned by the United States Government. I had heard on VOA various statements broadcast by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Goldberg in the UN to the effect that the U.S. attitude of the U.S. Government was neutral in the conflict between Israel and UAR and did not intend to take a position for or against either side. The VOA broadcast and BBC indicated that Israel indicated a willingness to abide by the cease fire that the UN had asked for to be effective about 072000 local time. The above considerations coupled with the right of innocent passage recognized in international law refutes this allegation categorically.


As counsel for the Court, I have in my possession a file containing messages from the official records of Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. I received these messages from the communications officer, CINCUSNAVEUR, and they are available for the use of the Court relative to this case. Do any of the Court members desire to examine this file at this time?

Captain ATKINSON: This file contains all pertinent messages concerning USS LIBERTY operations from 24 May to 11 June, is this correct?

Counsel for the Court: Yes.

The President of the Court adjourned the Court at 1445 hours, 15 June 1967, and will meet at his call in London, England.

FOURTH DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

Counsel for the Court: This Court of Inquiry is in session again after having adjourned on 15 June 1967 on board USS LIBERTY in Malta. Today the date is 16 June, the time is 1345, the place is London, England Headquarters Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

Captain Leonard Robert RAISH was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Captain RAISH will you now advise the court of information that you have to present in amplification of your prior testimony.

A. At the beginning of the court of inquiry I was directed by Admiral KIDD to prepare sets of questions to obtain detailed information on the attack of the LIBERTY. I did prepare sets of questions for NAVCOMMSTA PHILIPPINES, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE, NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO, Army Communication Facility Asmara, and NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA and I produce now the messages that answered the questions.

Counsel for the Court: These messages that I have received from Captain RAISH will be marked by the reporter as exhibits numbers 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, I now offer them into evidence, and hand them back to you Captain RAISH to read to the court.

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMMSTA PHILLIPPINES CONFIDENTIAL 141631Z JUN 67
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. DID YOU RECEIVE JCS 072230Z JUN AND JCS 080110Z JUN FOR RELAY?
IF ANSWER TO 1 IS YES:

B. FROM WHOM AND AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE THEM? TO WHOM DID YOU RELAY THEM AND AT WHAT TIME?

2. SUBMIT REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

FROM: NAVCOMMSTA PHILLIPPINES TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 150346Z JUN 67

A. YOUR 141632Z JUN 67

DECLASSIFIED

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B. JCS 072230Z JUN 67

C. JCS 080110Z JUN 67

D. NAVCOMMSTA PHIL 130041Z JUN 67

1. REF B OR 133E/08 FROM NAVRELSTA KUNIA TOD 1700Z/08 TO DCS RELSTA DAGIS
2. REF C TOR 0400Z/08 FROM NAVRELSTA KUNIA TOD 0449Z/08 TO NAVCOMMSTA GUAM
3. REF D TRACER ACTION BY NAVCOMMSTA PHIL PERTAINING TO REF C.

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE CONFIDENTIAL 141629Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. FROM WHOM DID YOU RECEIVE COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67? AT WHAT TIME?

B. WHO WAS NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TO PROTECT FOR IN REGARD TO THIS MESSAGE AS ASSIGNED BY THE ROUTING INDICATORS?

C. WHAT ACTIONS DID YOUR PERSONNEL TAKE WITH REGARD TO COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z?

D. HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR YOUR PERSONNEL TO RECOGNIZE THAT COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN HAD BEEN MISROUTED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AND START ACTION TO RECTIFY?

E. COULD YOUR PERSONNEL, ONCE THE MISROUTE WAS RECOGNIZED, HAVE RECOUPED SOME OF THE LOST TIME BY REROUTING DIRECTO TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA? IF SO, WHY DIDN'T THEY?

F. HOW DOES THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC HANDLED BY NAVCOMMSTA GREECE FOR THE WEEK 3-9 JUN 67 INCLUSIVE COMPARE WITH THE PREVIOUS WEEK (I.E., 29 MAY - 2 JUN INCLUSIVE) AS REGARDS VOLUME AND PRECEDENCES USED? HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO A REPRESENTATIVE WEEK, SAY IN FEB 67?

G. WHAT IS THE PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? HOW MANY DO YOU HAVE ON BOARD?

H. WHAT IN GENERAL IS THE LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN MESSAGE HANDLING OPERATIONS?

I. SUMMARIZE IN NARRATIVE STYLE COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDED AND ACTIONS OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INCIDENT TO AND FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

FROM: NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 150731Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS

A. YOUR 141629Z JUN 67

1. LAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO FORWARDED. SUB-PARAGRAPHS KEYED TO REFERENCE.

A. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED FROM MAJRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) AT 081238Z.

B. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE WAS INADVERTANT RELAY POINT. NORMAL DELIVERY PATH FROM ORIGINATOR TO ADDEE WOULD HAVE BY-PASSED THISTA. ONCE RECEIVED, HOWEVER, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE HAD TO PROTECT FOR RUQNA NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA. THIS WAS THE ONLY ADDEE IN THE ROUTING LINE WHEN RECEIVED THISTA.

C. HANDLED AS ANY OBOE MSG ALONG WITH OTHERS OF EQUAL AND HIGHER PRECEDENCE. DCS RELAY HANDLED 251 FLASH MSGS ON 08 JUN RADAY. OBOE TRAFFIC COUNT SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER, ESTIMATE 1500. EXACT COUNT WOULD REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS EFFORT. TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED IN THIS TORN TAPE RELAY ON 08 JUNE WAS 5718 MSGS.

D. NO PERSONNEL RECOGNITION OR SPECIAL ACTION REQUIRED ON THE PARTICULAR MSG AS IT CARRIED A VALID ROUTING MULTIPLE ADDRESS PROCESSING UNIT (MAPU) AUTOMATICALLY RE-ROUTED MSG BACK TO MAJRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) SEND POSITIONS. MAPU IS A MEMORY CORE DEVICE PROGRAMMED WITH PRE-DETERMINED ROUTING INDICATORS. ALL RUQP TRAFFIC, REGARDLESS OF RECEIVE ORIGIN, WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE AEZ SEND POSITIONS BY THIS DEVICE.

E. DUE TO EXTREMELY HEAVY TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSENT (NOT MISROUTED) MSG WAS EVER CONSIDERED FOR RE-ROUTE ACTION. THISTA HANDLES MANY OBOE MSGS TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA WITHOUT REQUIREMENT TO PASS VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. DIRECT CIRCUITRY CARRIES A DIFFERENT ROUTING THAN DCS COMMON USER CIRCUITRY AND DELIVERY MEANS IS DETERMINED BY THE ORIGINATOR; NOT THE RELAY STATION. RE-ROUTE ACTION DIRECT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA WOULD HAVE ENTAILED CUTTING A NEW PILOT ON THE MSG BY HAND, THEN PASSING TO A COMPLETELY SEPARATE RELAY (NAVCOMMOPNET) AT THISTA FOR DELIVERY VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. CONSIDER NEGATIVE RECOUP OF LOST TIME BY THIS METHOD.

F. TRAFFIC VOLUMES 29 MAY - 2 JUN WERE APPROX THREE-FOURTHS AS HEAVY AS PERIOD 3 - 9 JUN. PRECEDENCES 29 MAY - 2 JUN MUCH LOWER. VERY LITTLE FLASH AND OBOE TRAFFIC PASSED. VOLUMES FEB VERSUS JUNE LESS THAN TWO-THIRDS AS HIGH. NO HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC OF CONSEQUENCE IN FEB.

DIRECT COMPARISON FIGURES CAN BE FURNISHED BUT WILL REQUIRE TIME FOR COMPILATION.

[REDACTED]

G. TOTAL PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE FOR NAVCOMMSTA GREECE IS 299. ON BOARD COUNT IS 292. RM/CYN COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE IS 175. ON BOARD 139. THESE ALLOWANCE FIGURES ARE FOR BOTH RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER SITES. CONTROL/TRAFFIC PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN IN A THREE SECTION WATCH STATUS FOR THE PAST 14 MONTHS.

H. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL CONSIDERED MARGINAL BUT NOTHING LACKING IN ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM. EXAMPLE: 54 RM2 ALLOWED, 27 ON BOARD; 12 RMSN ALLOWED, 25 ON BOARD.

I. AT 081234Z JUN NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INTERCEPTED INITIAL LIBERTY ATTACK REPORT FROM THE USS SARATOGA ON THE CINCUSNAVEUR EO4.04 VOICE HI-COMM NET. THIS WAS PUT IN TTY FORMAT AND RELAYED VIA NAVCOMMOPNET AND XRA BCST AS A NO DTG MSG, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TIME OF FILE 1239Z/8 JUN. SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL REPORT, SARATOGA AND NAVCOMMSTA GREECE PASSED ALL AMPLIFY INFO OBTAINED VIA XRA BCST, HI-COMMNET, AND DIRECT TTY CIRCUITRY. DUE LIBERTY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROM SHIP WAS LIMITED TO VOICE TRANSMISSIONS. AFTER INITIAL ATTACK REPORT THISTA SHIFTED TO BEAMED ANTENNAS SEND/RECEIVE TO IMPROVE SIGNAL QUALITY UNDER EXTREMELY NOISY CKT CONDITIONS. RELIABLE COMM WITH SARATOGA AND LIBERTY WERE MAINTAINED BY THIS ACTION ALTHOUGH CIRCUIT DEGRADATION OCCURED TO OTHER STATIONS ON THE NET. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE ASSUMED RELAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LIBERTY AND COORDINATED SPEED, COURSE, AND ESCORT RDVU INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMSIXTHFLT. COMDESRON 12, ASSIGNED AS ESCORT, TERMINATED FULL PERIOD ORESTES THISTA AT 0030Z/9 JUN AND RDVU AFFECTED 0424Z/ 9 JUN. COMDESRON 12 ASSUMED COMM GUARD FOR LIBERTY AND MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC PASSED AFTER RDVU WAS VIA DIRECT SHIP/SHORE TERMINATION.

2. COMDESRON 12 REMAINS TERMINATED NAVCOMMSTA GREECE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. GP-4

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO CONFIDENTIAL 141628Z JUN 67
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A. AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE JCS 072230Z, JCS 080110Z, AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z ALL JUNE AND FROM WHOM?

B. FOR WHOM WAS NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO ASSIGNED TO PROTECT ON THESE MESSAGES? HOW AND WHEN DID YOU DELIVER THEM?

C. DID YOU RECEIVE THESE MESSAGES FOR DELIVERY TO USS LIBERTY? IF SO, AT WHAT TIME AND FROM WHOM?

D. WHAT WAS THE GENERAL COMMUNICATION LOAD FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA DURING THE WEEK OF 4 JUNE? HOW DOES THIS COMPARE TO AN AVERAGE WEEK OF, SAY, FEB 1967?

E. WHAT IS YOUR WATCH SITUATION? IF ANSWER IS LESS THAN 1 IN 4, HOW LONG HAS IT BEEN AT THIS TEMPO?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

FROM: NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 142255Z JUN 67
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

A. YOUR 141628Z JUN 67

B. MY 131659Z JUN 67

EX. MY 091745Z JUN 67

1. LAW REF A, THE FOLLOWING SUBMITTED:

A. JCS 072230Z INITIALLY RECEIVED FROM SAN PABLO AT 080523Z. RECEIVED AGAIN FROM WASHDC 081959Z. JCS 080110Z RECEIVED FROM WASHDC AT 080430Z. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED FROM COMSIXTHFLT AT TPZ.

B. JCS 072230Z: NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMSIXTHFLT ON INITIAL RECEIPT AND SENT TO COMSIXTHFLT VIA DIRECT CIRCUIT AT 080724Z. SECOND RECEIPT, MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIBERTY AND CTF 67. SENT TO SAN PABLO FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO ASMARA AT 082012Z FOR LIBERTY, AND TO NAPLES FOR DELIVERY TO CTF 67 AT 082135Z. JCS 080110 MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMSIXTHFLT. SENT TO COMSIXTHFLT VIA DIRECT CIRCUIT AT 080639Z. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z: MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR USS LIBERTY. SENT TO SAN PABLO FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO ASMARA 081100Z.

C. JCS 072230Z: AS NOTED ABOVE SECOND RECEIPT WAS FOR LIBERTY AT 081959Z FROM WASHDC. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED 081050Z FROM COMSIXTHFLT.

[REDACTED]

D. DURING PERIOD 4-10 JUNE HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TOTALS MOUNTED RAPIDLY WITH PEAK OCCURRING 8 JUNE. DUE TO IMPOSITION OF MINIMIZE BY USCINCEUR ON 5 JUNE THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC WHICH PARTIALLY COMPENSATED. AS NOTED IN REFERENCE B, FLEET RELAY TRAFFIC WAS ALMOST THREE TIMES THAT OF AN EQUAL PERIOD IN FEBRUARY 67.

E. COMMENCED ONE IN THREE WATCHES ON 5 JUNE IN ANTICIPATION INCREASED COMM LOAD.

F. REF C REFERS ALSO. GP-4

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO USASTRATCOMFAC ASMARA CONFIDENTIAL 141627Z JUN 67
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. ON BEHALF OF AND TO ASSIST NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION PLEASE FURNISH ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. AT WHAT TIME WAS COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN RECEIVED AT YOUR STATION FOR RELAY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA? AND FROM WHOM?

B. WAS YOUR STATION HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUNE 67? IF SO, STATE ROUGHLY THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER A ROUTINE DAY.

C. AT WHAT TIME DID YOUR STATION RELAY COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67 TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE IT BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RELAY IT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA?

2. REQUEST REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. COMMENTS IN ADDITION TO ABOVE QUESTIONS INVITED. GP-4

FROM: CO USASTRATCOM FAC ASMARA ETHIOPIA TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 150520Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

REF: CINCUSNAVEUR MSG 141627Z JUN 67 (PASEP)

1. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 080917Z JUN 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THIS STATION FOR RELAY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081200Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR RELAY STATION SEVILLE SPAIN.

2. THIS STATION WAS HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUN 67. THE FOLLOWING IS THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC RATE

FOR A ROUTINE DAY AND 8 JUN 67:

	ROUTINE DAY (4 MAY 67)		8 JUNE 67		
	NR OF MSGs	PCT OF DISTR	NR OF MSGs	PCT OF DISTR	PCT OF INCREAS
FLASH	0	0	198	2.5	INDETERMINATE
IMMEDIATE	649	12.7	2388	30.2	268
PRIORITY	1778	34.8	3860	49.0	117
ROUTINE	2682	52.5	1447	18.3	-85
TOTAL	5109		7893		54

3. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 080917Z JUN 67 WAS RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 081215Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 081503Z JUN 67 AND RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081510Z JUN 67. GP-4

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA CONFIDENTIAL 141626Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. AT WHAT TIME WERE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES RECEIVED AT YOUR STATION FOR PLACING ON THE NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA BCST BEING GUARDED BY USS LIBERTY:

- (1) JCS 072230Z JUN 67?
- (2) JCS 080110Z JUN 67?
- (3) COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67?

B. FROM WHAT RELAY STATION DID YOU RECEIVE THE MESSAGES IN QUESTION AND AT WHAT TIME?

C. WHAT WERE YOUR "IN-HOUSE" HANDLING TIMES FOR THE ABOVE MESSAGES?

D. ACCORDING TO YOUR INFO, AT WHAT TIME DID USS LIBERTY SHIFT TO THE ASMARA FLEET BROADCAST (JRTT)?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

FROM: NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 141956Z JUN 67
USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS

A. YOUR 141626Z JUNE 67

1. IAW REF A FOLL DATA IS SUBMITTED

A. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 082125Z JUN 67

B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 CANNOT LOCATE ANY RECORD WHICH WOULD TEND TO INDICATE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO DATE. HAVE INSPECTED FILED PAGE COPIES AND TAPE REELS OF ALL CIRCUITS TERMINATING THISTA FROM

080000Z TO DATE WITHOUT SUCCESS.

- C. COMSIXTHFLT 100917Z JUN 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 081510Z.
2. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 WERE RECEIVED FROM THE MAJOR DCS RELAY STATION ASMARS (U.S. ARMY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, ASMARA) AT THE TIMES LISTED PARAS 1A AND C ABOVE.
3. IN HOUSE HANDLING TIMES WERE:
- A. JCS 072230Z JUN 67 -- 10 MINUTES
- B. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67 -- 15 MINUTES
4. USS LIBERTY SHIFTED TO JRRT AT 070001Z JUNE 67.

GP-4

BT

Q. Captain, will you now give your conclusions drawn from the answers received from your queries?

A. Yes sir, the queries have confirmed information already available that the LIBERTY did not receive JCS 080110Z; that JCS 072230Z, being a priority message in competition with all the FLASH and OP IMMEDIATE messages, did not get on the Asmara Broadcast until too late; that COMSIXTHFLT's 080917Z also did not get on the Asmara Broadcast until too late. I conclude also that there was a tremendous surge of high precedence traffic injected into the communication system. For example, on 8 June alone NAVCOMMSTA Greece handled 250 Flash messages, about 1500 operational immediate messages, and a total of 10,499 of all types of messages. Although the communication system was heavily loaded, it did not breakdown and undoubtedly we had reader saturation rather than communications saturation. My final conclusion is that the queries confirm previous information as regards personnel in that the communication system continues to be short in both manning level and experience level.

CAPT RAISH: Gentlemen, in addition to the foregoing, I have here additional information that was assembled at the request of the JCS Fact finding group headed by MGEN Russ. This information is in the form of compilations of messages handled by NAVCOMMSTA Greece, NAVCOMMSTA Morocco, NAVCOMMSTA Asmara, NAVCOMMUNIT London. This information was compiled for the first 12 days of June for comparison purposes. We have compiled similar information for a similar period, namely 1-12 Feb. This is to give you an illustration of the burden on the system during this critical time as compared to normal operations, for example for the first 12 days in February NAVCOMMSTA Greece handled 69,122 messages, for the first 12 days in June NAVCOMMSTA Greece handled 1,190 flash messages. Gentlemen, the same comparison is made on all the stations and the objectives is to demonstrate to you the strain on the system at this time. I shall now read these into the record.

DECLASSIFIED

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MEMORANDUM FOR RADM KIDD DATED 16 JUNE 1967 FROM CAPT L. R. RAISH, USN,
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMMUNICATIONS.

1. ENCLOSED ARE COMMUNICATIONS MESSAGE HANDLING FIGURES FOR SELECTED
NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN AREA DURING THE PERIOD 1 JUNE-
12 JUNE 1967. FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES A COMPILATION HAS BEEN MADE FOR A
SIMILAR PERIOD IN FEBRUARY 1967.

2. THE ATTACHED INFORMATION WAS ASSEMBLED AT THE REQUEST OF THE JCS FACT
FINDING GROUP HEADED BY MEEN RUSS. IT IS FORWARDED TO YOU AS A MATTER
OF INTEREST.

Very respectfully,

/s/ L. R. RAISH

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

COMMUNICATIONS

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION GREECE

I. MESSAGE HANDLED

1 FEB	5,901	1 JUN	10,178
2 FEB	6,775	2 JUN	10,702
3 FEB	6,240	3 JUN	10,119
4 FEB	5,506	4 JUN	8,113
5 FEB	3,892	5 JUN	8,414

6 FEB 5,160
 7 FEB 5,941
 8 FEB 6,6521
 9 FEB 6,539
 10 FEB 6,935
 11 FEB 5,293
 12 FEB 4,419
 TOTAL 69,122

6 JUN 9,906
 7 JUN 9,750
 8 JUN 10,074
 9 JUN 9,959
 10 JUN 10,499
 11 JUN 8,073
 12 JUN 7,835
 TOTAL 113,622

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 96
 6 JUN 206
 7 JUN 114
 8 JUN 251
 9 JUN 182
 10 JUN 341
 TOTAL 1,190

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 134
 6 JUN 218
 7 JUN 162
 8 JUN 181
 9 JUN 181
 10 JUN 179
 TOTAL 1,055

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION MOROCCO

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1 FEB 7,596	1 JUN 11,317
2 FEB 7,663	2 JUN 10,871
3 FEB 8,083	3 JUN 9,991
4 FEB 7,870	4 JUN 8,049
5 FEB 6,283	5 JUN 8,794

6 FEB 6,943
7 FEB 7,361
8 FEB 8,153
9 FEB 8,058
10 FEB 8,355
11 FEB 7,393
12 FEB 5,205

TOTAL 87,963

6 JUN 9,636
7 JUN 9,512
8 JUN 11,195
9 JUN 9,878
10 JUN 9,192
11 JUN 7,722
12 JUN 8,771

TOTAL 114,928

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 23
6 JUN 16
7 JUN 25
8 JUN 124
9 JUN 12
10 JUN 3

TOTAL 203

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 109
6 JUN 107
7 JUN 133
8 JUN 258
9 JUN 52
10 JUN 90

TOTAL 749

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION SPAIN

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1 FEB 6,873
2 FEB 7,182
3 FEB 7,639
4 FEB 6,645
5 FEB 4,467
6 FEB 5,906
7 FEB 6,620

1 JUN 9,023
2 JUN 9,418
3 JUN 8,184
4 JUN 5,990
5 JUN 7,224
6 JUN 7,073
7 JUN 7,191

8 FEB 7,351

9 FEB 7,796

10 FEB 7,716

11 FEB 6,909

12 FEB 4,999

TOTAL 80,103

8 JUN 8,409

9 JUN 7,342

10 JUN 6,768

11 JUN 5,885

12 JUN 6,561

TOTAL 89,068

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 37

6 JUN 29

7 JUN 31

8 JUN 95

9 JUN 13

10 JUN 18

TOTAL 223

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 163

6 JUN 155

7 JUN 119

8 JUN 89

9 JUN 773

10 JUN 93

TOTAL 692

NAVAL COMMUNICATION UNIT LONDON

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1 FEB 968

2 FEB 927

3 FEB 969

4 FEB 872

5 FEB 846

6 FEB 842

7 FEB 695

8 FEB 704

1 JUN 1,538

2 JUN 1,705

3 JUN 1,278

4 JUN 909

5 JUN 1,406

6 JUN 1,717

7 JUN 1,648

8 JUN 1,775

9 FEB 818
10 FEB 858
11 FEB 914
12 FEB 954
TOTAL 10,367

9 JUN 1,589
10 JUN 1,382
11 JUN 1,030
12 JUN 1,268
17,245

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 2
6 JUN 2
7 JUN 20
8 JUN 17
9 JUN 8
10 JUN 28
TOTAL 77

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN 153
6 JUN 148
7 JUN 176
8 JUN 292
9 JUN 201
10 JUN 244
TOTAL 1,214

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION ASMARA

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1 FEB 1,019
2 FEB 1,233
3 FEB 1,229
4 FEB 1,054
5 FEB 974
6 FEB 828
7 FEB 1,039
8 FEB 1,094
9 FEB 955

1 JUN 1,568
2 JUN 1,891
3 JUN 1,696
4 JUN 1,652
5 JUN 1,570
6 JUN 1,575
7 JUN 1,579
8 JUN 2,228
9 JUN 1,837

10 FEB	880	10 JUN	1,430
11 FEB	772	11 JUN	1,394
12 FEB	<u>925</u>	12 JUN	<u>1,275</u>
TOTAL	12,002	TOTAL	19,695

Captain RAISH was asked the following questions from court members:

Q. What is the significance relative to the Naval communications system's capability of this increased volume of message traffic?

A. This reflects in my opinion the manner in which the Navy personnel rise to the occasion when called upon because this tremendous traffic load was handled by the same personnel without augmentation. The gratifying thing is that under this surge of traffic, I am not prepared to say how much of a surge we could have taken before the system had become saturated; however, considering the circumstances, the communication system was clearly responsible to the operational requirements of the time.

CAPT RAIS: Gentlemen, to assist you in evaluating all these high precedences from ACP 121, an official Defense Department publication, is available.

COUNSEL TO THE BOARD: This will be marked exhibit 46 and received into evidence as exhibit 46. Captain Raish, I will not ask you to read exhibit 46 as it will be appended to the record.

CAPT RAISH: I would like to call your attention to one point to illustrate what I mean by definit flash. Flash is reserved for initial enemy contact messages of extreme urgency, brevity is mandatory.

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[REDACTED]

If one station handles 251 flash messages in one day it is obvious that the use of precedences is being abused. I call this subject to your attention because it was not unusual for high precedence messages to be of a very lengthy character going back to the queries and answers a conclusion can be drawn that is confirmed that the experience level and the manning level is low in the NAVCOMMSTAs probably academic throughout the services and must be taken into account when a crisis developes.

Questions from Capt Lauff:

Q. Of the total traffic load indicated of Radio Asmara during the period 4 to 9 June approximately how many of those messages had to be introduced on to the JIATT circuit which provided the principle means of communications with the USS LIBERTY?

A. The JIATT broadcast was relatively light during this time and had no more than 500 messages that is 300 to 500 total first run traffic daily during that period.

Q. Even though the load on the broadcast Asmara was light this does not mean in itself that a priority message would get on that broadcast in a priority fashion. Such a message would first have to compete with all the flash and op immediate traffic and priorities ahead of it in the system before it gets to Asmara.

Captain Raish was warned not to discuss his testimony and excused.

CDR C.G. JORGENSEN? USN? Staff CINCUSNAVEUR was called as a witness, was sworn in and advised of his rights pursuant to Article 31, UCMJ and testified as follows:

Q. What is your duty on CINCUSNAVEUR Staff?

A. I am a Command Center Duty Officer, sir.

Q. Directing your attention to 8 June 1967 at or about 2330 through 0800, where you at this time?

A. I was the Command Center Duty Officer.

Q. In the capacity of Command Center Duty Officer were you advised of any incident involving the USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I ask you now if you have a chronological incident report of the

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watch that you stood on that day?

A. I have a chronological run down of incident to the LIBERTY.

Q. Request the reporter mark this exhibit 47 and I introduce it into evidence as exhibit 47. CDR will you now read exhibit 47.

A. MEMORANDUM From: Contingency Watch Team, To: CINCUSNAVEUR, VIA: Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 12 June 1967/N62 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JCS 080110Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander G.D. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant E.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

<u>TIMES</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
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072350Z	Major BREELOVE, JRC WASHDC, called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VCOM and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major BREELOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTHFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major BREELOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later.
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LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE.

The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTHFLT.

080001Z	LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTHFLT.
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TIMES

EVENTS

080010Z

CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major BREELOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTHFLT.

CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group of a message and had by-passed USCINCEUR. He wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JRC and get us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further stated that we were to release our message to COMSIXTHFLT if we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.

080030Z

The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.

080325Z

The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS LIBERTY. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCUSNAVEUR had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR.

LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group 080110Z. As he was relaying this information the Duty Yeoman handed the JCS 080110Z message, which had just been received, to CDR JORGENSEN.

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<u>TIMES</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
080325Z (cont'd)	The Command Center Duty Officer then had communications set up a Telecon to COMSIXTHFLT so that he could talk to COMSIXTHFLT's staff duty officer.
080355Z	Considerable delay was caused by atmospheric difficulties. After being unable to establish a Telecon circuit CDR JORGENSEN had the radio operator contact COMSIXTHFLT by SSB and request a Telecon with the Staff Duty Officer as soon as possible.
080410Z	Two way Telecon was established, with COMSIXTHFLT still having difficulty receiving CINCUSNAVEUR. CDR SLUSSER, COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, informed CDR JORGENSEN they did not hold JCS 080110Z. CDR JORGENSEN passed it to him three times before receiving an acknowledgement at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a wirenote "FROM CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER BE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS." CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCUSNAVEUR did not hold JCS 072230Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCEUR for it.
080507Z	CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR FORAC message was 080455Z.
080515Z	After talking to LCOL RUSSELL at USCINCEUR, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCEUR FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL GUIDE LINES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OP AREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. HAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."

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TIMES

EVENTS

080521Z Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate every action the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as possible.

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of all logs kept by each individual watch team member and constitutes the events as they took place. Signed: CAPT R.D. STEELE, USN CDR G.D. JORGENSEN, USN

LT E.L. GALAVOTTI, USN

The witness was duly warned and, withdrawn.

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Gentlemen: The JAG Manual provides that the responsibility of Counsel for the Court is to exploit all practicable sources of information and to bring out all facts in an impartial manner without regard to the favorable or unfavorable effect on persons concerned.

I believe that the record of proceedings of this Court of Inquiry will reflect that all facts and information which are available concerning the unprovoked attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967, have been brought to your attention.

The only remaining responsibility which I have, while this Court is in session, is to give summation of the evidence introduced observing the caveat that the summation must be an impartial argument and not amount to partisan advocacy.

Even though I intend to temper my remarks within the periphery limits of such a guide line, I must confess however, that after living intimately with the facts of this case for the past week, I have become more and more appalled that such a tragedy should have ever occurred. Therefore, I shall attempt to synopsize those salient facts which have influenced my judgement in this summation.

You have heard testimony and viewed incontrovertible documentary evidence which established the following factual setting:

USS LIBERTY, pictured, defined and described in James Fighting Ships as an unarmed U.S. Navy technical research ship, deployed to the Mediterranean pursuant to official orders and, on 8 June 1967, was on station in accordance with such orders. However, the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY, had not been appraised that LIBERTY's orders had been modified, apparently because of the Middle East War so, instead of the previously assigned area of operation being in international waters contiguous to the coast of the United Arab Republic, the modification provided for removal to an area of operation 100 miles from the coast. The evidence clearly reflects that any dereliction for USS LIBERTY not having knowledge of the modification in orders is not attributable to LIBERTY. Nor is there any evidence of probative value establishing culpability in non-receipt.

Accordingly, no matter what conclusions are reached as to the cause of the incident, the horrendous impact of the effect should disturb even the most impassioned.

I will not depict again the awesome combined firepower of the aircraft and torpedo boats which was brought to bear on this helpless vessel resulting in inordinate injuries and loss of life to her personnel.

In conclusion, I respectfully submit that USS LIBERTY wrote another chapter in the great heritage of Navy gallantry and that her personnel, from Commanding Officer to the most junior seaman, deserve the highest accolades and acknowledgement it is possible to bestow for their valor and acts of courage.

No further witnesses were called and the President closed the Court at 1645, 16 June 1967 in order to deliberate and prepare findings of fact.

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PROCEEDINGS

The Court of Inquiry experienced no unusual difficulties incident to conducting the subject proceedings except for the necessity of investigating such a major naval disaster of international significance in an extremely abbreviated time frame. However, because of the high degree of cooperation and assistance rendered by USS LIBERTY personnel in conjunction with the outstanding performance of duty evinced by clerical personnel assigned to the court, it was possible to complete the preparation of the record of proceedings in the allotted period of time. In regard to the aforementioned exemplary performance by clerical personnel, special recognition is given to Jeeray SPENCER, YNC, CINCUSNAVEUR Staff and Robert W. JOHNSON, YN2, COMFAIRMED Staff.

The following FINDINGS are enumerated as a recitation of those facts established by the evidence of record; however, in those areas of interest wherein the Court could not affirmatively establish a fact per se, an ostensible supportable inference was stated.

The Court, after inquiring into all the facts and circumstances connected with the incident which occasioned the inquiry, and having considered the evidence, finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity.
2. The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have made the American Flag difficult to identify.
3. The ship's westerly heading at the time of attack - in the general direction of Egyptian ports may have reinforced elements of doubt in the minds of the several Israeli pilots who looked the ship over in the forenoon.
4. The colors were shot down early in the action and were replaced prior to the PT attack.
5. The immediate confused milling around astern followed by peaceful

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- overtures by the attacking surface forces after launching only two torpedos of the six presumed available (two on each PT boat), indicate these craft may well have identified the colors for the first time when they got in close enough to see clearly through the smoke and flames billowing, at times above the mast head.
6. There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U. S. Ship.
7. LIBERTY's position at the time of the attack has been previously ordered changed farther to seaward by JCS; however, the messages relating to these changes were not known to the ship before the attack took place. The reasons these messages were not known to the ship can be determined in all instances except for one. Since LIBERTY records and knowledgeable personnel were lost in the action, it is impossible to determine the disposition of the message.
8. The communication delays and mis-routing errors which caused these several non-deliveries combined with delays in initiating follow-up actions on operational instructions received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware of plans and decisions made for her repositioning. A detailed accounting of the five pertinent messages are attached as appendices one through five.
9. The absence of any identifiable threat to the ship apparently caused the foregoing referred to operational actions to be taken and implemented in routine manner, i.e., without resorting to highest precedence (Flash) traffic.
10. USS LIBERTY WAS Assigned technical research tasks to be performed in the eastern Mediterranean by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. LIBERTY first became aware of this new tasking when she received sailing orders from Abidjan on the Ivory Coast on the 24th day of May 1967. The precise tasking by which LIBERTY was ordered to depart Abidjan is significant. In this tasking language, LIBERTY was directed to proceed to her new operating area in the eastern Mediterranean via Rota for pick-up of specifics at "best speed."

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11. LIBERTY received her basic operational and mission guidance from the JCS through her new operational chain in JCS 011545Z. LIBERTY proceeded to comply.

12. The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY conducted the operations of his ship in accordance with the intent of directives received by him. The operating area of LIBERTY on 8 June was in accordance with the announcements of intended movement promulgated by the Commanding Officer USS LIBERTY. Such operating areas were normal to the accomplishment of LIBERTY's mission. These announcements were addressed to, and presumably received, by all seniors in the chain of LIBERTY's operational command. LIBERTY received no directive, prior to the attack, that higher authority desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles from the coastline of the UAR.

13. LIBERTY responded to her newly assigned mission by departing Abidjan promptly within some four hours from the time of receipt of her sailing orders. LIBERTY experienced minor engineering difficulties enroute Rota which caused her arrival there somewhat later than originally planned. On departure Rota, LIBERTY filed her movement report and declared therein her intention to make best speed in compliance with the JCS detailed tasking assignments set forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967. It is significant to note that in this JCS tasking, two time frames were identified, one covering the period between 1 June through 8 June, the second covering the period 9 June to 30 June. During the first period (1 through 8 June), LIBERTY's movements were prescribed by the JCS to cover her transit along the north African littoral; and therein were prescribed minimum closest points of approach allowed to national maritime boundaries. The terminal point in this 1 through 8 June time frame was to be a navigational position at latitude 32 North, longitude 33 East. The second time frame addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assigned LIBERTY an operating area bounded on the North by latitude 32 North, the north African/Israeli littoral on the south and between longitudes 33 East and 34 East. It might well occur to some that LIBERTY's attack occurred on 8 June, which would have placed her considerably farther to the North of the African coast, had she conformed explicitly with the aforementioned JCS directive. However, as LIBERTY proceeded eastward through the Mediterranean from Rota, she filed three separate message

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reports of position and intent which advised superiors of her plans to anticipate arrival on station - that is, to arrive somewhat earlier than prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, LIBERTY advised superiors of her specific intentions to proceed to and operate in the closer of the two areas to the north African coast - that is south of latitude 32 north. Finally in this regard, LIBERTY reported her arrival at her final destination to appropriate addressees.

14. It is understood from representatives of the JCS Fact Finding Group that it was receipt of LIBERTY's 7 June SITREP/POSIT report which stated her final destination which prompted concern in the JRC as to her proximity to the African coast on the night of June the 7th. This concern by responsible authorities, who initially has tasked LIBERTY, resulted in follow-on actions and directives to the ship which were either never received or were transmitted on the fleet broadcast from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara after the attack has taken place.

15. Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of communication conditions regarding USS LIBERTY during the period 1 and 8 June. The ship is known not to have received at least five messages sent prior to the attack, each of which was not only important but, in that respect, critical to ^{the events} which terminated in the aggravated attack on this ship on June the 8th.

16. Higher authority modified LIBERTY's original operational guidance between June first and the attack on the eighth, which, if she had received it, would have resulted in her being further off-shore.

17. Combination and compounding of many delayed communication deliveries related to LIBERTY incident denied the ship the benefit of command decisions actually made prior to the attack which, among other things, would have caused the ship, as a minimum, to be heading further off-shore from her 081200Z actual position.

18. Pre-attack overflights of LIBERTY:

(First air attack occurred at 1403 local)

Unidentified aircraft circled LIBERTY at::

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0850 (5 hours 13 minutes prior to attack) (080742Z refers)

1056 (3 hours 7 minutes prior to attack)

1126 (2 hours 37 minutes prior to attack) 081022Z refers

Hull markings were clean and freshly painted - ensign was flying from a foremast halyard.

19. Aircraft attack on LIBERTY.

Attack initiated by single aircraft, making a run similar to previous overflights. First warning that this aircraft had attacked ship was a rocket explosion abaft the bridge, port side. In five of six attacks, from various angles, two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks.

20. Motor Torpedo Boat attack on LIBERTY.

Twenty minutes following air attack, MTB's closed ship to a position 2000 yards on starboard quarter and signalled ship by flashing light. At this time ship had been making turns for FLANK speed for 9 minutes (Estimated SOA 15-17 knots). Holiday ensign was flying from the starboard yardarm for at least five minutes before torpedo attack was launched. LIBERTY 50 cal. guns opened fire while the MTB was signalling. The torpedo attack was launched shortly after the MTBs were fired upon, and MTBs strafed the ship with machine gun fire as, at least, one MTB passed down the starboard side.

24. Offers of assistance.

Post air attack signalling by MTBs (before torpedo attack), may have been an offer of assistance.

Thirty minutes after attacking LIBERTY the MTBs signalled in English, "Do you need help?"

Two hours and 10 minutes after torpedo attack (2 hours 40 minutes after air attack) an Israeli helicopter apparently offered assistance.

Israeli defense forces reported they conducted air and surface searches for survivors at the scene of the attack responding to a U. S. request.

22. Groups of up to two and three jet and propeller aircraft began coming

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out from shore and circling ship at altitudes ranging from 500 up to several thousand feet at about eight hundred local on day of attack. Planes in question were otherwise active over El Arish on Sinai north coast which was plainly visible from the ship some sixteen miles off shore.

Ship's navigation was sound and practical, using bearings on minaret in El Arish and radar range to beach at that point.

23. The ship had exercises at full G. Q. and secured only a short time prior to the unprovoked attack. After securing from G. Q., the Commanding Officer had admonished all hands over the PA system that large billowing clouds of black smoke ashore were evidence of intense military activity, therefore, crew should be "heads up ball players" as long as she was in that close.

24. From the time of first air attack onward, attackers were well coordinated, accurate and determined. Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams, and quarters effectively chewed up entire topside including ship control and internal communications (sound powered) network. Well directed initial air attacks had wiped out the ability of the four 50 cal. machine guns to be effective.

25. PT attack first developed from starboard side and was identified as a high speed run in. Center and lead PT began flashing signal light and very shortly thereafter the Commanding Officer identified the Star of David flag on this lead boat. LIBERTY's signal light had been shot away requiring dependence upon an Aldis lamp to try and penetrate the smoke on the bearing of the PTs.

26. The Commanding Officer had passed word to stand by for torpedo attack and the forward starboard 50 cal. fired a very short burst in the direction of the boats on the gunner's own initiative. Having seen Israeli flag on the PT, the Commanding Officer waved to the forward gunner to cease firing. The after starboard gun, opened up at this point, with apparently no one pulling the trigger. The bridge could not see this gun for smoke and flame on the starboard side, so the Commanding Officer sent a runner to tell him cease fire. Before this runner could reach the after starboard

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gun, effective high volume fire from this gun was peppering the water around the middle PT. It appears as though 50 cal. ammunition was cooking off from intense fire. The gun was seen to be firing with no one manning it.

27. The reaction of all three PTs immediately after launch, when they stepped and milled around close aboard LIBERTY and then offered help by signal light, combine to indicate this was the first time the U. S. large ceters flying were actually positively identified. Not having signal lights available, the Commanding Officer then made the international flaghoist meaning, "Not Under Command."

28. Flat, calm conditions and the slow five knot patrol speed of LIBERTY in fereneen when she was being looked over initially may well have produced insufficient wind for steaming ceters enough to be seen by pilots.

29. USS LIBERTY had installed communications equipment whose reliability and degree of sophistication produced a feeling of maximum confidence in operators, the Communications Officer, and the Commanding Officer regarding the reliability of reception on fleet broadcasts which minimized the number of missed numbers.

30. In amplification of the proceeding statement, the superior communication capability inherent in LIBERTY's embarked element for technical research purposes combined with interests of economy in personnel have dictated that during LIBERTY's operation in her present configuration she used the best embarked equipments and personnel available to serve both her technical research requirements as well as operational and administrative requirements for the ship itself. The resulting consolidation of functions found LIBERTY organized internally in a way such that, in the person of a single officer we find both LIBERTY's Communication Officer and the Assistant Director of Technical Research. This system had worked well. After the attack, those LIBERTY personnel left alive who had been serving in combined capacities of this sort reported their conviction that such practices should continue.

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31. The aforementioned facts relative to communication procedural peculiarities unique to ships of LIBERTY's mission resulted in the ship transmitting under the scheduling control of the research department. This practice permitted optimum performance by the research department, scheduling outgoing transmissions during lull periods of research activities; furthermore, when available research lull periods were short, the practice had grown up, quite naturally, to combine into single transmission packages all of the outgoing traffic which had accumulated. Such procedures necessitated transmission of each ships communication package under a classification applicable to the highest classification of any single element within the package itself. Such transmission packages would frequently contain research material, ship position reports, and, periodically, requests for messages missed on the regular ship broadcast schedule. A built-in delay factor exists in this procedure however, inasmuch as not all shore-based terminals are equipped to accommodate research material. In the case of LIBERTY during the time period under consideration, the closest available eligible terminal for LIBERTY research material was NAVSECGRUDET Morocco, rather than NAVCOMMSTA Asmara, which happened to be serving LIBERTY as a subscriber at the time of the attack. The above conditions are detailed to point up occurrence of delays which must be anticipated in any such system. In summary, if LIBERTY had a normal outgoing message requesting missing sked numbers, it would first have to wait, under normal circumstances, for transmission during a lull period. It would next, by virtue of leaving the ship as part of a package containing research data, go to NAVSECGRUDET Morocco where the combined communication package would be broken down in its component parts; thirdly, the element of the package requesting retransmission of missed fleet broadcast numbers would then have to be sent from NAVCOMMSTA Morocco back to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara for action, Asmara being the transmitting station serving LIBERTY at the time.

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32. Detailed questioning of available surviving communication witnesses disclosed that LIBERTY had never before found missing messages, subsequently requested and received, to have been critical to the ship's operational commitments.

This fact was explained by ship's personnel as being due to the very few messages ever missed. This condition was attributed to superior equipment in the ship coupled with the fact that the ship operated independently as a regular practice and had not found herself wanting at any time previous.

33. It is important to be aware at this point that there are no logs and or records available in LIBERTY. There are no communication officers left alive with first hand knowledge of the missed message backlog on 8 June. It could only be determined from testimony that the ship had been copying transmissions from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara with no apparent difficulty from 070001Z and the time of the attack. One witness who was on watch on the Asmara broadcast between the hours of 0645 and 1615 on 7 June stated that he had logged no missed message numbers during the period of his watch and that the reception of the JRAIT broadcast was excellent.

34. LIBERTY's technical mission was one that made it necessary, in exercising the aforementioned close cooperation, to use minimum electronic transmissions and radiations on certain frequencies - radio transmissions particularly. LIBERTY was continually subjected to and used to the prejudicial effects such transmissions would have on the degree of efficiency of her primary functions. In summary on this point, ships of LIBERTY's configuration, like submarines, are members a "silent service" all their own.

35. It is found that it has been, and continues standard practice, in ships of this type to cultivate great patience with regards to desires to get electrical traffic off the ship because of the prejudicial effect on the ship's mission.

36. It is evident that communications procedures for ships of this type would be improved were they to be considered in a communication category analogous to submarines.

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37. On the matter of operational control of LIBERTY vis a vis the precise directives to the ship governing the application of her embarked capabilities, it is important to understand LIBERTY's situation as a mobile platform, under naval command, transporting capabilities belonging to a service or agency other than the Navy. This condition and situation, while not unique to naval platforms, requires a complete awareness and understanding of the very close coordination and cooperation between those responsible for operation of and positioning of the platform itself in relation to those responsible for the embarked capabilities. Detailed testimony discloses that LIBERTY found absolutely no difficulties accommodating to this condition, unique within the navy to ships of this particular type.
38. The on-line crypto capability has engendered a dangerous willingness to send more classified traffic than in days of manual decoding without required proportionate increase in experienced supervisory personnel to ride herd on traffic quantum increases. Conversely, we find often very inexperienced personnel being the first to give attention to misrouted messages such as those in question.
39. Key messages critical to international relations were not in this case, paralleled on other circuits.
40. High precedence of operational messages is too often not enough to overcome circuit choking resulting from large volume of such as FBIS of the same precedence competing for inexperienced operator attention at the same time.
41. LIBERTY's embarked "warning" capabilities apparently gave no indication of impending danger during the period prior to the attack.
42. LIBERTY had experienced periodic reconnaissance on this and other operating stations which tended to create a feeling of "acceptance without undue concern" conditions as they were on 8 June 1967.
- Reconnaissance experiences known to LIBERTY and other ships of LIBERTY's class in other parts of the world minimized concern by LIBERTY personnel

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over recon efforts on 8 June.

43. Commanding Officer LIBERTY appropriately reported recon early on A.M. of 8 June through her "locating two". This report was transmitted promptly by ship despite temporary interruption of her mission, at the direction of the Commanding Officer.

44. Up to the time of the attack, testimony disclosed no reasons to abort LIBERTY's mission in accordance with paragraph 1A of Appendix B to SM 676-66 of 19 August 1966.

45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the air and surface attacks *combined* first to wipe out defense and shipboard ^{control} capabilities, followed by the crippling blow of a torpedo.

46. The Israeli aircraft rockets penetrated topside steel easily, leaving roughly five inch holes, with innumerable shrapnel pock marks on the inside of spaces penetrated.

47. The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer, officers and men of the LIBERTY was exceptional. The Commanding Officer is being recommended for the Congressional Medal, and the ship for an appropriate unit citation. These planned actions are fully supported by testimony to the Court.

48. LIBERTY apparently experienced a phenomenon identified as electronic jamming of her voice radio just prior to and during air attacks. This jamming was described as a steady carrier without modulation.

49. Disparities in reported times relating to sequence of events can well be attributed to the number of ship's clocks on board hanging askew and often stopped from shock at various times. It was necessary to reconstruct time sequences because QM notebook was incomplete from 1355 to 1446 since the QM was killed during the first attack.

50. Extent of Damage. The major material damage to LIBERTY resulted from the torpedo explosion, as follows:

A. SHELL DAMAGE: Hole centered at FR 60 and extending 24 ft downward from just below second deck and longitudinally from fram 53

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to frame 66 (39 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape, larger at bottom.

B. Interior structural damage: Outboard 15 feet of first platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck (tank top). Second deck and frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending inboard 15 feet.

C. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck frame 52 to 78, entire width of ship.

In summary of above, the two research compartments, which extend the entire width of the ship, suffered severe structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and fittings were reduced to twisted wreckage.

Topside damage resulting from aircraft strafing and rocket attacks and from MIB strafing (ship was hit by more than 821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary) summarized as follows:

Pilot house and signal bridge forward deck house, all gun tubes, many antennas including radar antenna, numerous bulkheads and decks holed by explosive rockets. Whale boat destroyed in davits by incendiary rockets and many life rafts holed or burned in their stowages. Flag bags burned and numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions.


The gyro compass, air conditioning plant and many minor items of equipment, located in superstructure spaces, were damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personnel effects damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during firefighting.

Cost estimated - Value of destroyed research equipment \$6-8 million, 12 months lead time. Structural repairs to ship and ship's equipment \$2-4 million, 3-4 months.

51. The Israel government set forth 7 points of rationale to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY in USDAO Tel Aviv message DTG 091520Z. Legal opinion and other comments on each is appended hereto (Appendix VI).

~~TOP SECRET~~

52. That any killed or wounded personnel attached to the USS LIBERTY during the attack are eligible for the Purple Heart under the provisions of SECNAVINST. P1650.1C Chapter TWO SECTION THREE ARTICLE 231 PARA 12 b. sub-paras (4) and (5). The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY is preparing a listing of eligible personnel to be recommended.




Isaac C. KIDD, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President




Bernard J. LAUFF
Captain, U.S. Navy
Member



Bert N. ATKINSON, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy
Member



Isaac C. KIDD, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President



Ward BOSTON, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy
Counsel for the Court

~~TOP SECRET~~

That at 062349Z June 67 COMSIXTHFLT in part directed that LIBERTY would:

- A. Maintain a high state of vigilance against attack in view of the Arab/Israeli situation.
- B. Report by Flash precedence any threatening or suspicious action directed against LIBERTY.
- C. Advise if local situation dictates change in area of operations assigned by JCS 011545Z June 67.
- D. Report contact with ships, aircraft, and submarines which are unidentified, hostile or engaged in harassment.
- E. Copy the KRATT fleet BCST.

This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

- A. Received at Naval Communications Station Morocco from COMSIXTHFLT at 070115Z.
- B. Naval Communications Morocco entered the msg into the DCS for delivery to NCS Asmara at 070131Z.
- C. DCS Seville (San Pablo) transmitted to DCS Asmara at 070300Z. DCS Asmara claimed message was received from DCS Seville (San Pablo) at 070550Z (2 hours and 50 minutes time difference is unexplained).
- D. DCS (STRATCOM) Asmara relayed to Naval Communications Station Asmara at 070525Z.
- E. Naval Communications Station Asmara transmitted message on JRATT as JR NR 2077 at 070529Z.
- F. COMIDEASTFOR reports message was received at approximately 070531Z as JR NR 2077.
- G. LIBERTY personnel do not recall receiving message.

APPENDIX I
TO LIBERTY COURT
OF INQUIRY
DECLASSIFIED

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~~TOP SECRET~~

That at 072230Z JUN 67 JCS directed that LIBERTY CPA to UAR and Israel be changed to 20 and 15 NM respectively and modified his basic directive concerning LIBERTY operations (JCS 011545Z JUN 67), "Ref for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

A. Dept of the Army communication center (DACC) erroneously routed message to NAVCOMMSTA Philippines. This error resulted in critical time being expended for identification, recovery and correction.

B. Received at Naval Communications Station Philippines at 081330Z from DCS relay Kenia.

C. Naval Communications Station Philippines relayed to DCS relay DAVIS at 081700Z.

D. Message was received at Naval Communications Station Asmara at 082125Z for transmission to LIBERTY.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

APPENDIX II

TO LIBERTY COURT
OF INQUIRY

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281

~~TOP SECRET~~

That at 080110Z JUN 67 JCS directed that LIBERTY CPA to UAR and Israel be changed to 100 NM. This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

A. Dept of the Army Communication Center (DACC) erroneously routed message to Naval Communications Station Philippines. This error resulted in critical time being expended for identification, recovery and correction.

B. Received at Naval Communications Station Philippines at 080400Z from DCS Relay KUNIA.

C. Naval Communications Station Philippines relayed to Naval Communications Station Guam at 080449Z.

D. Received at DACC at 080502Z.

E. DACC routed message to NSA.

F. Naval Communications Station Asmara never received message for transmission to LIBERTY.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX III

TO LIBERTY COURT
OF INQUIRY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

That at 080625Z JUN 67 USCINCEUR officially confirmed by message a telephone conversation between the USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officers for CINCUSNAVEUR to take JCS 080110Z JUN 67 for action. This message was transmitted on the JRATT BCST at 081059Z as JR NR 2402. LIBERTY personnel have no knowledge of receipt of this message.

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX IV
TO LIBERTY COURT
OF INQUIRY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

That at 080917Z JUN 67 COMSIXTHFLT directed that LIBERTY CPA to UAR and Israel be changed to 100 NM in response to CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z JUN 67 which directed COMSIXTHFLT to take JCS 080110Z for action. This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

- A. Message received at Naval Communications Station Morocco from COMSIXTHFLT at 081050Z.
- B. Naval Communications Station Morocco entered the msg into the DCS for delivery to NCS Asmara at 081100Z.
- C. DCS Seville (San Pablo) transmitted to DCS Asmara at 081238Z. DCS Asmara reports receipt at 081200Z.
- D. DCS Asmara erroneously relayed message to Naval Communications Station Greece at 081215Z.
- E. Naval Communications Station Greece returned message to DCS Asmara at 081503Z.
- F. DCS Asmara relayed message to Naval Communications Station Asmara at 081510Z for transmission to LIBERTY.

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
APPENDIX V

TO LIBERTY COURT OF
INQUIRY

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[REDACTED]

Comments on the seven points provided by IDF FLO, LCOL MICHAEL BLOCH,
as "Futher Information on Yesterday's Incident with the American Ship".

Point 1 - Ship was sighted and recognized as a naval ship 13 miles from coast.

Comment - From 0849 on 8 June LIBERTY was steaming in international waters on a track generally parallel to the coast of the UAR. At one point the ship was, in fact, 13.6 miles from the coast.

Point 2 - The presence (of a neutral-nation naval ship) in a fighting area is against international custom.

Comment - The duties of a neutral under international law do not include a duty to ensure that its ships or personnel leave or refrain from entering an area of hostilities or an area adjacent to an area of hostilities. Nationals of a neutral country who may happen to be in belligerent territory nevertheless retain their right to protection by their neutral home state; and a belligerent must grant to neutral diplomatic envoys -- including those accredited to the enemy -- the right to quit the territory unmolesed. A neutral nation, in this respect alone, thus has a legitimate reason and a legal right to dispatch a ship into international waters adjacent to an area of hostilities, in fulfillment of its obligation to protect its nationals and to evacuate those who desire evacuation. It was in fulfillment of such a mission that USS LIBERTY was engaged. Far from being contrary to international custom, the presence of neutral ships on just such missions as LIBERTY's is a common, if not a universal, incident of situations involving the outbreak of hostilities. So long as such a neutral ship maintains the impartial attitude of neutrality, each belligerent has a duty to refrain from attacking her. Action by such a neutral ship to repulse an unlawful belligerent attack by force, where the neutral has not first attacked the belligerent, does not constitute "hostilities" against the belligerent and does not constitute an abandonment or a violation of neutrality.

APPENDIX VI
TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

DECLASSIFIED

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Point 3 - The Area (Where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) is not a common passage for ships.

Comment - Given the conceded proposition that a ship of a neutral is steaming in international waters, the question of whether or not such waters are a "common passage" is totally irrelevant to its right to be there.

Point 4 - Egypt (An opposing Belligerent) had declared the area (where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) closed to neutrals.

Comment - Closing certain adjacent waters including those otherwise considered to be high seas, has some precedent in history as a belligerent practice, notably in World Wars I and II when most of the belligerents, including the United States, declared "war zones", Military areas", and "defensive sea areas" and either attempted to close such areas completely and to severely circumscribe passage through them as a neutral the consistent position of the United States has been to reserve generally all of its rights in the premises, including the right not only to question the validity of such "war zones" but to present demands and claims in relation to any American interests which may be unlawfully affected, directly or indirectly, ^{except for a previously announced blockade or other maritime control measure} by virtue of their enforcement. As a general proposition, closing or attempting to restrict any portion of the high seas has not been recognized in international law as a belligerent right.

Point 5 - LIBERTY resembles the Egyptain supply ship EL QUSEIR.

Comment - While EL QUSEIR bears a highly superficial resemblance to LIBERTY, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. EL QUSEIR is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antenna array and distinctive bull markings of LIBERTY. The location of the superstructure island, a primary recognition feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criteria as a justification for attack, any ship resmbing EL QUSEIR was in jeopardy.

Point 6 - Ship was not flying flag when sighted. She moved at high speed westward toward enemy coast.

Comment - LIBERTY flew a size 9 (approx 5 feet by 8 feet) U.S. ensign from her foremast throughout the morning of 8 June and until it was shot down by the Israeli air attack. At least 5 minutes prior to the torpedo attack a size 7 ensign (approx 7 feet by 13 feet) was hoisted at the main yardarm. At 0849 LIBERTY changed course from 130°T to 253°T. At 0905 LIBERTY reduced speed to 5 Knots and continued to steam at that speed until after the initial air attack. At 1132 LIBERTY altered course to 283°T and continued on this course until after the ship was attacked.

Point 7 - IDF Navy had earlier reports of bombardment of El Arish from sea.

Comment - It is inconceivable that either the IDF Navy or Air Force would associate LIBERTY? with her ⁴⁻⁵⁰~~50~~ caliber machine guns, or EL QUSEIR, armed with two 3 pounders, with a shore bombardment.

NNNNXMMV

VV KXC356VV TVB026

00 RUDLKD

DE RUEPJS 02100 1521548

ZNY SSSSSS

O 011545Z JUN 67 ZFF3

FM JCS

TO RUFPPBKK/UISCINCEUR

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEDNKA/MCCCCINCLANTFLT

RUFPPBKK/CINCSNAVEUR

RUIPCR/COMSIXTHFLT

RUCIJUA/CTF 64

RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY

RUEPWS/CIRNSA

RUFPPBKK/NSAEUR

RUCIISA/DIRNAVSECGRU

RUCIJUA/ADIRNACSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUERU

BT

LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD BY
ALL ADDRESSES
SERVICE NUMBER 1521326

Downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED
by DTCS
10 Nov 76

JCS CFW JAB SENDS

SUBJ USS LIBERTY SKED (U)

REF DIRNSA G/104/311906Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)

PAGE 2 RUEPJS 0210 SECRET

1. (S) WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:

A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.

B. 2-8 JUN. ENROUTE VIA GIBRALIAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE

AV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL

ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO MATA

3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA

SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA

LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.

C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND

BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR

12.5 NM CPA ISRAEL 6.5NM

2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC)

CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INKO ADDRESSES ON ALL MOVREPS,

DAILY SITIEAND INCIDENT REPORTS.

3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

GP-3

BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
CINCSNAVEUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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CON	
FOR	
SSN	01/21/37
SGN	13

01/595 JUN 67

288

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NNNNXMMV

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

VV KXC356VV TV8526
00 RUCLKD
DE RUEPJS 02100 1521548
ZNY SSSSSS
O 011545Z JUN 67 ZFF3. --LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD BY
FM JCS
TO RUFPBKK/UISCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/NCCCCINCLANTFLT
RUPTKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUIPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/CTF 64
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
RUEPWS/CIRNSA
RUFPBK/NSAEUR
RUCINSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/ADIRNACSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUERU
BT
~~SECRET~~ JCS CFWP JAS SENDS
SUBJ USS LIBERTY SKED (U)
REF DIRNSA G/104/311906Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)
PAGE 2 RUEPJS 0210 S E C R E T
1. (S) WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING
SKED:
A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.
B. 2-8 JUN. ENROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS
SAFE
AV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO MATA
3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA
LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
12.5 NM CPA ISRAEL 6.5NM
2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINCLANT (JRC)
CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INKO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS,
DAILY SITIEAND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.
4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.
GP-3
BT

3--ALL ADDEES
SERVICE NUMBER 011545 1521326

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT 1 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

Ex 1

ORIGINAL OR SECTION		CINCLANTFLT												CITE		S.D.	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCLANTFLT	C	O	O	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
		0	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCLANTFLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16

CON	
TOR	
SSN	01/21/37
SGN	LB

DTG 011595 JUN 67

~~SECRET~~

289

Handwritten signature

[Handwritten signature]

READD: SSN-4081/SC-4/N3/14 JUN 67
R 141223Z JUN 67
FM CINCSNAVEUR
INFO CINCLANTFLT

8000: USS LIBERTY (U) JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED. OPERATING
AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE. REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VAIRED
CHANCE CPA CA TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM. GP-4

Ex. 2

ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
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(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
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SWN			
SCN	K		

072230 Z JUN 67 290
(195) 290

DISCLOSURE SHEET

080110Z JUN 67

DTG/MONTH/YEAR

FROM:

JCS

TO/INFO:

CINCUSNAVEUR

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED. CONTACT NAVCOMMUNIT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES.

DATE	SIGNATURE	RANK/RATE
1. _____	_____	_____
2. _____	_____	_____
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10. _____	_____	_____

26 - 27
COPY ~~10~~ of 10 COPIES

EX(3) avail

291
291

EXHIBIT 3 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

ZCZCDKA013VV TVE013

00 RUDLKD

DE RUEKDA 503 1590112

ZUY TTTT 7540

REF ID: A66666

RECEIVED

FORM 107-CPA

000000Z JUN 67 ZFF-3 - - LEGEND -- INFORM ORIG WHEN MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
ANS BY 500S AT 0312Z, W3/03 JUN/68

TO RUEPRK/USCINCPAC

INFO FUFNAAA/CNG

RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

RUEFNKA/CINCL TFI T

PUBLIC INFORMATION

AFIPCE/CONSIXTHFLT

FILED FOR/CT 64

AMERICAN/US LIBERTY

RUFMAS/HONSAEUR

RUFMAS/NSAEUR OFF GERMANY

RUEPWS/DIRNSA

RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECFU

RUC IHS A/AD IF NAVECGRU

RUFENKA/DIE TAUSCHGEULANT

RUFFORD/DISNAVSCORREUR-----

PT

JCS 73-7 J3 SEP 68

SUPJ: USE LIBERTY (U)

REFS: AJCS 7337/972230Z JUN 67

6. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CANCEL REF A.

2. (TS) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP ARES DEFINED LAST

SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT
CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM TO
CYPRUS. GP-3

BT

COPY 26 OF 27 COPIES

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR										NCU LONDON	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CITE	S D O
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NSGE N3					X							

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON			
TOR	03122		
SSN			
SGN			

DTG 080110 Z JUN67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

EXHIBIT 3 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 29

192

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

ZCZCDKAB013VV TUB013
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEKDA 003 1590112
ZNY TTTTT ZNYC
RUEKDA/AMCC
RUEKDA/STACF
RUEKDA/STCPA

080110Z JUN 67 ZFF-3 - - LEGEND -- INFORM ORIG WHEN MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
ANS BY 500S AT 0312Z, W3/08 JUN/BB

FM JCS
TO RUEPDK/USCINCPUR
INFO RUEHAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCL TELT
RUDLKD INCUSNAVEUR-----
RUEPDK/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPDK/CTT 64
RUEPDK/USC LIPERTY
RUEPDK/HONSAEUR
RUEPDK/NSAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPDK/DIRNSA
RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHS/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRU-----
BT

me

Downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED
by OTCs
10 Nov 76

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: AJCS 7337/072230Z JUN 67
P. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
1. (U) CANCEL REF A.
2. (TS) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP AREAS DEFINED LAST
SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT
CLOSED THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM TO
CYPRUS. GP-3
BT

COPY 22 OF 27 COPIES

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXX												X																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
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CC

Classification (cancelled) (~~Changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009D32/T31
on 29 June 76 DRG:pm 21 Jun 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

57



Ex 4

EM

(WHEN FILLED IN)

294

204

197

BW YWFP11
OO RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 052 1611205
ZNY SSUSS
O 101205Z JUN 67

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION RECEIVED GARBLED,
MESSAGE IS IN SERVICE, CORRECTED COPY WILL BE
ROUTED WHEN RECEIVED, W2/RB/10 JUN 67
//CORRECTED COPY//

DESTROY ALL OTHERS

FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUEKDC/CINCUSNAVEUR DEST
INFO RUTPP/COMDESRON TWELVE
RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
BT

~~S ZRC REF~~

REF (A) CINCUSNAVEUR 101036Z JUN 67*

(B) JCS 080110Z JUN 67

1. REF (A) ZEKEN FOR ACTION.

2. ACCORDING TO CO, USS HERTY, REF (B) AND ALL ASSOCIATED MSGS
TO PASS CONTENT OF REF (B) WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY
 PRIOR TO ATTACK.
 SP-3

3P-3

BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC:TR/W-2/13 JUN 67

Classification (cancelled) (~~Changed to~~)
) by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009D32431

on 28 June 76 OR Spain of 21 June 1976

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

~~OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY~~

[illegible]

CON			
TOR			
SSN	105/12337		
SGN			

DTG 10/20/57 , Page 6

~~SECRET~~

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVJAG NO. 1 ON 2160/2/DEU 10-65

UNCLASSIFIED

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION RECEIVED GARBLED.
MESSAGE IS IN SERVICE, CORRECTED COPY WILL BE
ROUTED WHEN RECEIVED, W2/RB/10JUN67
//CORRECTED COPY//

DESTROY ALL OTHERS

(B) JCS 080110Z JUN 67

1. REF (A) ZEKEN FOR ACTION.

2. ACCORDING TO CO, USS HERTY, REF (B) AND ALL ASSOCIATED MSGS
TO PASS. CONTENT OF REF (B) WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY
PRIOR TO ATTACK.

3P-3

BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC:TR/W-2/13 JUN 67

DECLASSIFIED

Ex 5.

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

ORIGINATOR SECTION		X X X	X X										X
CINCUSNAVEUR	O O	O I	O 2	N I	N 2	H 3	N 4	N 5	N 6	N I 7	C I T E	S D O	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	O O O I	O O 0 2	O O 0 3	O O 0 3 B	O I I I	O I I 2	O I I 3	O I I 4	O I I 5	O I I 6	O I I 7	A I I I 4	A D O

NCU LONDON

CON			
TOR			
SSN	10/12337		
SGN	13		

297

DTG 10/205 JUN 67

~~SECRET~~

CHIEF FILED

SECRET

NAVJAG FORM 10-1 (REV. 10-65)
EXHIBIT 5 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 707

USS LIBERTY AGOR-5 ZONE DESCRIPTION -25 DATE THURSDAY 25 JUN 67 (Date) (Month)
 AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
	<u>12-16 CONT.</u>
1211	LT O'CONNOR ASSUMED THE DECK AND COMM
1311	SET CONDITION ZERBA THROUGHOUT THE SHIP
1314	CONDITION ZERBA SET THROUGHOUT THE SHIP
1316	SIGHT EXPLOSION ON COAST. RNC - 13 MILES
1316	COMMENCED NUCLEAR-CHEMICAL WARFARE DRILL.
1330	SIGHTED EXPLOSION ON COAST BRG - 130° T + P.C.C. RNC - 25 MILES
1346	SET CONDITION YOKO THROUGHOUT THE SHIP
1348	SECURED FROM GENERAL QUARTERS. SET THE MODIFIED CONDITION OF REPAIR III WATCH.
1355	LT O'CONNOR ASSUMED DECK
1355	ENS O'MALLEY ASSUMED THE COMM
1446	ONE GUNBOAT INITIATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS NO. 286-17
1457	THREE GUNBOATS TURNED AWAY
1500	STBD LIST 10° ON UPPER INCLINOMETER, 13° ON LOWER INCLINOMETER
1503	ONE GUN BOAT SIGNALING US
1505	GUN BOAT APPROACHING PORT SIDE.
1507	HELICOPTER IDENTIFIED AS ENEMY RUSSIAN-MADE SACOUSKEY MODEL APPROACHED SHIP PORT SIDE 500 YARDS.
1508	SECOND HELICOPTER SIGHTED
1510	STBD LIST 10° ON UPPER INCLINOMETER, 13° ON LOWER INCLINOMETER.
1511	HULL NO. ON ONE HELICOPTER IDENTIFIED AS 04
1523	CR D4. SECOND HELICOPTER ID. ON NB
1534	WAGE OIL SUCTION LOST AFTER BOTH BOLLERS HAD BEEN PUT ON LINE AT APPROXIMATELY 1520.
1537	STBD LIST 9 1/2° ON UPPER INCLINOMETER, 12° ON LOWER INCLINOMETER.
1540	TORPEDO BORTS APPROACHING SHIP AT HIGH SPEED STBD SIDE, APPROXIMATE RANGE FIVE MILES. THREE BLATS.
1542	RAISED CODE LIMA INDIA -- NOT UNDER COMMAND
1545	Torpedo Reversed Course And App Retiring (One Appears To Be Smoking)
1545	COMMUNICATI
1600	SENT MESSAGE
1608	BOAT APPROACHING SHIP FROM PORT SIDE AMIDSHIP AT HIGH SPEED
1612	EFFORTS BEING MADE TO STEER FROM AFTER STEERING
1615	TWO UNIDENTIFIED JETS APPROACH
1626	UNIDENTIFIED BOAT APPROACH

EX 6(A)

298

298

AT/PASSAGE FROM

TIME

RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY

1633 PATROL CRAFT NO. 204 AND TWO OTHER CRAFT CLOSE
ABEAM TO PORT. COMMANDING OFFICER SAID "BOATS
ARE BELIEVED TO BE ISRAELI."
1633 C/C TO 340° MAGNETIC. C/S FROM A/E AHEAD 1/2 TO
8 KNOTS. THIS INFORMATION RADIOED A/U
1641 C/S TO A/E 1/2 CANNOT CONTROL SHIP AT 8 KNOTS
1642 STBD LIST 9 1/2° ON TOP INCLINOMETER, 12° ON
BOTTOM
1645 MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM COMSIXTHFLT THAT RESISTANCE
IS ON THE WAY.
1655 SHIP KEEPING WITHIN 1/2 OF PORT
1700 A/U STOP
1701 RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER. HEADING 330° MAGNETIC
1702 SETS HEADING 330° MAGNETIC
1703 LET GO PORT ANCHOR
1704 A/U BACK 1/3
1705 A/U BACK 2/3. 12 FATHOMS UNDER THE K
1706 NEW HEADING 315° MAGNETIC
1707 NEW HEADING 311° MAGNETIC
1708 FLOODING UP TO SECOND DECK. BURNING. HEADING
62° 57'. NO FLOODING EVIDENT. SMOKE. HEADING
RUPTURED. STBD SIDE CIND. IN. HEADING 62° 57'.
62° 57'. HEADING 62° 57'. SMOKE. HEADING 62° 57'.
IT WITHIN 1000 YARDS. HEADING 62° 57'.
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P 24




LIBERTY AGCR 5 ZONE DESCRIPTION - 25 DATE THURSDAY 18 JAN 1967

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1211	LT O'LENNER ASSUMED THE DECK AND COMM
1311	SET CONDITION ZEBRA THROUGHOUT THE SHIP
1314	CONDITION ZEBRA SET THROUGHOUT THE SHIP
1316	SIGHT EXPLOSION ON COAST. RNG - 13 MILES
1330	COMMENCED NUCLEAR CHEMICAL WARFARE DRILL
1346	SIGHTED EXPLOSION ON COAST BRG - 130° T + P. R. C. RNG - 25 MILES
1348	SET CONDITION YOKO THROUGHOUT THE SHIP
1355	SECURED FROM GENERAL QUARTERS. SET THE MODIFIED CONDITION OF REARIN III WATCH.
1355	PAINTER ASSUMED DECK
1355	ENS O'MALLEY ASSUMED THE COMM
1446	ONE GUNBOAT INITIATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS NO. 306-17
1457	THREE GUNBOATS TURNED AWAY
1500	STBD LIST 10° ON UPPER INCLINOMETER, 13° ON LOWER INCLINOMETER
1503	ONE GUN BOAT SIGNALING US
1505	GUN BOAT APPROACHING PORT SIDE
1507	HELICOPTER IDENTIFIED AS ENEMY RUSSIAN-MADE SAGOUSKEY MODEL APPROACHED SHIP PORT SIDE 500 YARDS
1508	SECOND HELICOPTER SIGHTED
1510	STBD LIST 10° ON UPPER INCLINOMETER, 13° ON LOWER INCLINOMETER
1511	HULL NO. ON ONE HELICOPTER IDENTIFIED AS QV OR D4. SECOND HELICOPTER ID OR D8
1523	WIDE OIL SUCTION LOST AFTER BOTH BOLLERS HAD BEEN PUT ON LINE AT APPROXIMATELY 1520
1534	STBD LIST 9° ON UPPER INCLINOMETER, 12° ON LOWER INCLINOMETER
1537	TORPEDO BOATS APPROACHING SHIP AT HIGH SPEED STBD SIDE, APPROXIMATE RANGE FIVE MILES. THREE BOATS.
1540	RAISED CODE LIMA INDIA -- NOT UNDER COMMAND
1542	TORPEDO REVERSED COURSE AND ARE RETIRING (ONE APPEARS TO BE SMOKING)
1555	COMMUNICATED
1600	SENT MESSAGE
1608	BOAT APPROACHING STBD SIDE APPROXIMATELY HIGH SPEED
1612	EFFORTS BEING MADE TO STEER FROM AFTER STEERING
1615	TWO UNIDENTIFIED JETS APPROACH
1620	UNIDENTIFIED BOAT APPROACH

EX. 6 (1)
300 300

EXHIBIT 600 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY



302

Ex 7

302


EXHIBIT 7 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

NOTE :

EXHIBIT 8 IS THE FRONT SIDE OF THE CARD
OF COMMANDER CASTLE. THE PRINTING IS
DIFFICULT TO READ ON THE PHOTO COPY.
THE TEXT IS:

COMMANDER ERNEST CARL CASTLE
UNITED STATES NAVY
NAVAL ATTACHE'
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel Aviv



LOOK ON REVERSE SIDE

EX 8

303

303

EXHIBIT 8 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

*Commander Ernest B. Cressler
United States Navy
Naval Attaché
Naval Attache for Air
Embassy of the United States of America
Tel Aviv*

304

EX 8 (A)

304

HAVE YOU
CASULTIES

NOTE: ORIGINAL PRINTING
VERY LIGHT
IT HAS BEEN ENHANCED
FOR SCANNING.

305


EX 8(B)

305

NOTE : on the black page below appears the words

PHOTOS 1 THROUGH 64

306





NOV 1961

PHOTO 2 OF 2 - AMENITY

ANTENNA TRUNK
MAIN DECK, FR 66, PORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) removed to
by authority of ONY 123456789
on 06/21/76
Signature: *[Signature]*
Rank: Sr Sec Cont
Date: 06/21/76
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

308
308




Photo 2 of 2 - Liberty

309



209

01 LEVEL DECK HOUSE,
FR 52 PORT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
by authority of ONI Memo Sec 0000361T31
on 2/1/76. *OK* Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CONFIDENTIAL

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6745

PHOTOS of EX 4 - EX 1000

VIEW OF STERN
OF LIBERTY
SHOWS LIST ON
MORNING OF 9 JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

121 060321 1231
MEMO Ser 060321 1231
of 060321 1231
by authority of
(cancellation) (cancel)
Signature: [Signature]
(Date) [Date]
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




Photo 4 of 5x9 - ARTY

MAIN DECK

STBD SIDE

FR 55-73

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) removed to Sec 806032/1131
) by authority of ONA 16 2100076
on 2/20/76 DR 806032/1131
JPS Sec Cont
(Rank)
(Signature)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PHOTO 5 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

MWB DAVITS

STBD SIDE, OR LEVEL.

FR 83 - 89

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of ONNA memo Ser 004039/T 31
on 21 Jun 76
Signature: W. R. Brown 21 Jun 76
(Rank) JAF Sec Cont
Office of the Judge Advocate General, of the Navy



Photo 6 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

317

217

NAVIGATION GEAR LOCKER
STBD SIDE, 03 LEVEL
FR 81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

1CL/6032/T31
Classification (cancelled) (reclassified by
, by authority of ONAN memo Ser 004032/T31
of 210476
on 210476 JAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

318

318



Photo 7 of Ex. 9 - Liberty

319

319

MAIN DECK DECK HOUSE
FR 50 ~~5~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
by authority of DONAN memo 5000381731
of 2/10/76
on 2/10/76 DR Brown
GAT Sec Cont
(Rank)
(Date) (Signature)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

320

320

CONFIDENTIAL




Photo 8 of Ex 9-1: Bery

TOP OF 01 LEVEL
DECK HOUSE
FR 50 - 73 ~~7~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~transferred to~~
) by authority of ONNAV memo Ser 0091032/131
on 29 Jun 76 DR Brown of 21 Jun 76
JAG-SEC Capt
(Signature: (Rank)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PHOTO 9 of EX 9 - KIMMITY

MAIN DECK
PORT SIDE
FR 74
QUARTER DECK
STATION.

ANNOUNCING

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of ONPA memo Sec 000034131
on 2/1/76. *DR Spaul*
JAF Sec Cont
(Signature: *DR Spaul*)
(Rank) (Rank)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



Photo 10 of Ex 9 - 11

325

325

FRONT OF BRIDGE
02, 03, 04 LEVELS
K

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification (canceled) (changed to) of 21 Nov 76
by authority of DONNA M. Ser 000032131
on 20 Nov 76
Signature: DR Brown Conf
JAG Sec (RPM)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PHOTO 11 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

327

327

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)
by authority of DR Brown
on 22 Jan 76 JAC Sec Cont
(Date) (Rank)
(Signature) GENERAL OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE

328

328

WILLIAMS




PLATE 12 OF EXP - 6200

329

779

01 LEVEL BRIDGE STRUCTURE
FR 80
E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~TOP SECRET~~ by authority of ONAN memo Ser 009032/131
of 21 Jun 79
on 21 Jun 79
Signature: W. B. Quinn CPT
MAY SEC (Rank)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

330

330

PHOTO 13 of EX-9 - LIBERTY

331

231

01 LEVEL BRIDGE
STRUCTURE
FR 80
£

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to) on 06/08/13
by authority of *DR BAKER*
DR BAKER
JAG Sec Cont (Rank)
(Signature)
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
(Date)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

332

332



PHOTO 14 of EX-11

01, 02, 03 LEVEL

PORT SIDE FR 85-95

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~Secret~~ on 02/19/79
by authority of OPRN 02/19/79
Signature: *W. Sec (HAK)*
Date: 02/19/79
Signature: ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CONFIDENTIAL

PHOTO OF EX 9 - LIBERTY



335

335

01 LEVEL LIFEBOAT
STOWAGE RACKS
PORT SIDE FR 91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (S) by authority of ~~OPN~~ ^{OPN} ~~Sec 0040321731~~
on 2/20/76 ~~DR BROWN~~ ^{DR BROWN} ~~Sec 0040321731~~
(Date) (Signature) ~~DR BROWN~~ ^{DR BROWN} ~~Sec 0040321731~~
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

336

336




PHOTO 16 OF EXHIBIT

337

337

VIEW OF PLANE AND
OIL SLICK AND AFTER
PORT SIDE OF SHIP.

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (emanded to
) by authority of ONRAN memo 8/8/76
on 3/20/76
Signature: *MR. [illegible]*
(Date) *3/20/76*
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

338
338

PHOTO 17 of 100 2-1-82

339

239

TORPEDO BOAT
VIEWED FROM PORT
WING OF BRIDGE
03 LEVEL FR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (canceled) removed by authority of ONN Memo 325 005083 1131
on 30/10/99
Signature: JAC Dec (Rank)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

340

340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTO 18 OF EX-118

341

341

ONE TORPEDO BOAT
VIEWED FROM STBD
WING OF BRIDGE
03 LEVEL, FR 80.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
on 29 June 76
(Date)
by authority of ONA-Info Sec 0000341731
(Cancelled)
Signature: *W. J. Quinn*
SAC, SEC COMNAV
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

342
342

PLATE 19 OF EX-6-111

343

243

TWO TORPEDO BOATS
VIEWED FROM STBD
WING OF BRIDGE
03 LEVEL, FR 80

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) by authority of OPNAV Memo Sec 880032/T31
on 2 June 76
(Date)
Signature: *[Signature]*
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

344
344

PHOTO 20 OF EX 9 - LIRDET

345

245

TWO TORPEDO BOATS
VIEWED FROM STBD
WING OF BRIDGE
03 LEVEL, FR 80.
SMOKE TO RIGHT
FROM BURNING WHALE BOAT
MOTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTO 20

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of ONAN memo Ser. 001032/131
of 21 Jun 76
on 25 Jun 76
Signature: DR Brown
JAG Sec Cont
(Rank)
(Date)
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

346
346

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Photo 21 of Ex 9 - LIBRARY

347

247

TORPEDO BOAT
VIEWED FROM
STBD WING OF
BRIDGE 03 LEVEL
FOR 80.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 004.0324731
on ~~March 76~~ MR 8/24/76 of a/b 76
SP4 Sec Cnt
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~TOP SECRET~~

PHOTO 22 of EX-G-EXHIBIT

349

249

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HELICOPTER

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~Changed to~~
) by authority of ONANMCMG Ser 009032/T31
on 23 Jun 76 W. B. Smith of 21 Jun 76
JAT Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature: (Rank))
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

350
350




Photo 23 of Ex-9-1000

351

351

TORPEDO BOAT
CROSSING BOW
STBD TO PORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~changed to~~ by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 091038-1731
on 28 Jun 76 *DeSpain* of 21 Jun 76
JH Sec 17
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTO 24 of EX-11

353

123

TORPEDO BOAT
AT HIGH SPEED
APPARENTLY CROSSING
WAKE OF SHIP
STBD TO PORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~changed to~~
by authority of OMBAN memo Ser 004032/131
on 22 June 76 *MB*
JMC Sec Conf of 21 Jun 76
Date: (Date)
Signature: (Name)

NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

354

354



PHOTO 25 BY EX 9 - LIBERTY

355

355

^{OK}
NOTE TORPEDO BOAT
VIEW LOOKING FROM
03 LEVEL BRIDGE PORT
SIDE FR 80.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
) by authority of ONAN memo Sec 0060381731
of 21 Jun 76
Signature: WR Brown
JAG-SEC Cont (Rank)
on 21 Jun 76
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CONFIDENTIAL




Plate 10 of 15 - 10/18/84

357

257

JET AIRCRAFT
PASSING FROM AFT
FORWARD. PLANE IN
VIEW JUST TO LEFT OF
AFTER MAST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) memo Ser 006032.1731
, by authority of OPNAV
of 21 Jun 76
on 21 Jun 76. MR. Brown
SAs Sec Conf
(Rank)
(Date)
(Signature)
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTOGRAPH EXHIBIT

359

359

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) by authority of ONYAN memo Sec 009082, IT 31
on 21 Jun 76 MR. Spaw of 21 Jun 76
(Date) JH Sec Conf
(Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PHOTOGRAPH - 361

361

361

01, 02, 03 LEVEL
PORT SIDE LOOKING AFT
NOTE WAKE.

PHOTO 28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~changed to~~
) by authority of OPA Memo Ser 009032/T31
on 21 Jun 76 *DR Spear* of 21 Jun 76
Jt Sec Conf
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




PHOTO SHOT OF LIBERTY

363

363

VIEW OF ~~STBD~~ ^{PORT} BOW ~~ON~~
FROM 03 LEVEL, PORT
FR 80.

PLANE JUST TO LEFT
OF WHIP ANTENNA.

NOTE WATER VIST IN VIEW
TO LEFT OF BOW.

NOTE HOLES IN SRR-20
DISH ANTENNA.

PHOTO 29

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~remanded to~~ ^{referred to} ~~by authority of~~ ^{by authority of} ~~ONM~~ ^{ONM} ~~on 2/20/76~~ ^{on 2/20/76} ~~Signature: [Signature]~~ ^{Signature: [Signature]} ~~(Rank)~~ ^(Rank) ~~OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY~~ ^{OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY}

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

364

364

PHOTO 30 OF EX 9 - LIBERTY

365

365

BELIEVED TO BE
HELICOPTER
OR PLANE DROPPING
UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) 0000321731
by authority of JINAN memo Ser 0000321731
on 2/2/76
MR. Brown
JAG Sec 501
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PHOTOGRAPH EX 9 - LIBRARY

367

367

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~Secret~~
) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 000000-131
on 21 Jun 76 *DR Brown* of 21 Jun 76
(Date) *JAG Sec Cont*
(Signature: (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





PHOTO OF EX-LIBERTY



369

369

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification

(cancelled) (changed to

) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009032/T31

on 2 June 76 *AL Brown* of 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

JAG Sec Cont

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PHOTO 33 of EXP - ABILITY

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~(changed to)~~ by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 069032/731
on 21 Jun 76 *JPB* of 21 Jun 76
JPB/Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

[REDACTED]



PHOTO BY OF EX & LIBERTY



373

373

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) by authority of ~~the~~ NAA mem Ser 0060321731
on 2/1/01
(Date)
Signature: Dr. K. R. R. R.
The Sec Cont (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAA

374

374



Photo 35 of Ex 9 - Liberty

375

375

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~(Secret)~~ by authority of ODNAL memo Ser 00403a/T31
on 24 Jun 76 *Dr Brown* of 24 Jun 76
JMS:ec:cont
(Date) (Signature) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~SECRET~~



PHOTO 36 of EXP - LIBERTY

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~Changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009032/131
on 29 Jun 76 *W. G. Davis* of 21 Jun 76
(Date) *SAC* Sec Conf
(Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



PHOTO 37 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

379

379

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (canceled) ~~changed to~~
) by authority of OPRNAV memo Ser 00-1032/T31
on 22 Jun 76 *AK Spaw* of 21 Jun 76
JAFSec cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICER OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

380

380



Photo 31 of Ex 9 - L. R. R. R.

381

381

REF1 ACQUIRED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OYNH memo Ser 004032/131
of 210076
on 220076
JRC ~~Seaton~~
(Rank)
(Signature)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, US NAVY



Photo 39 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

383

383

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) by authority of OPNAV memo Sec 00903a/T31
on 25 Jun 76 DK Spaw of 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



Photo 40 of EX 9-KINNEY



385

385

1

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) by authority of ONNAV memo SET 98-032/T31
on 29 Jun 76. *AL Brou* 29 Jun 76
JP Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



PHOTO 41 OF EX 9 - LIBERTY

387

387

NEW ACQUISITION

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of ONA memo. Ser 050032/131
on 29 Jun 76 *OK by me* of 21 Jun 76
JMK Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



Photo 42 of EX-9 - Liberty

389

389

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~(changed to)~~) by authority of OGNM memo Ser 609D3a/T31
on 21 June 76 DR Brown of 21 Jun 76
JAGSec Cont
(Date) (Signature: (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~SECRET~~



Photo 43 of Ex 9 - Liberty

391

391

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~changed to~~) by authority of ONNAV memo Ser 004032/131
of 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont
JAG Sec Cont
(Rank)
(Signature)
JAG OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




Photo 44 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

393

393

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~(S)~~ memo Sec 08 103a/131
) by authority of ONNAV of 21 Jun 76
on 21 Jun 76 *DR Brown*
JHD Sec Conf (Rank)
(Date) (Signature)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




PHOTO #5 of EX 9 - LIABTY

395

395

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~changed to~~
) by authority of QINRY memo Ser 009032/131
of 21 Jun 76
on 21 Jun 76 JK Spain
JAG Sec Conf
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



Photo 46 of Ex 9 - Liberty



397

397

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) memo Sec 704.32/131
) by authority of ORNM of 21 Jun 76
on 20 Jun 76 MR Spaw
JAL-SEC-CONF (Rank)
(Signature)
(Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



Photo 47 of Ex-9-LIBERTY

399

399

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (canceled) ~~extended to~~ *22 Jun 76*
) by authority of *CRN/KU/NAVJG* *So. 0071321-31*
24 Jun 76 *DR Brown* *ITG Sec Cont*
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




Photo 4806 Ex 9 - Liberty

401

40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~(changed to)~~
) by authority of CPINAU memo Ser 009032/131
on 29 Jun 76 ~~DRG~~ *DRG* ~~secret~~ *secret*
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Photo 49 of Ex 9 - Liberty

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAV/NAVSUB 56009P 327/31
on 29 Jun 76 8 21 Jun 76
(Date) W. Brown JAG Sec Cont
(Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



5006 EX-9-LIBERTY

405

405

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of ~~OPNAVJAG~~ ~~SEC~~ ~~CO~~ ~~131~~
on 28 Jun 76. ~~DR~~ ~~Quin~~ ~~76~~ ~~sec~~ ~~67~~
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



PHOTO of EX 4 - LIAISON

407

407

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of ANNUAL NO. 500 CO 1 D 34
on 29 Jun 76 RR Ryan 821 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Conf
(Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PHOTO 52 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



409

409

100-47

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) by authority of OPNAV NEWS SEC OCPD 321/31
on 24 June 76 DR Quinn 8 21 June 76
(Date) Signature: THC S. C. F.
(Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Photo 53 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

(B) (S)

411

11



DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV/MEMO Ser. 009 DS-1131
8 21 Jun 1976

on 29 Jun 76 OKayala
(Date) (Signature: JAG Sec Cont (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




PHOTO OF EXH - 413

413

413

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~SECRET~~) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 060033a/1731
on 28 Jun 76 DR J. M. W. at 21 Jun 76
JRC Sec Cont
(Rank)
(Date) Signature: DR J. M. W.
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL NETUS NAVY



PHOTOS of EX 4 - Liberty

415

415

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to ~~SECRET~~)
by authority of OPNAV MEMO SEC COAD 3473
8 21 Jun 76

29 Jun 76 *Albany* ~~SECRET~~
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



PHOTO 56 of EX-9 - LIBERTY





DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of OPNAV ~~MEMO~~ MEMO Sec 221332/T31 on 22 Jun 76 DR Spain JAG sec cat 821 June 76
(Date) (Signature: (Rank) —
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

418 418

CONFIDENTIAL



PHOTO #7 of EX 9 - LINCOLN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) ~~changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAVJAG SEC 009032/51
on 24 Jun 76 *AKG/nu* 24 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Mark)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



PHOTO 56 of EX-9- LIBERTY

421

421

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV memo 540090 2/131
on 29 Jun 76. *Allegiance*
JTG Sec Cod 8 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




PHOTO 57 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

423

423

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of *OPNAV Memo Sec 007D-2/731*
on *24 Jun 76* *DRG* *Sec 104*
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




PHOTO 80 of EX 9-LIBERTY

425

425

SECRET

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Classification (canceled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV/SECNAV 007D32713/
on 21 Jun 76 DE gain 8 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JTG SC Conf (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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PHOTO 61 of Ex 9-4121

427

427

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to) CONFIDENTIAL
() by authority of OPNAV memo SA 0091053/131
on 29 Jun 76 AKG SA
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

98



PHOTO 629 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

429

429



PHOTO 63 of EX-613-RTY

431

431

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
) by authority of ORNL/MUMD Sec 0010 21/76
on 29 Jun 76 DE Brown
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY




PHOTO of EX 9 - LIBERTY

433

433

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV/MEMO SEC OPD 24731
on 29 Jun 76 MRG Sec 1 8-21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

435



PHOTO 65 of EX-9 - LIBERTY

436

436



PHOTO 66 of Ex 9-LIBERTY

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437




PHOTO 67 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

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1438




Photo 68 of Ex 9 Liberty

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PHOTO 69 of EX 9-LIBERTY

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


PHOTO 70 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

441

1/41



PHOTO 71 of EX 7-LIBERTY

442

442

96

Photo 72 of EXP - Liberty

443

443

02 STB
FR 78

FR 73 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

444

443

FR-80

PROPERTY OF EX-9-LIBRARY

445

444



PHOTO 754 EX 9 - LIBERTY

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445



Photo 76 of 54 J-LIBERTY

447

446




PHOTO 77 of EX. 9- LIBERTY

448

447



PHOTO 78 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

449

448



PHOTO 79 of EX-5 - LIBERTY

450

449

450

154

PHOTO 80 OF EX 4 - LIBERTY



19h

257

PHOTO 81 4 EX 9 - LIBERTY



Photo 82 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



453

29h
452

PHOTO 83 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

45h 72577



hsh

455

PHOTO 84 OF EX 4- LIBRARY

02 STB

WING

PHOTO 85 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

45h 25h



PHOTO 86 OF EX 9 - LIBERTY

L54




PHOTO 8708 EX 4 - LIBER 14

151

458



8h
②

bst

PHOTO 88 of Ex 9 - L136274



460 097

LIBERTY 7 X 7 - 113674



05h

197

PHOTO 90 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



PHOTO 91 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

1041 296



20h
463

463

PHOTO 92 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



PHOTO 93 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

464



PHOTO 94 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

465



PHOTO 95 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

466

997

48



11/10/67

467

PHOTO 96 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY



PHOTO 97 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

897



PHOTO 98 of Ex 9 - LIZSETY



4/10/74


6974



607

077

NO 77-08-EX 4 - LINE 4



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127

PHOTO 100 OF EX 9 - LIBERTY



PHOTO 101 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

ILH

227



Photo 102 of Ex 9 - Liberty

473

472



PHOTO 103 of EX 9-LIBERTY

474

473



PHOTO 104 of EX 9 - LIBERTY

SL7



Photo 105 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY

476



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DATE 08-11-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP

FOR FIVE THOUSAND FOR
FBI KRE/CIG SIX ZERO

001 Id 0177 XAG 200-000000

INNOVATION

RECEIVED

171114Z APR 68
FM JCRC
TO: JCS
INFO: J3, J4, J5, J6, J7, J8, J9, J10, J11, J12, J13, J14, J15, J16, J17, J18, J19, J20, J21, J22, J23, J24, J25, J26, J27, J28, J29, J30, J31, J32, J33, J34, J35, J36, J37, J38, J39, J40, J41, J42, J43, J44, J45, J46, J47, J48, J49, J50, J51, J52, J53, J54, J55, J56, J57, J58, J59, J60, J61, J62, J63, J64, J65, J66, J67, J68, J69, J70, J71, J72, J73, J74, J75, J76, J77, J78, J79, J80, J81, J82, J83, J84, J85, J86, J87, J88, J89, J90, J91, J92, J93, J94, J95, J96, J97, J98, J99, J100, J101, J102, J103, J104, J105, J106, J107, J108, J109, J110, J111, J112, J113, J114, J115, J116, J117, J118, J119, J120, J121, J122, J123, J124, J125, J126, J127, J128, J129, J130, J131, J132, J133, J134, J135, J136, J137, J138, J139, J140, J141, J142, J143, J144, J145, J146, J147, J148, J149, J150, J151, J152, J153, J154, J155, J156, J157, J158, J159, J160, J161, J162, J163, J164, J165, J166, J167, J168, J169, J170, J171, J172, J173, J174, J175, J176, J177, J178, J179, J180, J181, J182, J183, J184, J185, J186, J187, J188, J189, J190, J191, J192, J193, J194, J195, J196, J197, J198, J199, J200, J201, J202, J203, J204, J205, J206, J207, J208, J209, J210, J211, J212, J213, J214, J215, J216, J217, J218, J219, J220, J221, J222, J223, J224, J225, J226, J227, J228, J229, J230, J231, J232, J233, J234, J235, J236, J237, J238, J239, J240, J241, J242, J243, J244, J245, J246, J247, J248, J249, J250, J251, J252, J253, J254, J255, J256, J257, J258, J259, J260, J261, J262, J263, J264, J265, J266, J267, J268, J269, J270, J271, J272, J273, J274, J275, J276, J277, J278, J279, J280, J281, J282, J283, J284, J285, J286, J287, J288, J289, J290, J291, J292, J293, J294, J295, J296, J297, J298, J299, J300, J301, J302, J303, J304, J305, J306, J307, J308, J309, J310, J311, J312, J313, J314, J315, J316, J317, J318, J319, J320, J321, J322, J323, J324, J325, J326, J327, J328, J329, J330, J331, J332, J333, J334, J335, J336, J337, J338, J339, J340, J341, J342, J343, J344, J345, J346, J347, J348, J349, J350, J351, J352, J353, J354, J355, J356, J357, J358, J359, J360, J361, J362, J363, J364, J365, J366, J367, J368, J369, J370, J371, J372, J373, J374, J375, J376, J377, J378, J379, J380, J381, J382, J383, J384, J385, J386, J387, J388, J389, J390, J391, J392, J393, J394, J395, J396, J397, J398, J399, J400, J401, J402, J403, J404, J405, J406, J407, J408, J409, J410, J411, J412, J413, J414, J415, J416, J417, J418, J419, J420, J421, J422, J423, J424, J425, J426, J427, J428, J429, J430, J431, J432, J433, J434, J435, J436, J437, J438, J439, J440, J441, J442, J443, J444, J445, J446, J447, J448, J449, J450, J451, J452, J453, J454, J455, J456, J457, J458, J459, J460, J461, J462, J463, J464, J465, J466, J467, J468, J469, J470, J471, J472, J473, J474, J475, J476, J477, J478, J479, J480, J481, J482, J483, J484, J485, J486, J487, J488, J489, J490, J491, J492, J493, J494, J495, J496, J497, J498, J499, J500, J501, J502, J503, J504, J505, J506, J507, J508, J509, J510, J511, J512, J513, J514, J515, J516, J517, J518, J519, J520, J521, J522, J523, J524, J525, J526, J527, J528, J529, J530, J531, J532, J533, J534, J535, J536, J537, J538, J539, J540, J541, J542, J543, J544, J545, J546, J547, J548, J549, J550, J551, J552, J553, J554, J555, J556, J557, J558, J559, J560, J561, J562, J563, J564, J565, J566, J567, J568, J569, J570, J571, J572, J573, J574, J575, J576, J577, J578, J579, J580, J581, J582, J583, J584, J585, J586, J587, J588, J589, J590, J591, J592, J593, J594, J595, J596, J597, J598, J599, J600, J601, J602, J603, J604, J605, J606, J607, J608, J609, J610, J611, J612, J613, J614, J615, J616, J617, J618, J619, J620, J621, J622, J623, J624, J625, J626, J627, J628, J629, J630, J631, J632, J633, J634, J635, J636, J637, J638, J639, J640, J641, J642, J643, J644, J645, J646, J647, J648, J649, J650, J651, J652, J653, J654, J655, J656, J657, J658, J659, J660, J661, J662, J663, J664, J665, J666, J667, J668, J669, J670, J671, J672, J673, J674, J675, J676, J677, J678, J679, J680, J681, J682, J683, J684, J685, J686, J687, J688, J689, J690, J691, J692, J693, J694, J695, J696, J697, J698, J699, J700, J701, J702, J703, J704, J705, J706, J707, J708, J709, J710, J711, J712, J713, J714, J715, J716, J717, J718, J719, J720, J721, J722, J723, J724, J725, J726, J727, J728, J729, J730, J731, J732, J733, J734, J735, J736, J737, J738, J739, J740, J741, J742, J743, J744, J745, J746, J747, J748, J749, J750, J751, J752, J753, J754, J755, J756, J757, J758, J759, J760, J761, J762, J763, J764, J765, J766, J767, J768, J769, J770, J771, J772, J773, J774, J775, J776, J777, J778, J779, J780, J781, J782, J783, J784, J785, J786, J787, J788, J789, J790, J791, J792, J793, J794, J795, J796, J797, J798, J799, J800, J801, J802, J803, J804, J805, J806, J807, J808, J809, J810, J811, J812, J813, J814, J815, J816, J817, J818, J819, J820, J821, J822, J823, J824, J825, J826, J827, J828, J829, J830, J831, J832, J833, J834, J835, J836, J8

0107-1986

TEST ARMY 11 1944

DT RICHARD 0849 1601530


L7CNP#724ZCNGA021

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OTHERWISE

8th

8th



6th

480




EXHIBIT 12 to LIBERTY
COURT OF INQUIRY
1-25 MM COLOR
SLIDE OF 20
AREA

486

481

EX 13 (10)

EXHIBIT 13 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

8 JUNE 1967

0000-0400

OOD LT OLIVER

CICW KRIMER

-2355 ASSUMED THE WATCH STEAMING INDEPENDENTLY

IN CLS. 0400 (T) 50-10 KNOTS ENROUTE FROM ROTA.

SPAIN TO CP AREA. THE AN/SPS RF, AN/SPN/AC

AND AN/UAV IE ARE IN OPERATION. THE

SEA STATE IS CALM AND VISIBILITY IS GOOD.

RADIO GUARD IS AIRCRAFT DISTRESS ON

THE RLS-4.

0300 C/C TO 1230 T

9335 WPR BY GILSON RD-3

Wm Krimer

0400-0800

OOD ENS SCOTT

CICW GILSON RD3

0335 ASSUMED THE WATCH STEAMING AS BEFORE

1553 C/C TO 1900 (T) TO BLOW TUBES

1615 C/C TO 0600 (T)

0630 C/C TO 1230 (T)

0650 W.P.R. BY COMMUNICATION RD-2

William RD-3

0800-1600

CICW COMMUNICATION RD-2

0650 ASSUMED THE WATCH STEAMING AS BEFORE.

0754 C/C TO 1300 (T)

0838 C/C TO 2550 (T)

0943 C/C TO 5145

1132 C/C TO 2830 (T)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE USS LIBERTY
(AGTR-5) UNDERWAY LOG

D.L. BURSON

COMMANDING OFFICER

EXHIBIT 14 TO LIBERTY LOG OF INQUIRY

481

482

483

1310	GENERAL QUARTERS DRILL
1317	GENERAL QUARTERS DRILL (simultaneous)
1324	CHEMICAL ATTACK (simultaneous)
1348	SECURE FROM GENERAL QUARTERS
1358	TRACKED BY TWO SETS. MACHIN
1406	GUN FIRE REPORTED COMBINGS
1410	FIRE BY BRIDGE
1410	COLLAPSED ATTACKS
1424	3 GUN BOATS SIGHTED BEARING
1430	BRIDGE ORDERS HOW FIRE
1431	STAND BY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK
1433	DEMONSTRATE STILL IN EFFECT
1436	TORPEDO SIGHTED SIDE
1515	SIGHTED 2 INBOARD HELICOPTERS
1516	MAKING REPEATED PASSES OVERHEAD
1517	TORPEDO BOATS HAVE NOW LEFT MAIN
1517	HELICOPTERS FRIENDLY
1519	POWER AVAILABLE NOW/POWER DOES NOT
1520	ANSWER
1524	AFTERSTEERING HAS CONTINUED
1524	COORDINATION ZEBRA RE-SET
1530	TORPEDO BOATS NOW RE-APPROACHING
1530	APPEARS TO BE 1 DESTROYER BEHIND
1539	TORPEDO BOAT
1539	HOLDING COPE WITH LINTA
1542	TORPEDO BOATS REVERSED (CHANGED COURSE)
1542	TO BE SMOKE

1607 Boat Approaching Starboard Side At

High Speed (Approx 12 miles)

1611 Hosted International Signal Flag

1615 2 unidentified jets approaching ship

Starboard Side

1621 Starboard Side No Steering

1622 Left Starboard Rudder

1623 All Engines Ahead $\frac{1}{3}$

1628 Shift Rudder Ahead Star

1639 164-17 High Speed Power Boat

SO CAL. Forward

310 SO Anti Aircraft

Circled Boat

1631 Mustang & Kites

1632 Boats Flying Israeli Flag

1632 "Torpedo Boats" Said to be Israeli

Captain's Statement

1637 Gunboats Retreating

1630 Ship is underway at 340 mph

1642 $\frac{1}{3}$ to A/A $\frac{1}{3}$ Aftersteering

Having trouble maintaining CUS

1645 Three Gunboats Have Turned Right

1653 92 to 000 mph

1655 Word Passed to Commsplit that

Photos were taken of the attacks

Aircraft

1702 Power to Avenger withdrawn

484

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) UNDERWAY LOG
D.L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

ENGINEER'S BELL BOOK

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON COVER)

REPRINTED TO BE A TRUE COPY

W. J. Brown
KCOE USN

U. S. S. Liberty (AGTR-5) SHAFI NO(S) I (ONE) DATE 8 JUNE 1967
En route from RETA, 3 P.M. to SEA

Record of all "BELLS," SIGNALS, and ORDERS received regarding movement of propellers this date

TIME ZONE DESCRIPTION -2 BRPD

Clocks set back or ahead _____ hrs. _____ min., of

(1)	TIME	(2)	SIGNAL	(3)	R. P. M.	(4)	COUNTER OR PITCH SET
(1)	TIME	(2)	SIGNAL	(3)	R. P. M.	(4)	COUNTER OR PITCH SET

0000	Counter	45.0	233340				
0100	Counter	45.0	231010				
0200	Counter	45.0	233740				
0300	Counter	45.0	232445				
<i>Don't S. 1000</i>							
0400	Counter	45.0	239140				
0500	Counter	45.0	241940				
0600	Counter	45.0	244500				
0700	Counter	45.0	247240				
<i>Ch. 1. K. 1000</i>							
0800	Counter	45.0	249940				
0900	Counter	45.0	252640				
0901	Y3	25	252650				
1000	Counter	25.1	254150				
1100	Counter	25.0	255650				
<i>Will be 1000</i>							
1200	Counter	25.0	257150				
1300	Counter	25.0	258650				
1400	Counter	25.0	260150				
1405	III		260275				
<i>Don't S. 1000</i>							
<i>Ch. 1. K. 1000</i>							

EXHIBIT IS TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

EX

1967

485

ENGINEERING LOG SHEET
REV. 12 (REV. 10-51)
1000-2400

TO BE A TRUE COPY
19 67
PAGE 827

AT OR ENROUTE FROM
Rota

NOTES: * TO TENTHS; USE WHOLE NUMBERS FOR OTHER ITEMS
** ON GETTING UNDER WAY AND ANCHORING
USE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

TABLE 1

ZONE	AVG. RPM	SPD. IN KNOTS	ITEM
------	----------	---------------	------

01	45.0	10.0	BROUGHT FWD AT 0000
----	------	------	---------------------

02	45.0	10.0	REC'D TODAY
----	------	------	-------------

03	45.0	10.0	INCREASE BY INVENTORY
----	------	------	-----------------------

04	45.0	10.0	DISTILLED TODAY
----	------	------	-----------------

05	45.0	10.0	TOTAL RECEIPTS
----	------	------	----------------

06	45.0	10.0	EXPENDED BY USE
----	------	------	-----------------

07	45.0	10.0	EXPENDED BY INVENTORY
----	------	------	-----------------------

08	45.0	10.0	TOTAL EXPENDED
----	------	------	----------------

09	45.0	10.0	ON HAND AT 2400 TODAY
----	------	------	-----------------------

10	25.1	5.0	
----	------	-----	--

11	25.0	5.0	
----	------	-----	--

12	25.0	5.0	
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13	25.0	5.0	
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14	25.0	5.0	
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REMARKS - USE REVERSE SIDE
TIME ZONE DESCRIPTION
CLOCK SET
BACK OR AHEAD
HRS
MINUTES AT

00-00 Underway enroute from Rota, Spain to sea making

45.0 R.P.M., 10.0 Knots, standard speed at 60.0 R.P.M.

13.0 Knots, standard speed at 60.0 R.P.M.

EX-16

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (WHEN FILLED IN)

EX-16

EX-16

488

U.S. ENGINEER OFFICER

USN COMMANDING

APPROVED: SIGNATURE AND RANK

CORRECT: SIGNATURE AND RANK

B.H. 10/10/67

04-08 Underway and surface alert, 0440 Requested and received permission from the O.O. to light fuel under "2" section. 0011/3 lighted fuel under "2" section. 0505 Secured fuel under "2" section. 0510 Tactid and dropped 4-74-3-W into 5-79-0-W. Tactid at 0500 a.p.m. 0527 Cleared and cleared returned on "1" section. 0555 Requested 00-04 (Cont'd) Low pressure air compressor, and the reactor gyro compass. The following machinery in out of commission: CIC air - Conditioning unit, utility shaft, and the fuel water meter. 0001 Shifted fuel oil station from "1" to "2" 0002 Shifted fuel oil service pump from "2" to "1" 0004 Shifted low pressure air compressor from "1" to "2" 0005 Shifted main air system from forward to aft and 0006 Shifted low air system from "1" to "2" 0007 Shifted fuel water pump from "1" to "2" 0100 Stow "1" section surface level. 0110 Tactid and dropped 4-74-3-W into 5-79-0-W. Tactid at 0500 a.p.m. 0200 Cleared and cleared returned on "1" section. 0330 Requested permission from the O.O. to start fuel on "1" section. 0330 permission not granted. 0334 Received permission from the O.O. to start fuel on "1" section. 0334 Cleared and cleared returned on "1" section. 0330 Shifted, completed cleaning tank on "1" section. 0330 Shifted, inspected, and cleared fuel oil station on the main engine, "3" and "3" along main fuel generator. Bounding and security patrol reported Condition normal. All Reactor tank and inspection, Condition normal.

10/10/67

DATE 8-June-1967

Wiley (RG7E-5)

U.S.S. NAVSHIPS 117A (1-55)

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION

ERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

28

CORRECT: SIGNATURE AND RANK

DATE 8-2-1967

PAGE 23

REF ID: A70541

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION

NAVSHIPS 117A (1-55)

U.S.S.

Worthy

(B67R-5)

200

DATE _____

8. June - 1961

6

CORRECT: SIGNATURE AND RANK

DATE 8-24-1967

PAGE 30

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14

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION

NAVSHIPS 117A (1-55)

NAVSHIPS 117A (1-55)

U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5)

08-12 (Cont'd) c/s to 1/3, 25 R.P.M's, @ 0915 P.M. #1 (108000)

~~Exercises: Find a generator in the line parallel with #2 and~~

3. *Alfalfa* (various types) - 2000 Tons

~~Successive Finke-generation of the line history = 1 and = 3 changes~~

across three-generation in parallel supplying various markets

Final Research and Analysis Final Exam, 60922, April 8, 2011

and 5 other persons in the same manner

~~Handwritten scribbles and illegible text.~~

1. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 2. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 3. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 4. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 5. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 6. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 7. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 8. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 9. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$
 10. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

[illegible]

Alfred Service (Indo-German) with 21 other German

Indo -german) applying August 1944 and to. 00940

Take #1 at 100 minutes - generator off the line

~~Henry J. Allen, American (English) - English - American~~

Lower level tie @ 1000 lat also R.P.M's on #1 Altpad

various photo-generation with no lead at 1200 R.P.M's.

The total of the enclosed trip and shipboard expenses -

governor, Trip. A. at 1310, Hotel Lafayette, 21006

... ..

[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]

1920

[illegible]

1000

492 267 322

G/RO LOG

22 DEC 1966	1030	ARRIVED AT ABINGDON, SECURED
24 DEC 1966	1030	LIT OFF COMPASS FOR LENDING
23 JAN 1967	0830	ARRIVED AT LUMUDA, SECURED
26 JAN 1967	0830	LIT OFF COMPASS FOR LENDING
15 FEB 1967	0730	ARRIVED AT MONROVIA, SECURED
16 FEB 1967	0730	LIT OFF COMPASS FOR LENDING
18 FEB 1967	0930	ARRIVED AT JOE NARRA, SECURED
19 MAR 1967	1430	LIT OFF COMPASS FOR LENDING
24 MAR 1967	0940	ARRIVED NOB ABOLIA-SEAM
1 MAY 1967	0900	LIT OFF FOR SEA
12 MAY 1967	1000	GYRO TUMBLED - DIALS TAPPED
21 MAY 1967	0640	SECURED GYRO FOR INMART
23 MAY 1967	2230	LIT OFF GYRO FOR SEA

EX 17

EXHIBIT 17 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

D. L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

D. L. BURSON

COMMANDING OFFICER

5001

12-11-10

12-11-10

212-3 1973

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RAJEE
N.L.
15/11/14

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L.

~~17-21-77~~

LC 1457

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7-7 ARISA

PT.

KT: Side MT.

1711 100

171107010

7. N

7 י' תשרי ה'תשנ"א

1707

403

EXHIBIT 19 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY EX 19

494

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) DRT LOG

D.L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

TIME	LAT.	LONG.	INT	REMARKS
0000	31°59'N	32°24'E	AFK	
0100	31°59'N	32°35'E	AFK	
0200	31°58.5'N	32°47'E	AFK	
0300	31°58'N	33°00'E	AFK	
0400	31°57'N	33°10'E	AFK	
0500	31°47'N	33°20'E	AFK	
0600	31°41'N	33°30'E	AFK	
0700	31°38.5'N	33°35'E	AFK	
0800	31°34'N	33°50'E	AFK	
0900	31°27'N	33°54'E	AFK	
1000	31°27'N	33°51'E	AFK	
1100	31°44'N	33°41'E	AFK	
1200	31°22'N	33°41'E	AFK	
1300	31°23'N	33°35'E	AFK	

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE DEAD PERSONNEL.
THE BODIES OF THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN RECOVERED

569825/1100	SN	BLANCHARD, GARY R.
771 77.22	OM3	BROWN, FRANCIS (n)
778 76 70	CF3	HIGGINS, ALAN (n)
788 62 97	SN	HOAR, CARL
774 46 48	CF2	MENDLE, ANTHONY
777 62 87	ICEN	SKOLAK, DAVID
850 17 83	PC2	SPICHER, JOHN C.
473 41 77	GM3	THOMPSON, ALEXANDER
770 47 21	CF3	THORNTON, THOMAS R.
997 97 91	LF	JOHN, STEPHEN S.
669613/1100	CF1	WALTON, FREDERICK J.
236 31 86		
235 31 86		

EXHIBIT 20 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

Ex. 20

495

15071

495

EXHIBIT 21 to LIBERTY COURT of INQUIRY

496

Ex 21

CT3 WILLIAM B. ALLENBAUGH 684-49-46 USN
CT2 RONNIE J. CAMPBELL 5861323 USN
CT2 JERRY L. CONVERSE
CT2 ROBERT B. EISENBERG 1760935 USN
CT1 CURTIS A. GRAVES 5195824 USN
CTSN LAWRENCE P. HAYDEN 3705370 USN
CT1 WARREN E. HERSEY 9036711 USN
CT2 RICHARD W. KEENE 1788275 USN
CTSN JAMES L. LEMAU 4975658 USN
CTSA DAVID W. MARLBOROUGH 3160480 USN
CTC RAYMOND E. LINN 5711374 USN
CT3 DUANE R. MARGRAF 7739656 USN
LT JAMES C. PIERCE 649805/6462 USN
CT1 JOHN CALER SMITH 2377794 USN
CTC MELVIN D. SMITH 4939596 USN
CT3 PHILLIPPE C. THEDKE 9143284 USN
CT3 CARL C. NYGREN 7287716 USN
CPL EDWARD E. REHMEYER 2126919 USMC
SGT J.L. RAPER
CT3 JERRY L. GOSS
CPL JAMES M. LUPTON 5113128 USN
CIVILIAN ALLEN M. BLUE 53142327 06-7

PERSONNEL MISSING

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

The following is a list of the wounded Research Department personnel. Personnel are listed in alphabetical order according to name, and contains the rate and service number of each.

RESEARCH WOUNDED

OFFICERS

LT. ENNES, James M.
 LT. O'CONNOR, James G.
 LCDR. LEWIS, David E.
 653840/1615
 584572/1610
 671765/1615

ENLISTED

CT1 ADDINGTON, Reginald N.
 CT3 ANDERSON, Joe D.
 CT1 BAKER, Richard K.
 CT3 BENNETT, Lee R.
 CT3 BRONG, James V.
 CT1 CARLSON, Richard C.
 CT1 CARPENTER, Jeffere R.
 CT2 DAVIDSON, James R.
 CT3N EAKINS, Kenneth B.
 CT3N ECKER, Kenneth P.
 CT3 HAWKINS, David W.
 CT2 HENDRICKS, Charles R.
 CT2 JOHNS, Fredrick K.
 CT3 JOHNSON, Melvin P.
 CT3N KAVANAUGH, James P.
 CT3N KIRK, Eugene H.
 CT3 KREUN, Loren W.
 CT1 LENTINI, Joseph C.
 #SSGT LOCKWOOD, Bryce F.
 CT2 McFAGGEN, David L.
 CT2 MEYER, Stephen E.
 CT1 ROWLEY, Charles L.
 CT3 SHAFFER, Maurice B.
 CT3N SHAW, David A.
 CT3 SIX, Harold E.
 *CTC THOMPSON, Harold J.
 ET3 TIMMERMAN, Barry R.
 349 53 80
 771 76 77
 486 80 12
 139 55 74
 998 13 79
 913 41 23
 444 13 05
 535 14 05
 699 64 72
 794 04 69
 851 36 48
 118 73 49
 685 56 42
 794 91 14
 997 32 29
 918 51 32
 918 81 30
 538 49 74
 594 81 55
 185 98 56
 774 71 98
 771 42 03
 458 48 03
 695 94 36
 904 39 56
 777 58 53
 471 37 37
 770 11 63

CIVILIAN

BALLOCK, Donald L.

Denotes United States Marine Corps
 * Denotes Personnel retained on board

EXHIBIT 22 (a) to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

EX 22(a)

497
 190

GENERAL SERVICE
WOUNDED LIST

ENGINEERING DEPT

EM2 LEWY, William M. 773 35 21
IC1 RANDALL, John R. 517 81 45

DECK DEPT

SN CASPER, William E. 796 40 74
SN CONCEPCION, Rodney C. 674 38 09
SN COOK, Eddie L. 997 59 71
SN FOLLIN, Donald F. Jr. 917 66 74
GM3 HAZEN, David C. 696 84 98
SN JACKSON, Thomas F. 689 15 99
SN PAVAN, Salvador (n) 796 66 15
SN PIERSON, Gerald A. 794 07 20
SA RIELLY, Thomas J. Jr. 913 50 66
SN SLAVENS, Larry T. 916 92 00
SN SOFER, Larry L. 698 89 98
BMSM WARD, Jerry W. 775 76 67
SN WEAVER, Richard L. 999 88 63
SN WILSON, George W. 529 34 49

OPS DEPT

YN3 BROWNFELD, Virgil L. 794 23 49
SM2 DAVID, RUSSEL O. 683 33 65
SN LAMAR, John D. 779 56 36
SMSN MEADORS, Joseph L. 871 04 56
OM3 POLLARD, Floyd H. 353 55 47

SUPPLY DEPT

SH2 HEROLD, Donald (n) 609 22 48
SN LEMOND, Thomas W. 917 49 31
TN MARFEL, Sofronio P. 776 90 09
SN MATHEWS, Jimmy L. 998 21 92

498
197

EX 22 (8)

EXHIBIT 22 (8) to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

FBI, NEW YORK 09501

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

Wounded Transferred

Rate	For	Diagnosis
------	-----	-----------

Diagnosis
Compound Fracture Skull
Compound Fracture Skull
Wound Left Eye, Left Forearm
Mult. Puncture wounds, Pneumonitis
HEMOPNEUMOTHORAX

Pneumothorax
Perforated Bowel, Hemothorax
Cpd. Fr. L. Tibia and Fibula Pneumothorax
Penetrating wounds, back & kidney
Hemopneumothorax, Post laparotomy
Penetrating wound back- to colon
Multiple Puncture Wounds
Fracture L. Tibia Remained aboard
Flash burns face
Cpd Fracture L. Femur
Flash burns, face & eyes
Compound Fr. Radius & Ulna
Multiple Punctures, Cervical Sprain
Multiple Puncture wounds
Fracture - Forearm

"	Multiple bullet & Shrapnel wounds
"	Multiple Shrapnel wounds
"	Multiple Shrapnel wounds
"	Multiple Shrapnel wounds
"	Multiple Shrapnel wounds
"	Shrapnel-chest, amputated toe
"	Shrapnel Neck, Fractured Mandible
"	Shrapnel hand, leg

Shrapnel wounds, legs & Back
Shrapnel, Gluteal area
Shrapnel, L. Ankle
Shrapnel, R. Flank
Multiple Shrapnel Wounds
Shrapnel, Knee
Shrapnel, Gluteal & R. Thigh
Fracture, L. Ankle
Multiple Shrapnel Wounds

Multipel Sharpnel Wounds
Multipel Sharpnel Wounds
Multipel Sharpnel Wounds
Sharpnel Skull
Multipel Wounds Sharpnel
Multipel Wounds Sharpnel

SHRAPNEL, abedonen

$$EX_{22}(e)$$

EXHIBIT 22(C) TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

6677

8617

520 1499

Foreign Bodies R Temple, Hand, L Arm
Puncture Wounds-Multiple- with F.B.
Milt Puncture Wounds-Flash Burns Face
Finger Wound Hand-Lacerations milt contusions
Foreign Body Left Wrist
Lacerations R Hand
Contusions and Abrasions-Back
Foreign Body, 2nd Digit
Lac, R Hand, Hematoma R Wrist
Lac, R Hand, Contusion back
Abrasions L calf
Finger Wound R Shoulder
Milt, Contusions, Arms, L. Knee
Milt, Contusions, F.B. R Hand
Contusions L. Shoulder
Back Strain, Contusions Shoulders
Milt, Lacerations hand & Arms
Lac, L Hand
Lacerations and Contusions L Hand, Burns L Arm
Abrasion & Contusion R Leg & Calf
Fracture Tibia
Contusion L Lower Leg
Cerebral Contusion
Abrasion R Calf
Lac R Arm
Contusions Chest, Arms, Legs
F.B. L 5 Digit(hand)
Milt, Contusions ext's
Milt, Lac Hands
Lac, Arms(Milt)
Lac, Cont Hands, Knees, Chipped R Low, Can
Contusions Legs (bll)
Burns R Foot, Soft tissue inj. R Knee
Contusions, Knee, bll
Abrasions and Strain-Lower Back
Burns-Arms
Contusions, R. Calf & Thigh
Abrasions, Lac, contusions R Forearm
Abrasions, Cont, R. Lat Thorax
Abrasions Legs, Bll & Clitoral
Abrasions L. Thigh
Low Back Strain, Lac Fingers
Milt, Contusions lgs, bll
Punct, Wd. R. Knee, Burns R. Leg
Traumatic Hemarthrosis R. Knee
Lac, Finger, Puncture L. Calf, Thigh, Arm
L. B. Thigh, Contusions R. Arm
Puncture R. Thigh, Contusion Buttocks
Lac R. Hand
Lac, L. Leg
Lac, R. Shoulder, L Calf
Lac, R. Parietal, L Calf

WOUNDED PERSONS STILL ON BOARD

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder fr. Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY		OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY AGTR-5		VAROUS	VAR.	BICOM	500K06
TIME	TRANSMISSION				
	11256.51				
0000Z	NEW RADIO DAY....FREESE RM3... <i>FREESE</i>				
0430Z	SEC TWO OFF TO SEC ONE....FREESE RM3... <i>FREESE</i>				
0430Z	SEC ONE ASSUMED GUARD THIS FREQ <i>10000</i> RM2 <i>Halina</i>				
1130Z	AS	DE RS	K		
1158Z	AS	DE RS	Z K		
	AS	DE RS	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK, BE ADVISED WE ARE UNDER		
			ATTACK K		
	RS	DE SM	U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K		
	SM	DE RS	I SAY AGAIN WE ARE UNDER ATTACK, WE ARE UNDER		
			ATTACK INT QRK K		
	RS	DE SM	U ARE STILL GARBLED SAY AGAIN K		
	SM	DE RS	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K		
	AS	DE RS	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK DO U READ ME K		
1136X	SWITCHING XMTRS BUT NO LUCK,				
1204Z	AS	DE RS	K		
	RS	DE SM	K		
1208Z	SM	DE RS	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK (REPEATED ABOUT 3 TIM S) K		
1140Z	RS	DE SM	R R AR		
1141Z	SM	DE RS	K		
1209Z	RS	DE SM	K		
	SM	DE RS	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK AND NEED IMMED ASSIST. K		
	RS	DE SM	R INT ZNB (ETC..) K		
	SM	DE RS	ZNB (ETC.) K		
	RS	DE SM	ZNB CORRECT AS I AM STANDING BY FOR FURTHER		
1214Z			TRF K		
1146Z	SM	DE RS	R R AR		
1150Z	SM	DE RS	K		
1218Z	RS	DE SM	K		
	SM	DE RS	BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO LISTING		
1220Z			ABOUT 9 DEG REQUEST IMMED ASSIST K		
1152Z	RS	DE SM	R R AR		
1154Z	SM	DE RS	K		
1224Z	RS	DE SM	K		
	SM	DE RS	THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING THE SHIP K		
1157Z	RS	DE SM	R AR		
1227Z					
1233Z	DESTRUCTION BILL IN EFFECT				
1323Z	LOST POWER				
1355Z	Comm BACK UP				
1433Z	C.C TO 340' SPD & RTB.				
1445Z	FM CSF ASSISTANCE IS ON THE WAY.				
1500Z	LOST ALL POWER IN RDO CENT				

EX 23
 EXHIBIT 23 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY
 501

DATE 08 June 67
 PAGE NO. 1

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FRSO Cdg. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY		OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY AGTR-5		VARIOUS	VAR	6721 KCS	
TIME	TRANSMISSION				
1923Z	T.....O.....L.....E./JH/				
1939Z	RS DE BC	RDO CK K			
	BC DE RS	R K			
1940Z	RS DE BC	R AR			
1941Z	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	R REQUEST U CONFIRM NR OF MEN			
1943Z	BC DE RS	SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND NR JUST WOUNDED			
1945Z	BC DE RS	R AS AR			
	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
		REF UR LAST 10 DEAD, NR SERIOUSLY			
		INJURED 15 - 25 AND NR JUST UNJURED			
		100 K			
	RS DE BC	R I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED			
1950Z	BC DE RS	R XX K			
1951Z	RS DE BC	R AR			
	RS DE DTG	K			
	RS DE SM	BQ ADVISED DTG CALLING U K			
	DTG DE SM RS	REQ U SAY AGAIN K			
	RS DE DTG	(GARBLED) K			
	DTG DE RS	AS AR			
	SM DE RW	REQ U ACK AS RELAY FOR ME K			
1953Z	RS DE SM	R AR			
1954Z	JTG DE RS	R UR LAST K			
2013Z	RS DE SM	K			
	SM DE RS	U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	R K			
	B6 DE B6	REQ U AST AS RELAY BETWEEN SM AND ME			
	RS DE BC	R AR			
	RS DE BC	SM NEG TRF K			
2019Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
2023Z	RS DE FC	K			
	FC DE RS	K			
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K			
	FC DE RS	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BEARELY			
		READABLE AS AR			
	BC DE RS	REQ U RELAY FOR SM FC K			
	RS DE BC	I PASS FROM FC FM FC TO RS STEEL JAW			
		702 WILL BE AIRBORNE 2100Z TO ASSIST			
		RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION			
		BT K			
2030Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
2031Z	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	BC DE RS				
	RS DE BC				
		INT SERIOUSLY WOUNDED 15 -25 INCLUDED			
		IN NR WOUNDED 100 K			

DATE	PAGE NO.
08 JUNE 1961	

(OVER)

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TIME	TRANSMISSION
2031Z	T....O....L....E/JH/
2033Z	BC DE RS C K
2038Z	RS DE BC R AR
	RS DE BC K
	BC DE RS K
	RS DE BC I PASS FROM TOP HAND - REQ LIST OF
2040Z	BC DE RS MEN WOUNDED AND DEAD, NOT BY ANY INST
2041Z	RS DE JTG BUT JUST NAME OF MEN DEAD AND WOUNDED .
	JTG DE RS R AR
2042Z	RS DE JTG K RDO CK K
2201Z	FC DE RS U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K
	RS DE FC R AR
	FC DE RS O K
2305Z	RS DE FC K.
0000Z	NEW RADIO DAY.....09 JUNE 1967...FREESE RM3
0020Z	RS DE BC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS GOOD AND READABLE K
	RS DE BC R OUT
0138Z	RS DE SM RDO CK K
	SM DE RS U GOOD AND RADABLE K
0139Z	RS DE SM U GOOD AND RADABLE ALSO NEG TRF AR

503 502

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FFSO Cag. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	WARD, RM2	SECT TWO	HI COMM	11256.5
TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1750Z	T - D - L E			
1755Z	FM COMSIXTHFLR TO LIBERTY - POSSIBLE CONT CUS 340° MAG MAX SPD			
1802Z	FM CSF TO R S ESCORT PROCEED MAX SPD DESTROYERS UNTIL 100 MI FM RASHT POSIT THEN TURN 27			
1803Z	FM CS TO R S			
	SCHEMATIC DE RS			
	RS DE FF			
	FF DE RS			
	RS DE FF			
	FF DE RS			
1804Z	RS DE FF			
	RS DE CP			
	CP DE RS			
	RS DE CP			
1809Z	CP DE RS			
1815Z	RS DE DR			
1820Z	DR/DE/RS			
	DR DE RS			
	RS DE CP			
	CP DE RS			
1829Z	RS DE CP R			
1715Z	C P DE RD			
	RS DE C P			
	C P DE R S			
1742Z	R S DE C P			
1743Z	C P DE R S			
1800Z	R S DE CP			
	CP DE RS			
	CP DE RS			
	RS DE CP			
	CP DE RS			
	RS DE CP			
1805Z	CP DE RS			
1806Z	SM DE RS			
	RS DE SM			
	SM DE RS			
	RS DE SM			
1807Z	SM DE RS			
1808Z	SM DE RS			
	RS DE SM			
	SM DE RS			
1810Z	RS DE SM			

LOCAL TIME 1700

ESCORT ON WAY TO ASSIST DAMAGE AND IF
 - POSSIBLE CONT CUS 340° MAG MAX SPD
 UNTIL 100 MI FM RASHT POSIT THEN TURN 27
 REQ UR 1800Z EST POSIT K
 RGR UR LST FROM FAST CHARGER AR
 K
 K
 B ADVISED STA BELMONT IS CALLING U
 UR WWEAK AND BRLY RDABLE UNABLE TO
 READ BELONT K
 R ZUJ AR
 K
 K
 CALL SIGNS OF ESCORT ARE MATADORE
 AND BIG DIPPER K
 R AR
 ZX PASS FM FC DESTROYERS EXPECT TO
 RENDEVOUS WITH YOU AT 0700Z
 TOMMORROW K
 R AR
 IND U TOR JCS MSG 080110Z K
 OUR FILES WERE DESTROYED AND WE
 ARE UNABLE TO GET TO THEM WE DO NOT
 ACKNOWLEDGE RECPT OF THIS MSG K
 RGR AR
 000 K
 K
 00-081715Z (SEE FILES)
 QSL UR 081715Z AT TIME 1742Z K
 R AR
 K
 K
 GAY TIME GOLF ETA 0600Z HOLD EMPRE
 DOROTHY 081612Z K
 I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED)
 C WA DOROTHY TO READ 081612Z K
 R AR
 K
 INT TOR COMSIXTHFLT 081917Z K
 INT CORR TOR COMSIXTHFLT 081917Z K
 C WA COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z K
 R AS AR
 K
 K
 UNABLE TO LOCATE DUE TO CARPT SEALED
 OFF K
 R AR

DATE	PAGE NO.
08 JUNE 1967	

(OVER)

504 503

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1810Z	T.....O.....L.....E/JH/
1812Z	RS DE SM K SM DE RS K RS DE SM REQUEST YOU STEAR COURSE 300 DEG FOR RENDEZOUS MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT RPTS THIS NET K SM DE RS REQ U SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS K RS DE SM R I SAY AGQIN AA RENDEZOUS (REPEATED) K 1817Z SM DE RS R AR 1819Z SM DE RS K RS DE SM K SM DE RS WE ARE STEARING 300 DEG MAGNATIC AND ALSO WE ARE UNABLE TO GIVE POSIT K 1824Z RS DE SM R AR 1830Z RS DE CP INT TRFC K CP DE RS NEG K 1833Z RS DE CP R AR 1842Z RS DE DR K DR DE RS K 1843Z RS DE DR RR AS AS AR 1844Z RS DE DTG K DTG DE RS U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE REQ U REBAY THRU STA CP K 1845Z RS DE DTG R AR 1850Z RS DE FC K FC DE RS K RS DE FC INT U HAVE CAPABILITY OF SWIFTING FREQS K FC DE RS BELIEVED ZUE HOWEVER IF NOT HEARD 15 MIN REQ SWIFT BACK TO THIS FREQ K RS DE FC R DO NOT SWIFT FREQS YET, I WILL CONTACT NCS K 1853Z FC DE RS R AR 1856Z RS DE DR K DR DE RS K RS DE DR INT KNOW FREQ 4B K DR DE RS C K 1859Z RS DE DR R AS AR 1901Z ATTEMPTING TO QSY 1915Z QSY COMPLETED 1918Z AA DE RS RDO CK K DE BC (GARBLED) K AA DE RS SAY AGAIN AND GIVE LONG COUNT K RS DE BC U GOOD AND READABLE K 1923Z BC DE RS R AR RS DE BC RDO CK K BC DE RS R K RS DE BC R AR RS DE CP RDO CK K CP DE RS R K RS DE CP R AR RS DE FC RDO CK K FC DE RS R K RS DE FC R AR

505 504

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPO. Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	WARD, RM2	TWO	H1 COMM	11236.5 KC
TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1609Z	T O L E			
1611Z	C P D E R S	K		
	R S D E C P	K		
	C P D E R D	PASS TO F C MY 1800Z POSIT 31°35'N		
		33° 32'E NORTHWEST AT 10 KTS K		
1614Z	R S D E C P	R AR		
1614Z	JPW			
1620Z	R S D E D E R A I L	K		
	D R D E R S	K		
	R S D E D R	I PASS FM F C BT DESTROYERS EXPECT TO		
		RENDEZVOUS WITH U AT APPROX 0700Z TOMMOROW		
1621Z	D R D E R S	R AR		
1622Z	R S D E C P	K		
	C P D E R S	K		
	R S D E C P	I PASS FROM FANFARE BT INT TOR JCS MSG		
		080110Z K		
1623Z	C P D E R S	ZUJ AR		
1625Z	CP D E R S	K		
	R S D E C P	K		
	C P D E R S	PASS TO FANFARE BT OUR FILES WERE DESTROYED		
		DURING BATTLE WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT		
		OF THIS MSG. RPT DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT		
		OF THIS MSG K		
1629Z	R S D E C P	R AR		
1715Z	C P D E R S	000 K		
	R S D E C P	K		
	C P D E R S	-0-081715Z (SEE FILES)		
1742Z	R S D E C P	QSL UR 081715Z AT TIME 1742Z K		
1743Z	C P D E R S	R AR		
R S D E C P		K		
	C P D E R S	K		
1800Z	R S D E C P	GAY TIME GOLF ETA 0600Z HOLD EMPRESS		
		DOROTHY 081612Z K		
	CP D E R S	I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED) K		
1805Z	R S D E C P	C WA DOROTHY TO READ 081612Z K		
1806Z	C P D E R S	R AR		
	R S D E S M	K		
	S M D E R S	K		
	R S D E S M	INT TOR COMSIXTHFLT 081917Z K		
	S M D E R S	INT CORR INT TOR CSF 081917Z K		
	R S D E C P	C WA C S F 080917Z K		
1807Z	C P D E R S	R ZUJ AR		
1810Z	C P D E R S	K		
	R S D E C P	K		
	C P D E R S	COMMUNICATIONS SPACES DESTROYED DURING		
		BATTLE, UNABLE TO LOCATE SUBJ MSG DUE		
		SPACES SEALED OFF DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT		
		OF SUBJ MSG K		
1810Z	R S D E C P	R AR		

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TIME	TRANSMISSION
1810Z	T O L E/JH/
1812Z	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM REQUEST YOU STEER COURSE 300 DEG FOR RENDEZOUS MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT REPORTS THIS NET K
	SM DE RS REQ U SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS K
1817Z	RS DE SM R I SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS (REPEATED) K
1819Z	SM DE RS R AR
	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS WE ARE STEERING COURSE 300 DEG MAGNETIC AND ALSO WE ARE UNABLE TO GIBE POSIT K
1824Z	RS DE SM R AR
1830Z	RS DE CP INT TFC K
	CP DE RS NEG K
1833Z	RS DE CP R AR
1842Z	RS DE DERAELS K
	DR DE RS K
1843Z	RS DE DR R AS AR
1844Z	RS DE GAY TIME GOLF K
	GTG DE RS U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE REQUEST U RELAY THRU STA CP K
1845Z	RS DE GTG R AR
1850Z	RS DE FASTCHARGER K
	FC DE RS K
	RS DE FC INT U HAVE CAPABILITY OF SW SHIFTING FREQS K
	FC DE RS BELIEVED ZUE, HOWEVER IF NOT HEARD 15 MIN REQ SHIFT BACK TO THIS FREQ K
	RS DE FC R DO NOT SHIFT FREQS YET, I WILL CONTACT NCS K
1853Z	FC DE RS R AR
1856Z	RS DE DR K
	DR DE RS K
	RS DE DR INT KNOW FREQ 4B K
	DR DE RS C K
1859Z	RS DE DR R AS AR
1901Z	ATTEMPTING TO QSY 4B
1915Z	QSY COMPLETED
1918Z	ANY STA DE RS RDO CK K
	RS DE BLUECAT (GARBLED) K
	BC DE RS SAY AGAIN AND GIBE LONG COUNT K
	RS DE BC U GOOD AND READABLE K
1923Z	BC DE RS R AR
1924Z	RS DE BC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS R K
1925Z	RS DE BC R AR
1930Z	RS DE CP RDO CK K
	CP DE RS R K
1931Z	RS DE CP R AR
1932Z	RS DE FC RDO CK K
	FC DE RS R K
1933Z	RS DE FC R AR

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPS-1 Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY		OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)		HALMAN RM2	ONE	HI- COM	6721.5KCS
TIME	TRANSMISSION				
1933Z	T.....O.....L.....E/JH/				
1939Z	RS DE BC	RDO CK K			
	BC DE RS	R K			
1940Z	RS DE BC	R AR			
1941Z	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	R REQUEST U CONFIRM NR OF MEN SERIOUSLY INJURED AND NR JUST WOUNDED K			
1943Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
1945Z	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	REF YOUR LAST - 10 DEAD, NR SERIOUSLY INJURED 15 TO 25 AND NR JUST INJURED 100 K			
	RS DE BC	R I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED) K			
1950Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
1951Z	RS DE GTG	K			
	GTG DE RS	K			
	RS DE RS SM	BE ADVISED GTG CALLING U K			
	GTG DE RS	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE SAY AGAIN K			
	RS DE GTG	(GARBLED) K			
	GTG DE RS	AS AR			
	SM DE RS	REQ U ACT AS RELAY FOR ME K			
1953Z	RS DE SM	R AR			
1954Z	RS DE SM	(GARBLED) K			
	SM DE RS	U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	R K			
	BC DE RS	REQ U ACT AS RELAY BETWEEN SM AND ME K			
2016Z	RS DE RS	R AR			
2017Z	RS DE BC	SM NEG TRF K			
2018Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
2023Z	RS DE FC	K			
	FC DE RS	K			
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K			
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K			
	FC DE RS	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE AS AR			
	BC DE RS	REQ U RELAY FOR FC K			
	RS DE BC	I PASS FROM FC FM FC TO RS STEEL JAW 702 WILL BE AIRBORNE 2100Z TO ASSIST RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION K			
2030Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
2031Z	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	INT SERIOUSLY WOUNDED 15 TO 25 INCLUED IN NUMBER 100 K			

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ACTIVITY		OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)		VARRIOUS	VAR	HI COMM	11256.5 KC
TIME	TRANSMISSION				
0001Z	NEW RDO DAY NEW LOG 08 JUN 67 ----- E. FREESE, RM3				
0430Z	SECT TWO OFF TO SECT ONE E. FREESE, RM3				
0430Z	SECT ONE ASSUMED WATCH THIS FREQ <i>Haltman Rm 2</i>				
1158Z	ANY STA DE RCK STR K				
	A S DE R S Z K				
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K				
1200Z	R S DE SCHEMATIC U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K				
	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K				
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K				
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK DO U READ ME K				
1204Z	SWITCHING XMITRS BUT NO LUCK				
	A S DE R S K				
	R S DE SCHEMATIC K				
1208Z	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK (RPTED ABOUT THREE TI				
	R S DE S M R R AR				
	S M DE R S K				
1209Z	R S DE S M K				
	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK AND NEED IMMED ASSIST I				
	R S DE S M R INT ZNB (ETC..) K				
	S M DE R S ZNB (ETC..) K				
	R S DE S M ZNB CORRECT AS I AM STANDING BY FOR				
	FURTHER TRFK K				
1214Z	SM DE R S R R AR				
	S M DE R S K				
	R S DE S M K				
1217Z	S M DE R S BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO				
	LISTING ABOUT NINE DEG REQUEST IMMED				
	ASSISTANCE K				
1220Z	R S DE S M R R AR				
	S M DE R S K				
1224Z	R S DE S M K				
	S M DE R S THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING SHIP K				
1227Z	R S DE S M R AR				
1233Z	EMEG DESTRUCT BILL IN EFFECT.				
1233Z	FROM 1233 TO 1320Z NO SIGS RECVD OR SENT				
1323Z	POWER FAILURE LOST POWER THROUGH SHIP				
1355Z	POWER RESTORED, PATCH PANELS IN RDO CENT INOPP. SHIFTED				
	CONTROL TO XMITR ROOM				
1355Z	XMITR ROOM ASSUMES CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, WARD, FM2 SUPVSR.				
1356Z	HAVE HI COMM XMITR ON AIR BUT HAVE NO RCVR IN POSITION.				
1400Z	FST CHARGER DE R S Z Z Z I PASS IN THE BLIND WE ARE UNDER				
	ATTACK BY A/C AND HIGH SPD SURFACE CRAFT				
	I SAY AGAIN Z Z Z I PASS IN THE BLIND				
	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK BY A/C AND HIGH				
	SPD SURFACE CRAFT K				
1402Z	AT THIS TIME WE HAVE COORDINATION ESTABLISHED BETWEEN XMITR				
	ROOM AND RDO CENTRL RDO CENTRL HAS RCVR				
	AND WE HAVE XMITR IN LOCAL POSIT.				
	WE PASS TRF ON XMITR AND RDO RELAYS OTHER				

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EXHIBIT 24 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY
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TIME	TRANSMISSION
1402Z	T O L E STATIONS ANSWER, ADVISE OR INQUIRY.
1405Z	FAST CHARGER DE R S ZZZ K R S DE F C K F C DE R S BT REQ IMMED ASSISTANCE. TORPEDO HIT STBD MIDSHIP. FLOODING. LIST WAS AT NINE DEG. APPROX CASUALTIES FOUR DEAD, THREE SERV WOUNDED, FIFTY WOUNDED. RADAR, FATHOMETER, AND GYRO INOP. WILL REQUIRE NAV AID CONSISTING OF SEA AND AIR ESCORT. LAST KNOWN POSIT, TIME 1405Z THIRTY ONE DEG THIRTY FIVE POINT FIVE MIN NORTH, THIRTY THREE DEG TWENTY NINE MIN EAST BT K
1410Z	R S DE F C R R AR
1410Z	FROM 1 10Z TO 1433Z NO SIGS RCVD OR SENT
1433Z	F C DE R S CHANGED CUS TO 340 DEG AT EIGHT KTS K
1434Z	R S DE F C R AR
1445Z	R S DE F C K F C DE R S K R S DE F C ASSISTANCE IS ON THE WAY K F C DE R S R AR
1447Z	SOMETIME BETWEEN 1405Z AND 1445Z ET S HAVE BROUGHT A R390 RCVR TO POSITION IN XMIT ROOM AND NOW IS TUNED AND IN OPERATION XMITR ROOM NOW ASSUMES ALL COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL .. JPW
1500Z	LOST ALL POWER
1520Z	APPROX TIME .. POWER RETURNED ALL XMITRS INOP EXCEPT WRT-2 NUMBER TWO .. ALL ANTENNAS DESTROYED OR INOP EXCEPT POIT TUNER
1550Z	R S DE S M K S M DE R S K R S DE S M I PASS FM FAST CHARGER BT ESCORT ON WAY TO ASSIST DAMAGE AND IF POSSIBLE CONT CUS 340° MAGNETIC AND MAX SPD UNTIL 100 MILES FROM PRESENT POSIT THEN TURN TO 270 DEG K
1552Z	S M DE R S R AR
1555Z	R S DE S M I PASS FM FAST CHARGER BT ESCORT PROCEEDING AT MAX SPD DESTROYERS K
1555Z	S M DE R S R AR
1602Z	R S DE CACTUS PETE K C P DE R S K R S DE C P I PASS FM F C BT REQ UR 1800Z EST POSIT K C P DE R S R ZUJ AR R S DE FF(FANFARE) K FF DE R S K
1604Z	R S DE F F BE ADVISED STA BELMONT CALLING U K F F DE R S UR WEAK AND BARELY READABLE . UNABLE TO READ STA BELMONT K
1604Z	R S DE F F R ZUJ AR R S DE C P K C P DE R S K R S DE C P CALL SIGSNS OF ESCORT ARE MATADORE AND BIG DIPPER K
1609Z	C P DE R S R AR

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RADIO LOG

CPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder fr. SO Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY		OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)		VARRIOUS	VAR	HI COMM	11256.5 KCS
TIME	TRANSMISSION				
0001Z	NEW RDO DAY NEW LOG 08 JUN 67 ----- E. FREESE, RM3				
0430Z	SECT TWO OFF TO SECT ONE E. FREESE, RM3				
0430Z	SECT ONE ASSUMED WATCH THIS FREQ <i>Hatfield Radio</i>				
1153Z	ANY STA DE RCK STR K				
	A S DE R S Z K				
	A S DE R S				
1200Z	R S DE SCHEMATIC WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K				
	S M DE R S U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K				
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K				
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K				
1204Z	SWITCHING XMITRS BUT NO LUCK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK DO U READ ME K				
	A S DE R S K				
	R S DE SCHEMATIC K				
1208Z	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK (RPTED ABOUT THREE TIME				
	R S DE S M R R AR				
	S M DE R S K				
1209Z	R S DE S M K				
	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK AND NEED IMMED ASSIST K				
	R S DE S M R INT ZNB (ETC..) K				
	S M DE R S ZNB (ETC..) K				
	R S DE S M ZNB CORRECT AS I AM STANDING BY FOR				
1214Z	SM DE R S FURTHER TRFK K				
	S M DE R S R R AR				
	R S DE S M K				
1217Z	S M DE R S BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO				
	LISTING ABOUT NINE DEG REQUEST IMMED				
	ASSISTANCE K				
1220Z	R S DE S M R R AR				
	S M DE R S K				
1224Z	R S DE S M K				
	S M DE R S THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING SHIP K				
1227Z	R S DE S M R AR				
1233Z	EMEG DESTRUCT BILL IN EFFECT.				
1233Z	FROM 1233 TO 1323Z NO SIGS RECVD OR SENT				
1323Z	POWER FAILURE LOST POWER THROUGH SHIP				
1355Z	POWER RESTORED, PATCH PANNELS IN RDO CENT INOPP. SHIFTED				
	CONTROL TO XMITR ROOM				
1355Z	XMITR ROOM ASSUMES CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, WARD, RM2 SUPVSR.				
1356Z	HAVE HI COMM XMITR ON AIR BUT HAVE NO RCVR IN POSITION.				
1400Z	FST CHARGER DE R S Z Z Z I PASS IN THE BLIND WE ARE UNDER				
	ATTACK BY A/C AND HIGH SPD SURFACE CRAFT				
	I SAY AGAIN Z Z Z I PASS IN THE BLIND				
	WE ARE UNDER ATTACK BY A/C AND HIGH				
	SPD SURFACE CRAFT K				
1402Z	AT THIS TIME WE HAVE COORDINATION ESTABLISHED BETWEEN XMITR				
	ROOM AND RDO CENTRL RDO CENTRL HAS RCVR				
	AND WE HAVE XMITR IN LOCAL POSIT.				
	WE PASS TRF ON XMITR AND RDO RELAYS OTHER				

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TIME	TRANSMISSION
1402Z	T O L E STATIONS ANSWER, ADVISE OR INQUIRY.
1405Z	FAST CHARGER DE R S ZZZ K R S DE F C K F C DE R S BT REQ IMMED ASSISTANCE. TORPEDO HIT STBD MIDSHIP. FLOODING. LIST WAS AT NINE DEG. APPROX CASUALTIES FOUR DEAD, THREE SERV WOUNDED, FIFTY WOUNDED. RADAR, FATHOMETER, AND GYRO INOP. WILL REQUIRE NAV AID CONSISTING OF SEA AND AIR ESCORT. LAST KNOWN POSIT, TIME 1405Z THIRTY ONE DEG THIRTY FIVE POINT FIVE MIN NORTH, THIRTY THREE DEG TWENTY NINE MIN EAST BT K
1410Z	R S DE F C R R AR
1410Z	FROM 1410Z TO 1433Z NO SIGS RCVD OR SENT
1433Z	F C DE R S CHANGED CUS TO 340 DEG AT EIGHT KTS K
1434Z	R S DE F C R AR
1445Z	R S DE F C K F C DE R S K R S DE F C ASSISTANCE IS ON THE WAY K F C DE R S R AR
1447Z	SOMETIME BETWEEN 1405Z AND 1445Z ET S HAVE BROUGHT A R390 RCVR TO POSITION IN XMIT ROOM AND NOW IS TUNED AND IN OPERATION XMITR ROOM NOW ASSUMES ALL COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL .. JPW
1500Z	LOST ALL POWER
1520Z	APPROX TIME .. POWER RETURNED ALL XMITRS INOP EXCEPT WRT-2 NUMBER TWO .. ALL ANTENNAS DESTROYED OR INOP EXCEPT PORT TUNER
1550Z	R S DE S M K S M DE R S K R S DE S M I PASS FM FAST CHARGER BT ESCORT ON WAY TO ASSIST DAMAGE AND IF POSSIBLE CONT CUS 340 MAGNETIC AND MAX SPD UNTIL 100 MILES FROM PRESENT POSIT THEN TURN TO 270 DEG K
1552Z	S M DE R S R AR
1555Z	R S DE S M I PASS FM FAST CHARGER BT ESCORT PROCEEDING AT MAX SPD DESTROYERS K
1555Z	S M DE R S R AR
1602Z	R S DE CACTUS PETE K C P DE R S K R S DE C P I PASS FM F C BT REQ UR 1800Z EST POSIT K C P DE R S R ZUJ AR R S DE FF(FANFARE) K FF DE R S K
1604Z	R S DE F F BE ADVISED STA BELMONT CALLING U K F F DE R S UR WEAK AND BARELY READABLE . UNABLE TO READ STA BELMONT K
1604Z	R S DE F F R ZUJ AR R S DE C P K C P DE R S K R S DE C P CALL SIGSNS OF ESCORT ARE MATADORE AND BIG DIPPER K
1609Z	C P DE R S R AR

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 231-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from 1 Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

OPERATOR
WARD, RM2

CREW
TWO

CIRCUIT
HI COMM

FREQUENCY
11236.5 KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1609Z	T O L E
1611Z	C P D E R S K R S D E C P K C P D E R D PASS TO F C MY 1800Z POSIT 31°35'N 33° 32'E NORTHWEST AT 10 KTS K R AR
1614Z	R S D E C P
1614Z	JPW
1620Z	R S D E D E R A I L K D R D E R S K R S D E D R I PASS FM F C BT DESTROYERS EXPECT TO RENDEZVOUS WITH U AT APPROX 0700Z TOMMOROW R AR
1621Z	D R D E R S
1622Z	R S D E C P K C P D E R S K R S D E C P I PASS FROM FANFARE BT INT TOR JCS MSG 080110Z K ZUJ AR
1623Z	C P D E R S
1625Z	CP D E R S K R S D E C P K C P D E R S PASS TO FANFARE BT OUR FILES WERE DESTROYED DURING BATTLE WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MSG. RPT DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MSG K R AR
1629Z	R S D E C P
1715Z	C P D E R S R S D E C P C P D E R S -O-081715Z (SEE FILES) QSL UR 081715Z AT TIME 1742Z K R AR
1742Z	R S D E C P
1743Z	C P D E R S
R S D E C P	K
1800Z	C P D E R S K R S D E C P GAY TIME GOLF ETA 0600Z HOLD EMPRESS DOROTHY 081612Z K I READ BACK FOR PO'S CORR (REPEATED) K C WA DOROTHY TO READ 081612Z K R AR
1805Z	CP D E R S
1806Z	R S D E C P C P D E R S R S D E S M S M D E R S R S D E S M S M D E R S R S D E C P C P D E R S C WA C S F 080917Z K R ZUJ AR
1807Z	C P D E R S
1810Z	C P D E R S K R S D E C P K C P D E R S COMMUNICATIONS SPACES DESTROYED DURING BATTLE, UNABLE TO LOCATE SUBJ MSG DUE SPACES SEALED OFF DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF SUBJ MSG K R AR
1810Z	R S D E C P

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TIME	TRANSMISSION
1810Z	T O L E/JH/
1812Z	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM REQUEST YOU STEER COURSE 300 DEG FOR RENDEZOUS MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT REPORTS THIS NET K
	SM DE RS REQ U SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS K
1817Z	RS DE SM R I SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS (REPEATED) K
1819Z	SM DE RS R AR
	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS WE ARE STEERING COURSE 300 DEG MAGNETIC AND ALSO WE ARE UNABLE TO GIBE POSIT K
1824Z	RS DE SM R AR
1830Z	RS DE CP INT TFC K
	CP DE RS NEG K
1833Z	RS DE CP R AR
1842Z	RS DE DERAILED K
	DR DE RS K
1843Z	RS DE DR R AS AR
1844Z	RS DE GAY TIME GOLF K
	GTG DE RS U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE REQUEST U RELAY THRU STA CP K
1845Z	RS DE GTG R AR
1850Z	RS DE FASTCHARGER K
	FC DE RS K
	RS DE FC INT U HAVE CAPABILITY OF SW SHIFTING FREQS K
	FC DE RS BELIEVED ZUE, HOWEVER IF NOT HEARD 15 MIN REQ SHIFT BACK TO THIS FREQ K
	RS DE FC R DO NOT SHIFT FREQS YET, I WILL CONTACT NCS K
1853Z	FC DE RS R AR
1856Z	RS DE DR K
	DR DE RS K
	RS DE DR INT KNOW FREQ 4B K
	DR DE RS C K
1859Z	RS DE DR R AS AR
1901Z	ATTEMPTING TO QSY 4B
1915Z	QSY COMPLETED
1918Z	ANY STA DE RS RDO CK K
	RS DE BLUECAT (GARBLED) K
	BC DE RS SAY AGAIN AND GIBE LONG COUNT K
	RS DE BC U GOOD AND READABLE K
1923Z	BC DE RS R AR
1924Z	RS DE BC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS R K
1925Z	RS DE BC R AR
1930Z	RS DE CP RDO CK K
	CP DE RS R K
1931Z	RS DE CP R AR
1932Z	RS DE FC RDO CK K
	FC DE RS R K
1933Z	RS DE FC R AR

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder: 50 Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY		OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)		HALMAN RM2	ONE	HI- COM	6721.5KCS
TIME	TRANSMISSION				
1933Z	T.....O.....L.....E/JH/				
1939Z	RS DE BC	RDO CK K			
	BC DE RS	R K			
1940Z	RS DE BC	R AR			
1941Z	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	R REQUEST U CONFIRM NR OF MEN SERIOUSLY INJURED AND NR JUST WOUNDED K			
1943Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
1945Z	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	REF YOUR LAST - 10 DEAD, NR SERIOUSLY INJURED 15 TO 25 AND NR JUST INJURED 100 K			
1950Z	RS DE BC	R I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED) K			
1951Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
	RS DE GTG	K			
	GTG DE RS	K			
	RS DE RS SM	BE ADVISED GTG CALLING U K			
	GTG DE RS	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE SAY AGAIN K			
	RS DE GTG	(GARBLED) K			
	GTG DE RS	AS AR			
1953Z	SM DE RS	REQ U ACT AS RELAY FOR ME K			
1954Z	RS DE SM	R AR			
	RS DE SM	(GARBLED) K			
	SM DE RS	U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	R K			
2016Z	BC DE RS	REQ U ACT AS RELAY BETWEEN SM AND ME K			
2017Z	RS DE RS	R AR			
2018Z	RS DE BC	SM NEG TRF K			
2923Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
	RS DE FC	K			
	FC DE RS	K			
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K			
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K			
	FC DE RS	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE AS AR			
	BC DE RS	REQ U RELAY FOR FC K			
	RS DE BC	I PASS FROM FC FM FC TO RS STEEL JAW 702 WILL BE AIRBORNE 2100Z TO ASSIST RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION K			
2030Z	BC DE RS	R AR			
2031Z	RS DE BC	K			
	BC DE RS	K			
	RS DE BC	INT SERIOUSLY WOUNDED 15 TO 25 INCLUDED IN NUMBER 100 K			

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TIME	TRANSMISSION
2031Z	T.....O.....L....E/JH/ BC DE RS C K
2033Z	RS DE BC R AR
2038Z	RS DE BC K BC DE RS K RS DE BC I PASS FROM TOP HAND - REQ LIST OF MEN WOUNDED AND DEAD, NOT BY ANY INST BUT JUST NAME OF MEN DEAD AND WOUNDED K
2040Z	BC DE RS R AR
2041Z	RS DE GTG RDO CK K
2042Z	GTG DE RS U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K
2201Z	RS DE GTG AR RS DE RS O K RS DE FC K FC DE RS -T-0-082202Z FM ROCKSTAR TO SECNAV INFO BUPERS, CHIEF BUMED, NAVFINCEN CLEVELAND, COMFIVE, CNO, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCLANTFLT, COMSIXTHFLT, COMSERVLANT, COMSEAFRON EIGHT BT UNCLAS C/FILES BT K
2305Z	RS DE FC R AR
2359Z	END OF DAY END OF RADIO LOG FOR 08 JUN 1967 / HALMAN RM2.

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FR-1 Cog. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	OPERATOR FREESE RM3	CREW TWO	CIRCUIT HI-COMM	FREQUENCY 6721.5KCS
----------------------------------	------------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------------

TIME	TRANSMISSION
0001Z	NEW RADIO DAY..... 09 JUNE 1967 /... FREESE RM3
0020Z	RS DE BC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS GOOD AND READABLE K
0021Z	RS DE BC R AR
0138Z	RS DE SM RDO CK K
	SM DE RS U GOOD AND READABLE K
0139Z	RS DE SM U GOOD AND READABLE ALSO NEG TFC AR
0200Z	SHIFTED MOST TFC TO FLEET COMMON UHF
0201Z	STATION BC CONTINUED TO GIVE RDO CKS EVERY 15 MIN.
0500Z	SECURED FROM THIS CIRCUIT, STATION MATADOR ASSUMED GUARD THIS FREQ / HALMAN RM2... <i>Halman</i> ...

DATE 09 JUNE 1967	PAGE NO. 1 OF 1
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(OVER)

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-52) Recorder from P. Log. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000.

ACTIVITY USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	OPERATOR FREESE RM3	CREW TWO	CIRCUIT HI-COMM	FREQUENCY 6721.5KCS
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0500Z	SECURED FROM THIS CIRCUIT, STATION MATADOR ASSUMED GUARD THIS FREQ / HALMAN RM2.....

DATE 09 JUNE 1967	PAGE NO. 1 OF 1
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(OVER)

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14 June 1967

Statement by Captain R. L. ARTHUR, 415894/1400, USN
Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer

1. A preliminary estimate of the time required to make permanent shell repairs repairs to and necessary associated interior strength members is two to three weeks.
2. A firm estimate will require a detailed survey, not expected to commence until 15 June.

R. L. Arthur

EXHIBIT 25 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

EX 25

520

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IDENT DISTANCE 4-7 MILES
 1426 NOTICED NORMAL STEAMING ENSIGN SHOT AWAY DURING AIR ATTACK.
 HOLIDAY SIZE ENSIGN HOISTED ON PORT YARDARM.
 1428 MTB SIGNALLING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STBD QUARTER. LIGHT
 OBSCURED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALEBOAT.
 1430 ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE GUN 51. C.O. ORDERED HOLD FIRE.
 1431 MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE. C.O. SENT ENS LUCAS AROUND PORT
 SIDE OF BRIDGE TO GET MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING
 1431 WORD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD.
 MTB COMMENCED STRAFING STARBOARD SIDE OF SHIP
 1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF SHIP.
 1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS.
 TWENTY SIX MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB
 STRAFING FIRE.
 1435 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.
 1436 LOST STEAM PRESSURE- SECURED ENGINES AND BOILERS -
 MANY GAUGES AND METERS IN FIREROOM AND ENGINE ROOM WERE KNOCKED
 OUT. TORPEDO HIT IN RESEARCH COORDINATION CENTER WHERE
 APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MEN WERE AT G.Q. STATIONS. THESE SPACES

PAGE FIVE RUQKRM 001DLV ~~SECRET~~
 FLOODED INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THIS SPACE DIED OF
 EITHER BLAST OR DROWNING. NO SIGNS OF LIFE EMINATING FROM COORDINATION
 CENTER AND ADJACENT SPACES WHICH COULD NOT BE OPENED WITHOUT
 DANGER OF FLOODING OTHER SPACES.
 1440 MTB'S STANDING AWAY FROM THE SHIP. ONE MTB HAS HULL NUMBER
 206-17
 1503 ONE MTB RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALLED "DO YOU NEED HELP"
 IN ENGLISH. C.O. SIGNALLED "NEGATIVE"
 1505 MTB'S RETIRED TOWARD SHORE
 1507 HELICOPTER BEARING STAR OF DAVIS MARKINGS APPROACHED SHIP,
 PORT SIDE, HOVERING AT ABOUT 500 YDS DISTANCE.
 1508 SECOND HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP.
 MARKINGS ON HELICOPTERS ARE 04 AND 08 OR D4 AND D8. HELICOPTER
 MADE REPEATED PASSES AROUND AND OVER SHIP. THEY WERE NOT
 OBSERVED TO PICK UP ANY BODIES, PERSONS OR DEBRIS.
 1519 POWER RESTORED TO BRIDGE BUT RUDDER DID NOT ANSWER -
 CONTINUED STEERING FROM AFTER STEERING.
 1536 MTB'S APPROACHING SHIP STARBOARD SIDE 7-8 MILES DISTANT.
 DURING NEXT HOUR AND A QUARTER THE MTB'S RETURNED TO THE SHIP
 SEVERAL TIMES AND BY 1713 THEY HAD RETIRED OUT OF SIGHT OVER

PAGE SIX RUQKRM 001DLV ~~SECRET~~
 THE HORIZON.
 1615 TWO UNIDENTIFIED JET A/C APPROACHED SHIP FROM THE STBD SIDE
 AND RECONNOITERED FROM A DISTANCE.
 1620 ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR AREA STEERING NORTHERLY COURSE AT SPEEDS
 VARYING FROM 0 TO 8 KNOTS. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WERE TREATED IN
 THE WARDROOM ON A CONTINUING BASIS, DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE
 FIGHTING CONTROLLED FLOODING AND DAMAGE, ENGINEERING
 CASUALTIES WERE RESTORED BUT STEERING WAS BY HAND FROM AFTER
 STEERING.
 1845 ISRAELI HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP- CIRCLED CLOSE ABOARD
 AND ATTEMPTED TO SIGNAL - THEY APPEARED TO DESIRE TO LOWER
 SOMEONE TO THE DECK - C.O. CONSIDERED REFEIVING HIM ON FORECASTLE
 BUT RULED THIS OUT AS TO HAZZARDOUS. REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO
 COMMUNICATE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AND AT 1852 COPTER DROPPED
 A MESSAGE PACKET ON FORECASTLE. THE MESSAGE, WRITTEN ON A CALLING
 CARD OF THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE TEL AVIV, ASKED "HAVE YOU
 CASUALTIES". SHIP TRIED BY SEVERAL MEANS TO INDICATE, DURING NEXT
 TEN MINUTES THAT THERE WERE MANY CASUALTIES BUT THERE WAS NO
 INDICATION THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERSTOOD. THE MUTILATED
 BODIES OF THREE DEAD CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT YET BEEN REMOVED

PAGE SEVEN RUQKRM 001DLV ~~SECRET~~
 FROM THE FORECASTLE AND MUST HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE
 HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED THE SHIP SHORTLY BEFORE
 SUNSET (ABOUT 1905) SHIP CONTINUED STEAMING THROUGH NIGHT TO
 RDVU WITH ESCORTS DISPATCHED BY COMSIXTHFLT
 3. FOREGOING CONSTITUTES DETAILED RECONSTRUCTION FROM QM NOTEBOOK,
 CIC LOG, BELL BOOK AND BEST RECOLLECTION OF CO/CHIEF ENGR/
 CON OFF/BRIDGE PERSONNEL. ALL CONCUR

GP-3

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (On-going to)

by authority of OANV/MNS-009472/131
 on 27 June 1984 DR/gram 8 21 June 86

(Date) (Rank) (Signature)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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Cover 4 of 7 copies 54

27

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00 RUQKRQ
DE RUQKRM 001DLV 1660016
ZNY SSSSS
O 150016Z JUN 67 ZFF1
FM COMDESRON ONE TWO
TO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT

~~SECRET~~

FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN FROM KIDD. DELIVER AT BREAKFAST.

1. REF TELECON, YOUR 141740Z NOT RCVD AS OF 142355Z; HOWEVER REQUESTED 8 JUNE CHROMOLOGY FOLLOWS:

A. APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT 13 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-00E (POINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE TO 31-31N 33-00E, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK UNTIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED. SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS TRACK LINE AT ALL TIMES. IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY OBTAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED TO HEAD DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 100 FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED AND THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NORTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND FORTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 100 FATHOM CURVE. NORMAL

PAGE TWO RUQKRM 001DLV ~~SECRET~~

STEAMING SPEED WAS TO BE FIVE KNOTS. NORMAL STEAMING COLORS WERE FLOWN AND NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS LIGHTED AT NIGHT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO STEAM AT DARKEN SHIP AT ANY TIME AND THE SHIP DID NOT EVEN EXERCISE AT DARKEN SHIP DRILL DURING THE DEPLOYMENT

2. ALL TIMES BRAVO UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

0754 STEAMING ON 130T, SPD 10 KNOTS

0849 PASSED THROUGHT POINT ALPHA CHANGED CSE TO 253T

0850 SINGLE JET A/C (UNIDENTIFIED) CROSSED ASTERN DISTANCE 3-5 MILES - CIRCLED SHIP FROM STBD TO PORT AND RETURNED TO UAR MAINLAND. LOCATING TWO TRANSMITTED (LIBERTY 080742ZJUN).

0905 DECREASED SPD TO 5 KNOTS

1056 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP-HIGH

1126 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP LOCATING THREE DRAFTED FOR TRANSMISSION AT 081022Z (BUT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED)

1132 PASSED THROUGH POINT BRAVO C/C TO 283T

1310 EXERCISED AT G.Q. DRILL

1348 SECURED FROM G.Q. DRILL.

1351 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32,000 YARDS BEARING 082T - REPORTED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT

PAGE THREE RUQKRM 001DLV ~~SECRET~~

1353 RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS.

1358 SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE 5-6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 7000 FT.

A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP

1403 LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS

1405 SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85, 01 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.

1405 ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLLED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH.

1405-1410 SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF SHIP WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR A ATTACK. ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE 01 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREAS FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS.

1419 BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS .

PAGE FOUR RUQKRM 001DLV ~~SECRET~~

1424 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD

IBEAM DISTANCE 4-5 MILES

1426 NOTICED NORMAL STEAMING ENSIGN SHOT AWAY DURING AIR ATTACK.

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05 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To: All OOD/JOOD/CIC Personnel

Subj: Modified Condition of Readiness Three and Unidentified Contacts

1. Effective immediately, two men will be stationed on the forecastle as additional lookouts/gun crews to establish and maintain a modified Condition of Readiness Three Watch on a twenty-four hour basis until further notice. All .50 caliber machine guns are to be kept on station with ammunition in mount tray. (Rounds to be next to but not in chamber). Lookouts and forecastle gun mount personnel are to man mounts on engaged side and defend the ship in the event of surprise air/surface attack while regular General Quarters teams are being assembled. Control of fire to be IAW LIBERTY Gunnery Doctrine.
2. Any unidentified surface contact approaching the ship on a collision or near collision course at a speed of 25 knots or more is to be considered acting in a hostile manner and condition of Readiness One is to be set immediately.
3. Any unidentified air contact(s) directly approaching the ship on an apparent strafing/bombing/torpedo attack attitude is (are) to be considered acting in a hostile manner and condition of Readiness One will be set immediately.
4. When any craft - surface/air/sub-surface is sighted and identified as enemy, condition of Readiness One will be set immediately to engage enemy and repel attack.
5. Maximum effort must be made to minimize personnel/material damage, safeguard the watertight integrity of the ship, and continue performance of primary mission. It is better to set general quarters in doubtful cases than to be taken by surprise and be unable to fight the ship. Take immediate action as may be required by the situation, then advise me of what steps have been taken.

Respectfully,
W. L. McGonagle
W. L. MCGONAGLE

Copy to:

JK
Executive Officer
Gunnery Officer

Ex 28
EXHIBIT 28 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

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GUNNERY DOCTRINE

1. ORDNANCE INSTALLATIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

The ordnance installation aboard the USS LIBERTY consist of four single mount .50 caliber machine guns located port and starboard on the 01 level frame 37 and port and starboard on the 03 level frame 89. These guns are .50 caliber Browning Machine Guns, M2, Heavy Barrel with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. The guns have a firing arc of 220° in the forward mounts port and starboard and 140° in the amidships mounts, all mounts have limit rails installed to prevent the guns from shooting in to the ship's superstructure. They may be used to defend against either low flying aircraft or small surface craft, but their primary function is to act as a deterrent to any attempt by hostiles to board the ship.

2. STANDARD COMMANDS AND REPORTS.

In order for the .50 caliber mounts to be as effective as possible, there must be a thoroughly understood and standardized system of commands and reports utilized.

a. Standard Procedures. The following actions will be carried out when General Quarters is sounded:

1. Gun crews proceed immediately to stations bringing the topside if not already mounted.
2. When sufficient personnel are on station, the station will report "Manned" to Gun Control over the 5JP circuit.
3. When ready to open fire at a reduced rate with sufficient personnel on hand, each station will report "Ready".
4. When the station is in a fully ready condition with sufficient personnel to service the station at a normal rate, and ammunition is nearby, the station reports "Manned and Ready".
5. During peacetime when conditions do not require the breaking out of ammunition, the reports of "Ready" and "Manned and Ready" will be modified by the words "Except for Ammunition".

b. Ammunition Commands.

1. "Ammunitions Type"(followed by a type such as armor piercing or ball) is a command to gun crews to designate the type of ammunition.
2. "Replace Ammunition" is a command to replace all ammunition expended from ready stowage. A report of completion is made when the ammunition has been replaced.

c. Firing Commands.

1. "Standby" is the command for loaders to prepare to load.
2. "Load" is a command to load the guns. This command may be omitted, in which case the guns are loaded at the command "Commence firing".
3. "Commence Fire" is the command from the controlling station to load and open fire on previously specified targets or to resume fire after a command to "Check Fire".

EXHIBIT 29 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 29

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W. c. Firing Commands. (Cont'd)

4. "Check Fire" is the command to discontinue fire, usually temporarily. All other functions of the control parties and gun crews continue. Loaded hot guns must be fired as soon as possible on safe bearings in accordance with established procedures.

5. "Silence" is a command used in case of a serious or potentially serious casualty. It may be given by an observer or by any other person. At the command Silence every man in the vicinity freezes in his tracks and remains there without noise or confusion until further orders are given.

6. "Carry On" is the command to continue normal battery operations that have been interrupted by the command "Silence".

7. "Cease Fire" is the command to stop firing. A command to cease fire does not signify the end of an action or mission. As soon as "Cease Fire" is given, hot guns are unloaded on safe bearings as soon as possible. Immediately after "Cease Fire" all guns will report any casualties to material or personnel experienced during action and the status of the gun, whether loaded or clear followed shortly by an accurate account of ammunition expended.

8. "At Ease" is the command given to allow the men at stations to relax when they must remain at stations.

d. Open Fire Doctrine.

The command to "Commence Fire" will normally come from the Commanding Officer via the Gun Control Officer. Exceptions to this are made during wartime as follows:

Surface Target

	<u>Gun Control</u>	<u>Mt. Operator</u>
a. submarine or periscope, not previously identified as being friendly, sighted.	X	
b. torpedo or wake directed toward ship.	X	
c. positively identified enemy close aboard during a melee.	X	X

Air Target

a. Plane(s) making a threatening approach.	X	
b. Plane(s) making surprise attack.	X	X
c. Any plane attacking after an air engagement has started.	X	X
d. Radio control bomb or Rocket approaching.	X	X

3. TARGET DESIGNATION AND ACQUISITION PROCEDURES.

a. Bearing: All reports of bearing are given in three digits. All ciphers in bearing reports are pronounced "zero". For example bearing 050 is reported "zero five zero".

b. Range: 1. When the range is an even hundred or thousand, it is reported as the number of hundreds or thousands as in the following example:
"Range eight hundred"(800)
"Range three thousand" (3000)

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3. TARGET DESIGNATION AND POSITION PROCEDURES. (Cor)

2. When the range is below 1000 and not an even hundred each digit is pronounced. For example:

"Range nine seven hundred" (970)

3. When the range is above 1000 and ends in an even hundred it is reported as follows:

"Range four seven hundred" (4700)

- c. Altitude: The absence of height finding radar makes an estimate of altitude largely guess work and since there is no automatic or mechanical fire control it is largely unimportant.
- d. Position Angle: The angle above the horizon of and aircraft in degrees as follows:
"Position angle one" (1 degree)
"Position angle forty seven" (47 degrees)
- e. Due to the limited ordnance capabilities of LIBERTY the primary responsibility for target acquisition is with the mount operator. Initial target designation may come from gun control, but as indicated in Open Fire doctrine, it may be initiated by the mount operator.

4. FIRE CONTROL DOCTRINE-SURFACE.

- a. Type and method of fire. Rapid continuous fire is accomplished in short bursts (three to five rounds per barrel) until hitting gun range is established, at which time a shift is made to normal rapid continuous fire.
- b. Spotting is direct and will be corrected by the individual gunner.
- c. Maximum range of opening fire is 2000 yards.
- d. Type of projectiles API, API-T, and Incendiary.

5. FIRE CONTROL DOCTRINE - ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

- a. Type and method of fire - All firing is continuous fire. Fire is interrupted only when the target is obscured.
- b. Maximum range of open fire is 2000 yards.
- c. Type of projectile - API, API-T, and Incendiary.
- d. Priority of targets - based on best estimate of enemy capabilities or threats.

6. PREFIRING CHECK OFF LIST.

Prior to operation of the .50 caliber machine gun the following items must be checked by the mount operator. A similar inspection will be held after firing.

- a. Check the general appearance of the weapon.
- b. Pull the bolt to the rear, release, and check for smooth operation.
- c. Check the cover latch and be sure that the spring has enough tension to keep the cover securely latched.

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6. PREFIRING CHECK OFF LIST (Cont'd)


- d. Raise the cover and check the functioning of the cover detent pawl.
- e. Move the belt feed lever from side to side and make sure the belt feed mechanism moves in its full travel in both directions.
- f. Check the back plate latch and lock.
- g. Check to see if the bore is clear.
- h. Check the head space.
- i. Check timing.

7. FIRING SECTORS AND FIRING ARC.

The mount firing sectors are as follows: Mount 51 from 000° to 090°R; mount 52 from 270°R to 360°R; Mount 53 from 090°R to 160°R; Mount 54 from 200°R to 270°R. Any target in these arcs or sectors is the responsibility of the respective mount.

The mounts firing arcs are limited as follows: Mount 51 from 320°R to 160°R; Mount 52 from 200°R to 040°R; Mount 53 from 020°R to 160°R; Mount 54 from 200°R to 340°R.

Mount 51's firing sector is designate Sector I, Mount 52's firing sector is designated Sector II, Mount 53's firing sector is designated Sector III, Mount 54's firing sector is designated Sector IV.





NEUVERING BOARD

SCALES

4:1 5:1

Suggested scales for plotting of ranges or distances measured in yards

From yds.	To yds.	Scale
1,000	10,000	1:1
10,000	20,000	2:1
20,000	30,000	3:1
30,000	40,000	4:1
40,000	50,000	5:1



TIME in minutes

DISTANCE in yards
Relative or actual
DISTANCE in miles

SPEED in knots
Relative or actual

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under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

529


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
SCALES

2:1 3:1


MANEUVERING BOARD



CAPITAL LETTERS — RELATIVE PLOT
Lowercase letters — speed triangle



$r \rightarrow m$ is always parallel to $M_1 \rightarrow M_3$



RELATIVE MOVEMENT

Relative direction } $M_1 \rightarrow M_2 \rightarrow M_x$
Relative distance }
Relative direction } $r \rightarrow m$
Relative speed }

Reference Ship R Maneuvering Ship M
True course and speed $e \rightarrow r$ True course and speed $e \rightarrow m$

LOGARITHMIC TIME, SPEED, AND DISTANCE SCALE

Use of miles with logarithmic time, speed, and distance scale.

TO FIND SPEED, place one point of dividers on elapsed time and second point on distance in miles. Without changing spread of dividers or right-left relationship of points, place first point on 60; second point will then indicate speed in knots.

TO FIND DISTANCE OR TIME, place one point of dividers on 60 and second point on speed in knots. Without changing spread of dividers or right-left relationship of points, place first point on time; second point will then indicate distance in miles. Or, place second point on distance in miles; first point will then indicate time.

Actual distance and speed units can be used in the same way as relative units.

Use of 3-scale nomogram.

Given any two corresponding quantities, solve for third by laying rule through points on proper scales and read intersection on third scale.

Price \$1.00

Per Pad of 50

H.O. 2665-10

530


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MANEUVERING BOARD

S. 4:1 5:1

Suggested scales for plotting of ranges or distances measured in yards

From yds.	To yds.	Scale
1,000	10,000	1:1
10,000	20,000	2:1
20,000	30,000	3:1
30,000	40,000	4:1
40,000	50,000	5:1




Use of yards with logarithmic scale, speed, and distance scale.

TO FIND SPEED, place one point of dividers on elapsed time and second point on distance in thousands of yards. Without changing spread of dividers or right-left relationship of points, place first point on 30; second point will then indicate speed in knots.

TO FIND DISTANCE OR TIME, place one point of dividers on 30 and second point on speed in knots. Without changing spread of dividers or right-left relationship of points, place first point on time; second point will then indicate distance in thousands of yards. Or, place second point on distance in thousands of yards; first point will then indicate time.

Actual distance and speed units can be used in the same way as relative units.



TIME in minutes


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DISTANCE in yards
Relative or actual
DISTANCE in miles




SPEED in knots
Relative or actual



SCALES
2:1 3:1

MANEUVERING BOARD



LOGARITHMIC TIME, SPEED, AND DISTANCE SCALE

Use of miles with logarithmic time, speed, and distance scale.

TO FIND SPEED, place one point of dividers on elapsed time and second point on distance in miles. Without changing spread of dividers or right-left relationship of points, place first point on 60; second point will then indicate speed in knots.

TO FIND DISTANCE OR TIME, place one point of dividers on 60 and second point on speed in knots. Without changing spread of dividers or right-left relationship of points, place first point on time; second point will then indicate distance in miles. Or, place second point on distance in miles; first point will then indicate time.

Actual distance and speed units can be used in the same way as relative units.

Use of 3-scale nomogram.

Given any two corresponding quantities, solve for third by laying rule through points on proper scales and read intersection on third scale.

Price \$1.00
Per Pad of 50
H. O. 2665-10

Published at Washington, D. C.
by the U. S. NAVY HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE
under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

532

531

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF SHELL
HITS, BOTH HOLES AND DIRECT HITS
THAT DID NOT PENETRATE SHIP.

Below MAIN DECK	Port	36
	Starboard	171

MAIN DECK	Port	68
	Starboard	160

01 Level Deck House	91
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01 Level Fwd + Aft	52
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FORECASTLE	26
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02 Level Deck House	53
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03 LEVEL (BRIDGE) AND 04 LEVEL	164
(THIS INCLUDES STACK AND MACHINERY CASING AREA)	

821

533

Starboard side below MAIN DECK (EX 33)

TORP. HIT EXHIBIT 33 TO LIBERTY COURT OF
INQUIRY 22

NNNNCZCKDB352ZCEGA732
 PP RUDLKD
 DE RUMFCR 088B 1660809
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 150346Z JUN 67
 FM NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
 TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

N5	
N5A/M	
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BT
 C [REDACTED] A 1
 A. YOUR 141632Z JUN 67.
 B. JCS 072230Z JUN 67.
 :. JCS 080110Z JUN 67.
 D. NAVCOMMSTA IHIL 130041Z JUN 67.
 7. REF B OR 133E/08 FROM NAJRELSTA KUNIA
 TOD 1700Z/08 TO DCS RELSTA DAGIS
 2. REF C TOR 0400/08 FROM NAJRELSTA KUNIA
 TOD 0449Z/08 TO NAVCOMMSTA GUAM
 39 REF D TRACER ACTION BY NAVCOMMSTA PHIL PERTAINING
 TO REF C.
 BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV Memo 00002/T31
 on 29 Jun 76 DRB/pwh
 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
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0	1201	1202	1203	1204	1205	1206	1207	1208	1209	1210	1211	1212	1213	1214	1215	1216	1217	1218	1219	1220	1221	1222	1223	1224	1225	1226	1227	1228	1229	1230	1231	1232	1233	1234	1235	1236	1237	1238	1239	1240	1241	1242	1243	1244	1245	1246	1247	1248	1249	1250	1251	1252	1253	1254	1255	1256	1257	1258	1259	1260	1261	1262	1263	1264	1265	1266	1267	1268	1269	1270	1271	1272	1273	1274	1275	1276	1277	1278	1279	1280	1281	1282	1283	1284	1285	1286	1287	1288	1289	1290	1291	1292	1293	1294	1295	1296	1297	1298	1299	1300	1301	1302	1303	1304	1305	1306	1307	1308	1309	1310	1311	1312	1313	1314	1315	1316	1317	1318	1319	1320	1321	1322	1323	1324	1325	1326	1327	1328	1329	1330	1331	1332	1333	1334	1335	1336	1337	1338	1339	1340	1341	1342	1343	1344	1345	1346	1347	1348	1349	1350	1351	1352	1353	1354	1355	1356	1357	1358	1359

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F. HOW DOES THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC HANDLED BY NAVCOMMSTA GREECE FOR THE WEEK 3-9 JUN 67 INCLUSIVE COMPARE WITH THE PREVIOUS WEEK (I.E., 29 MAY - 2 JUN INCLUSIVE) AS REGARDS VOLUME AND PRECEDENCES USED? HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO A REPRESENTATIVE WEEK, SAY IN FEB 67?

G. WHAT IS THE PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? HOW MANY DO YOU HAVE ON BOARD?

H. WHAT IN GENERAL IS THE LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN MESSAGE HANDLING OPERATIONS?

I. SUMMARIZE IN NARRATIVE STYLE COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDED AND ACTIONS OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INCIDENT TO AND FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4.

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)

by authority of

on

David R. Spain
29 Jun 66

(Date)

Signature

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE TWO OF TWO

SSN 1194

141629/JUN 67

81007 D34/13
8 21 Jun 76

NNNNVV KXC080 BBM698
 PP RUQKRQ
 DE RUQKC 4337 1660731
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 150731Z JUN 67
 FM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
 TO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
 BT

N5	
N5A/M	
N5B	
N51	N51A
N52	N51B
N53	
N54	
N55	N552
N551	N553
D.G.P.C.E.A.L. CODE	
FILE	

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on 29 Jun 76 by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009057/1
 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS
 A. YOUR 141629Z JUN 67

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO FORWARDED. SUB-PARAGRAPHS KEPT TO GENERAL OF THE NAVY REFERENCE.

A. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED FROM MAJRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) AT 081238Z.

B. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE WAS INADVERTANT RELAY POINT. NORMAL DELIVERY PATH FROM ORIGINATOR TO ADDEE WOULD HAVE BY-PASSED THISTA. ONCE RECEIVED, HOWEVER, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE HAD TO PROTECT FOR RUQPNA NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA. THIS WAS THE ONLY ADDEE IN THE ROUTING LINE WHEN RECEIVED THISTA.

C. HANDLED AS ANY OBOE MSG ALONG WITH OTHERS OF EQUAL AND HIGHER PRECEDENCE. DCS RELAY HANDLED 251 FLASH MSGS ON 08 JUN RADAY. OBOE TRAFFIC COUNT SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER, ESTIMATE 1500. EXACT COUNT WOULD REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS EFFORT. TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED IN THIS TORN TAPE

PAGE TWO RUQKC 4337 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 RELAY ON 08 JUNE WAS 5718 MSGS.

D. NO PERSONNEL RECOGNITION OR SPECIAL ACTION REQUIRED ON THE PARTICULAR MSG AS IT CARRIED A VALID ROUTING. MULTIPLE ADDRESS P PROCESSING UNIT (MAPU) AUTOMATICALLY RE-ROUTED MSG BACK TO MAJRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) SEND POSITIONS. MAPU IS A MEMORY CORE DEVICE PROGRAMMED WITH PRE-DETERMINED ROUTING INDICATORS. ALL RUQP TRAFFIC, REGARDLESS OF RECEIVE ORIGIN, WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE AEZ SEND POSITIONS BY THIS DEVICE.

E. DUE TO EXTREMELY HEAVY TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSENT (NOT MISROUTED) MSG WAS EVER CONSIDERED FOR RE-ROUTE ACTION. THISTA HANDLES MANY OBOE MSGS TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA WITHOUT REQUIREMENT TO PASS VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. DIRECT CIRCUITRY CARRIES A DIFFERENT ROUTING THAN DCS COMMON USER CIRCUITRY AND DELIVERY MEANS

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXX																X		
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR																		
	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	CITE	S D O
	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A I D O	
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(PAGE 1 OF 2)

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150731 JUN 67
DECLASSIFIED
 (WHEN FILLED IN)
 538 537

EXHIBIT 37 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

IS DETERMINED BY THE ORIGINATOR, NOT THE RELAY STATION. RE-ROUTE ACTION DIRECT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA WOULD HAVE ENTAILED CUTTING A NEW PILOT ON THE MSG BY HAND, THEN PASSING TO A COMPLETELY SEPARATE RELAY (NAVCOMMOPNET) AT THISTA FOR DELIVERY VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. CONSIDER NEGATIVE RECOUP OF LOST TIME BY THIS METHOD.

F. TRAFFIC VOLUMES 29 MAY-2 JUN WERE APPROX THREE-FOURTHS AS HEAVY AS PERIOD 3-9 JUN. PRECEDENCES 29 MAY-2 JUN MUCH LOWER. VERY

PAGE THREE RUQKC 4337 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LITTLE FLASH AND OBOE TRAFFIC PASSED. VOLUMES FEB VERSUS JUNE LESS THAN TWO-THIRDS AS HIGH. NO HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC OF CONSEQUENCE IN FEB. DIRECT COMPARISON FIGURES CAN BE FURNISHED BUT WILL REQUIRE TIME FOR COMPILATION.

G. TOTAL PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE FOR NAVCOMMSTA GREECE IS 299. ON BOARD COUNT IS 292. RM/CYN COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE IS 175. ON BOARD 139. THESE ALLOWANCE FIGURES ARE FOR BOTH RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER SITES. CONTROL/TRAFFIC PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN IN A THREE SECTION WATCH STATUS FOR THE PAST 14 MONTHS.

H. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL CONSIDERED MARGINAL BUT NOTHING LACKING IN ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM. EXAMPLE: 54 RM2 ALLOWED, 27 ON BOARD; 12 RMSN ALLOWED, 25 ON BOARD.

I. AT 081234Z JUN NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INTERCEPTED INITIAL LIBERTY ATTACK REPORT FROM THE USS SARATOGA ON THE CINCUSNAVEUR E04.04 VOICE HI-COMM NET. THIS WAS PUT IN TTY FORMAT AND RELAYED VIA NAVCOMMOPNET AND XRA BCST AS A NO DTG MSG, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TIME OF FILE 1239Z/8 JUN. SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL REPORT, SARATOGA AND NAVCOMMSTA GREECE PASSED ALL AMPLIFYI

O INFO OBTAINED VIA XRA BCST, HI-COMM NET, AND DIRECT TTY CIRCUITRY. DUE LIBERTY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROM SHIP WAS LIMITED

FINAL PAGE of 2 150731Z JUN 67

PAGE FOUR RUQKC 4337 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
TO VOICE TRANSMISSIONS. AFTER INITIAL ATTACK REPORT THISTA SHIFTED TO BEAMED ANTENNAS SEND/RECEIVE TO IMPROVE SIGNAL QUALITY UNDER EXTREMELY NOISY CKT CONDITIONS. RELIABLE COMM WITH SARATOGA AND LIBERTY WERE MAINTAINED BY THIS ACTION ALTHOUGH CIRCUIT DEGRADATION OCCURED TO OTHER STATIONS ON THE NET. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE ASSUMED RELAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LIBERTY AND COORDINATED SPEED, COURSE, AND ESCORT RDVU INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMSIXTHFLT. COMDESRON 12, ASSIGNED AS ESCORT, TERMINATED FULL PERIOD ORESTES THISTA AT 0030Z/9 JUN AND RDVU AFFECTED 0424Z/9 JUN. COMDESRON 12 ASSUMED COMM GUARD FOR LIBERTY AND MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC PASSED AFTER RDVU WAS VIA DIRECT SHIP/SHORE TERMINATION.

2. COMDESRON 12 REMAINS TERMINATED NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

GP-4
BT

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

by authority of OPNAV MEMO

on *David R. Spaw* 29 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Mark)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Sn 009 032/T31
DECLASSIFIED

539

538

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

G [REDACTED]

2. REQUEST REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. COMMENTS
IN ADDITION TO ABOVE QUESTIONS INVITED. GP-4.

PAGE TWO OF TWO

[REDACTED] CENTRAL

SSN 1192
141627/JUN 67

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

by authority of OPNAV Memo Sec

on David R. Spain

(Date) 29 Jun 76 (Signature) (Blank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

DECLASSIFIED

609 D32/T31
8 21 Jun 76

543

542

31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ASM 716703

REF: CINCPACAVEUR MSG 141627Z JUN 67 ZFD (PASEP)

2. THIS STATION WAS HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUN 67. THE FOLLOWING IS THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC RATE FOR A ROUTINE DAY AND 8 JUN 67:

ROUTINE DAY (4 MAY 67)

8. JUNE 67

NR	OF	PCT	OF
1	1	100	1
2	2	50	2
3	3	33	3
4	4	25	4
5	5	20	5
6	6	17	6
7	7	14	7
8	8	13	8
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12	12	8	12
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15	15	7	15
16	16	6	16
17	17	6	17
18	18	5	18
19	19	5	19
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21	21	5	21
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33	33	3	33
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36	36	3	36
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52	52	3	52
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64	64	3	64
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90	90	3	90
91	91	3	91
92	92	3	92
93	93	3	93
94	94	3	94
95	95	3	95
96	96	3	96
97	97	3	97
98	98	3	98
99	99	3	99
100	100	3	100

NR OF PCT OF

	MSG	DISTR	MSG	DISTR	PCT OY INCR
FLASH	0	0	198	2.5	INDETERMINATE
IMMEDIATE	649	12.7	2338	32.2	268
PRIORITY	1778	34.8	3860	49.0	117
ROUTINE	2682	52.5	1447	18.3	-85
TOTAL	5109		7893		54

3. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 080917Z JUN 67 WAS RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 081215Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 081503Z JUN 67 AND RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081510Z JUN 67.

GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAV Memo Sec 089D32/TB)
A-10 Nov 76

29 Jun 76 DRBRAIN
TRG Sec Cont

(Date) _____ (Signature) _____ (Initials) _____
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

41

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TOR	16/0655		
SSN			
SGN			

PTC

150520 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA

INFO: [REDACTED]

N5		
N5A/M		FOR COMMUNICATION
N5B		USE ONLY
N51	N51B	
N52	N51B	TAPE CUTTER
N53		
N54		PROOF READER
N55	N552	
N551	N553	CCWPO
D.SPOSAL CODE		CWO
FILE		

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT
OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

DECLASSIFIED

(2) JCS 080110Z JUN 67?

(3) COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67?

42

D. ACCORDING TO YOUR INFO, AT WHAT TIME DID USS
ERTY SHIFT TO THE ASMARA FLEET BROADCAST (JRTT)?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4.

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXX X X												210
N5	001	012	011	N12	N13	N14	N15	N16	N17	CITE	S DO		
ACTION DEPARTMENT	XXXXX X X												210
N5	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X X												210
	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A DO	
	XXXXX X 												

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1191		
SGN	1191		

DTG 141626, JUN 67

DECLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT 42 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

VV KXC250T
 PP RUQPNARQ
 DE RUQPNA 067 1651956
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 141956Z JUN 67
 XAONAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
 TO RUQPNARQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
 BT

N5	
N5A/M	
N5B	
N51	N51A
N52	N51B
N53	
N54	
N55	N552
N551	N553
DISPOSAL CODE	
FILE	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS
 A. YOUR 141626Z JUNE 67

1. IAW REF A FOLL DATA IS SUBMITTED
 - A. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 082125Z DDN 67
 - B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 - CANNOT LOCATE ANY RECORD WHICH WOULD TEND TO INDICATE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO DATE. HAVE INSPECTED FILED PAGE COPIES AND TAPE REELS OF ALL CIRCUITS TERMINATING THISTA FROM 080000Z TO DATE WITHOUT SUCCESS.
 - C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 081510Z JUNE 67.
2. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 WERE RECEIVED FROM THE MAJOR DCS RELAY STATION ASMARA (U.S. ARMY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY, ASMARA) AT THE TIMES LISTED PARAS 1A AND C ABOVE.
3. IN HOUSE HANDLING TIMES WERE:

PAGE 2 RUQPNA 067 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- A. JCS 072230Z JUN 67 - 10 MINUTES
 - B. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 - 15 MINUTES
4. USS LIBERTY SHIFTED TO JRRT AT 070001Z JUNE 67.
 GP-4RK
 BT

DECLASSIFIED 43

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV MEMO SEC 009 D32/T31
 01 29 Jun 76 JAG Sec last
 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		00		01		02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34	
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16 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RADM KIDD

1. Enclosed are communication message handling figures for selected Naval Communication Stations in the European area during the period 1 June - 12 June 1967. For comparison purposes a compilation has been made for a similar period in February 1967.

2. The attached information was assembled at the request of the JCS Fact Finding Group headed by NADM RSHS. It is forwarded to you as a matter of interest.

Very respectfully,

L. R. RAISE
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Communications

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EXHIBIT 44 TO LIBERTY
COURT OF INQUIRY

EX 44

~~547~~

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546



Naval Communication Station Greece

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	5,901
2 Feb	6,775
3 Feb	6,240
4 Feb	5,506
5 Feb	3,892
6 Feb	5,160
7 Feb	5,941
8 Feb	6,521
9 Feb	6,539
10 Feb	6,935
11 Feb	5,293
12 Feb	<u>4,419</u>

Total 69,122

1 Jun	10,178
2 Jun	10,702
3 Jun	10,119
4 Jun	8,113
5 Jun	8,414
6 Jun	9,906
7 Jun	9,750
8 Jun	10,074
9 Jun	9,959
10 Jun	10,499
11 Jun	8,073
12 Jun	<u>7,835</u>

Total 113,622

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	96
6 Jun	206
7 Jun	114
8 Jun	251
9 Jun	182
10 Jun	<u>341</u>

Total 1,190

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	134
6 Jun	218
7 Jun	162
8 Jun	181
9 Jun	181
10 Jun	<u>179</u>

Total 1,055

548
547

Naval Communication Station Morocco

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	7,596
2 Feb	7,663
3 Feb	8,083
4 Feb	7,870
5 Feb	6,283
6 Feb	6,943
7 Feb	7,361
8 Feb	8,153
9 Feb	8,058
10 Feb	8,355
11 Feb	7,393
12 Feb	<u>5,205</u>

Total 87,963

1 Jun	11,317
2 Jun	10,871
3 Jun	9,991
4 Jun	8,049
5 Jun	8,794
6 Jun	9,636
7 Jun	9,512
8 Jun	11,195
9 Jun	9,878
10 Jun	9,192
11 Jun	7,722
12 Jun	<u>8,771</u>

Total 114,928

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	23
6 Jun	16
7 Jun	25
8 Jun	124
9 Jun	12
10 Jun	<u>3</u>

Total 203

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	109
6 Jun	107
7 Jun	133
8 Jun	258
9 Jun	52
10 Jun	<u>90</u>

Total 749

349
548

Naval Communication Station Spain

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	6,873
2 Feb	7,182
3 Feb	7,639
4 Feb	6,645
5 Feb	4,467
6 Feb	5,906
7 Feb	6,620
8 Feb	7,351
9 Feb	7,796
10 Feb	7,716
11 Feb	6,909
12 Feb	<u>4,999</u>

Total 80,103

1 Jun	9,023
2 Jun	9,418
3 Jun	8,184
4 Jun	5,990
5 Jun	7,224
6 Jun	7,073
7 Jun	7,191
8 Jun	8,409
9 Jun	7,342
10 Jun	6,768
11 Jun	5,885
12 Jun	<u>6,561</u>

Total 89,068

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	37
6 Jun	29
7 Jun	31
8 Jun	95
9 Jun	13
10 Jun	<u>18</u>

Total 223

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	163
6 Jun	155
7 Jun	119
8 Jun	89
9 Jun	73
10 Jun	<u>93</u>

Total 692

558
549

Naval Communication Unit London

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	968
2 Feb	927
3 Feb	969
4 Feb	872
5 Feb	846
6 Feb	842
7 Feb	695
8 Feb	704
9 Feb	818
10 Feb	858
11 Feb	914
12 Feb	<u>954</u>

Total 10367

1 Jun	1,538
2 Jun	1,705
3 Jun	1,278
4 Jun	909
5 Jun	1,406
6 Jun	1,717
7 Jun	1,648
8 Jun	1,775
9 Jun	1,589
10 Jun	1,382
11 Jun	1,030
12 Jun	<u>1,268</u>

Total 17,245

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	2
6 Jun	2
7 Jun	20
8 Jun	17
9 Jun	8
10 Jun	<u>28</u>

Total 77

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	153
6 Jun	148
7 Jun	176
8 Jun	292
9 Jun	201
10 Jun	<u>244</u>

Total 1,214

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Naval Communication Station Asmara

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	1,019
2 Feb	1,233
3 Feb	1,229
4 Feb	1,054
5 Feb	974
6 Feb	828
7 Feb	1,039
8 Feb	1,094
9 Feb	955
10 Feb	880
11 Feb	772
12 Feb	925

Total 12,002

1 Jun	1,568
2 Jun	1,891
3 Jun	1,696
4 Jun	1,652
5 Jun	1,570
6 Jun	1,575
7 Jun	1,579
8 Jun	2,228
9 Jun	1,837
10 Jun	1,430
11 Jun	1,394
12 Jun	1,275

Total 19,695

552 551



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ROUTINE DAY (4 MAY 67)			8 JUNE 67			
NR OF	PCT OF		NR OF	PCT OF		
MSGS	DISTR		MSGS	DISTR		PCT OY INCR
FLASH	0	0	198	2.5		INDETERMINA
IMMEDIATE	649	12.7	2388	30.2		268
PRIORITY	1778	34.8	3260	49.0		117
ROUTINE	2682	52.5	1447	18.3		-85
TOTAL	5109		7893			54

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EXHIBIT 45 TO LIBERTY
COURT OF INQUIRY

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46

DEFINITIONS OF MESSAGE PRECEDENCE FROM ACP 121 US SUPP-1(C)

CATEGORY: ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE DESIGNATION: R

DEFINITIONS, USE AND EXAMPLES

ROUTINE is the precedence to be used for all types of messages which justify transmission by rapid means unless of sufficient urgency to require a higher precedence.

Examples:

- (1) Messages concerning normal peacetime military operations, programs and projects.
- (2) Messages concerning stabilized tactical operations.
- (3) Operational Plans concerning Projected operations.
- (4) Periodic or consolidated intelligence reports.
- (5) Troop movement messages, except when time factors dictate use of a higher precedence.
- (6) Supply and equipment requisition and movement messages, except when time factors dictate use of a higher precedence.
- (7) Administrative, logistic and personnel matters.

CATEGORY: PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE DESIGNATION: P

DEFINITIONS, USE AND EXAMPLES

PRIORITY is the precedence reserved for messages which require expeditious action by the addressee(s) and/or furnish essential information for the conduct of operations in progress when ROUTINE precedence will not suffice.

Examples:

- (1) Situation reports on position of front where attack is impending or where fire or air support will soon be placed.
- (2) Orders to aircraft formations or units to coincide with ground or naval operations.
- (3) Messages concerning immediate movement of naval, air, and ground forces.

EX 46 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 46

554
553 (514)

FF1-3
N62
12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Contingency Watch Team
To: CINCUSNAVEUR
Via: Deputy Chief of Staff
Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JCS 080110Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander G.D. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant E.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

TIMES

EVENTS

072350Z Major BREELOVE, JRC WASHDC, called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VOCCOM and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major BREELOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTHFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major BREELOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later.

LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE. The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTHFLT.

080001Z LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTHFLT.

080010Z CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major BREELOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTHFLT.

CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group

FOR [REDACTED] ONLY

EX 47 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

555

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~~TOP SECRET~~

of a message and had by passed USCINCEUR. He wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JRC and get us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further stated that we were to release our message to COMSIXTHFLT if we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.

080030Z

The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.

080325Z

The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS LIBERTY. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCUSNAVEUR had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR.

LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group 080110Z. As he was relaying this information the Duty Yeoman handed the JCS 080110Z message, which had just been received, to CRD JORGENSEN.

The Command Center Duty Officer then had Communications set up a Telecon to COMSIXTHFLT so that he could talk to COMSIXTHFLT's staff duty officer.

080355Z

Considerable delay was caused by atmospheric difficulties. After being unable to establish a Telecon circuit CDR JORGENSEN had the radio operator contact COMSIXTHFLT by SSB and request a Telecon with the Staff Duty Officer as soon as possible.

080410Z

Two way Telecon was established, with COMSIXTHFLT still having difficulty receiving CINCUSNAVEUR. CDR SLUSSER, COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, informed CDR JORGENSEN they did not hold JCS 080110Z. CDR JORGENSEN passed it

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to him three times before receiving an acknowledgement at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a wirenote "FROM CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER BE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS."

CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCUSNAVEUR did not hold JCS 072230Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCEUR for it.

080507Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR FORAC message was 080455Z.

080515Z After talking to LCOL RUSSELL at USCINCEUR, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCEUR FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL GUIDE LINES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OP AREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. HAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."

080521Z Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate every action the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as possible.

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of all logs kept by each individual watch team member and constitutes the events as they took place.

R.D. Steele
CAPT R.D. STEELE, USN

G.D. Jorgensen
CDR G.D. JORGENSEN, USN

E.L. Galavotti
LT E.L. GALAVOTTI, USN

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Doc. 1 - Ex 48 - LIBERTY

NNNGZCKDB613ZCNGB386
 PP RUEKLD
 DE RUQMVL 0928/1 1691050
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 181030Z JUN 67
 FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
 TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
 RUEPJS/OSD
 RUEPNAA/CNO
 RUEHC/DEPT STATE
 RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
 RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
 RUEKLD/CINCNAVEUR
 RUEKDA/JCS
 INFO RUEPJS/DIA
 RUEHDT/USUN
 RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEJCOM
 RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
 RUFPBW/USAFE
 RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
 RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
 RUEKLD/USDAO LONDON
 RUFGC/USDAO PARIS
 RUEHCR/USDAO MOSCOW

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) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND
 DIA 5-18, 999/RDS-3A
 OF 11 NOV 1976
 16 NOV 76 DR [Signature] JAG 8C Cont
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(PAGE 1 OF 5)

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX																
ACTION DEPARTMENT	C I N C U S N A V E R	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CITE	S	D	O		
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UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION I OF II.

SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHINGAR, THE IDF JAG.

C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRAT'S ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH. THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.

SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JAMES FLIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

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FINAL SECTION OF II.

(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORECASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. ONE IDF CNO DECIDED THAO ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBEROY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0928/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATTACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD ITS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP. END QUOTE.

COMMENTS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0928/1 C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS, AN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLING THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 280 TO 30 KNOTS, THE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTY'S SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHING THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STANDING ORDER

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0928/1 C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL GUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MECHANIC SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

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2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT ONE POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBEROY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.

3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:

A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIBERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0928/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.

D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.

4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.

5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.

6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3

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(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999/RDS-3A
on 16 Nov 1976 DR Spain OF 11 NOV 1976 JPK Sec Cont
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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8 JUN 1967	PHONE EXT. NO. 201	ACTION		XX			
		INFO		XX			

USCINCEUR

SECRET

MOVEMENTS AND POSITION OF LIBERTY

- A. JCS CFWP JA3 SENDS DTG 011545Z JUN 67
- B. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67
- C. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 *PASEP*
- D. JCS 7347 DTG 080110Z JUN 67
- E. CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z JUN 67 *PASEP*
- F. USCINCEUR ECJC/JRC 09045 DTG 080625Z JUN 67 *PASEP*
- G. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67
- H. USS LIBERTY 021330Z JUN 67

1. BY REF A J ~~100~~ DIRECTED LIBERTY TO PROCEED TO

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of OPNAV

POSIT 32-00N 33-00E.

on 29 Jun 76 DR Smith 8 21 Jun 76

2. BY REF B CINCUSNAVEUR PASSED ON CON TO JTG Sec 404
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

COMSIXTHFLT. MOVEMENTS OF LIBERTY WERE STILL

(PAGE 1 OF FOUR)

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081903 JVA 67

SECRET

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Doc. 2 Ex 48- LIBERTY

5/102

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GUIDED BY REF A.

3. AT 072350Z CINCUSNAVEUR DUTY OFFICER RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MAJOR BREEDLOVE, JRC WASHINGTON, DIRECTING THAT USS LIBERTY COMPLY WITH NEW COMSINCEUR OF AREA RESTRICTIONS DELINEATED IN LAST SENTENCE PARAGRAPH TWO OF REF C AND NOT TO PROCEED CLOSER THAN 100 MILES TO ISRAEL, SYR OR UAR. THIS WAS A VERBAL DIRECTIVE WITH NO DTG OF MESSAGE AVAILABLE. NECESSARY MESSAGES WERE THEN PREPARED.

4. AT 080140Z AND PRIOR TO RELEASE OF ANY MESSAGES, THE USCINCEUR DUTY OFFICER, LT COL WAGNER, WAS CALLED AND ADVISED OF JRC PHONE CALL. IN VIEW OF NO WRITTEN DIRECTIVE AT THIS TIME, HE WAS REQUESTED TO OBTAIN DTG OF MESSAGE FROM JCS BECAUSE A PREVIOUS JCS DIRECTIVE WAS BEING MODIFIED.

5. AT 080325Z USCINCEUR DUTY OFFICER, LT COL RUSSELL, WAS CONTACTED TO SEE WHAT RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED ON PREVIOUS PHONE CALL. HE CALLED JRC WASHINGTON AND OBTAINED REFERENCE D, WHICH MODIFIED REFERENCE A.

(L.E. JCS 011075Z)

PAGE TWO OF FOUR PAGES

SECRET

NAVEUR HCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

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by authority of

on 29 Jun 76

(Date)

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THIS WAS READ TO CINCUSNAVEUR DUTY OFFICER.

6. AT 080400Z CINCUSNAVEUR ESTABLISHED TELETYPE CONFERENCE WITH COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER, CDR SLUSSER, AND RELAYED REFERENCE D, AND TOLD HIM "TAKE FORAC OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS."

7. AT 080400Z CINCUSNAVEUR SENT IMMEDIATE MESSAGE TO COMSIXTHFLT DIRECTING HIM TO TAKE REF D-FORAC.

8. AT 080814Z CINCUSNAVEUR RECEIVED USCINCEUR MSC, REFERENCE F, DIRECTING ~~LIBERTY~~ ~~TO~~ ~~TAKE~~ ~~REF~~ ~~D~~ ~~FORAC~~.

9. AT 080817Z COMSIXTHFLT SENT A MESSAGE, REF G, DIRECTING LIBERTY TO COMPLY WITH REF D AND REMAIN 100 MILES FROM COASTS UAR, ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND SYRIA. LIBERTY WAS ALSO INFO ADDED ON REF D, SENT AT 080810Z WHICH DIRECTED HER TO REMAIN 100 MILES FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS.

10. DIRECTING COMSIXTHFLT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE REASON FOR NON-RECEIPT OR NON-COMPLIANCE BY LIBERTY TO RESPOND TO TWO MESSAGES, REF D AND G, DIRECTING HER TO PROCEED 100 MILES FROM COAST.

11. LIBERTY'S MOVEMENT REPORT REF H (OF JUNE SECOND)

PAGE THREE OF FOUR PAGES

SECRET

NAVEUR MCM 2100/22 (9-65)

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by authority of OPNAV

29 JUN 76 DR Spain

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~~SECRET~~

INDICATED SHE WOULD ARRIVE AT POSITION DIRECTED
IN REINA (POSIT 33-00N 33-00E) AT 080000Z.

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8/9037 JUN 67

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SECRET

NAVEUR NOU LON 2100/22 (S-65)

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on 29 Jun 76 DR Gain Ser 009.DZ/T31
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NAVAL MESSAGE

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INFO					

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CINCUSNAVEUR

CNO

WERENOTE FOR RADN WEEKS (OP 94)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE APPARENT THAT
USS LIBERTY DID NOT RECEIVE JCS 080917Z AND COMEXTHREFT
080917Z. NON RECEIPT OF THE LATTER NOT SO CRITICAL
BECAUSE EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN A TIMELY
FASION LIBERTY WAS ALREADY SO CLOSE THAT SHE COULDN'T
HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF THE AREA IN TIME ANYWAY.

2. WE ARE LOOKING INTO THE MATTER FURTHER BUT IT IS ALREADY APPARENT THAT JCS 680110Z WAS MISROUTED TO NAVCOMMSTA PHIL BY THE JCS COMM CENTER FOR DELIVERY TO THE LIBERTY.

3. ABOVE PROVIDED TO YOU NOW AS THE QUESTION IS CERTAIN
TO ARISE AS TO WHY THE LIBERTY WAS OPERATING WHERE
SHE WAS. AS YOU CAN SEE NON-RECEIPT OF THE JCS

MESSAGE COULD VERY WELL END UP BEING

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

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29 Jun 76 OPNAU

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FORM NCH LON 2100/2 (REV 12-73)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE REASON. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED BUT IN THE MEAN
TIME YOU MAY WANT TO START SOMETHING ON YOUR END.

4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION DURING THE "LIBERTY CRISIS"
COMMUNICATION RESPONSIVENESS WAS IN ALL RESPECTS
OUTSTANDING AND ADM MCCAIN HAS EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION
TO ME.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, CAPT RAISK.

GP-4

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081805Z JUN 67
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by authority of CPNAVJAG Sec 009032/731
on 29 Jun 76 LR Egan 8 21 Jun 76

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OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO RUEPJS/JCS

RUENAAA/CNO

RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEPCR/DIRNSA

RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRU

RUCIHS/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU

RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT

RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHTT

RUFPBK/USCINCEUR

RUWTATA/NFOIO

RUDLSB/NSAEUR

RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUFRR/CCOMFAIRMED

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on 29 June 76 OK by 921 June 76

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Doc 5-EX 48
LIBE

PAGE 2 RUTPL 334 C
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JCS PASSS TO JRC

CINCLANNT PASS TO JRC

SSITREP/POSIT

1. 2400Z POSITT 35-20N0 019-110E1 PIM 106/115
2. ASSUMEDD CONDITION OF REAADINESS THREE MOD

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NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY

CDR FULLINWIDER

PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
ACTION			XX		
INFO			XXXXXXXXXX	XXXX	

6 JUN 67

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PHONE EXT. NO. 263

FROM

CINCUSNAVEUR

Test

COMSIXTHFLT//USS LIBERTY

INFO:

USCINCEUR FOR JRC//JCS FOR JRC//CNO//DIRNSA//CINCLANTFLT

~~DIRNAVSECGRU/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR/ASTD~~ ^S ~~IRNAVSECGRU/~~

DIRNAV3ECGRULANT//^{HQ}NSAEUR//COMFAIRMED//COMSERVLANT//

COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//CTF SIX FOUR//NFOIO//

NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//CINCLANT FOR JRC//COMSERVFOR SIXTHFLT

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)

DECLASSIFIED

A. MY 3111750Z MAY 67 (LIBERTY MOVORD 7-67, WITH CH-1)

B. MY 031016Z JUN 67

C. USS LIBERTY 021330Z JUN 67 (MOVREP)

D. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 (USS LIBERTY SKED)

E. USS LIBERTY 022108Z JUN 67

1. FOR COMSIXTHFLT. TO FACILITATE AREA COMMAND AND ~~LAND AND ANY POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR PROTECTION~~ CONTROL DURING MIDEAST HOSTILITIES, USS LIBERTY WILL BE

CHOPPED TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z JUN 67. OPERATE
LIBERTY IAW REF'D TO DERIVE MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM SPECIAL
CAPABILITIES. REF'D MAY BE MODIFIED FOR SAFETY REASONS

Doc 6-EX45
LIBERTY

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

ORIGINATOR SECTION N311	CINCUSNAVEUR	X X X X X X 0002N1N2N3N4N5N6N7CITE SDO								
ACTION DEPARTMENT N3 NS6E		000200030004000500060007 AIDO	NCU LONDON							
		X X X X X 000200030004000500060007 AIDO								
		X X X X X 000200030004000500060007 AIDO								

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1068		
SGN			

DTG 061357 Jan 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

570

569

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

C [REDACTED]
AS DICTATED BY THE LOCAL SITUATION.

A. REQUEST CHANGE PIM REPORTS (REFS A AND B) TO AS
OF 1800Z, CHANGE PRECEDENCE TO IMMEDIATE AND CHANGE
ADDEE FOR USCINCEUR TO USCINCEUR FOR JRC.

2. FOR USS LIBERTY. CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z
BY MESSAGE.

A. PIM REPORT NOT RECEIVED SINCE REF E.

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

1068

061357Z

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
1 by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 0090327731
on 29 Jun 76 NR [Signature] 21 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

571

570

VV KXC169EGVV AG3422VV
 ZZ RUTPRQ
 DE UTPRC 002 1581523
 ZNY SSSSS
 ZTO 071303Z JUN 67
 FM COMSIXTHFLT
 TO RUEPJS/JCS
 INFO RUENAAA/CNO
 RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
 RUEPFX/USCINCEUR
 RUEPBN/CINCUSAFE
 RUEPJS/DIA
 RUEKNN/NSA
 BT

ACTION TAKEN:
 PRC997

JUN 8 12 09 AM '67

REFC

///CORRECTED COPY///
 UNDERLINED PORTION OF PARA 3.
 CORRECTED PER ORIG. 071950Z.
 DESTROY ALL OTHER COPIES. EH-W-3

A. COMSIXTHFLT 070626Z JUN 67

1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.
2. PRIOR TO 052015Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 30E OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 100 MILES. AT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) changed to
 by authority of
 29 Jun 76
 (Date) (Signature) (Mark)
 PRICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
ACTION DEPARTMENT																														

PAGE 1 OF 2	
CON	
TON	
SSN	071303
SGN	061152

AVENUE NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

DESTROY ALL COPIES

Doc-12-Ex 4P-410500
 573

Liberty

mcloc

DECLASSIFIED

Immediate 2 Hrs & 20 min

Classification (cancelled) changed to
1 by authority of OPNAV MEMO SN 009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 11P5m 231 Jun 76

(Date) _____ (Signature) *[Signature]* (Rank) _____
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

cwo asked to
check receipt at
070800

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
A. YOUR 061357Z JUN 67
1 061800Z POSIT 34-18N6 024-06E2, PIM 107/16
C. MY 032028Z, 042050Z, AND 051934Z ARE
DTG PRIOR PIM REPORTS. REF A PERTAINS. SUBSEQUENT
PIM REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO COMSIXTHFLT.
3. TEMPORARY REPAIRS HAVE RETURNED TRSSCOMM.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM TO SATISFACTORY
OPERATIONS.
GP-4
BT

[illegible]

CON	
TOR	2102/6
SSN	
SEN	PC

061844 JUN 65

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 8-EX 48 LIBERTY

574 572

DE RUTPRC 129 1572349
ZNY CCCCC
O P 062349Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUTPP/USC LIBERTY
INFO RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFPPBK/USCINCEUR
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEAAAA/CNO
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUELDK/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIJUA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUELDK/HQ NSAEUR
RUFRR/COMFAIR

XC 10

Leaty

MC/OC

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
1 by authority of OPNAV Memo SMC001032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain 8 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

RUCILLA/COMSERVLANT
RUCIJUA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRR/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIJUA/NFOIO

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 129 C
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUTPP/CTF SIX THREE
RUFRR/CTF SIX SEVEN
RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUTPM/NAVCOMS MOROCCO
RUTKC/NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN
BT

C
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL

- CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67 NOTAL X
 - JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTALB
 - CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL
 - CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z JUN 67 NOTAL
 - COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66 NOTAL
 - CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL
1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF.
B, C AND D.
2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF
UAR ACTIONS. MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

CON	
TOR	013217
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SGN	FL

062349Z JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 9 - EX 48 - AMENT

575

473

PAGE THREE RUTPRC 129 C [REDACTED] **CONFIDENTIAL**
THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY
THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY
DIVERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT. ADVISE
IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.
3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFIC-
IENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY
WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.
4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHFLT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA
2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.
5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES
WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN
HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN
SIXTHFLT.
6. COMSIXTHFLT OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND
NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT
REQUIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG
WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS.
PT EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL
SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.
7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.

PAGE 201
2 0623

PAGE FOUR RUTPRC 129 C [REDACTED] **CONFIDENTIAL**
A. COPY KR BROADCAST. ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY XRA BCST.
B. IF PERMANENT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MEX COMM STA SUBMIT
REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO REF E.
C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO TF 60 UTILIZE TF 60 TACTICAL
CIRCUITS AS REQUIREBSM?
D. AUTHGRA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.
3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

3P-4
3T

Classification (unclassified) changed to

by authority of [REDACTED]

on 24 June 1981

(Date) (Signature) (Name)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

DECLASSIFIED

576 574

Liberty ...
SDD
R

Classification (cancelled) (changed to SECRET) by authority of SPUD memo Sec 009032/13
on 29 Jun 76 at Spain 821 Jun 76
(Date) JAG sac lat
(Signature) _____ (Rank) _____
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ACTION TAKEN:
~~22~~
JUN 03 04 AM '67

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

CON				
TOR	07/2356			
SSN				
SGN				

DTG 062036 2 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 10-Ex 48 LIBRARY

577 575

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1994 C
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUQKRD/COMSERVFOR SIXTHFLT
BT

C [REDACTED]
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)
USCINCEUR FOR JRC
JCS FOR JRC
CINCLANT FOR JRC

- A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66
1. REPORTING YOUR OPCON IAW PARA 2 REF A AT 070001Z JUN 67.
2. FUEL STATE EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT. NORMAL CONSUMPTION WHILE ON STATION
APPROXIMATELY ONE PERCENT PER DAY.
3. ESTIMATED PROVISION ENDURANCE/DAYS:
A. DRY/110
B. FROZEN/135 -
C. CHILL/75
4. HAVE ASSUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE MODIFIED. SELF DEFENSE
CAPABILITY LIMITED TO FOUR .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS AND SMALL ARMS.

Page 2 of 2 0620 36Z JUN 67
PAGE THREE RUQKC 1994 C [REDACTED]
5. CURRENT TERM - PROMULGATING MESSAGE NOT HELD. PARA 8B ANNEX DELTA
REF A PERTAIN.
6. REPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC REPAIRMEN ON BOARD WILL BE SUBMITTED
SEPARATELY.
7. ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED WHEN
CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.
8. REQUEST ADVISE TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED/OTHER NECESSARY DATA.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) changed to
by authority of *OPNAV JCS 009132/13*
on *23 Jun 76* *OK* *8-21 Jun 76*
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

578

576

TVV KXC007 BBM929V KCA014

00 RUQKRQ
DE RUQKC 1972 1582016
ZNY CCCCC
O 070908Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIISA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIISA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUCIISA/NFOIO
RUQKRQ/NSAEUR
RUQKRQ/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUFRE/COMFAIRMED
RUTRE/CTF SIX ZERO

Liberty 314
mc SDO

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
(Date) 27 Jun 76 by authority of [Signature] [Signature]
[Signature] [Signature]
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1972 C O N
RUFRE/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPRC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT

C O N
JCS PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT

A. USCINCEUR 0614-0Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

1. 070800Z POSIT 33-06N2 28-54E9. PIM 109/16.5 UNTIL
072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY WITHIN 30NM OF 31-45N3 33-30E9.
2. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTED AS OF 0800Z8
IAW REF A.

GP-2
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N3 NSGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

(PAGE 1 OF)	
CON	
TOR	07/2355
SSN	
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DTG 070908Z JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

VV KXC169EQVV AG242ZVV
 DE UTPRC 082 1581523
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 0 071503Z JUN 67
 FM COMSIXTHFLT
 TO RUEPJS/JCS
 INFO RUENAAA/CNO
 RUTPRQ/CINCSNAVEUR
 RUFPBX/USCINCEUR
 RUFPBX/CINCSAFE
 RUEPJS/DIA
 RUEKNN/NSA
 BT

A. COMSIXTHFLT 070626Z JUN 67

1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.

2. PRIOR TO 052015Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 30E OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 100 MILES. AT

///CORRECTED COPY///
 UNDERLINED PORTION OF PARA 3.
 CORRECTED PER ORIG. 071950Z.
 DESTROY ALL OTHER COPIES. EH-W-3

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Classification (cancelled) changed to
 by authority of [unclear]
 22 June 1988 [unclear]
 (Date) (Signature) (Mark)
 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	VX	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1

PAGE 1 OF 2			
CON			
TOR			
SSN	071503		
SCN	15		

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

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Doc 12-8X 4P-410500X

580

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AD
ON

1003
UNEX

~~SECRET~~

6/10/67

SE TWO RUTPRC 082 ~~SECRET~~
05015Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED
TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS,
EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 100 MILES OF ISRAEL,
SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.
3. ON 5 JUNE BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE
IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAI. FLIGHT OPERATIONS
ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 0915Z UNTIL 1235Z AND ON SARATOGA
FROM 0828Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR
TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN
LIMITED UR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE
PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER.
4. ALL SIXTHFLT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS
ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES
AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED. AT
NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARA
1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT
APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAI COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 240 MILES
AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA
OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE
ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING

P. 2022 071503 Z

PAC THREE RUTPRC 082 ~~SECRET~~
3000Z. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER
TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS
EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST
ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW
ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OR UTILIZED
BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.
5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER
SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN RPARWS1
ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT.
GP-3
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classification Canceled (Changed to)
by authority of *OPNAVINST 5510.1*
on *29 Jan 76* by *AP/...*
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

581

279

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U) JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED. OPERATING
AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VAIRED
AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
2. CHAGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM. GP-4
BT

DOC. 14 Ex 48-LIBRARY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR										NCU LONG	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	001	002	003	003B	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011
	001	002	003	003B	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011
	001	002	003	003B	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011

CON			
TOR	164218		
SSN			
SGN	18		

053

07223a, June 67

10-10-68

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>RD Steele</i>		DRAFTED <i>[Signature]</i>		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
08 JUN 67		PHONE EXT. NO. 454		ACTION		0000			
				INFO					

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: COMSIXTHFLT

INFO:

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF
READER

CCWFO _____

CWO _____

UNCLAS EFTO.

JCS 080110Z JUN 67

1. TAKE FORAC.

TS
on Liberty
yes

Doc 15 Ex 48-LIBERTY

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF <u>1</u>)			
CON			
TOR			
SSN	1016		
SGN			

DTG 080455Z June 67

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

FAVEUR NCULON 2100/L (REV 10-55)

583

Liberty
REF F

CINCUSNAVEUR
WNO
mc/c

VV KXC121ZCZCDKA035VV TVA024
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFFBK 011 1590628
ZNY CCCCC
O 080625Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUDAC/USS LIBERTY
RUTPRC/CONSIXTHFLT
RUEEPJS/JCS
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
ZEN/NSAEUR
BT

C O N T I N U E ECJC/JRC 09045 USNAVEUR FOR N-32 AND N-31,
JCS FOR JRC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). REF A. FONECON LTC RUSSELL,
THIS HQ, AND CDR JORGENSEN, DUTY OFFICER, NAVEUR, 080425Z JUN 67.
REF B. JCS 7347, 080110Z JUN 67.
(C) THIS CONFIRMS REF A TO TAKE REF B FORAC. GP-3

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) changed to
) by authority of *OPNAV memo Sec 09.D3/731*
on *29 Jun 76* *Resigned* *8.21.76*
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Liberty

ORIGINATOR SECTION	<i>266</i>															
ACTION DEPARTMENT	<i>3</i>															
CINCUSNAVEUR	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	CITE	S	D	O		
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	A	D	O			
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	A	D	O			
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	A	D	O			

(PAGE 1 OF)			
CON			
TON	<i>47142/02</i>		
SSN			
SGN	<i>2K</i>		

584

080625Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Liberty

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to _____)
by authority of OPNAV MEMO Ser 007032/T3

by authority of OPNAV mem
29 Jun 76 A R Spain 8 21 Jun 76
Top Sec Cont

on 29 Jan 19 10 40 AM JAG Section
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(Rank)
CAPTAIN GENERAL OF THE
MC/OC

Signature _____
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

MC 10

2 3/4 hours
Good

2 3/4 hours
Good

UTKRE/CTF 60

The following information is for your information only. It is not intended to be used for any other purpose.

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TOR	09/16/8		
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SSN	A		

080634, Jan 65
3 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 17 Ex 48 Limerly

Liberty

DECLASSIFIED

Classification: (canceled) (changed to _____)
() by authority of SPNAU memo S-007032/134
on 21 Jun 76 DR Spain 921 Jun 76
(Date) JTS:claw
(Signature) (Mark)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
OC

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS

1. PARA 1 REF C IS MODIFIED BY REF B. PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-40N/32-30E8 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES, AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILES.

2. NO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-3

BT

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)			
CON			
TOR	1108/P		
SSN			
SSN	12		

DATE 080917 2 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

EX 48 LIBERTY

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM:	CINCUSNAVEUR	DECLASSIFIED Classification (cancelled) (Changed to _____) _____ by authority of <u>OPNAV MEMO SEC 0091032</u> on <u>21 Jun 76</u> <u>ORSpain</u> <u>8 21 Jun 76</u> (Date) <u>JAG Sec Cnt</u> (Signature) _____ (Rank) _____ OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY	FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY
TO:	NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO		TAPE CUTTER _____
INFO:	NAVCOMSTA ASMARA//NAVCOMSTA PHILIPPINES		PROOF READER _____
			CCWPO _____

INFO: NAVCOMSTA ASHARA//NAVCOMSTA PHILIPPOVIC
CC: [REDACTED] OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

A. JCS 080110Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

1. CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THIS HQTRS AND YOUR STATION OVER THE PAST 20 HOURS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE ACTUAL ROUTING AND DELAYS OF REFS A AND B.
2. IT IS APPARENT THAT REF A WAS ORIGINALLY ERRONEOUSLY ROUTED BY THE JCS COMM CENTER TO NAVCOMMSTA PHIL FOR DELIVERY TO USS LIBERTY. NAVCOMMSTA PHIL CLAIMS REF A REROUTED AT 080440Z TO MOROCCO FOR USS LIBERTY. NO RECORD OF RECEIPT OF REF A AT NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO.
3. IT IS ALSO APPARENT THAT REF B DID NOT REACH NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA UNTIL 081525Z ALTHOUGH NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO TRANSMITTED THIS MESSAGE TO MAJOR RELAY SAN PABLO AT 081106Z.

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

CON			
TOR			
CSN	1026		
SGN			

DTG 091102 Z JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc. 19 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

587

585

PE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

4. REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS TRACING OF REF A TO DETERMINE
REASON FOR NON-RECEIPT OF NAVCOMMSTA PHIL REROUTE.
FURTHER REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS TRACING OF REF B TO DETERMINE
REASON FOR DELAY OF DELIVERY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA. A
DETERMINATION OF ALL RELAYS INVOLVED WITH TOR AND TOD
IS DESIRED.

GP-4.

1026
091102Z JUN 67

PAGE TWO OF TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVJAG NOU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAV memo
29 Jun 76 DR 8 p. 11 Sub 091032/73
of 21 Jun 76

DECLASSIFIED

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

588

586

IT'S INTERESTING
TO SEE HOW THE
MILITARY INFORMATION CHANGED ON

ON THE 23RD OF JUNE SOMETHING TO
NOT ESTABLISHED AND M. M. INDISCRIMINATE
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE ADVISED RELAY RESPONSE
HAD TO FREQUENTLY TELL OTHERS
OF HANDLING EMERGENCY TRAFFIC
PROTOCOL TRC TO CINCUSNAVEUR

KRZ
DE RUTKREEEEEEE
PP WESLEY'S TERMINATION
PFPS EYPIWT
XVC278BBM083VV KCA224 TH
DAMAGED SHIP.

YEEEE VV
PP RUQKRQ
DE RUQKC 2535 160125Z
ZNY CCCCC
P 091257Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
TO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O
WIRENOTE TO CAPT RAISH
COMMUNICATIONS SITREP USS LIBERTY INCIDENT (U)
AT 1234Z/8 JUNE THISTA INTERCEPTED INITIAL LIBERTY ATTACK REPORT
FROM THE SARATOGA ON THE CINCUSNAVEUR HI-COMM NET. HIS WAS
RELAYED VIA NCON CIRCUITRY AND XRA BCST AS A NO DTG MESSAGE (NCS
GREECE TIME OF FILE 1239Z/9 JUNE) FROM THE USS SARATOGA. SUBSEQUENT
TO THE INITIAL REPORT, SARATOGA AND NAVCOMMSTA GREECE PASSED ALL
AMPLIFYING INFO OBTAINED VIA BCST, E4.4 HI-COMM NET AND DEDICATED
CIRCUITRY.

DUE TO LIBERTY EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL,
ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROM THE SHIP WERE LIMITED TO UNCLASSIFIED
VOICE TRANSMISSIONS. APPROXIMATELY 90 PER CENT OF THE TIME AFTER
INITIAL REPORT, TWO WAY VOICE CONTACT WAS MAINTAINED WITH THE
FOLLOWING STATIONS ON E04.04D: LIBERTY, SARATOGA, AMERICA,
OMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, AND NCS MORDCCO. DEGRADATION OF

JUN 10 21 21

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV MEMO 0070327
on 29 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc. 20 Ex 48-4
590

CD7

PAGE TWO RUQKC 2535 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TQWUG L
VOICE CIRCUITRY TO ALL STATIONS EXCEPT LIBERTY AND SARATOGA
OCCURED SHORTLY AFTER INITIAL REPORT DUE TO THISTA UTILIZING
BEAMED ANTENNAS BOTH WAYS TO THE LIBERTY. IN ADDITION, THISTA
COORDINATED DIRECT VOICE CIRCUIT BETWEEN CNO AND USS AMERICA ON
EQ4.01H.

3. AS YOU KNOW, OUR PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT IS OPTIMIZED. YESTERDAY
I TOOK MY "BATTLE STATION" AT THE HI-COMM NET CONTROL SPOT AND
REALLY APPRECIATED THE CAPABILITIES OF REAL TIME COMMUNICATIONS.
I WAS ABLE TO KEEP RIGHT UP TO THE MINUTE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN
PASSED TO WHOM AND AT THE SAME TIME MAKE FREQUENT TELEPHONE REPORTS
TO CAPTAIN DAVIE, ALUSNA ATHENS. IN ADDITIONS, IT WAS INTERESTING
AND HELPFUL TO BE AWARE OF WHAT WAS BEING BROADCAST ON XRAJ
AND KR, AS WELL AS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION EXCHANGED ON OUR
MULTITUDINOUS.

DIRECT IRCUITS.

4. CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE ON THE EQ4.04 NET LEFT SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED.
A DIRECTED NET WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AND MANY INDISCRIMINATE
TRANSMISSIONS ENSUED. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE ASSUMED RELAY RESPONS-
IBILITY FOR THE LIBERTY AND HAD TO FREQUENTLY TELL OTHERS TO
CEASE TRANSMISSION BECAUSE OF HANDLING FLASH EMERGENCY TRAFFIC.
EXAMPLE: NAVY 1021 PASSING PROTOCOL TRAFFIC TO CINCUSNAVEUR DURING

PAGE THREE RUQKC 2535 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A PERIOD WHEN IDENTIFICATION OF FORCES ATTACKING LIBERTY WAS
BEING ATTEMPTED.

5. AT PRESENT HAVE ORESTES TERMINATION WITH COMDESRON 12. ESCORT
DESTROYERS MASSEY AND DAVIS RDVU'ED LIBERTY AT 0424Z/9 JUNE. MAJORITY
TRAFFIC TO/FROM NOW BEING PASSED VIA THIS MEANS BUT MAINTAINING
EXCELLENT VOICE COMM WITH DAMAGED SHIP.

6. THIS SITUATION WAS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL IN THAT ONLY VOICE COMM
AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, IN FUTURE INSTANCES OF THIS TYPE, STRONGLY
RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTED NET. NET CONTROL
COULD NORMALLY BE CINCUSNAVEUR BUT IT COULD BE DELEGATED
IF CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE.

7. NEW SUBJ. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR WELCOME ABOARD WIRENOTE.
BEST REGARDS, THORSON.

P-4

T

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (Cancelled) (Changed to)
1. by authority of *OPNAVOPNAV 5009100/173*

on *29 June 76* *DRG*

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

591

CDD

LIBERTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VV KXC376TDDXB

UDYBD QG INADPX

NYI-...3\$

9

4C...9; AV4EQWKVVV CWC 338
OTTC JAW RUENAAA1697 1592115-CCCC--RUDLKD.

ZNY CCCCC

O 082115Z JUN 67

FM CNO

TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WIRENOTE CAPT RAYSH FM RADW WEEKS

LIBERTY SITUATION FURTHER MY 082000Z

1. IT NOW APPEARS THAT NEITHER JCS 080110Z NOR COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z REACHED LIBERTY BEFORE SHE WAS HIT. LIBERTY ON ASMARA BROADCAST SINCE 060001Z. FIRST MSG IMPROPERLY ROUTED TO PHIL FOR LIBERTY. PHIL RE-ROUTED PROMPTLY TO MOROCCO. MOROCCO CLAIMS NON-RECEIPT.

2. COMSIXFLT MSG RECEIVED MOROCCO AT 081035Z, FORWARDED TO ASMARA AT 081106Z. ASMARA PLACED ON JRIT AT 081525Z. HAVE ASKED ASMARA TO EXPLAIN DELAY. REGARDS. WEEKS.

GP-4

BT

MC

JUN 21 10 00 PM '67
ACTION TAKEN

584

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
) by authority of CPNAU MEMO 009032/131
on 29 Jun 76 [Signature] 22 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

[Handwritten signature]

Doc. 21 Ex 48-LIBERTY

592

589

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION TAKEN:

Deliberate
Mc

8 JUN 67 21 14Z
APHS503VWTPM358

VV KXC370VV AGB597V
PP RUTPRQ
DE RUTPM 358 1592007
ZNY CCCCC
P 082008;Z
FM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
BT

C O [REDACTED]
WIRENOTE CDR LONGHI
4. PHONECON CDR LONGHI/CAPT DARBY
3. JCS 080110Z

1. AS REQUESTED HAVE MADE ATTEMPT TO TRACE DELIVERY B. FOLLOWING INFO PERTINENT:
A. WHEN QUERIED VIA E04.04 AT 1745Z, USS LIBERTY REPORTED REF B NOT RECD. (ALL CLASSIFIED MATTER DESTROYED).
B. REF B RECD MOROCCO NCON RELAY AT 0430Z FOR RELAY COMSIXTHFLT. ERRONEOUSLY ROUTED RUTPCR VICE "RC" AND TRANSMITTED AT 0630Z.

AGE TWO RUTPM 358 C [REDACTED]
ELAY DUE BACKLOG DIRECT CKT AND KRTT BCST.
C. ANALYSIS SHOWS REF B ORIGINATED MSGCEN RUEKDA MISROUTED UMFVE (NCS PHILGLVV FOR USS LIBERTY AND RUMFCR FOR CTF 64).
D. QUERIED NCS PHIL FOR MISROUTE PROTECTION ACTION. PHIL ADVISED ERROUTED AT 0449Z TO MOROCCO FOR PROTECT TO USS LIBERTY AND CTF64. SUCH MSG RECD TO DATE. HAVE REQUESTED PHIL INSTIGATE TRACER. ILL ADVISE.
E. A SECOND COPY OF REF B RECD MOROCCO AT 1622Z FOR TRANSMISSION COMSIXTHFLT AGAIN MISROUTED RUTPCR. ALSO LINE 7 FORMAT SHOWS SS LIBERTY INCORRECTLY ROUTED TO RUMFCR. MSG TRANSMITTED TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 1731Z.

2. ASSOCIATED SUBJ: COMSIXTHFLT PRESENTLY TRACING MSG 080917Z USS LIBERTY WHICH CONTAINED SAME INFO REF B. MSG RECD & 1058Z INCORRECTLY ROUTED TO KR BCST, REROUTED TO JR BCST AT 1106Z. MARA REPORTS INFORMALLY THAT MSG TRANSMITTED AS JR2443 AT 1525Z. TRACER BEING INITIATED BY MOROCCO TO DETERMINE DELAY.
WILL FORWARD INFO REGARDS PARA ONE AND TWO AS RECEIVED.
REGARDS CAPT DARBY

-4

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
) by authority of [REDACTED]
on 21 Jun 76 [REDACTED]
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
Doc. 22 Ex 4 LIBERTY
593

VV KXC367CWC3370TTC JAW RUENAAA1659 1592000-CCCC--RUDLKD.

NY CCCCC

082300Z JUN 67

1 CNO

3 RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IRENOTE CAPT RAISH FM RADM WEEKS.

SS LIBERTY (U)

. YOUR 081930Z

. HAVE CONFIRMED JCS 080110Z IMPROPERLY ROUTED TO PHIL. PHIL
RECEIVED IT AT 080400Z AND CORRECTLY FORWARDED BACK TO WARDS MOROCCO
F 080449Z. HAVE QUERIED MOROCCO FOR TOR AND DISPOSITION.

. COMSIXFLT NEVER RECEIVED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THEIR 080917Z.
LIBERTY REPORTS THAT THEIR COPY, IF RECEIVED, IS IN COMPARTMENT
WHICH IS BLOCKED. COMSIXFLT FORWARDED TO MOROCCO AT 081035Z.

AGE 2 RUENAAA1659 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVE ALSO QUERIED MOROCCO RE DISPOSITION. MSG APPEARED ON ASMARA
ROADCAST AT 081525Z. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DETAILS AS RECEIVED.

REGARDS. WEEKS.

P-4

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009037431
on 29 Jun 76 DRS 21 Jun 76
JAS
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

NNN OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 23 Ex 48-LIBERTY

594

591

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 8 1967 1522

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIBERTY

NNNNV KXC399

IP

HVV BEM017VV MNA325
RUQKRO
E RUQPN 059 1591939
NY CCCCC 207 RUQPNA
0519390 JUN 67
NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
RUQPNARQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
WFO RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

MC/SDO
JUN 8 1967 22 27z

RE NOTE FOR CAPT RAISH
CINCUSNAVEUR W/N 081711Z JUN 67 PASSEP
JCS 080110Z
COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z
NO INDICATION REF B. RECEIVED THISTA. BELIEVE THIS MSG MAY HAVE
EN TOP SECRET AND THEREFORE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED ON
REF C REC THISTA 1510Z 8 JUN TRANSMITTED ON JULIET ROMEO
ST AT 1525Z 8 JUN. RECEIPT OF REF C BY LIBERTY DOUBTFUL AS SHIP
S ATTACKED PREVIOUSLY. BEST REGARDS CDR BAKER.

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) removed by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 000032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 of 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont.
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Doc 24 Ex 48 LIBERTY

595 592

Liberty

DE RUFF BK 115 1591940

ZNY CCCCC

0-081937Z JUN 67

FM USCINCEUR

TO RUEKRE/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO RUDLKB/USC LIBERTY

RUTPRC/CONSIXTHFLT

RUEPJS/JCS

23-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ECJC/JRC-09116. USNAVEUR FOR N-31

AND N-32. JCS FOR SRC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REF ID: A66738

1. (C) PER REQUEST OF JCS, ADVISE TIME USE LIBERTY
RECEIVED REF.

RECEIVED REF.

2. ADVISE JCS, INFO THIS HQ.

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009032/T3)

on 29 Jun 76 OR Spain of 21 Jun 76

(Date) _____ (Signature) _____ (Rank) _____

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXX													
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCINNATI NAVEUR	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CITE	S	O
		001	002	003	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A11	A	D
		001	002	003	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A11	A	D
N3					X						X			

CCN				
TOR	48/2 4220			
SEN				
CGN				

Doc. 681731 - J. H. B.

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 25 Ex 48 LIBERTY

596

503

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

CAPT L. R. RAISH

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

AIR MAIL

ACTION

XX

INFO

PHONE EXT. NO.

250

8 JUN 1967

FROM

CINCUSNAVEUR

TO

COMSIXTHFLT

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE
CUTTER

PROOF
READER

CRYPTO

CWO

~~SECRET~~

MOVEMENTS AND POSITION OF LIBERTY (U)

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 081903Z JUN 67

B. JCS 7347 DTG 080110Z JUN 67

C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

1. TAKE PARA 10 OF REF A FORAC. THIS HEADQUARTERS
INVESTIGATING ROUTING REF B TO DETERMINE CAUSE
APPARENT NON-DELIVERY. IF REF C STILL NOT
ACKNOWLEDGED, SUGGEST TRACER ACTION MAY BE
APPROPRIATE.

GP-4

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009032/T31

on 29 Jun 75 DR Spauld OF 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

ORIGINATOR SECTION N5	XX	X		X	X				X
ACTION DEPARTMENT N5	C	I	N	C	U	S	N	A	V
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

CON				
FOR				
NSN	1104			
SON				

DTG 081910 2 June 67

Doc 26 Ex (WHEN EXEMPTED)

597

294

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PR	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
<i>[Signature]</i>	W. J. LONGHI, CDR	AC		000			
8 JUN 1967	T-1	INFO					
FROM	PHONE EXT. NO.						
CINCUSN AMEMB	231						

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA MONSIEUR

WIRENOTE FOR CAPT DARBY COR BAKER

UNCLAS EFTO

A. JCS 080110 Z JUN 67

1. REF A WAS ADDRESSED TO SEVERAL ADDRESSEES INCLUDING
USS LIBERTY. *But incorrectly routed to PHIL.* IMPORTANT TO ASCERTAIN THAT THIS MESSAGE

WAS IN FACT RECEIVED BY LIBERTY. ASSUME DELIVERY
 WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER ~~KEEP~~ ^{JATT} BROADCAST ^{IF PHIL READDRESS} REQUEST ^{TO YOU}
 CHECK AND ASCERTAIN THAT MESSAGE WAS PLACED ON ^{RECEIVED AND}
 BROADCAST AND ADVISE IF YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION
 LIBERTY ACTUALLY RECEIVED. ~~EXPEDITE REPLY~~

~~BEST REGARDS CAPT RAISH~~

2. Advise also if ref B received for relay to USS LIBERTY and is delivered. ~~Expedite~~
~~Reply~~ Reply. Best Regards Capt Raish

ORIGINATOR SECTION		CINCSNAVEUR		<table border="1"> <tr> <td>O</td><td>O</td><td>N</td><td>N</td><td>N</td><td>N</td><td>N</td><td>N</td><td>C</td><td>S</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>O</td><td>I</td><td>2</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>I</td><td>O</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>A</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>O</td><td>I</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>I</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>A</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>O</td><td>I</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>I</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>O</td><td>A</td> <td colspan="4"></td> </tr> <tr> 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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

DOC. 27 EX 48 LIBRA

NAVAL MESSAGE

AIR MAIL

[illegible]

PHONE EXT. NO.
231

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF
READER _____

CGWPO _____

CWO _____

Classification (cancelled) (~~changed to~~ CWO _____)
() by authority of 01N AV memo Ser 009D32/T31

on 29 Jun 76 at WR Spain of 21 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (U)

A. MY 081903Z JUN 67

1. THIS IS INTERIM REPORT ON USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS
JUST PRIOR TO AND AT TIME OF ATTACK.

2. GENERAL COMMUNICATION SITUATION FOLLOWS. THE USS LIBERTY HAD BEEN COPYING ASMARA FLEET BROADCAST (JRTT) SINCE ⁰⁷ 030001Z. LIBERTY WAS ALSO COPYING THE MOROCCO OPINTEL BROADCAST (XRI) FOR OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC. NO PERMANENT SHIP/SHORE CIRCUIT WAS MAINTAINED BY LIBERTY. THE NORMAL PATH FOR TRAFFIC TO THE USS LIBERTY ~~THAT~~ WAS VIA NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA FOR GENERAL SERVICE TRAFFIC AND VIA THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DEPARTMENT OF NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO FOR COMINT TRAFFIC. BOTH THE ASMARA AND MOROCCO BROADCASTS IN QUESTION ARE ON-LINE BROADCASTS.

[illegible]

CON			
TOR			
SSN	11000		
SGN			

DTG 091610 2 JUNE 67

(WEEK) FILLED IN)

Doc. 28 Ex 48 LIBRARY

59/10

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

3. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AS KNOWN AT THIS TIME FOLLOWS:

080112Z JCS 080110Z RECEIVED AT JCS MSG CENTER.

080312Z JCS 080110Z RECEIVED AT CINCUSNAVEUR MSG CENTER AND RECEIVED BY MSG CENTER IN REPLY TO BFF-3 DP SIG.

080430Z JCS 080110Z RECEIVED AT NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO FOR RELAY TO COMSIXTHFLT.

UNKNOWN JCS 080110Z RECEIVED AT NAVCOMMSTA PHIL FOR DELIVERY TO USS LIBERTY AND CTF 64 DUE TO MISROUTING BY JCS COMM CENTER.

080449Z NAVCOMMSTA PHIL REROUTED JCS 080110Z TO NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO FOR USS LIBERTY AND CTF 64. (MOROCCO REPORTS MSG NEVER RECEIVED).

080630Z NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO DELIVERED JCS 080110Z TO COMSIXTHFLT. DELAY DUE TO BACKLOG ON COMSIXTHFLT CIRCUIT AND MOROCCO FLEET BROADCAST.

080917Z COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED AT COMSIXTHFLT MSG CENTER ABOARD ^{USS} LITTLE ROCK.

081058Z COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED AT NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO FROM COMSIXTHFLT.

081106Z NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO ROUTED COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA VIA SAN PABLO DCS-USAF MAJOR RELAY.

SSN 1100
091610Z
JUNE 67

PAGE 2 OF 3

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

1 by authority of *OPNAV memo Sec*

on *29 Jun 76* *009 D32/17* *921 Jun 76*

DECLASSIFIED

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

600

597

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

081108Z COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED AT CINCPACNAVEUR
MSG CENTER.

081200Z COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED BY US ARMY
COMM CENTER AT ASMARA FOR FURTHER RELAY TO
NAVCOMSTA ASMARA FOR RELAY TO USS LIBERTY.

081215Z US ARMY COMM CENTER ASMARA RELAYED COMSIXTH-
FLT 080917Z ERRONEOUSLY TO NAVCOMSTA GREECE
FOR RELAY TO USS LIBERTY.

081506Z NAVCOMSTA GREECE RETURNED COMSIXTHFLT
080917Z TO US ARMY COMM CENTER AT ASMARA.

081510Z US ARMY COMM CENTER ASMARA RELAYED COMSIXTH-
FLT 080917Z TO NAVCOMSTA ASMARA FOR RELAY
TO USS LIBERTY.

081525Z NAVCOMSTA ASMARA PLACED COMSIXTHFLT
080917Z ON ASMARA BROADCAST ~~WIRELESS~~

~~RECEIVED BY US ARMY COMM CENTER ASMARA FOR RELAY TO USS LIBERTY.~~
3. FOREGOING BEING FURTHER REFINED AS MORE
GP-4. POSITIVE INFO BECOMES AVAILABLE.

SSN 1100
Q 91610 Z
JUNE 67

PAGE 3 OF 3

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

by authority of OPNAV MEMO SEC 091032/151

on 29 Jun 76 *DRG* 921 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

601

598

KXC313

Liberty

VV 180757 APH907VV CD547

00 RUTPRQ
DE RUTPC 167 1601745
ZNY CCCCC
O 091745Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
TO RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
) by authority of *OPNAV memo Ser 000032/T31*
on *29 Jun 76* *DR Spain* of *21 Jun 76*
DAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG TRACER ACTION

- A. CINCUSNAVEUR 091102Z JUN 67
- B. JCS 080110 Z JUN 67
- C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING RXPORT ON HANFLING OF REFS B AND C AS DERIVED FROM LOGS, OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL TRACER ACTION WITH STATIONS INVOLVED:

2. REF B RECEIVED FROM NAVCOMMSTA WASH AS CHANNEL NR WWN054 AT 08/0430Z. ROUTED TO RUTPCR BY ORIGINATOR FOR DELIVERY COMSIXTHFLT (RUTPRC). PROTECTED TO RUTPRC AT 08/0639Z AS PPNG 993. DELAY DUE HI PREC BACKLOG

KRTT AND DIRECT CHANNELS COMSIXTHFLT. MSG HEADING CONTAINED ERRONEOUS ROUTING FOR USS LIBERTY VIA NCS PHIL. EFFORTS FIND DETAILS OF PHIL REROUTE ACTION UNSUCCESSFUL OTHER THAN INFORMED THAT MSG REROUTED TO MOROCCO FOR PROTECTION AT 0449Z. NO COPY RECD TO DATE.

3. REF C RECD AS CHANNEL NR PRC 065 AT 1050Z ROUTED KRTT BCST. BCST SECTION THISTA REROUTED TO RUQPNA (JRTT BCST NAVY ASMARA) AS LIBERTY HAD BEEN COPYING JRTT BCST SINCE 070000Z. MSG SENT AS AMA 568 AT 1100Z TO SAN PABLO. SAN PABLO 091310Z ADVISED MSG RECD AT 1100Z TRANSMITTED AS MHA 158 AT APPROX 08/1115Z TO ARMY ASMARA. UNOFFICIALLY ADVISED BY ARMY ASMARA VIA NAVY ASMARA, MSG RECD AT 1200Z BY ARMY ASMARA AND MISSENT TO NCS GREECE AS HWA 455 AT 1215Z. ARMY ASMARA AGAIN RECD MSG FROM GREECE AT 1506Z AND TRANSMITTED TO NAVY ASMARA (RUQPNA) AT 1510Z. LATTER CONFIRMED BY NAVY ASMARA WHO TRANSMITTED ON JRTT BCST AT 1525Z AS JR 2443. INFORMALLY, NCS GREECE ADVISES MSG RECVD AS HWA 455 AT APPROX 1245Z, REROUTE BACK TO ARMY ASMARA AS WHB 105 AT APPROX 1255.

4. TIME DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NCS GREECE AND ARMY ASMARA WILL PROBABLY BE CLEARED AFTER ARMY ASMARA WNSWERS OFFICIAL TRACER MSG. CINCUSNAVEUR TO BE INFO ADDEE.

GP-4
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ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXX																CINCUSNAVEUR	NCU	LONDON
ACTION DEPARTMENT	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15			
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DTG 091745Z Jun 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 29 KX 48 LIBERTY

602

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DE RUEPJS 0630 1601943
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O P 091936Z JUNE 67 ZFF1
FM JCS
TO RUEPBJ/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUENAAA/US LIBERTY
RUDLKG/CINCSNAVEUR
RUTPRG/COMSIXTHFLT
BT

Liberty

JCS7531 J-3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

- REFS: A. JCS 7347/080110Z JUN 67
B. CINCSNAVEUR 080455Z JUN 67
C. USCINCEUR ECJCPJRC 09045/080625Z JUN 67
D. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

1. (S) IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE COMM PORTION OF THE JCS WRAP UP LIBERTY INCIDENT, REQUEST PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFO:

- A. TIME OF RECEIPT:
(1) REFS A, B, C, AND D BY USS LIBERTY.
(2) REFS A, B, AND C BY COMSIXTHFLT.

Downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED
by DTES
10 Nov 76

PAGE 2 RUEPJS 0630 3 : 4 3 5

- (3) REF C BY CINCSNAVEUR
B. TIME OF TRANSMISSION FROM LAST RELAY STATION

INCLUDING NAME RELAY STATION:

- (1) REF B TO COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY.
(2) REF C TO CINCSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, AND USS LIBERTY
(3) REF D TO USS LIBERTY.

2. (U) REQUEST RETRANSMIT REF B INFO TO JCS(JRC) AND CNO

EP-4
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ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCSNAVEUR															
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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3 (WHEN FILLED IN)

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FM COMSIXTHFLT

TO RUEFPBK/USCINCEURO

INXO ~~RUTPRQ~~/CINCUSMAVEUR

RUE NAAA/CNO

OB T.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY (U)

A. JCS 7531 DTG 091936Z JUN 67 X

1. REXHA OF REF A RECD 0445Z/08 FROM VINCUSMAVEUR.0
2. REF B OF REX A RECD 0445Z/08

2. REF B OF REX A RECD 0518Z/08 FROM MCS MOROCCO.
3. REF C OF GEEVA RECD 0518Z/08 FROM MCS MOROCCO.

REF C OF GEFHA GECD 0735Z08 FROM NCS MOROCCO.
GP-4

GP-4

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DECLASSIFIED

Classification: ~~Confidential~~ (changed to)
() by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 004032/T3
on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain of 21 Jun 76
JTB-SEC CONT
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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092332, Jan 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEE-NCU LON 2100/2 (REV. 10-65)

Doc. 31 Ex 48 LIBERTY

604

1001

00 RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 048 161113Z
ZNY CCCCC

0 101132Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY (U)
A. YOUR 101031Z JUN 67. *

B. USCINCEUR 080625Z JUN 67.
1. REF B RECEIVED

1. REF B RECEIVED AT 0735Z/08 JUN 67 FROM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
VIA NAVCOMOPNET.

GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 005032/T31
on 29 Jun 76. OK by main of 21 Jun 76
(Date) JAG S. [unclear]

(Date) 21 Jun 76 JAG Sec Conf
(Signature) _____ (Rank) _____
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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DTG 18132 JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

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VV KXC15CVV AGB832V

BW
YWPPII
CO RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 052 1611205
ZNY SSUSS
D 101205Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPP/COMDESRON TWELVE
RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION RECEIVED GARBLED
MESSAGE IS IN SERVICE, CORRECTED COPY WILL BE
ROUTED WHEN RECEIVED, W2/RB/10JUN67

//CORRECTED COPY//

DESTROY ALL OTHERS

S ZRC R E T
REF (A) CINCUSNAVEUR 101036Z JUN 67*
(B) JCS 080110Z JUN 67

1. REF (A) ZEKEN FOR ACTION.
2. ACCORDING TO CO, USS HERTY, REF (B) AND ALL ASSOCIATED MSGS
TO PASS. CONTENT OF REF (B) WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY
PRIOR TO ATTACK.

GP-3

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
() by authority of SP-1A memo 048-033/T31
on 29 June 1982
JAC Sec Com
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC:TR/W-2/19 JUN 67

ORIGINATOR SECTION	VXX XIX													X						
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR													SDO						
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 101036Z JUN 67
PASSED REF A TO LIBERTY AT 1345Z. NO ONE ON BOARD HAS KNOWLEDGE OF
PRERECEIPT INFO CONTAINED THERIN.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

on 29 Jun 76 OK Grain of 21 Jun 76

on 20/11/18 at 1400 hrs

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON				
TOR	10/2030			
SSN				
SGN				

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

DTG

101330, JUNG

(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 36 - Ex 48 - LIBERTY

609

1006

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i> 10 JUN 67	DRAFTED BY CDR W. J. LONGHAI	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
		ACTION		XXX			
		INFO.		XXX			

ROMB CINCUSNAVEUR

0: JCS

USCINCEUR // CNO // USS LIBERTY // COMSIXTHFLT

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF
READER

CGWFO

CWO

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (~~changed to~~
) by authority of ~~OPNAV~~ ~~Sec 009032/13~~

on 21 Jan 76 at W. Spain of 21 Jan 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
J. Sec. Capt

1. IN REPLY TO REF A THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED: OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(A) JCS 7347 DTG 080110Z . . . RECEIVED BY COMSIXTHFLT AT

0445Z/08 FROM CINCUSNAVEUR. ~~EXCLUDED AT 1445Z 1208Z RECAP/PH/08~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

(B) CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z. RECEIVED BY COMSIXTHFLT AT

0518Z/08 FROM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO. THIS MESSAGE NOT ADDRESSED

TO USS LIBERTY.

(C) USCINCEUR 080625Z. REC^{E/}IVED BY COMSIXTHFLT AT 0735Z/08

FROM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO. RECEIVED BY CINCUSNAVEUR AT

0727Z/08 FROM DCS MAJOR RELAY CROUGHTON ENGLAND. ~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1063		
SGN	NR		

10 1410 JUN 61

Doc 37 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

610

1007

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

(D) COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z. NEVER RECEIVED BY USS LIBERTY SINCE IT WAS NOT PLACED ON NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA BROADCAST UNTIL 1525Z/08. SEE REF B FOR DETAILS.

2. REF C WAS READDRESSSED BY MY 081906Z TO USCINCEUR, JCS, CNO AND CINCLANTFLT FOR INFO. REF C RETRANSMITTED BY MY 100926Z TO JCS AND CNO IN REPLY TO PARA 2, REF A.

3. ACCORDING TO CO, USS LIBERTY, JCS 080102 AND ~~REF B~~ *(CERTAINING)* MSGS ~~REF B~~ CONTENT OF REF B WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY PRIOR TO ATTACK.

4. REF B CONTAINS ALL INFO KNOWN AT THIS TIME CONCERNING JCS 080102 AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z. TRACER ACTION HAS BEEN INITIATED AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED.

GP-4.

1063
101410-3 JAN 67
DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

1 by authority of

on 29 Jun 76 DRB/pc

8 21 Jun 76

PAGE 2 OF 2

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

FORM 100-100 (100-100) (9-55)

612

609

NN

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 17 8 03 AM '67

*Copy given to
Sec. for finding
tom*

CZCKDA725ZCMGB601
RU DLKD
Y EEEEE ZFH1
CSB568ZCHMB919
MMB919VV NAA147 PNA013
RU DLKD
RUQPNA 013 1680530
EEEE
170530Z JUN 67
COMIDEASTFOR
RU DLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
WFO RUQPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA

UNCLAS E F T O

OR JCS FACT FINDING TEAM

CINCUSNAVEUR 16140Z JUN 67

COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67

COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUBMITTED:

A. REF B APPEARS IN JRT FILES OF THIS STATION AS JR NR
77 WITH APPROX. TOR 070531Z. JRT FILES FOR PERIOD 070000Z
0 072359Z INDICATE NO UNUSUAL RECEPTION ENCOUNTERED.D

B. REF C APPEARS IN JRT FILES OF THIS STATION AS JRNR
443 WITH APPROX TOR 081527Z. ACTION ADDEE USS LIBERTY IS
RECEDED BY ROUTING INDICATOR RUTPP INDICATING MESSAGE MAY
HAVE BEEN SENT ORIGINALLY TO NAVCOMMSTA MORROCCO FOR RELAY.
JRT FILES FOR PERIOD 080000Z TO 082359Z INDICATE NO UNUSUAL
RECEPTION PROBLEMS.

AGE 2 RUQPNA 013 UNCLAS E F T O

C. BOTH REF A AND B WERE RECEIVED AS FIRST RUN TRAFFIC.
O RECORD OF REF A OR B BEING RECEIVED AS RERUNS.

T

149

Doc 39 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

613

1210

CA EUR DE DCA MEA AND I GOT A WIRENOTE FOR U ALL THERE AND CAN
GO AHEAD ANS SEND IT NOW PLSE KKKKK

P 141111Z
M TUSLOG DET 115 ANKARA TURKEY
O DCA EUROPE VAHINGEN GERMANY
T

14 JUN 1967 11 49

NCLAS E F T O 115/M400/239
NQUIRY ON COMMSIXTHFLT MSG

COMMSIXTHFLT DTG 080917Z JUNE RESPONSE TO:

1. ORDER WIRE INQUIRY TO DCS STATION ASMARA REGARDING REFERENCE
A. BEING SENT TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE RATHER THAN NAVCOMMSTA
ASMARA WAS THAT MESSAGE MISSENT TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE DUE TO
OPERATOR ERROR. ASMARA RECEIVED MESSAGE ON 9C53 AND MISSENT IT
ON H780. IT WAS RETURNED TO THEM ON C373 AND THEN SENT TO
NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA ON CABLE (NO CCSD).

T

Doc. 40 Ex 48 LIBRARY

614

Call

NNNNVV KXC337TKTBZVV QAA018
PP RUQPNARQ
DE RUQPNARQ 063 1672116
ZNY EEEEE
P 162116Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
TO RUQPNARQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO ZEN/COMIDEASTFOR
BT

ACTION TAKEN:

11 17 PM '67

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR JCS FACT FINDING TEAM USS LIBERTY INVESTIGATION

A. YOUR 161450Z JUN 67

B. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67

C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

1. IAW REF A FOLL DATA IS SUBMITTED

2. REF B AND REF C DID IN FACT APPEAR ON ASMARA JRRTT BCST.

JR MONITOR TAPE REELS (RECEIVED "REAL TIME" FROM XMTR SITE
RADIATED SIGNAL) CONFIRMS PARA 3 BELOW.

3. SERIAL NO. AND T. O. T.

A. REF B - JR NO. 2077 AT 070529Z

B. REF C - JR NO. 2443 AT 081525Z

4. RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE REFS B AND C WERE RERUN. AM RERUNNING ALL
MONITOR REELS FROM 070529Z TO 081800Z TO VERIFY. WILL ADVISE.

5. NO UNUSUAL TRANSMISSION CIRCUMSTANCESBG

BT

16 JUN 67 23 07z

32

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)

by authority of OPNAV MEMO SEC 07D32/T3

on 29 Jan 76 DRB/...

21 Jan 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 41 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

615

NNNN

VV / KXC161VV QAA010

PP RUQPNARQ

DE RUQPNARQ 039 1600625

ZNY EEEEE

P 090625Z JUN 67

FM NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA

TO RUQPNARQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

WIRENOTE FOR CAPT RAISH

A. YOUR W/N 081711Z JUN 67

B. MY W/N 081939Z JUN 67

C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67

1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF B.

2. PRELIM INVES DELAY IN DELIVERY REF C REVEALS FOLLOWING

A) COMSIXTHFLT TOT 08/1106Z

B) AEZ (USA STRATCOMFAC) CLAIMS RECEIPT 08/1200Z

C) AEZ TOT TO NGR (NCS GREECE) 08/1215Z (ERRONEOUSLY)

D) AEZ CLAIMS REF A RECEIVED BACK FROM NGR AT 08/1506Z

E) TOR AT THISTA 08/1510Z

F) TOT JRTT BCST BY THISTA AT 08/1525Z

3. POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES IN ABOVE TIMES, RECD THRU PRELIM INVES, COULD BE CLEARED UP BY TRACER ACTION.

BT

Doc 42 Ex 48 LIBRARY

616

1013

48

11555

CZCKDB545ZCNGB853

PP RUDLKD
DE RUQMV 0900/1 1661620
ZNY SSSSS
P 151615Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT

SECRET NOFORN 0900-1, 67.

SECTION 1 OF 2

SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

REFERENCES:

- A. YOUR 141250Z JUN 67*
- B. USDAO 0825 JUN 67.
- C. USDAO 0827 JUN 67.
- D. USDAO 0834 JUN 67.
- E. USDAO 0845 JUN 67.
- F. USDAO 0849 JUN 67.
- G. USDAO 0852 JUN 67.
- H. USDAO 0858 JUN 67.
- I. USDAO 0884 JUN 67.
- J. USDAO 0886 JUN 67.
- K. USDAO 0892 JUN 67.

FOR RADN KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY. FOLLOWING IS

DECLASSIFIED

Doc. 45 Ex 48-LIBERTY

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV 3510.1E AND DIA 5-13,999/RDS-3A
on 16 Nov 76 *OPNAV 3510.1E AND DIA 5-13,999/RDS-3A*
OF 11 NOV 1976

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR																CITE		SDO		NCU	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	00101234567891011121314151617181920																A1140		A1140		LONDON	

(PAGE 1 OF)			
CON			
TOR	15	08	075
SSN	15	08	075
SGN			

C1155-53
51 JUN 67
52 JUN 67

DTG 15/16/15 2 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN) 619
616

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0900/1 S [REDACTED] T NOFORN

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E.C. CASTLE, USNRR:

1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (IDF/FLO) AT APPROX 081400Z. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAEL AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 081200Z POSIT 3125N 3333E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR WAR ZON COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 081530Z DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID IDF HELOS HAD PUT U.S. SURVIVORS ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR ARRIVAL IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

PAGE 2066

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0900/1 S [REDACTED] T NOFORN

PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.

4. (U) AT APPROX 081540Z, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO FLO TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.

5. (C) AT 081610Z (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 081625Z, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MTB RUNNING NORTH. AT 081635Z, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV 5510-1E AND DIA 5-18, 999/ROG-39
on 16 Nov 76 [Signature] JAG Sec 11g1
82 11 NOV 1976

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

620
601

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0900/1 S [REDACTED] T NOFORN
ON CALLING CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE.
ALUSNA UNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGNAL AFFIRMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT
THE NUMBER SENT WAS FOUR OR FORTY BUT IS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION
FROM HAND HELD LIGHT. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF
DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO
TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA
WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE
LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081700Z
AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 081725Z.

6. (C) WHILE ALUSNA ON FLIGHT, DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT
FROM IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN OF

DF PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH
WAS FOR RELEASE AT 081930Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE
CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT
SEEKING IDF ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM
WITH U.S. NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTTER AMLLIFYING REMARKE
CONTAINED IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG REF D.

7. (C) ON RETURN EMBASSY, ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF
NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z.
SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.

8. (C) AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM

PAGE 3-66 1516 152 JUNE 67

QUOTE; PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0900/1 S [REDACTED] T NOFORN
GENL CASSIBRY OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF
IDF PLANES OR SHIPS HAD SIGHTED ANY BODIES OR PICKED UP ANY
SURVIVORS. GENL SAID 22 MEN WERE MISSING BUT WERE POSSIBLY
ALL IN HOLD OF LIBERTY. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER
AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.

9. (S) AT 091300Z, LT COL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS
EXPECTING REPLY TO INQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCH READ OFF
LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT.
THESE WERE:

- A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES
FROM COAST.
 - B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
 - C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
 - D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
 - E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
 - F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE
HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
 - G. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM
SEA.
- ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCH FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV 6510.1E AND DIR 5-18, 999/RDS-3A
on 16 Nov 76 DRK/pain JRG JcM/yr OF 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

621

618

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN 0900/2 JUN 67.

FINAL SECTION OF TWO
THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. LCOL BLOCH
COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE
CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH CALLED BACK AND
GAVE ABOVE NON-COMMITAL HEADING. USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E
DESCRIBING ABOVE EXCHANGE AND COMMENTING ON UNLIKELYHOOD OF
PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS CONFUSING LIBERTY AND EL QUSEIR
AND EVALUATING NAVY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK AS RESULT OF EAGERNESS
OF IDF NAVY TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE.

10. (C) AT APPROX 091400Z, ALUSNA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
RADM MOORE AT NMCC REGARDING TYPE AND EXTENT OF SEARCHES FOR
SURVIVORS MADE BY IDF NAVY. RADM MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
BUT PHONE CONNECTION VERY POOR. ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD

PAGE 4 of 6

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0900/2 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
TENOR OF QUESTIONS AND WOULD ACT ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG
BACKUP WITH DETAILED QUESTIONS. ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM MOORE
THAT IN VIEW GENERAL RECENT NON-COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING USDAO
REQUESTS FOR INFO ON HOSTILITIES, SLOWNESS OF REPLY TO QUERY
REGARDING POSSIBLE SURVIVORS, AND THE JUST RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN
POINTS UNQUOTE THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION
WOULD PROBABLY GET BETTER RESPONSE AT LEVEL HIGHER THAN USDAO
TO FLO. REQUESTS FOR INFO AND RENEWED SEARCH WERE PASSED TO
FLO IMMEDIATELY.

11. (S) AT 091630Z, LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
TO ALUSNA:

A. FOLLOWING ATTACK, 3 ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY
BUT WERE REFUSED.

B. N

MTB'S CONTIOPFBLEARCH IN ATTACK AREA UNTIL 081504Z WITH
NEGATIVE RESULTS EXCEPT FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND
OTHER EQUIPMENT.

C. MTB PERSONNEL STATE THEY SAW NO ONE JUMP INTO THE SEA OR
IN SEA.

D. IDF HELICOPTERS WERE OVER LIBERTY 081305Z TO 081311Z AND
WERE WAVED OFF. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH UNTIL 081504Z

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999705-3A OF 11 NOV 1976

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PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0900/2 S E C R E T NOFORN

E.

TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER.

F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE.

G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH.

H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE.

I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.

10. (S) AT 100730Z, LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 100300Z AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

PAGE 5 of 6 151615 JUNE 67

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0900/2 S E C R E T NOFORN

13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 100930Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.

14. (S) AT APPROX 101915Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.

15. (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I, REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

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on 16 Nov 76 116000Z 999/ROS-312 OF 11 NOV 1976

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0900/2 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INFO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBABLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.

C. MTB'S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.

16. (S) AT APPROX 131200Z WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE ITEM). ALUSNA SAID ATE IN QUOTE MALICIOUS UNTRUE UNQUOTE STORIES AND REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIP. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

PAGE 6 of 6

PAGE 6 RUQMVL 0900/2 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.

17. (S) AT 131255Z, LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GENL RABIN HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.

18. (C) ON 14 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.

19. COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.

B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CAN BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.

C. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

BT

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) by authority of ~~OPNAV~~ 10.1E AND DIA 5-18,
on 16 Nov 76 OR ~~OPNAV~~ RDS-3A OF 11 Nov 1976

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6021

JNNVV KXB346ZCZCDBA025PBD 015PBD 015

RUDLKD
RUFPPBK 095 0881435
NY EEEEE

291430Z MAR 67

1 USCINCEUR
NFO CINCUSNAVEUR
241212Z FEB 67

1 USCINCEUR
3 CINCUSAFE
INCUSNAVEUR
INCUSAREUR
USASAEUR

UNCLAS E F T O 02056. USAF FOR OTR,
SNAVEUR FOR N-32, USAREUR FOR ALGC-A, USASAEUR FOR
PN-E. SUBJ: MESSAGE ADDRESSEES.

REQUEST THAT ADDRESSEES ON YOUR MESSAGE TRAFFIC PERTAINING TO
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN THIS THEATER AND REQUIRING AN
OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS BE LIMITED TO THIS
HEADQUARTERS AND THOSE IN-THEATER AGENCIES ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS. ALL PAR PLANS AND PROGRAMS REQUIRED BY CURRENT
DIRECTIVES TO BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL ARE EXAMPLES OF MESSAGE
TRAFFIC REQUIRING AN OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

PAGE 2 RUFPPBK 095 UNCLAS E F T O

AS APPROPRIATE, THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST APPROVAL,
COORDINATE WITH, OR INFO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND/OR OTHER
MAJOR COMMANDS ON THEATER PAR PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Doc 46 Ex 48 LIBERTY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012
	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012

(PAGE 1 OF 1)			
CON	29	B	346
TOR	1915		
SSN			
SGN	12		

DTG 241212Z FEB 67

UNCLASSIFIED

625 622

UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

081715Z JUN 67

FM: USS LIBERTY
TO: NAVCOMSTA GREECE
UN



UNCLAS
SITREP FOLLOWS AIR ATTACK
AT TIME 081205Z SHIP CUS 283° SP 5 KTS. POSITION 31°35.5N 3329E
SHIP ATTACK WITH UNID JET FIGHTERS BELIEVE 1SERIAL APPROX. 6 STRAFFING
RUNS. MADE ON SHIP TIME 081225Z 3 TORP BOATS 110 AS 1SERIAL APPROACHED
STARBOARD QUARTER AT HIGH SPEED HULL NUMBER BOAT 206-17 APPROX 081427Z
TOOK TORP BOAT UNDER FIRE 2000 YDS. LAUNCHED TORP ATTACK AND
STRAFFING RUN. 1 TORP PASSED APPROX 75 YARD ASTERN. 1 MIN LATER TOOK
TORP HIT STBD SIDE. SHIP HAS 10° STBD LIST. W/T BOUNDARY ESTABLISHED
AM HOLDING. AFTER ATTACK TORP BOATS CLEARED TO EAST ABOUT 5 MILES.
CLEARING AREA AT 10 KTS.
2. PHOTO OF A/C AND BOATS TAKEN. AFTER ATTACK COMPLETED 2 1SER.
HELO ORBITED SHIP AT 500 YDS. TIME 081255. 1SER. INSIGNIA CLEARLY
VIS. PHOTO TAKEN SEVERAL PROJ. RECOVERED FROM TOP STDE AREA.
NUMBER DEAD EST 10. SEVERLY WOUNDED 15, TOTAL WOUNDED 75, NUMBER
MISSING UNDETERMINED.
3. SHIP UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MISSION WILL PERSONELL CASREPS ASAP
4. EXTENSIVE SUPERFICIAL TOPSIDE DAMAGE. DAMAGE LOWER DECKS FORWARD
DESTROYED.
5. COMM. CAP. LIMITED WILL PROVIDE FILM AND PROJ. AS DIRECTED
SHIP WILL REQUIRE DRY DOCK AND EXTENSIVE REPAIRS.

SHIP-STAFF-INFO
VIA...CIC
TOR...081750Z JUN 67
WU...TG

MSG NR 75/08



626
623

UNCLASSIFIED

081715Z JUN 67



248

From: Operations Officer, USS DAVIS (DD 937)
To: Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve
Subj: Hi Comm traffic, Liberty Incident

1. Logs were not maintained. However, the following attached messages were received over the HICOMM NET on 8 and 9 June and are considered pertinent.

2. Guard of the HICOMM NET was commenced at 081650B.

3. UHF communications on 277.8 MGS was established at 090130B with USS LIBERTY.

Glen W. Smith

Glen W. SMITH
LT USN

Doc. 47 Ex 48-LIBERTY

628

1025

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

121057Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM: COMSIXTHFLT
TO: CTF 60 / USS AMERICA / USS SARATOGA
INFO: COMDESRON 12

CONFIDENTIAL

LIBERTY INCIDENT

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 111311Z JUN

1. REQ FWD ASAP TO COMDESRON 12 AND COMSIXTHFLT COPIES ALL INCOMING/OUTING RADIO MESSAGES INCLUDING VOICE CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION REF A COVERING PERIOD 080001Z TO 121000Z.
2. FOR COMDESRON 12: UPON RECEIPT DELIVER MESSAGES TO RADM KIDD.

GP-3

*****REF A: OF HIGHER PRECEDENCE, TO SEE COME TO RADIO *****

RIR TO SWO

STAFF---IN
VIA-----KRRR 8420
TOR-----1208Z/12 JUN 67
W/U-----DH
MSG NR--43

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on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain of 21 Jun 76
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(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

121057Z JUN 67

Doc. 48 Ex 48 LIBRARY

629

(4246)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~//CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY
ROUTINE

130720Z JUN 67

FM: COMSIXTHFLT

TO: NCS ASMARA / USS MASSEY / CINCUSNAVEUR / NCS GREECE / NCS MOROCCO
CTF 67 / NAVRADSTA LONDONDERRY / NCS SPAIN / CTF 61

INFO: COMDESRON ONE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VOICE RADIO LOG
A. BY 121107Z JUN 67

1. TO EXPEDITE RECEIPT REQ FWD PERTINENT PORTIONS VOICE RADIO
LOGS REF A TO COMDESRON 12 VIA MSG. COMPLETE COPY STILL DESIRED
VIA MAIL IAW PARA 1 REF A.

CP-4

REF A...REQ FWD ASAP COPY YOUR VOICE RADIO LOGS....ETC....

DECLASSIFIED

STAFF..IN
VIA....KRRR 0909Z
TOR....131108Z JUN 67
W/U....HK
MSG NR.22/13

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 OK Spain of 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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130720Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Doc. 49 Ex 48 LIBERTY

630

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PRIORITY

131400Z JUN 67

FM: CTF 61
TO: COMDESRON 12

↓

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VOICE RADIO LOGS

1. COMSIXTHFLT 130721Z JUN 67
2. VOICE RADIO LOGS ON CIRCUIT E04.04 NOT MAINTAINED DURING SUBJECT PERIOD.
3. INTERROGATION OF RADIO PERSONNEL REVEALS THAT LIBERTY WAS HEARD ON CIRCUIT AND THAT ONE INFORMAL MESSAGE WITH NO DATE TIME GROUP CONCERNING LIBERTY'S INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH COMSIXTHFLT WAS RELAYED BY CTF 61 TO NCS GREECE.

(P-4)

REF A: VOICE RADIO LOG TO BE FWD TO CDS-12

DECLASSIFIED

STAFF--IN
VIA--KRN 9273
TOR--1629Z
C/D--DH
HUG NR-51

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on 29 Jun 76. *OR Spain* of 21 Jun 76
JAN Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Block)
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131400Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 631
Doc. 50 Ex 48 LIBERTY 628

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRIORITY 131620Z JUN 67

FM: USS MASSEY

TO: COMDESRON ONE TWO

✓

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A. COMSIXTHFLT 121107Z JUN 67

B. COMSIXTHFLT 130720Z JUN 67

C. VOICE RADIO LOG CKT E04.04 DURING PERIOD 8-9 JUN 67. ALL TIMES B

TIME TO FROM TEXT
8 JUNE 1967
2255 DEPUTY (GARBLED)

PROVIDE TO (RBJTEK) (XRGYRP)
(NP) AT 16 KNOTS TO REMAIN
VICINITY DESTINATION. INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW.

2302 DERAIL FAST CHARGER

REQUEST YOU ADVISE ME WHEN STEEL
JAW IS AIRBORN.

2302 ROCKSTAR BLUE CAP

WILL YOU SEND LIST OF CASUALTIES
THIS CIRCUIT

2303 BLUE CAP ROCKSTAR

BE ADVISED I WILL SEND LIST OF
CASUALTIES THIS CIRCUIT

2305 CACTUS PETE DERAIL

ACCORDING TO ROUTING OF
JOINTCHIEF STAFF 080100Z WE DO
NOT BELIEVE SUBJECT MESSAGE HELD
BY ROCKSTAR.

2 JUL 67

FAST CHARGER ROCKSTAR

(ROCKSTAR 082200Z JUN 67)

1. COMPLETE LOG SENT 130800Z JUN 67

00-4

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on 29 Jun 76

OR Spain

of 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

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STAFF IN

PLA--NR NR 9433

FOR--131955Z JUN 67

00-PT

00-70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

131620Z JUN 67

Doc 51 Ex 48 LIBERTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

629 443 632

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN M. J. HANLEY, USN

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, CINCUSNAVEUR

(For the JCS Fact Finding Team and the Court of Inquiry)

Before getting into the details of what happened on the night of 7-8 June, it may be of assistance if I clarify my position on the staff; particularly as regards the movements of ships under CINCUSNAVEUR's operational control or, in the case of the USS LIBERTY, under CINCUSNAVEUR's operational cognizance (my definition).

During the present upheaval in the Middle East, the movements of U. S. Navy ships have assumed a political and diplomatic sensitivity that has naturally resulted in a close screening of all ship moves prior to the time that they are made. During the night no ship moves which have not been previously scheduled and about which CINCEUR has not been informed are made without calling me. It is my responsibility to determine whether the move is of such significance that it should be reported to and approved by either CINCUSNAVEUR or the Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR. Standard practice is to make no moves however insignificant without informing the USCINCEUR duty officer. This is as a result of both written directives from USCINCEUR and informal understandings with their senior officers.

On the night of 7-8 June our battle watch was set in the Operations Control Center and, at a time that I did not notice, I received a phone call from Commander Jorgenson, the Command Center Duty Officer, about a proposed unscheduled movement of the LIBERTY. Commander Jorgenson informed me that a major in the JRC had called him and stated that they wanted the LIBERTY to move out to at least one hundred miles from the coast to conform to the restrictions which CINCUSNAVEUR had originated on ship movements in the Eastern Mediterranean and which COMSIXTHFLT had reported to the JCS as policy restrictions on ship movements.

I asked Commander Jorgenson if, to his knowledge, USCINCEUR knew anything about this direct phone call from the JRC to CINCUSNAVEUR inasmuch as this was not a normal procedure. Generally we are informed of this type of movement by USCINCEUR. He replied in the negative. I did not ask Commander Jorgenson if he had asked for an authentication on the phone call.

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)

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on 21 June 76 by [Signature] 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

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Doc 52 Ex 48-2111214

630633

I instructed him to inform the USCINCEUR Duty Officer in the premises of the call. I further instructed him to tell the USCINCEUR Duty Officer that we were ready to carry out any directive on moving ships that USCINCEUR should so order. However, in this case, the movements of the ship were being controlled by the JCS directly and we would like to have the date-time group of the JCS directive to include in our message to the SIXTH Fleet. We were dealing with a ship on a recognizably sensitive mission which was operating under a carefully drawn and very detailed JCS directive which had received a great deal of attention on our staff. He informed me that the messages directing COMSIXTHFLT to comply were already drafted and that he would get the JCS date-time group and release the messages to COMSIXTHFLT.

In this instance, because the LIBERTY was being moved from a recognized high risk area incident to her sensitive mission to an area that was not high risk, I did not consider it necessary to inform my superiors.

I might point out that our staff is particularly sensitive to directives to move ships by phone calls during this critical period without some indication that a written directive is being forwarded. Only the previous day, or perhaps the day before, we had as a result of a phone call sent out a flash message directing the amphibs to sortie from Malta only to cancel this within the hour by another flash message as a result of another phone call. This is but the latest in a series of similar incidents which would indicate that phone calls are sometimes not completely staffed. CINCUSNAVEUR policy is that we request the date-time group of substantiating messages for telephone-directed actions to move ships unless the call is received from a flag or general officer or higher authority. This does not mean that we have to receive the written message but only an indication that it has been staffed and released. In this case I was frankly disturbed that a major was the agent directing the movements of this very sensitive ship.

The LIBERTY represented an unusual ship as far as the normal ship that operates under CINCUSNAVEUR. While COMSIXTHFLT supposedly had her under his opcon, this was a misnomer. Her movements were not being directed by COMSIXTHFLT but by the JCS in view of her recognized high risk mission.

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(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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631

~~SECRET~~

I have knowledge of one other fact that bears on the LIBERTY incident as regards some of the communication difficulties. It is a matter of record that CINCUSNAVEUR recommended that minimize be instituted in the Mediterranean area. A modified form of minimize was adopted in the European area. Minimize as we intended to assist fleet communications was not adopted.

M. J. Hanley Jr.
M. J. HANLEY, JR.

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of CPN 111 MONO SN 009132/T31
on 29 Jun 76 DLR/pan 8 21 Jan 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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635

632

✓ 48

13 June 1967

From: Rear Admiral J. G. Wylie, USN
Deputy COMUSMACV
To: Major General Russ
Subj: Communication Problems

1. During the period of 5-10 June 1967 inclusive, the records of the Command Center indicate that 418 FIVE messages were received. Of these, 317 were OFFICIAL, and 101 were UNOFFICIAL. The percentage of OFFICIAL and UNOFFICIAL was then approximately 14%.
2. 19AF Seymour Johnson AFB AND 00347 DTG 301730Z May 1967 is an opim concerning CINCASSTRIKE's operation "BRINK PORT" for evacuation of certain categories in the Hanoi area. Its precedence is PRIORITY. It contains 10 pages. It is addressed to 31 addressees from California to the Indian Ocean and 21 of these addressees are in Europe.
3. The CINCASSTRIKE opim for the "BRINK PORT" evacuation is CINCASSTRIKE SPLWEN 30047 DTG 100051Z May 1967. It contains 10 pages. It is addressed to 31 addressees. Its precedence is PRIORITY.
4. I do not have at hand Changes 1 and 2 to the CINCASSTRIKE opim.
5. Change 3 to the CINCASSTRIKE opim is CINCASSTRIKE SPLWEN 30047 DTG 020051Z June 1967. It contains 10 pages. It is PRIORITY.
6. Interim Change 4 to the CINCASSTRIKE opim is CINCASSTRIKE SPLWEN 00047 DTG 040710Z June 1967. It contains 11 pages. Its precedence is OFFICIAL.

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to

) by authority of COMNAVJAG/SEC 009 D32/T31

J. G. WYLIE

on 29 Jun 76 by [Signature] 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 53 Ex 4 - Linc

636

1033

SAS DUPE

KRE#066 r

NNNNCZCKDE452ZCMGR810
PP RUDLKD
DE RUTKC 048A 1540927
ZNY CCCCC
P 021330Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO AIG 240
INFO RUEPJS/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIISA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIISA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIISA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPRK/USCINCEUR
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCIISA/NFOIC
RUFPRK/NSAEUR
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
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03-B-424
w-3/B

3 JUN 67 13 00

PAGE TWO RUTKC 048A C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRO/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUTKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUOPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

JCS PASS TO JRC

CINCLANT PASS TO JRC

CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 021330Z9 LIBERTY AGTR-5, POXX

ORG SP LIBERTY AGTR-5, 02//

ETD P ROTA SPAIN, 021330Z9 CO 015.0K6 03//

VIA L 35-57N0 005-35W3, 021730Z3 CO 015.0K6 04//

VIA L 37-00N0 012-00E3, 050330Z1 RH 015.0K6 05//

ETA L 32-00N5 033-00E6, 080300Z1 06//

MOD IND 32-00N525:9-0E9 080300Z1 50 MILE RADIUS-SPECCPS, CINCUSNAVEUR
311750Z7, 07//

ECT C 3 BG KIL0 ROMEO TANGO TANGO, LIBERTY, 070001Z8 JULIETT ROMEO TANGO
TANGO, LIBERTY, 08//

CFN 021330Z9, 021330Z9, 015.0K6, ETATUN0, 005-35W3, 021730Z3, 015.0K6,

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

) by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009.D32/T31

on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY



PAGE THREE RUTJC 048A C O N F I D E N T I A L

37-00N0, 012-00E3, 050330Z1, 015.0K6, 32-00N5, 033-00E6, 080300Z1,

32-00N5, 033-00E9, 080300Z1, 311750Z7, 070001Z8, 09//END

GP-4

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637 634

Doc. 54 Ex 48 LIBERTY

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by OTCs
10 Nov 76

[illegible]

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JUN 2 07 43

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXX												Y
ACTION PARTRMENT	C I N C U S N A V E U R	000	001	002	N01	N02	N03	N04	N05	N06	N07	C I T E	S D O
		001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A I I 4
3													NCU L O N D O N

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
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DTG 012030 2 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

ELR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 56 - Ex 48 - LIBERTY

640 637

NNNNCZCKDA527ZCNGX103
OO RUDLKD
DE RUOMVL 0920 167200Z
ZNY CCCCC
O JSSUORTZ JUN 67 17445
FM USDA TEL ACIV ISRH
MH

TO RUCIJUA/CNO
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCRCF/CONSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
BT

C O N T I N U E N T I A L 0920 JUN 67
REF: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 11700Z JUN 67
B. C ANEMB TEL AVIV 4178 JUN 67

REF A MSG TO ANEMB TEL ACIV CITED WASHLAQKNL 16 JUN NEWS
STORY STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED ALUSNA ON 5 JUN AS TO
WHETHER THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI
PENINSULA, STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B MSG TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THA SUCH REQ WAS
MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND
REPEATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION TAKEN

JUN 16 8 53 PM '67
MC-5310

copy to adm. Kidd

16 JUN 67 472

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPIAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18,
on 16 Nov 76 OR Spain TAG & Co 99/RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 57 Ex 48 LIBERTY
Encl 8 5-18, 999/RDS-3A

641
638

XERO COPY

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R. KIDD

ZOB - take no further action for forwarding msg.

16 JUN 67 17 05z

ACTION TAKEN:
JUN 18 5 16 PM 1967

MC / SEP

223

NNNNVV KXC231TN

WVV FBM801VV HIT E KCB237

PP RUQKRQ

DE RUQKRM 006DLV 16IPW

ZNY EEEEE

P 160302Z JUN 67

FM USS DAVIS

TO RUQKRQ/CINV

SNAVEUR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

RADM KIDD MSG TRAFFIC

A. YOUR 142258Z JUN 67

B. YOUR 141425Z JUN 67

C. YOUR 151640Z JUN 67

D. YOUR 151425Z JUN 67

1. REFS ALFA THRU DELTA RECEIVED BY DAVIS AND CTG 60.5 AFTER DEPARTURE RADM KIDD.

2. UNODIR ZOB.

BT

Doc 58 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

642

1-29

BT

ACTION TAKEN:

LIBERTY

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to _____)
() by authority of CPNAV memo Ser 009032/13,
on 29 Jun 76 *ORR* *9 21 Jun 76*
(Date) *TAG Seclet*
(Signature) _____
(Mark)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON			
TOR	10/1356		
SSN			
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[illegible]

DTG 18/256, Jun 67

CONFIDENTIAL

Doc. 59 Ex V8-2100

645

646

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10 JUNE 67 12 57z

VV KXC163

ZTC
ETG

D GVV BBM173VV KCA318

OO RUQKCO

DE RUQKRM 011DLV 1611100

ZNY CCCCC

O 101100Z JUN 67

FM CTG SIX ZERO PT FIVE

TO RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT

RUQKCF/CTF SIX ZERO

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

RUENAAA/CHINFO

RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUFLC/CINCEUR

RUTPRE/CTF SIX THREE

RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

RUQKCF/USS AMERICA

RUQKRD/USS TIDEWATER

BT

C

SITREP THIRTEEN

1. MY 1200B3 POSIT 34-17N/5 38-06E/6

2. FUEL STALS DAVIS 60 PAPAGO 47 LIBERTY 79

G

EM DAVIS ARRANGING TO OBTWYN LIBERTY PAY RECORDS AND WILL PAY
PRIOR ENTRY PORT.

4. DAVIS MEDICAL STORES AND DAMAGE CONTROL CONSUMABLES AND

PAGE TWO RUQKRM 011DLV C O N F I D E N T I A L
EQUIPMENT SERIOUSLY REDUCED. SEPERATE ACTION PRIORITY
REQ. BEING SUBMITTED. MOST ITEMS SHOULD BE AVAIL. TIDEWATER
5. NO FURTHER MATERIAL LOSS OVERBOARD. OIL REDUCED TO SEEPAGE
LEAVING THIN FILM IN WAKE. NO BLACK OIL.

6. LIST NOW NEGLIGABLE DUE FUEL TRANSFER.

7. SUBJECT FIRST PRIORITY TO PROVIDE ESCORT AND ALL OTHER
SERVICES TO LIBERTY REC. BRIEF STOP SUDA FOR DAVIS ASAP TO:

A. EXAMINE/REHAIR BOILER. DAVIS 100934Z NOTAL REFERS.

B. REPL MEDICAL AND DAMAGE CONTROL. PARA 4 ABOVE REFERS

C. PICK UP TORPEDO MK 44 ASSIGNED BY CTF 60.6.

IF LIBERTY DESTINATION OTHER THAN SUDA BRIEF STOP COULD S

.-\$3 76 TEMP DIVERT AT INCREASED SOA LEAVING PAPAGO AS ESCORT UNTIL
REJOIN.

8. DAVIS CAN DIVERT TO EXAMINE EAST CRETE ANCHORAGE BY GOING NO
MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE MILES AHEAD LIBERTY. WILL NOT DO SO UNLESS
DIRECTED.

-4

254

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dec. 60 EX 4P - LIBERTY

644

641

DECLASSIFIED (100)

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of CPNAV Memo Ser 00902/13/
29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
JAG Sec Cont
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

JUN 10

1 07 PM '67

ACTION TAKEN:

DE RUFFBK 038 1611115
ZNY SSSSS
P 101045Z JUN 67 ZFF 346
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUEPJS/JCS
INFO RUDLKD/USNAVEUR
BT

S [REDACTED] ECDC 09200. SUBJECT IS LIBERTY.

1. (S) HAVE REVIEWED AVAILABLE DATA WITH RESPECT TO LIBERTY WITH CINCUSNAVEUR IN GENERAL FRAM OF CHRONOLOGY BEFORE ACCIDENTAL ATTACK, DURING ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT THERETO. WE BOTH HAVE MANY VERY PERTINENT AND AS YET UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AS WE APPRECIATE WASHINGTON HAS. AT SAME TIME, MUST BE RECOGNIZED CREW MEMBERS OF LIBERTY FROM WHOM ANSWERS MUST BE GOTTEN ARE AT POINT OF EXHAUSTION, SUFFERING FROM WOUNDS AND SHOCK, DEAD OR MISSING. IT SIMPLY DOES NOT MAKE SENSE, LEGALLY OR OTHERWISE, TO INITIATE BARRAGE OF UNCORRELATED QUESTINGING VIA LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS AT THIS TIME. OBVIOUSLY FACTS MUST BE DEVELOPED INVOLVING ACTIONS AND JUDGEMENTS OF CREW, LIBERTY COMMAND AND CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND ALSO LEGAL BASE MUST BE ESTABLISHED FOR POSSIBLE CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. THEREFORE, I STRONGLY ENDORSE ESTABLISHMENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY BY CINCUSNAVEUR AS PROPER PROCEDURE TO ESTABLISH.

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 18 12 54

PH 117

PAGE 2 RUFFBK 038 S [REDACTED]

WHAT HAPPENED AS BASIS FOR ANY APPROPRIATE SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS, ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE SOMEWHAT TIME-CONSUMING AND CREATE IMPATIENCE AMONG THOSE WHO DESIRE MORE RAPID ANSWERS.

2. (S) WHILE I BELIEVE WE ARE ASKING FULL RANGE OF PERTINENT QUESTIONS, SUGGEST WASHINGTON AGENCIES COMPILE AND FORWARD ALL QUESTIONS INTO WHICH THEY WANT SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO INSURE COURT OF INQUIRY DOES FULLY RESPONSIVE JOB. MEANWHILE WOULD APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE IN HOLDING OFF STREAM OF QUESTIONS TO SATISFY PRESS OR OTHER INTERESTS UNTIL FACTS CAN BE PROPERLY AND FORMALLY ESTABLISHED. INFORMATION FOR NOTIFICATION NEXT OF KIN AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT DATA WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE BE FURNISHED ASAP.

3. (S) WE FORESEE A PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO COURT OF INQUIRY. IN VIEW OF ASSIGNED MISSION IT MUST BE A CLOSED COURT. ANTICIPATE PRESSURES FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH SURVIVORS, OPEN COURT AND PUBLIC SPECTACLE WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF COURT APPOINTMENT. SUGGEST WE GO AHEAD AND ANNOUNCE THAT A COURT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO INQUIRE INTO ALL ASPECTS OF LIBERTY AFFAIR, THUS IMMUNIZING ALL MEMBERS OF LIBERTY FROM FURTHER PRESS CONTACT, AND IF PRESSED FOR OPEN COURT OR REMATURE PRESS INTERVIEWS, SUGGEST ANSWER THAT LIBERTY, IN SUPPORTING U. S. COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS IN EASTERN MED WAS PART OF

PAGE 3 RUFFBK 038 S [REDACTED]

OVERALL OPERATIONAL, COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THEREFORE PART OF OPERATIONS WHICH ROUTINELY CLASSIFIED. AS IN VIETNAM, WE DO NOT MAKE PUBLIC OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OF A CLASSIFIED NATURE.

• (U) REQUEST GUIDANCE.

P-4.

T

253 DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) [REDACTED]
(Date) 29 Jun 76 (Signature) [REDACTED] (Rank) [REDACTED]
by authority of [REDACTED] 821 Jun 76

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Doc 61 NAME X 48 LIBERTY

645

642

S. [REDACTED] T 0849 JUN 67
REF TEGXAN RADM MOORE NMCC AND ALUSNA, TEL AVIV AND JCS UTPO J-3 NOT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of OPNAV SSIO IE & DIA SSI 591/RUS-3A & 4 Nov 76
on 21 Jun 76 DR 6 21 Jun 76
(Date) JAG Sec Cont
(Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXXXXXXXX																				
ACTION DEPARTMENT	C I N C U S H A V E U R	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020
		001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020
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DTG

091815 2 Jan 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Encl 2 5-18, 999/KDS-3A

Doc 62 Ex 48 LIBERTY

646 643

314 Liberty
PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0849 S ~~SECRET~~ IRB

REGARDING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT. 1. AT

091631Z IDFIARMY ASSISTANT

ARMY SPOKESMAN, LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, TELEPHONED FOLLOWING STATEMENTS TO ALUSNA: A. FOLLOWING ATTACK THREE ISRAELI MTB APPROACHED LIBERTY AND AT 1227Z ASKED BY LCGCT QUOTE DO YOU NEED HELP UNQUOTE. LIBERTY REPLIED QUOTE NO THANK YOU. WE DO NOT NEED HELP UNQUOTE. MTBS REMAINED IN AREA UNTIL 1504Z SEARCHING TWO TO THREE MILES AROUND ATTACK POSITION. THEY SAW NO PERSON IN SEA, BUT RECOVERED TWO RUBBER LIFE BOATS, ONE SURVIVAL KIT AND ONE PAMPHLET ON TRANSISTORS. MTB PERSONNEL NOW STATE POSITIVELY THEY SAW NO CREWMEMBERS JUMP INTO SEA AND NONE IN SEA. B. TWO IDF HELICOPTERS WERE OVER LIBERTY 1305Z TO 1321Z AND WERE WAVED OFF BY SHIP. MTBS TOLD HELICOPTERS SHIP DID NOT DESIRE HELP. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH OVER 5 KILOMETER RADIUS UNTIL 1504Z. C. LT COL BLOCH HAS INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE WHO IS NOW ON AIR MISSION. ALL STATE THEY SAW NO CREWMEMBER ENTER SEA AND FINE IN SEA. D. IDF INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS. STATED THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO YESTERDAY IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MISSING PERSONNEL BUT UNDERSTOOD SHIP NEEDED NO HELP. E. IDF NAVY STATES UNDER STANDARD WIND

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0849 S ~~SECRET~~ AND CUR

PG 2 OF 2 191815Z June

ENT CONDITIONS SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS WOULD BE CARRIED TO COASTLINE APPROX OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH (3118N 3415E) IN GAZA STRIP. 2. IF CERTAIN THAT LIBERTY STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND BEC US

OF POSITIVE STATEMENTS OF IDF FORCES AT SCENE THAT NO PERSONS ENTERED OR WERE IN WATER CONSIDER SEARCH EFFORT ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW UNACCOUNTED CREWMEMBERS BELIEVE NO EFFORT TOO GREAT. IDF AGREES CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE AND WILL COMPLY ANY OTHER REQUEST.

3. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED COLONEL BLOCH REPORTED LAST PILOT INTERVIEWED: PILOT STATES HE THINKS HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF SHIP. BLOCH DOES NOT CREDIT REPORT IN VIEW OTHER WITNESSES. HAS LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CONFIRM OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)

) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18.991

on 16 Nov 96 OK by JASc RDS 3A OF 11 NOV 1976

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

647 644

NNNN
VVV KXC405VV BBM01.
OO RUQKRO
DE RUQKC 2307 1592139
ZNY CCCCC

NCS CI123

CMC/ASNAVEAN

ACTION TAKEN:

BT
C O N [REDACTED] A L SVC

A. USCINCEUR 081937Z JUN 67

B. JCS 7347/080110Z

1. REF B NOT HELD BY USS LIBERTY.

2. LIBERTY ADVISES NO CRYPTOABILITY ON DD.

GP-3

BT

JUN 8 10 44 PM '67

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MC1190

618

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

) by authority of

on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain 9 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc. 63 Ex 48 LIBERTY

648

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NNNNCZCKDA340ZCNGA682

00 783-783

DE RUQMVL 0834 1592107

ZNY CCCCC

O 082100Z JUN 67

FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL

TO RUEPJS/DIA

RUEHC/DEPT STATE

RUEPJS /OSD

RUQMKG/USDAO AMMAN

RUEHDT/USUN

INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE

RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

RUFPRK/USCINCEUR-USEUCOM

RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

RUFPRW/CINCUSAFE

RUFPAQ/CINCUSAREUR

RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT

RUEKDA/JCS

RUDLKD/USDAO LONDON

RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO

RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (Excluded) (Excluded)

Declassified by: [illegible] on: [illegible]
Date: Nov 76
Authority: [illegible]
Page: 1 of 1

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	C	I	N	C	S	N	A	V	E	U	R	C	I	T	E	S	O
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE 1 OF 2			
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SSN	08/03374		
SON	18		

DTG 082100 JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 64 Ex 48 - LIBRARY
Encl 5 5-18,999/KDS-3A

46
649

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0834 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DML0834 JUN 67.

SUBJECT: ISRAELI ACCIDENTAL ATTACK ON U.S.S. LIBERTY, 8 JUNE.

1. FLO HAS PASSED IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS AT 1930Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED THE EL ARISH (3107N-3348E) AREA AT NOON TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER IT WAS VERIFIED THAT THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL, ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED BUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 18 MILES OFF THE COAST. UNQUOTE.

2. LOCAL APOLOGIES FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0825.

3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENTAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.

4. EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DAO 0812.

5. ASSISTANCE AFTER ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY MTR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.

6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO,

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0834 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TEL AVIV) ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONF. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTACT WITH US NAVY.

7. ALUSNA OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEMPTED CONTACT NON PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 8 KNOTS NORTHERLY, COURSE 62 NM WEST OF ASKELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYN

DLTARBOARD AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.

8. IDF WILL RESPOND IN RESCUE IF ASKED, HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIATE NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.

9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NOTICE COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

BT

DECLASSIFIED

(Cancelled) (Changed to
on... by authority of OPNAV 5610 IE AND DIA 5-18,
16 Nov 76 DRG/RA 999/RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976

OFF (Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

650
644

VV KXCS51VV BL 18VV KCA117

OO RUQKRC

DE RUQKC 2276 159175

ZNR UUUUU ZEL

O 081715Z JUN 67

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUEKAA/CNO

INFO RUQKRC/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPBK/CINCEUR

RUEPJS/JCS(JRC)

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUEDNKA/COMERVLANT

BT

UNCLAS

SITUATION FOLLOWING AIR ATTACK.

1. AT 081205Z WHILE SHIP ON COURSE 283 DEG SPEED 05 KNOTS POSITION 31 DEG 35.5 MIN NORTH 33 DEG 29 MIN EAST SHIP ATTACKED BY UNIDENTIFIED JET FIGHTERS. BELIEVED TO BE ISREALI. APPROXIMATELY SIX STRAFING RUNS MADE ON SHIP. APPROXIMATELY 081225Z THREE TORPEDO BOATS, ONE IDENTIFIED AS ISREALI APPROACHED SHIP ON STBD QTR AT HIGH SPEED. HULL NUMBER OF ONE BOAT WAS 206-17. APPROXIMATELY 081427Z TOOK TORPEDO BOAT UNDER FIRE WITH 50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS AT A RANGE OF 2000 YARDS. TORPEDO BOAT LAUNCHED TORPEDO AND STRAFING ATTACK. ONE TORPEDO PASSED APPROX 25 YARDS ASTERN. APPROXIMATELY ONE MINUTE LATER SHIP SUSTAINED TORPEDO HIT STBD SIDE. SHIP HAS 10 DEG

PAGE TWO RUQKC 2276 UNCLAS

STBD LIST. WATER TIGHT BOUNDARIES ESTABLISHED AND HOLDING. AFTER ATTACK TORPEDO BOATS CLEARED TO EAST ABOUT FIVE MILES, CLEARING AREA AT 10 KNOTS.

2. PHOTOS OF AIRCRAFT AND BO

TAKEN. AFTER ATTACK COMPLETED TWO ISREALI HELICOPTERS ORBITED SHIP, AT ABOUT 081255Z, RANGE 500 YARDS. ISREALI INSIGNIA CLEARLY VISIBLE. PHOTOS TAKEN. SEVERAL PROJECTILES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED FROM TOPSIDE AREAS. NUMBER KILLED IS ESTIMATED AT 10. NUMBER SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AT 15. TOTAL WOUNDED 75. NUMBER MISSING CURRENTLY UNDETERMINED.

3. SHIP UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MISSION. WILL SUBMIT PERSONNEL CASREPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SEPARATELY.

4. EXTENSIVE SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE TOPSIDE. LOWER DECK SPACES FORWARD DESTROYED.

5. COMM CAPABILITIES LIMITED WILL PROVIDE FILM AND PROJECTILES RECOVERED AS DIRECTED. SHIP WILL REQUIRE DRYDOCK AND EXTENSIVE REFITTING.

BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR										CITE		SDO		NCU	
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DTG 081715 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (RE 2100-55)

Doc. 65 Ex 48 LIBERTY

651

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(PAGE 1 OF _____)

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SGN	22		

DTG 081519 Z JUN 66

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

100

CONFFLASHSITREV 06005 COMSIXTHFLT 0814TEZ
1. FOLLOWING MSG REC FROM USDAO TEL AVIV.
QUOTE: ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO. TO RECEIVE REPORT.
ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT
081200Z. POSITION 31-25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF
HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND
ABJECT APOLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR
COAST. UNQUOTE.
2. AT 081430Z LIBERTY REPORTED UNDERWAY AT EIGHT(8) KNOTS,
340 DEGREES MAGNETIC.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

on 29 Jun 76 OR Equin 8 21 June 76
 Dr. Scott

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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(PAGE 1 OF _____)

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DTG 081455, Jun 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 68 Ex 48 LIBERTY

654 105

JUN 0 3 42 AM '67

47141/CONFIRMED
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
BT
GXWYCNBOPPAGEVJ VFPFMLOXMTAZJYJQIBHOSRBXWWFFRVT

FLPRXCONSIXTHFLT/98064

1. FOLLOWING FROM LIBERTY (NO DTG):
QUOTE: WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE VESSELS.
BELIEVE TO BE ISREALI HELICOPTERS THAT CIRCLED THE SHIP AFTER ATTACK.
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE. WILL HAVE TO BE MADE FROM SHIPS
PHOTOGRAPHS. UNQUOTE.
GP-4
BT

PHOTOGRAPHS. UNQUOTE
GP-4
BT
DECLASSIFIED
... (cancelled) (changed to ...
... SPANIA

DECLASSIFICATION (cancelled) (Changed to _____)
by authority of OPNAV MEMO Ser 004D32721
on 24 Jun 76 DRG
(Date) (Signature) JHG Sec Cont
(Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

LIBERTY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	C O		
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DATE 081447 JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 69 Ex 48 LIBRARY

655/62

1. RECEIVED OVER VOICE HICOM FROM US ZLIBERTY. USS LIBERTY UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKING CRAFT. AFTER ATTACK A HELO CIRCLED THE SHIP BELIEVED TO BE ISRAELIAN.
GP-4
BT

8 JUN 67 15 38Z

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

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081428, JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

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VEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV. 10-65)

Doc 70 Ex 48 LIBERTY

656

1953

AP-

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SEN

DT 4

BF1426, Jan 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 71 - Ex 48 - LIBERTY

657

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FM CONSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPEK/USCINCEUR
INFO AIG NINE NINE EIGHT (TO CINCUSNAVEUR)
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTRF/COMFAIRMED
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

DECLASSIFIED

Declassification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of SPN AUTHORITY SMOARDS 2/31
on 29 Jan 76 (R. R. Spain) 3 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ET
SECRET, FLAGSHIP 06002 CONSIXTHFLT 081400Z
UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH USS LIBERTY ON ANY CIRCUIT.
2. THE FOLLOWING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED TO PILOTS: QUOTE: YOU
ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY TO
CONTROL THE SITUATION. DO NOT USE MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED. DO NOT
PURSUE ANY UNIT TOWARD LAND FOR REPRISAL PURPOSES. PURPOSE OF CONTER-
ATTACK IS TO PROTECT LIBERTY ONLY. ADDITIONALLY, ALL PILOTS BRIEFED
THAT EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL LIMIT ONLY TWELVE (12) MILES AND LIBERTY
RIGHT ON EDGE. DO NOT FLY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SHORELINE
EXCEPT AS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF ABOVE. FIGHTER COVER
PILOTS BRIEFED THAT ANY ATTACKS ON ATTACK AIRCRAFT, LIBERTY,
OR THEMSELVES IS HOSTILE ACT AND ABOVE APPLIES. UNQUOTE.

AP 3
ET

INDICATOR SECTION		CINCUSNAVEUR														ACTION PARTNMENT	
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081425 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

EX-111-LIBERTY

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Liberty

8 JUN 67 14 30z

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.....ZZ RUQKRC

DE RUQKC 2226 1591420

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NO DTG

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT

INFO RUQKRC/CINCUSNAVEUR

BT

SNCLAS

FO LOWING RECVD VIA VOICE HICOMM

PUOTE

FASTCHARGER DE ROCKSTAR

BT

1. WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE VESSELS.
BELIEVE TO BE ISREALI HELICOPTERS THAT CIRCLED THE SHIP AFTER
ATTACK

BT
2. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE. WILL HAVE TO BE MADE
FROM SHIPS PHOTOGRAPHS -4-4Z

SNQUOTE

3. NCS GREECE COMMENTS: NOT AUTHENTICATED.

BT

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ORIGINATOR SECTION	<i>[Handwritten marks]</i>												CITE		SD																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
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	NCU													001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020	021	022	023	024	025	026	027	028	029	030	031	032	033	034	035	036	037	038	039	040	041	042	043	044	045	046	047	048	049	050	051	052	053	054	055	056	057	058	059	060	061	062	063	064	065	066	067	068	069	070	071	072	073	074	075	076	077	078	079	080	081	082	083	084	085	086	087	088	089	090	091	092	093	094	095	096	097	098	099	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																														

51

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of CNAU memo 00902/131
on 21 Jun 76 DRS 9 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAC Soc Coll
(Rank) Sgt
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE TWO RUTPRO 111 N A T O ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L
N A T O C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L
FOLLOWUP NR 1 AND FINAL TO COMSIXTHFLT CRITIC 1-67
1. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTBS ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED US SHIP AT 081200Z, POSIT 31-25N, 33-33E.
MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS
SEND ABJECT APOLOGIES. SIXTHFLT SENDING ASSISTANCE.
GP-4
BT

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CAT B ENCRYPTION.
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DTG PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION.

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TON	1P227A		
SSN			
SEN	1C		

Orig 081349 2 Jun 67
3 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 24 Ex 48 LINDENT

660 - 6511

NNNNCZCKDA131ZCNGX934

*****ZZ RUEKDA

DZQRUQML 0825 1591405

ZNY CCCCC

Z 081414Z JUN 67

FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL

TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPJS/OKRVH

RUEPNAA/CNO

RUENC/DEPT STAE

RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT

RUEPSPA/CINCSTRIKE

RUEKDA/CINCNAVEUR

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUEPJS/DIA

RUEHDT/USUN

RUEPBA/CINCEUR-USEUCOM

RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO

RUEPBA/USAF

RUEYAG/CINCUSAREUR

RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO

BT

C 15 JUN 67.

ALUSMA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT : ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

AND MTB'S DE

RONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

PAGE 2 RUQML 0825 C

POSITION 3125N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT
APOLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)

by authority of OPAV 5510.1E AND DIA

5-18, 999/RDS-3A OF

on 16 NOV 76 DR8min 11 NOV 1976

JAGSec

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

ORIGINATOR SECTION	OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY															
ACTION DEPARTMENT	C	O	I	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	0	0	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0													

RELEASED BY <i>J. L. W. 1.</i>		DRAFTED BY <i>J. F. Lynch</i>		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
8 JUN 1967		PHONE EXT. NO.		ACTION	XXX				
				INFO	XXX				

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____
PROOF READER _____
CEWPO _____
CWO _____

UNCLAS//JOPREP/SUM. TOTAL/001/CINCUSNAVEUR/081239Z

AT 081245Z QUOTE UNDER ATTACK AND HIT BADLY UNQUOTE.

AT 081245Z QUOTE HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY
NEED ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE

2. MESSAGE IS NOT AUTHENTICATED.

GF-3

DECLASSIFIED

Doc. 77 Ex 48-LIBERTY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	C N C U S N A V E U R	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	C I T E	S D O	N C U L O N D O N					
ACTION DEPARTMENT		0 0	0 1	0 2	0 1	0 2	0 3	0 4	0 5	0 6	0 7						A I L O
N3		0 0 1	0 0 2	0 0 3	0 0 3	0 1 1	0 1 2	0 1 3	0 1 4	0 1 5	0 1 6						0 1 7

CON			
TON			
SSN	1059		
SGN			

of 081400, JUNE 67

663

1060

Liberty

0 JUN 67 14 38z

mc/oc

VV KXC207VV BBM989
...ZZ RUQKRQ
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUQKC
ZFH-2 THIS MSG PASSED TO YOU FOR INFO
VV KRF3
...ZZ RUTPRC
DE RUQKRQ 054 1591358
ZNY CCCCC
Z 031350Z JU 67
FM USS SARATOGA
TO UTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THIS STATION RECEIVED ATTACK REPORT FROM STATION ROCK STAR AT
1200Z WE CHANNELLED WITH WS ROCK STAR AUTHENTICATED CORRECTLY WITH
ON PUB USED WAS KAA 33.
GP 4
BT
E

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of [unclear] on 09/12/76
DATE 29 JUN 76
(Date)
Signature [unclear]
(Name)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

[Handwritten signature]

ORIGINATOR SECTION	☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒															
ACT'G DEPARTMENT	☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒															
NAVEUR NCU	☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒ ☒															

(PAGE 1 OF)			
CON			
TOR	1438/8		
SSN			
SEN	FL		

081358 2 Jan 67

GENERAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Liberty

TO: ALL STATIONS THIS NET

BT

TOR: 4313Z

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TOR	1313/8		
SSN			
SEN	R		

DATE 02/13/67 JAN 67
FILE TIME
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 80 Ex 48 LIBERTY 666

1063

Liberty

0 JUN 67 13.05z

VV KXC182VV BBM982VV KCA089
..ZZ RUQKRQ
RUQKC 2201 1591301
UUUUU
081301Z JUN 67
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
KXCF/CTF SIX ZERO
KXCF/CINCUSNAVEUR

UNCLAS
FOLLOWING RCVD VIA VOICE HICOM FROM QBM ROCKSTAR
NOTE
081253Z AT 081253Z WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY A TORPEDO
CDB SIDE LISTING BADLY REQ ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY
UNQUOTE

APPROXIMATE VESSEL NAME UNKNOWN

[Handwritten signature]

ORIGINATOR SECTION	<i>[Handwritten marks]</i>											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	<i>[Handwritten marks]</i>											
CINCUSNAVEUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

(PAGE 1 OF)	
CON	
TOR	1305/P
SSH	
SEN	R

DTG 081301 Jan 67

[Handwritten signature] UNCLASSIFIED

VEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 81 Ex 48 LIBERTY 567

1704

8 JUN 67 13 04z

VV KXC181V BBM981VV KRF38B

...ZZ RUQKRQ

DE RUQKRQ 052 1591254

ZNY EEEEE

Z 081254Z JUN 67

FM USS SARATOGA

TO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE

RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR
HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY NEED ASSISTANCE
IMMEDIATELY

BT

Liberty

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012
	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020	021	022	023	024

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON	
TOR	1304/P
SSN	
SEN	R

081254Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc 82 EX 48 LIBERTY 668
1705

NNNVV BBM979V KJF386

O RUQKRQ

E RUQKRF 051 11 (/1180VV

1111ZZ RUQKRQ

E RUQKRF 053 1591245

NY EEEEE

081245Z JUN 67

M USS SARATOGA

O RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

NFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

UTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE

UTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

T

NCLAS E F T O

THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR:

UNDER ATTACK AND HIT BADLY.

T

8 JUN 67 13 02z

nc/oc

Liberty

INATOR
TION

ON
MENT

3

CINCUSNAVEUR

001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020
001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020
001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020

NCU																			

(PAGE 1 OF

CON				
TOR	1302/8			
SSN				
SEN				

081245, Jun 67

UNCLASSIFIED

R NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 183 Ex 48 4/1/67

669

1266

.. ZZ RUQKRQ

BBM977VV

KCAØ

DE RUC 2194 1591239

ZNR UUUUU

Z NO DTG

FM USS SARATOGA

TO RUQKRO/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO RUPRC/CONSIXTHFLT

RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO

BT

(NO CLASS RECD)

FOLLOWING RECD FROM USNS LIBERTY.
"I AM UNDER ATTACK"

1. I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33.25E 31.23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQ IMMED (MISSED PORTION)

REQ IMMED (MISSED PORTION)

NOTE: NO AUTHENTICATION RECEIVED. INTERCEPTED E04.04 FROM
USS SARATOGA.

BT

BT

8 JUN 67 12 47z

mc/oc

Liberty \$

**ORIGINATOR
SECTION**

**ACTION
DEPARTMENT**

N3

									X
O O	O I	O 2	N I	N 2	N 3	N 4	N 5	N 6	CITE S D O
O O I	O O 2	O O 3	O O 2 S	O I 2	O I 3	O I 4	O I 5	O I 6	A I I 4 A 8 O
X			X				X	X	

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TOR	1247/8		
SSN			
SEN			R

Ord. 08/1239 - Jan 67

UNCLASSIFIED

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 84 Ex 48 Lipe

CS-70

1 n 1 0 1

BT

1008

Liberty

-Z- 0 8 1 2 3 7 Z

// CORRECTED COPY //

-FM CTU 60.2.9

-TO CINCUSNAVEUR

-INFO COMSIXTHFLT

CTG 60.2

CTF 60

BT

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM USS LIBERTY THREE UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS
APPROACHING OUR POSITION NOW.

BT

TOR: 102/3 JUNE 1967/SSB/L/L CALL FROM MOROCCO/

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
ACT																				
U.S. NAVY																				
VEUR																				
NCU																				
LON																				
2100/1																				
(REV 10-65)																				

(PAGE 1 OF)	
CON	
TOR	1319/P
SSN	
SEN	R

081237 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc 86 Ex 48 LIBERTY

672

1069

Liberty

NNNNVV KXC176NNJ IGVV BBM978V KRF 385
00 RUQKRQ
DE RUQKRQ 050 1591235
ZNY EEEEE
O 081235Z JUN 67
FM USS SARATOGA
TO RUQKRQ/GINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE
RUTPRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

8 JUN 67 1255Z

mc/oc

BT
UNCLAS E F T M
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR
I AM UNDER ATTACK MY POSIT 31 23N 33 25E. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE
BT

E4.4

~~XXXX~~

ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00
DEPARTMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00

(PAGE 1 OF _____)	
CON	
TOR	1255Z
SSN	
SSN	R

081235Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

00 RUQKRO
DE RUQKC 2144 1500005
ZNY EEEEE

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUQKRG/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPP/COMSIXTHFLT

RUFRR/COMFIRMED

RUFERS/PATRON SIGONELLA

RUTKC/PATRON ROTA

RUTPP/CTF 60

RUTPP/CTG 60.2

RUTPP/CTU 60.1.5

RUTPP/CTU 65.2.5

RUEDSPA/USCINCMFAFSA

RUQP NAA/ COM IDEASTFOR

INFO, RUE NAAA/SECNAV

RUE NAAA/ CNO

RUEENKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUFPBK/USCINCEUR

RUCLBKA/FICEUR

RUFPBW/CINCUSAFE

RUWONLB/CINCONAD

PAGE TWO RUQKC 2144 UNCLAS E F T O

RUEPJS/DIA

RUE NAAA/OSD (ISA)

RUEDNKA/ CONSERVANT

RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT

BT

UNCLAS E F T O LOCATING TWO

TWO DELTA WING SINGLE ENGINE JET FIGHTER A/C ORBITED USS LIBERTY

THREE TIMES AT 31-27N, 34-00E AT TIME 08/0630Z. NO IDENT. VISIBLE

DUE ALT. EST. 5,000 FT, DISTANCE EST. 2 MILES. NO AMPLIFYING

REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED.

BT

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TOR	1221/8		
SSN			
SON	R		

On 080742, Jun 62

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 88 Ex VP LIBERTY

674 611

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1972 C 0
RUFED/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT
C 0
JCS PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
A. USCINCEUR 0614-0Z JUN 6
1. 070800Z5 POSIT 33-06N2
072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY
2. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP W
IAW REF A.
EP-4
BT

CLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to _____)
() by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 OPNAV 921 Jun 76
(Date) JAG Sec Cont
(Signature) _____ (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXXXXXX										C S D O	C I T E	A D O	N C U L O N			
	C O I	0 1 2	0 1 2	0 1 2	0 1 3	0 1 4	0 1 5	0 1 6	0 1 7								
ACTING DEPARTMENT	0 0 10 0 20 0 30 0 3 80 0 1 10 0 1 20 0 1 30 0 1 40 0 1 50 0 1 60 0 1 7																
N3 NSGE																	

(PAGE 1 OF _____)			
CON			
TOR	07/2355		
SSN			
SGN			

DTG

070908 JUN 7

(WHEN FILLED IN)

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

DOC. 89 EX 48-LIBERTY

675

1972

Liberty

KRO 105

MC

Capt Ruish told of delays he has 3 hrs 27 11

27 Hours to Receive Priority

NNNNVV KXC284TX OVV B2M926VV KCB701C?
PP RUQKRG
DE RUQKRG 1978 1582052
ZNY CCCCC
P 062000Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO AIG TWO FOUR ZERO--TO MRO-LONDON--INFO USCOMEASTLANT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHS/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERV RON EIGHT

RUFPBK USCINCEUR
RUQKRG/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUQKRG/NSAEUR
RUQKRG/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIHS/NFOIO
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRE/COMFAIRMED
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQPA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (Cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009032/134
on 21 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
LIBERTY AGTR-5, REF 021330Z9 011 10//

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 062000Z8 LIBERTY AGTR-5, 11//
ORG SO LIBERTY AFTR-5, 11//
CHG CHP 070001Z8 COMSIXTHFLT, 12//
CFN 062000Z8, 070001Z8, 13//END
GP-4
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

PAGE 1 OF	
CON	
TOR	07/23/67
SSN	
SEN	

062000Z JUN 67
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	DRAFTED BY <i>[Signature]</i> CDR FULLINWIDER	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
3 JUNE 1967	T-1	ACTION				XX	
	PHONE EXT. NO. 263	INFO				XX	

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

**PROOF
READER**

CGWPO

GWO

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of **EXNAV MINS SUCOR 032/B**)

on 29 Jun 76 ORKmin 8 21 Jun 76

(Date)

(Signature: _____)

{Karuk

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

A. MY 311750Z MAY 67 PASEP (MOVORD)

B. MY 011305Z JUN 67 PASEP(MOVORD-CH. ONE)

C. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTAL (SKED)

D. USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY

1. USS LIBERTY, (AGTR 5) WILL BE CONDUCTING EXTENDED INDEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN MED IAW REFS A THRU C. ADDEES MAY BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OR OTHER ASSISTANCE DURING THESE OPERATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT LIBERTY WILL MAKE SHORT PORT VISITS IN THE EASTERN MED AT 3 TO 4 WEEK INTERVALS ALTHOUGH HER ENDURANCE EXTENDS WELL BEYOND THIS TIME.

2. LIBERTY HAS RECEIVED A MED PUB^{lication} PACKAGE LESS THE

ORIGINATOR SECTION	N314	CINCUSNAVEUR	X X X X X X X K X	O O O I N N N N N N N I C S D O O 0 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T E O					
ACTION DEPARTMENT	N3		O O O O O O O A A A I 2 3 B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I D O		NCU				
			X X X X X		L O N G O N				

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1046		
SGN			

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

0310 16, JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

677 1074

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. REFERENCE TO THIS LIST SHOULD ASSIST IN REACHING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING SHOULD ADDRESSEES BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LIBERTY.

A. COMSIXTHFLT INST: 5370.1A, 5720.6A, 5840.1, 6000.1, 05510.2

B. COMSERVFOR SIXTHFLT INST: 4000.1G, 03180.1A

3. REQUEST COMSIXTHFLT PROVIDE COPIES OF THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS TO LIBERTY BY MAIL.

GP-4

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAV Memo 031000 32/B1
on 24 Jun 76. [Signature] 21 Jun 76

(Name) Signature (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SSN: 1046
DTG: 031016Z JUN 67

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

NAVEUR.NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

678

1075

679 1276

Liberty (AGI)

2 JUN 67 13 33

mc/cc

NNNNCZCKDA538ZCMGA048
OO RUDLKD
DE RUTKC 101A 153113Z
ZNY CCCCC JUN 67
O 021132Z
FM USS LIBE
TY
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUFPPBK/USCINCEUR
RUEPJS/JCS

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (Cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of SPNAVJAGS 009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPCR/IRNSA
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUSDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUCIHS/DIRNAVSEFGRU
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIHS/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPPBK/NSAEUR
RUFRR/COMFAIRMED
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUTKRE/CTF SIXTY
RUFRR/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIHS/NFOIO

PAGE TWO RUTKC 101A C [REDACTED] A L
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CICCLANT
BT

C [REDACTED]
JCS FOR JRC - CINCLANT FOR JRC
RFS (U)

- A. YOUR 011305Z JUN 67.
1. TEMPORARY REPAIRS MADE TO TRSSCOMM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. SYSTEM
CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL.
2. RFS AT 021230Z. WILL DEPART ROTA AT THAT TIME AND PROCEED
BEST SPEED IAW REF A. MOVREP SEPARATE.
GP-4
BT

021330Z

ORIGINATOR SECTION	C I N C U S N A V E U R	0 0 1	0 0 2	0 0 3	0 0 4	0 0 5	0 0 6	0 0 7	0 0 8	0 0 9	0 1 0	0 1 1	0 1 2	0 1 3	0 1 4	0 1 5	0 1 6	0 1 7	C I T E	S D O
ACTION DEPARTMENT		0 0 1	0 0 2	0 0 3	0 0 4	0 0 5	0 0 6	0 0 7	0 0 8	0 0 9	0 1 0	0 1 1	0 1 2	0 1 3	0 1 4	0 1 5	0 1 6	0 1 7	A 1 4	A 1 0

PAGE 1 OF	
CON	
TOR	1399947
SSN	
SEN	

021132Z
3 [REDACTED]
(WHEN FILLED IN)

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY 		DRAFTED BY 		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
		CDR D.B. MEEK		ACTION			PPF		
1 JUL 67	T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 454		INFO			PPF		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: **U.S. LIBERTY**

INFO:

USINCEUR//JCS FOR JRC//CNO//DIRNSA//COMSIXTHFLT//CINCLANTFLT//
DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRUEUR//AST DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRULANT//
NSAEUR//COMFAIRMED//COMSERVLANT//COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//
CTF SIX FOUR//NFOIO//NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//CINCLANT FOR JRC//

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ S-5

- A. CINCINNATI 311750Z MAY 67
B. CINCINNATI 011305Z JUN 67
C. JCS 011545Z JUN 67

1. WHEN REF TWO JUNE DEPART ROTA, SPAIN AND PROCEED IAW REF: C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1994年12月

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) CONFIDENTIAL
) By Authority of OPNAV/MC/SECDEF/DSE/TS
 301-7-101

on 29 Jun 76. U.S. grain 8 2/3 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) JAG & Co.

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 94 Ex 48-LIBERTY

**FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY**

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF
READER

CGWPO

CWO _____

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNA YEUR												NCU LONDON					
N3	X	X	X		X		X				X							
	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	CITE	S	D					
ACTION DEPARTMENT	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
N3					X						X							

(PAGE 1 OF _____)			
CON			
TOR			
SSN	1021		
SEN			

DTG 020711 204 07

(WHEN FILLED IN)

68/678

TOE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IAW TECH SPECS ISSUED SEPARATELY. OPAREAS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE PROVIDED. UNQUOTE.

C. ADD NEW PARAGRAPH SIX. QUOTE. 6. REPORTS.

- A. CONTACT REPORTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IAW REF H.
- B. SUBMIT CLASSIFIED SITREP AND POSIT REPORT AS OF 2400Z DAILY. USE PRIORITY PRECEDENCE UNLESS CONTENT WARRANTS INCREASED SPEED. INCLUDE PIM POR NEXT 24 HOURS AND COMMENTS/STATUS AS APPROPRIATE. ADDRESS ACTION CINCUSNAVEUR, INFO ADDEES SAME AS THIS MESSAGE. UNQUOTE.

GP-3

011305Z JUNE 67

1092

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) changed to
by authority of OPNAV Memo Sec 001052/T31
on 29 June 76 DR [signature] 21 Jun 76
(Date) Signature (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE 2 OF 2

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

77

683
1080

123

CONFIDENTIAL

Doc. 96 Ex 48 LIBERTY 684

108

NNNNCZCKDA298ZCMGA872
OO RUDLKD
DE RUIPL 304 1521298;C
ZNY COCC

U 010712Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
INFORUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RSRDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT

RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUFPMK/USCINCEUR
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
PIM

1. 3500 POSIT 36-30 NORTH 06-46 WEST
PIM 055 16 KT. ETA ROTA
010845Z. THIS IS FINAL REPORT UNTIL DEPARTURE FROM
ROTA.
2. NEW SUBJ: WILL CHOP WITHOUT REPORT TO
CINCUSNAVEUR AT 010900Z. WILL REMAIN ROTA AWAITING
FURTHER
ORDERS.

GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAVINST 5000.103
on 29 Jun 76 DR/Jan 76 9 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X																
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR	0	0	0	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	
		0	0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
N3	CINCUSNAVEUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		X															

(PAGE 1 OF)			
CON			
TOR			
SSN	00101131		
SGN	RB		

DTG 010712 JUN 52

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 97 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

685
1082

00 RUDLKD ✓
DE RUFPPBK 011 1520430
ZNY SSSSS

FM USCINCEUR

~~TO RUEBKD/CINCUSNAVEUR~~

INFO RUEPJS/JCS

RUEP:3/DIRNSA

RUC 100A/DIRNAVSECGRU

~~RUDLKE/DIRNAVSECGREUR~~

ZEN/HQ NSAEUR

RUDAC/USS LIBERTY

BT

~~SECRET~~ ECJC/JRC 08686. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-31 AND 32.
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (DD)

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REF A. JCS 6714, 010309Z MAY 67

B. DIRNSA K12/596; -312213Z MAY 67

1. (S) PER REF A, REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD USS LIBERTY AT
ROTA PENDING ARRIVAL OF THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL BEING PROVIDED
BY DIRNAVSECGRU ACTION, AS OUTLINED REF B.

2. (S) REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HQ WHEN PERSONNEL ARE ABOARD AND SHIP'S PLANNED DEPARTURE TIME. GP-4

31

DO NOT SAIL UNTIL DIRECTED OTHERWISE
Modified per Vocam from CINCINNATI

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Classification: (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPAW memo Ser 00 90 32/T31

on 24 Jun 76. DR Spain of 21 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR	X	X	X									X	
		00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CITE	S DO	
ACTION DEPARTMENT		001	002	003	0038	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A114	A DO
N3														
NSGE					X									

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON			
TOR	06/8/01		
SSN			
SGN			

③ φ10419 10544-67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 98 Ex 48 - Limer;

686

1073

NNNNVV KXC108ZCDKA015

00 RUDLKD
DE RUEPJS 07C 1520326
ZNY EEEEE
O 010309Z MAY 67 ZFF3
FM JCS
TO RUFPPBK/USCCNCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

INFORM ME WHEN THIS MESSAGE
IS RECEIVED BY ALL ADDRESSEES
ANS BY 168

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUFMAS/NSAEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTIFLT
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
BT

UNCLAS E F T O 6714 J3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD THE USS LIBERTY AT
ROTA, SPAIN UNTIL DIRECTED OTHERWISE.

BT

mdsdf

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON	
TOR	0634/d
SSN	
SEN	

010309Z MAY 67

UNCLASSIFIED

687 1084

VV KXC027ZCDKA009VV TVB004
 00 RUDLKD
 DE RUF PBK 002 1520115
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 010035Z JUN 67
 FM USCINCEUR
 TO RUEPJS/JCS
 RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
 INFO RUDAC/USS LIBERTY
 RUEPWS/DIRNSA
 ZEN/NSAEUR
 BT

~~SECRET~~ ECJC/JRC 08685. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-32 AND
 N-31. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
 REF A: USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
 B: CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67
 1. (S) FOR JCS. REF A STATES THAT USS LIBERTY EXPECTS TO BE RFS
 011400Z JUN 67 FROM ROTA. INTEND SHIP PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRAN
 EAN WHEN READY AS OUTLINED REF B. AWAITING YOU GUIDANCE WITH
 RESPECT TO SCHEDULE, OPERATING AREA AND ANY SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
 2. (C) FOR USNAVEUR. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE LOGISTIK REQUIREMENTS
 AND ARRANGE FOR LIAISON OFFICER TO MEET USS LIBERTY WITH DOCUMENTS
 AS REQUESTED REF A. SCHEDULE AND OPERATING AREAS WILL BE PROVIDED
ASAP. FURTHER REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH REPORTING PROCEDURE TO INSURE

Report Action OK

PAGE TWO RUF PBK 002 ~~SECRET~~
 SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS LIBERTY ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 0430Z
 DAILY, AND THAT ANY INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED ASAP IAW CURRENT
 RECONNAISSANCE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. GP-4.
 BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of *OPNAV/MEM 001032783*
 on *29 Jun 76* *DR Spair* *24 Jun 76*
 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X X X X X X X													
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12
		NCU LONDON												

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON	
TOR	
SSN	01/03007
SGN	18

DTG *000035* JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Doc 100 Ex 48 LIBERTY

688 1085

DOC. 101 EX 48 - LIBERTY

30,000 00 00

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY CHOP (U)

A. JCS 291602Z MAY 67

B. COMSERVRON EIGHT 240020Z MAY 67

1. IAW REF A DIRECT LIBERTY CHOP USCINCEUR ON ARRIVAL
ROTA FOR OPS PER REF B.

D2. ENSURE CINCLANT JRC AND CINCLANTFLT KEPT INFORMED
LIBERTY MOVEMENTS.

GP-4

53

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of: OPNAV Memo Ser 009D3/T31

on 29 Jun 76 RR 6/11 9 21 Jun 76

(Date) JAG Sec. Comd (Rank)

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	C I N C U S N A V E U R	X	X	X	X		X	C I T E	S O O	NCU								
		O O	O 1	O 2	N 1	N 2	N 3							N 4	N 5	N 6	N 7	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	N3 NSOE	O O 1	O O 2	O O 3	O O 3 B	O 1 1	O 1 2	O 1 3	O 1 4	O 1 5	O 1 6	O 1 7	A 1 4	A D O				
						X				X								

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
TON	0800/30		
SSH			
SEN	FL		

DTG 300040 Z MA 21

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 103 Ex 48 LIBERTY


69

688

CP 291602Z MAY 67 ZFFI
FM JCS
TO RUEENKA/CINCLANT
RUEPDR/USCINCEUR
INFO RUEHAAA/CNO
RUEENKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEHKO/CINCSNAVEUR
RUEENKA/COMSERVANT
RUEPAC/COMSIXFLT
RUEENKA/COMSERVON 3
GUEHBA/USC LIBERTY
RUEHKO/IRNSA
RUEHKO/IRNAVSECGRU
RUEHBA/ASD INAVSECGRU
RUEHKO/IRNAVSECGRU
RUEHKO/IRNAVSECGRU

Downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED
by DTCS
10N6176

[REDACTED] CSC499 J3 SENDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
1. ((C)) FOR CINCLANT: UPON PASSING NEAR BUOY INBOUND
NOTE 07A 01 MAY REQUEST CHOP LITERATURE OPCCN USCINCEUR.
2. ((C)) FOR USCINCEUR: UPON ASSUMING OPCCN REQUEST
LINE PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT EASTERN MCD.
WILL PASS SKED ASAP. GPA



FLAG ACT.....
TFR/ 291952Z MAY 67 HR 21/29 CWO.....
29 16 02Z MAY 67
CITE LOGGED

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Doc 104 Ex 48 LIBERTY



TV KRO040NCZCKDA424ZCEGC088

PP: RUDLKDA

DE RUEDSLA3515 1501925

ZNY CCCCC

P 301925Z MAY 67 - TIC

FM MRC NORVA

TO RUDLKDA/MRO LONDON

P 291300Z MAY 67 - ORIG

FM USS LIBERTY

TO AIG SEVEN EIGHT - N/A

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

RUEPJS/JCS

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT

RUEDNKA/COMSERVRON EIGHT

RUQPN/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA

RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE

RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS PASS TO JRC CINCLANT PASS TO JRC

CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 291300Z5 LIBERTY AGTR-5, REF

240800Z4 011 07//

ORG SP LIBERTY AGTR-5, 08//

POS LIMA 22-13N 8017-01W9, 291200Z4CO 015. 0K6 09//

ETA P ROTA SPAIN, 010900Z0 10//

CFN 291300Z5, 240800Z4, 011, 22-13N 8, 017-01W9, 291200Z4,

015. 0K6, 010900Z0, 11//END

GP-4

BT

READ: SSN 11010/DJ/W2/31MAY67/MRO

R 310501Z MAY 67

FM MRO LONDON

INFO COMICEDEFOR

USCOM EASTLANT.....

CINCHOMEFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR.....

COMSIXTHFLT

CTF 64

CTF 69

NAF NAPLES

NAVCOMMSTA (CALS) SPAIN

NAVSUPPACT NAPLES

COMNAVACTS SPAIN

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to

) by authority of OPNAVJAGS 009032/131

on 29 Jun 76 JAG Sec 1

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCLANTFLT											
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

(PAGE 1 OF)			
CON			
TOR			
SSN	31/0500/13		
SEN	13		

DTG 291300 2 MAY 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 105 Ex 48 LIBRARY

693 690

NNNNCZCKDB897ZCEGB577
 PP RUDLKD
 DE RUEDNKA1454 1451450
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 251355Z MAY 67
 FM COMSERVLANT
 TO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
 INFO RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
 RUEDNKA/CINCUSNAVEUR
 RUTPRE/COMSERFOR SIXTHFLT
 RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
 RUQPNA/KSS LIBERTY
 RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
 BT

Mel SDD Liberty

UNCLAS E F T O
 MED PUBS
 A. USS LIBERTY 241732Z MAY 67
 DELIVERY QUESTIONABLE IF FORWARDED BY COMSERVLANT. THEREFORE REQ
 YOU TAKE PARA 2 REF A FOR ACTION.
 BT

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION	REF XXX XXX												
ACTION DEPARTMENT	N3 CINCUSNAVEUR												
	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013
	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON	
TOR	
SSN	25/18351
SGN	DJ

DTG 25/355 MAY 67

UNCLASSIFIED

00 ~~RULDKD~~

ZNY EEEEE ZFH-1

CZC CSB4 37ZC CSB257

ZCXCSB257

00 RUCDBM RUCIHS RUDLKA RUEDNKA RUENAAA RUFPBNA RUTKC RUTPRC

ZNY EEEEE ZFH-1

CZC CSB4 32Z CDKA074

ZCDKA074

OO RUCDBM RUCIHS RUDLKD RUEDNKA RUEDNWFS RUENAAA RUFPBNA RUTC
RUTPRC

DE RUD.KMD 3264 1450804

ZNY EEEEE

0 250805Z MAY 67

FM ALUSNA MADRID

TO RUEDNWFS/CINCLANTFLT

INFO RUE NAAA/CNO

RUCDBM/DIRNSA

RUCI HSA/DIR.NAVSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

RUCIHA/ASST DI NAVSECGRU

~~RUC~~LD/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTP:CR/COMSIXTHFLT

RUFP.BNA/DIRNAVSE CGRUEUR

RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROAT

RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA

ZEN/CHJUSMG SPAIN

RUTKC/PORT SERVOFF ROTA

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

YOUR 241922Z

1. REF A. ACKNOWLEDGED AND DIPL CLNC GRANTED.

BT

[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF _____)			
CON			
TOR	0845/25		
SSN			
SEN			12

NO. 250805 2 11/62

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc. 107 / Ex 48 Liberty
695 692

00 RUDEKMD
DE RUEDNKA1344 144T921
ZNY CCCCC
O 241922Z MAY 67
NM CINCLANTFLT
TO RUDKMD/ALUSNA MADRID
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

NM CINCLANTFLT

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

RUCDBM/DIRNSA

RUED NKA/DIRNAVSE CGRULANT

~~RUDLKD~~/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA

RUDKMD/CHJUSMG SPAIN

RUTKC/PORT SERV OFF ROTA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PORT VISIT

1. REQUEST ARRANGE FOLLOWING VISIT:

A. ROTA, SPAIN

B. OPERATIONAL

C. USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

D. NON-SALUTING

1. CDR W L MCGONAGLE, USN

F. 19 OFF/295 ENL

G, ARR 31 MAY, DEP DATE TO BE DETERMINED

PAGE TWO RUEDNKA1344 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

H. LENGTH 455 FT, DRAFT 24 FT

2. REGRET LATE NOTIFICATION, REQUEST/ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-4

BT

Classification (cancelled) (~~Changed to~~

by authority of ORIGINAL FILE No. 00902/T3

on 29 Jun 76 OR Spair 9:21 Jun 76

(Date) _____ (Signature) _____ (Rank) _____

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

[illegible]

CON			
TOR			
SSN	29/2003-		
SGN			13

DTG 29/22 2 MAY 0

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 108 Ex 48 LIBERTY
696

103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NNNNCZCKDB590ZCYGC274

PP RUD

KD

DE RUCIJUA 800.1450245

ZNY CCCCC

P 241732Z MAY 67

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUEDSPA/COMSERVR

N EIGHT

INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUENAAA/CNO

RUEPJS/JCS/JRC

RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

RUEPWS/DIRNSA

RUCIUSA/DIRNAVSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

RUCIUSA/SSDIRNAVSECGRU

RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA

RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA

BT

RUCIJUA 800.1450245

A. YOUR 240020Z MAY 67

1. DEPARTED ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST 240530Z MAY. SOA 15 KTS. ETA ROTA 312000Z MAY. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS WILL BE NECESSARY TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PERS AND REFUEL. THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSANDS GALLONS NSFO WILL BE REQUIRED. ETA OPAREA OFF PORT SAID 061400Z JUN 67. REF A PERTAINS

2. DO NOT HOLD ANY COMSIXTHFLT INSTRUCTIONS/OPLANS/OPORDERS/TAPV NOTES/ETC. IF ANY WILL BE REQUIRED REQUEST ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO HAVE THEM DELIVERED ON ARRIVAL ROTA.

3. UNODIR WILL INCLUDE FOLLOWING COMMANDS AS INFO ADDEES ON DAILY PIM REPORT AFTER ENTRY INTO MEDITERRANEAN: CINCUSNAVEUR/COMSIXTHFLT/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR.

GP-4

BT

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of CPNPA MEMO 079052/T31
on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain 821 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR												NCU LONDON			
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2

(PAGE 1 OF)	
CON	
TOR	0352/25
SSN	
SGN	

070 241732 2 MAY 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

VEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 109 Ex 48 LIBERTY

697 1094

*NNNCZCKDA585ZCGGA355
 00 RUDLKD
 DE RUEDSPA3804 1440019
 ZNY CCCCC
 0 240020Z MAY 67
 FM COMSERVRON EIGHT
 TO RUTPH/USS LIBERTY
 INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVTANT
 RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
 RUE NAAA/CNO
 RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
 RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/DRC
 RUEPCR/DIRNSA
 RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRU
 RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
 RUCIHS/ASST DIRNAVSECGRU
 RUDLKD/CINCSSNAVEUR
 RUTKC/COMSIXTHFLT
 RUCIHS/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
 RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
 RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
 BT

mcl/sq

Liberty

Passed to USCINCEUR

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
 by authority of *OPNAV MEMO IN 009 D32/TS/*
 on *29 June 76* *8 21 Jun 76*
 (Date) *JAG Sec Cont* (Rank)
 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 A. MY 281502Z APR 67

PAGE TWO RUEDSPA3804 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- MOVEORD CHANOE
1. CANCEL PARAS BQ AND 2 REFERENCE A.
 2. MAKE IMMEDIATE PREPARATIONS TO GET UNDERWAY. WHEN RFS ASAP DEP RT ABIDJAN AND PROCEED BEST POSS SOA TO ROTA SPAIN TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIALBXPE
 3. WHEN RFS PROCEED TO OP AREA OFF PORT SAID. SPECIFIC AREAS WILL FOLLOW.
 3. REMAINDER REF A UNCHANGED.
- GP-1
BT

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X X X X X X X X X X X X X												
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCSNAVEUR 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012												
<i>N3</i>	001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013												
	001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013												

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON	
TOR	<i>0318/24</i>
SSN	
SGN	

240020Z MAY 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 110 EX 48-LIBERTY

698

1005

PAGE TWO RUTKC 048A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO

RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR

RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE

RUQPN/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS PASS TO JRC

CINCLANT PASS TO JRC

CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 021330Z9 LIBERTY AGTR-5, PQXX

DRG SP LIBERTY AGTR-5, 02//

ETD P ROTA SPAIN, 021330Z9 CO 015.0K6 03//

JIA L 35-57N0 005-35W3, 021730Z3 CO 015.0K6 04//

JIA L 37-00N0 012-00E3, 050330Z1 RH 015.0K6 05//

ETA L 32-00N5 033-00E6, 080300Z1 06//

MOD IND 32-00N 1033-30E9 080300Z1 50 MILE RADIUS-SPECOPS, CINCUSNAVEUR

311750Z7, 07//

ICT C 3 BG KILO/ROMEO TANGO TANGO, LIBERTY, 070001Z8 JULIETT ROMEO TANGO

TANGO, LIBERTY, 08//

CFN 021330Z9, 021330Z9, 015.0K6, ETATUN0, 005-35W3, 021730Z3, 015.0K6,

PAGE THREE RUTJC 048A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

07-00N0, 012-00E3, 050330Z1, 015.0K6, 32-00N5, 033-00E6, 080300Z1,

02-00N5, 033-30E9, 080300Z1, 311750Z7, 070001Z8, 09//END

P-4

T

Page 2 of 2 021330Z Jun 67

DECLASSIFIED

[Handwritten mark resembling a large 'X' or 'H']

Classification (changed) changed to
by authority of OPNAV Memo Sec 100-232/13
on 21 Jun 76 ARK/ps 21 Jun 76

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
NAVY

699 1n96

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) **NAVAL MESSAGE**

RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	DRAFTED BY <i>[Signature]</i> FOR FULLWIDER	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
31 MAY 67	T-1	ACTION		00			
	PHONE EXT. NO. 377	INFO				RR	

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR
 TO: USS LIBERTY
 INFO: READD: SN 1089/DJH/W3/01 JUN 67/N314
 R 011256Z JUN 67
 FM: CINCUSNAVEUR
 INFO: CINCLANT FOR JRC

FOR COMMUNICATION
USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____
 PROOF READER _____
 CCWFO _____
 CWO _____

USCINCEUR//JCS FOR JRC//CNO//DIRNSA//COMSIXTHFLT//
 CINCLANTFLT//DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRUEUR//
 ASDIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRULANT//NSAEUR//COMFAIRMED
 COMSERVLANT//COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//CTF SIX FOUR
 NFOIO//NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//

CONFIDENTIAL READD: SSN 1031/DJH/W3/03 JUN 67/N314
 R 030939Z JUN 67
 FM: CINCUSNAVEUR
 INFO: COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT

- A. USCINCEUR 300932Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- B. COMSERVRON EIGHT 240020Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- C. CINCUSNAVEUR 311351Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- D. CINCUSNAVEUR OFORD 50-66 NOTAL
- E. CINCUSNAVEURINST 4235.2D NOTAL
- F. CINCUSNAVEUR/USCOMEASTLANTINST (COMMOPLAN) NOTAL
- G. NAVEUROPREP MANUAL OF 1 JUN 66 NOTAL

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to 1 by authority of *[Signature]* on 29 Jun 76 *[Signature]* 2 Jun 76
 02000, 1B *[Signature]* (Rank)
 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CINCUSNAVEURINST 403120, 5B NOTAL

ORIGINATOR SECTION N314	ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR	CINCLANTFLT	DIRNAVSECGRU	DIRNAVSECGRUEUR	ASDIRNAVSECGRU	DIRNAVSECGRULANT	NSAEUR	COMFAIRMED	COMSERVLANT	COMSERVRON EIGHT	CTF SIXTY	CTF SIX FOUR	NFOIO	NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

CON	TOR	SSN	SGN
	1194		

DTG 311750 2 MAY 67

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)
 Doc 111 Ex 48-41222

700 1097

TYPE WITH MARGIN ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. UPON DROP TO CINCPACNAVEUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, ENTER AREA FOR FUEL AND LOADING TECHNICAL/LOGISTICAL SUPPORT MATERIAL SPECIFIED REF B.
2. UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING; (AFTER RECEIPT OF NAVER/SIXTHFLT MED PUBS BEING DELIVERED BY CARRIER, REF C); AND WHEN RFS ABOUT 1 JUNE; DEPART AREA AND PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IAW REF D SECS ISSUED SEPARATELY.
3. REMAIN IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS DURING TRANSIT AND OPERATIONS. YOUR ATTENTION DIRECTED APPENDIX VIII, ANNEX D, REF D FOR CLAIMED MED TERRITORIAL SEAS.
4. LOGISTICS IAW REF E.
5. COMMUNICATIONS IAW REF F.

SSH 1194
311750/may 67

~~OPERATIONAL REPORTS IAW REFS G AND H.~~

~~B. COMBAT REPORTING AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT~~

~~IAW REF I.~~

~~C. WHILE ENROUTE SUBMIT DAILY CLASSIFIED 0800~~

~~STATUS AND POST-REPORTS TO ORIGINATOR, INFORMATION TO~~

~~COMBANT, COMINT, COMINT, COMINT, CTF 64, CTF 64,~~

~~DIEMAVSECGRU, CMC, JCS FOR JRC, PIRNSA, CINCLANT~~

~~FOR JRC, CINCPACFLT, DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU,~~

~~DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU,~~

~~DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU,~~

~~DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU, 1ST DIEMAVSECGRU,~~

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)

by authority of OPNAVJAG

on 29 Jun 76 DR 6701 009032/13

(Date)

(Signature)

(Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

DECLASSIFIED

761 100P

Photo 1 of Ex 49 - Library

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



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PHOTO 49 EX 49-610000




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




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
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
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
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
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PHOTO II OF EX 49 - LIBERTY



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


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PHOTO 13 OF EX 49 - LIBERTY

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PHOTO 14 OF EX 44-LIBERTY



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


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
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PHOTO 12 OF EX 49-LIMBAY



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PHOTO 18 OF EX 49 - LIBRARY



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PHOTO 19 OF EX 49 - LIBERTY


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
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
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



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PHOTO 27 OF EX 49 - LIAISON



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



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PHOTO 29 OF EX 49 - C10547



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